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      This thesis employs Critical Rationalism—an inter-subjective theory of rationality 
originated in Karl Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge— in order to develop a 
new macrosociology of globalisation. It describes contemporary globalisation as the 
formation of a liberal globality through which the centrality of the Hobbesian struggle 
for political power has been superseded with the Lockean competition for economic 
interests. But the thesis argues that liberal globalisation suffers from fundamental 
societal deficits due to a global organisation of people based on economic competition 
rather than rational dialogue and social cooperation. The central question of thesis 
therefore is that ‘how emerging utilitarian-based liberal globality can be transformed 
into a global society of free and equal citizens?’ The thesis argues that people’s 
potential access to critical rationality enables them to agree upon one set of globally 
shared values concerning the equality of people and people-centric global institutions, 
which are required for creating a global society of free and equal citizens. Through its 
macrosociological analysis the thesis addresses the question of how such a system of 
globally shared values can operate as the cultural driving force of a radical global 
institutional change from the Lockean logic of economic competition to the Kantian 
logic of dialogue and social cooperation. The thesis concludes that intellectuals can 
employ the ideal-type of an open global society of free and equal persons in order to 
persuade global social movements to work for realising such a fundamental global 
institutional change towards a just and free global society.   
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Principal Argument and Thesis Structure 
 
       
     Globalisation has grown to be a popular subject of study and research in the social 
sciences. Due to the proliferation of inquiries into globalisation, there are different 
conceptions and analyses of globalisation process. This thesis aims to introduce a 
macrosociological analysis of globalisation as one set of entwining cultural, political 
and economic learning processes. As an introduction to the thesis, chapter 1 begins 
with globalisation as a ‘macro-sociological problem’ that is viewed in the context of 
societal deficits of contemporary globalisation. It then introduces the thesis’ principal 
argument. The thesis structure will be outlined in the final section of this chapter.  
1.1 Introduction: Globalisation as a Macro-Sociological Problem      
      The perspective I develop in this thesis suggests that contemporary globalisation is 
a global institutional change: a qualitative shift in the logic of global ordering of 
human societies from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition 
for economic interests, which is affecting people’s lives around the globe in positive 
and negative ways. However, this liberal form of global institutional shift suffers from 
fundamental societal deficits because it aims to replace Hobbesian power politics with 
a Lockean economic rivalry, as opposed to a Kantian rational dialogue. While 
globalisation has partly transformed the anarchical context of the Cold War world 
order, it has not yet radically changed this context through its liberal logic. Not all 
global social disorders can be attributed to liberal from of globality, but paradoxically 
it has contributed to both global crises and global progress.
1
  
                                                 
1
 Regarding the paradoxical nature of contemporary globalisation see: Lourdes Beneria, "Response: 
The Dynamics of Globalisation," International Labor and Working-Class History, (47) (1995), p.50. 
  2 
      The following three major points of evidence of global societal deficits urge us to 
rethink how contemporary globalisation affects both people’s misery and prosperity. 
However, a more fundamental question is, ‘can the utilitarian (economic) logic of 
contemporary globalisation be replaced by the cultural logic of a rational dialogue 
among world civilisations?’  
      Viewed as a type of global cultural deficit, global liberalism is unable to 
successfully reorganise national societies in a wider global order whilst respecting 
their cultural diversity. In the emerging transnational world order, powerful societies 
still impose their cultural identities upon powerless societies. Apart from the 
immorality of such a cultural hegemony, it has led to global cultural resistance, 
sometimes with a highly violent nature. The events of 11 September 2001 were an 
indication of Islamic extremists’ reaction to an illegitimate presence of the West, 
specifically Americans, in their Islamic homelands. If our post-national world order 
suffers from a clash of civilisations, one of its major causes is the imposition of a 
liberal model of globality upon the whole world without prior consensus.
2
 
     As a global political deficit, the emerging global governance still remains too 
unaccountable to the world’s population. Powerful societies still manage global 
politics and destroy the public sovereignty of powerless peoples by their political and 
military interventions. The emergence of global governance has not prevented wars 
and other forms of violence. The American invasion of Iraq was just one of the recent 
expressions of such interventions. Hence, liberal global governance does not 
fundamentally change the anarchical context of the Cold War political order, because 
it has not created an accountable governance to prospective global citizens. 
     As a global economic deficit, liberal globalisation mixes this unaccountable global 
governance with an oligopolistic world economy in which opportunities and resources 
are allocated highly unequall. This is because powerful economies impose their 
unjustly economic regulations upon the global market. In a highly unjust division of 
labour in emerging ‘transnational’ world economy, it is no surprise that weaker 
economies lose their share in the global product and suffer from poverty due to this 
oligopolistic model of economic globalisation. In a world economy in which roughly 
44 percent of the world's population lives below the two dollars per day international 
                                                 
2
 See Robert W. Cox, "Civilisations and the Twenty-first Century," in Globalisation and Civilisations, 
(ed.) Mehdi Mozaffari, (London and New York, Routledge: 2002), p.4. 
  3 
poverty line, who consume only 1.3 percent of global products, the poor peoples 
would need just 1 percent more of the global product to escape poverty, as defined 
above.
3
 The highly uneven distribution of welfare and the resulting poverty gap 
between the Global North and the Global South is the outcome of an unjust global 
division of labour that has been reinforced by oligopolistic economic globalisation.
4
  
     Not all global social disorders can be assigned to contemporary globalisation, 
because power politics has been established long before contemporary globalisation. 
However, global liberalism reshapes power politics in its economic form: i.e. the 
struggle for economic power. Nevertheless, globalisation should not be viewed an 
entirely negative phenomenon. In its cultural dimension, the emergence of global 
liberalism—despite its hegemonic nature—has globalised the culture of liberty and 
the rule of law. In its political aspect, the end of the superpower bipolarity and the 
emergence of multi-centric global governance have to some extent civilised global 
governance by prioritising economic competition over political clashes. In its 
economic aspect, globalisation has encouraged many national economies to open their 
markets to the world economy, thereby accelerating global economic growth with 
some positive externalities for less developed and developing countries.
5
   
     Viewed from an ideal type of global society, however, contemporary globalisation 
is far removed from a global society of free and equal citizens. Its liberal logic leads 
to a reorganistion of national societies into a multi-centric world order through 
encouraging a global competition for economic interests. But, this global competition 
does not lead national societies to a global society of free and equal citizens. In 
contrast, it actually operates as a quasi--global liberal empire that is unaccountable to 
the world population.
6
 Against this background, a central normative question for 
Globalisation Studies is how liberal globality could be altered into such a global 
society of free and equal citizens, which respects people’s cultural diversity, political 
sovereignty, and equal right to enjoy from a decent life.  
                                                 
3
 Thomas Pogge, "World Poverty and Human Rights," Ethics and International Affairs, 19 (1) (2005), 
p.1. 
4
 See D. Dollar, "Globalization, Poverty and Inequality," Globalization: What's New?, (ed.) M.M. 
Weinstein (New York, Columbia University Press: 2005), pp.96-128. 
5
 See World Bank, Globalization, growth, and poverty: building an inclusive world economy, (New 
York, Oxford University Press: 2002). 
6
 See Martin Shaw, "Post-Imperial and Quasi-Imperial: State and Empire in the Global Era," 
Millennium, 31 (2002), pp.327-336, and Jedediah Purdy, "Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments," 
Ethics & International Affairs, 17 (2), (2003), pp.35-47.  
  4 
     This thesis attempts to respond to such a normative question. It takes the view that 
moving from liberal globality to a global society of free and equal citizens is a central 
global macro-sociological problem. The thesis’ central question therefore becomes: 
‘how can liberal globality be transformed into a global society of free and equal 
citizens through a rational dialogue among world civilisations?’ 
     There is a substantial literature discussing alternative forms of globality and 
globalisation, the breadth of which makes comprehensive reference is not possible. 
However, we can recognise an important linkage between the idea of world society 
and alternative understandings of globalisation in this literature, which may be called 
a world society tradition in Global Studies. The thesis aims to reinvent the linkage 
between the very conception of globality and the meaning of globalisation by an 
epistemic-institutional approach—what it terms a critical rationalist approach to 
globality and globalisation. It aims to show how an alternative model of globalisation 
can be built based on a new normative conception of globality— i.e. the ideal type of 
an open global society, resting upon the premise of equal access of human beings to 
critical rationality. This alternative model of globality refers to an alternative global 
order as to how it could be, rather than how it is. Recognising the importance of our 
definitions of globality for alternative forms of globalisation, the thesis argues that the 
notion of ‘world’ or ‘global’ society has an important place in current Globalisation 
Studies. While many of those who define globalisation as the formation of a world 
society do not employ a normative ideal type of world society to describe the existing 
forms of globality and globalisation, their notions of world society have affected their 
analyses of globalisation. This key link helps us to create a new relation between a 
new ‘normative account of global society’ and a new ‘normative vision of 
globalsation’ on the basis of people’s equal access to critical rationality.  
     As Barry Buzan argues, for most sociological approaches to world society, the 
concept of world society is used as “an attempt to capture the macro-dimension of 
human social organization as a whole.”7 This account of world society has directly 
affected the analyses of globalisation. For instance, Martin Shaw defines globalisation 
as a process of world society formation because world society “exists through the 
social relations, involved in global commodity production and exchange, through 
                                                 
7
 See Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2004), p.63. 
  5 
global culture and media, and through the increasing development of world politics.”8 
John Burton believes that, “communications, and not power, are the main organizing 
influence in world society.”9 Another sociologist, Nicolas Luhmann, discusses “if 
society exists only as (and through) a conglomerate of systems, and if these systems 
because of their functional definition operate transnationally, society is only possible 
on a world scale--it is world society.”10 The Stanford School (or sometimes ‘world 
polity’) views world society as shared norms, rules and institutions. It puts global 
culture at the centre of its analysis of world society.
11
 For Leslie Sklair, world society 
has become a believable idea only when ‘global’ relations have found a distinctive 
meaning from ‘inter-national’ relations.12       
     The World Society Research Group (WSRG) stresses a holistic and multilevel 
approach to the idea and reality of world society, and puts some emphasis on shared 
culture and values as the essence of a world society. Viewed from a Weberian account 
of society as a rational agreement over mutual adjustments of interests, the WSRG 
regards the world society formation as an incorporation of international system and 
international society into a wider world order i.e. a world society.
13
 Similarly, Dietrich 
Jung’s political sociology of world society discusses that the tension between 
traditional social forms and rational social action is not only a historical divide but an 
ongoing dynamic, shaping a world society of the traditional and modern societies.
14
 In 
a Marxian-inspired sociological approach to world society, Immanuel Wallerstein and 
Christopher Chase-Dunn developed theories of the modern world-system for macro-
sociological analysis of capitalist globalisation. For them, the modern world-system is 
a capitalist mode of production and the hierarchy of classes is structured in the center-
                                                 
8
 Martin Shaw, "Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political 
Limits of International Society", Millennium, 21 (3) (1996), p.55. 
9
 John W. Burton, World Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1972), p.45. 
10
 See Thomas Diez, "Cracks in the System, or Why Would I Need Luhmann to Analyze International 
Relations," Draft Paper for ECPR workshop on Modern Systems Theory and International Society, 
COPRI, (2000), pp.3-4. Also see: Niklas Luhmann, "Globalisation or World Society: How to Conceive 
of Modern Society," International Review of Sociology, 7 (1), pp.67-80. 
11
 See Johan W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the 
Nation States," American Journal of Sociology, 103 (1) (1997), pp.144-181. 
12
 See Leslie Sklair, Globalisation, Capitalism & Its Alternatives, third edition, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 2002), pp.12-28. 
13
 See Mathias Albert, Lother Brock, Klause Dieter Wolf (eds.), Civilizing World Politics. Society and 
Community Beyond the State, (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield: 2000), pp.1-17.  
14
 See Dietrich Jung, "The Political Sociology of World Society," European Journal of International 
Relations, 7 (4) (2001), pp.433-474. 
  6 
periphery formation. The idea of a capitalist world society views the forces of capital 
as the driving power of a long-term historical process of capitalist globalisation.
15
  
     In sum, as Barry Buzan notes, “macro-sociological way of thinking is undeniably 
powerful and attractive.”16 However, such a macro-sociological approach to globality 
and globalisation should not be limited to analyses of the existing forms of globality 
and globalisation. We can also find those normative accounts of globality, which have 
affected an analysis of alternative globalisations. Among normative approaches to the 
idea of world society, Jürgen Habermas’ and Andrew Linklater’s ideas of dialogic 
world society are notable. They employ the notion of communicative rationality to 
discuss the possibility of the emergence of such a global human society.
17
 Inspired by 
such normative accounts of globality and globalisation, this thesis argues for a new 
normative vision of globalisation based on the idea of an open global society.            
     Habermas’and Linklater’s accounts of a dialogic world society have provided us 
with a rich normative analysis of contemporary globalisation and its alternative form, 
as we will see in chapter 3. Nevertheless, these normative analyses can be advanced 
through introducing the ideal type of open global society, which is constructed based 
on the principle of people’s access to critical rationality, what Karl Popper terms as 
Rational Unity of Humankind. The thesis therefore introduces a rationally constructed 
normative ideal type of an open global society as the basis of its critical rationalist 
approaches to globality and globalisation. It dates the philosophical origin of this 
approach to Immanuel Kant’s concept of the universal kingdom of ends. Kant’s strong 
epistemological faith in human reason and its implications for moral equality of 
human beings led him to the ideal of a universal kingdom of ends.
18
  
     The thesis aims to reinvent this Kantian epistemological faith in human reason and 
rational dialogue by reconceptualising the notion of a universal community of ends 
with the idea of open global society, through turning Popper-Bartley’s conjectural 
                                                 
15
 See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy, (Cambridge University Press: 1984), 
and Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation. Structure of the World-economy, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Basil Blackwell:1989) 
16
 Buzan, From International to World Society? (2004), p.77. 
17
 See Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, Political Essays, (trans. and ed.) Max Pensky, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), and Andrew Linklater, "Globalisation and The Transformation of 
Political Community," in John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 2001), pp.509-525.  
18
 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, Hans Reiss (ed.) and H. B. Nisbet (transl.), (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 1970), pp.41-53. Also see: J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.) 
Prepetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitian Ideal, (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press: 1997). 
  7 
theories of knowledge and rationality into critical rationalist models of human action 
and social organisation. However, if at the time of Kant the global conditions were 
not prepared for an active debate about using people’s access to rationality for the 
creation of an open global society; contemporary globalisation has paved the way for 
rethinking the possible creation of a universal community of ends.
19
 In line with the 
macrosociologies of S. N. Eisenstadt, Benjamin Nelson, Donald Nielsen, Björn 
Wittrock, and Jeffery Alexander, the thesis develop a new macrosociology of dialogic 
globalisation that rests upon Critical Rationalism as an analytical model for a rational 
dialogue among world civilisations. 
     Validating George Modelski’s approach to globalisation’s concept,20 the thesis 
introduces globalisation as a global epistemic-institutional change that has paved the 
ways for the emergence of transnational social connectivity. However, the thesis’ 
institutional approach differs from Modelski because it gives a cultural meaning to 
such a global institutional change. Inspired by Wittrock and Alexander,
21
 the thesis 
proposes a new macrosociological analysis of contemporary globalisation through 
exploring the cultural motors of global social changes.
22
 
1.2 Principal Argument      
     The thesis puts forward a main hypothesis for addressing the challenges of 
contemporary liberal globalisation: a rational (open to criticism) dialogue among 
civilisations operates as a cultural mechanism for the creation of certain globally 
shared values that causes a global institutional transformation from the liberal 
globality into an open global society of free and equal citizens. Given the dialogic 
solution of the thesis, the meaning of rational dialogue plays a key role in exploring 
the cultural motor forces of such an institutional change. As Fred Dallmayr argues, 
                                                 
19
 Richard Falk, "Toward Global Parliament," Foreign Affaires, 80 (1) pp.212-220. 
20
 See George Modelski, "Globalisation as Evolutionary Process", in George Modelski, Tessaleno 
Devezas, and William R. Thompson, (eds.), Globalisation as Evolutionary Process, (London, 
Routledge: 2008), pp.11-29. 
21
 See Björn Wittrock, "Social Theory and Global History: The three Cultural Crystallizations," Thesis 
Eleven, 65 (27) (2001), pp.27-50., and Jeffery C. Alexander, The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural 
Sociology, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2003), pp.11-26. 
22
 On the cultural approach to globalisation, see: Mike Featherstone (ed.) Global Culture. Nationalism, 
globalisation and modernity, (London, Sage Publication: 1990); Roland Robertson, Globalisation: 
Social Theory and Global Culture, (London, Sage publication: 1992), and Arjun Appadurai, Modernity 
at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation, (London, Public-World: 1996). 
  8 
understanding the very meaning of dialogue calls for a theory of dialogue.
23
 The 
thesis argues that if dialogue is the most reasonable way of social organisation of 
equal and free persons either on a national or global scale, the main challenge of such 
a dialogic form of globalisation is addressing the possibility of a rational dialogue 
among civilisations. The thesis suggests Critical Rationalism as a sophisticated theory 
of rationality, and employs it to address the meaning of rational dialogue. On the 
basis of this critical rationalist model of inter-civilisational dialogue, the thesis argues 
for the possibility of emerging an inter-civilisational consensus over globally shared 
values regarding the equality of human beings and a people-centric social governance. 
      For Critical Rationalism, the term ‘rational’ means ‘openness to criticism’ or in 
better sense ‘openness to rational criticism’.24 It refers to a method of social learning 
from mutually recognised errors. The thesis thus defines a rational dialogue among 
civilisations as an open dialogue to mutual criticism for achieving certain globally 
shared values. Upon this critical rationalist-conception of rational dialogue, the thesis 
explains the reasons why not only a rational dialogue among civilisations is possible 
but also it is the key cultural mechanism for the formation of the globally shared 
values in order to realise a macro-institutional transformation from liberal globality 
into an open global society of free and equal citizens. It argues that if world 
civilisations take a rational dialogic position to each other, the centrality of 
competition for economic interest can be replaced with rational dialogue and social 
cooperation for mutual interests.   
     Inspired by Mark Amadeus Notturno’s Science and the Open Society,25 the thesis 
categorises three major epistemological doctrines to justify an epistemic possibility of 
rational dialogue among civilisations. These major doctrines are as follows: uncritical 
rationalism (absolutism), critical irrationalism (relativism), and critical rationalism as 
a sophisticated defense of rationalism, located between those extremes. Karl Popper 
has elaborated on Critical Rationalism as an epistemological attitude in defence of a 
sophisticated rather than dogmatic rationalism. He introduces his own account of 
                                                 
23
 For a review of the meaning of ‘dialogue’ and the need for a theory of dialogue see: Fred R. 
Dallmayr, ‘Justice and Cross-Cultural Dialogue: From Theory to Practice’, in Michalis S. Michael and 
Fabio Petito (eds.) Civilisational Dialogue and World Order, (USA, Palgrave: 2009), pp.29-45. 
24
 The term “openness to criticism” is used in this thesis as “openness to a ‘rational’ criticism”-- as 
opposed to openness to any kind of criticism.  
25
 Mark Amadeus Notturno, Science and the Open Society: The Future of Karl Popper’s Philosophy, 
(Hungary, Central European University Press: 2000), pp.xviii-xix. 
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Critical Rationalism through a critique of both absolutism and relativism, regarding 
them as different types of irrationalism. Popper defines Critical Rationalism as “a 
way of thinking, and even a way of life: a readiness to listen to critical arguments, to 
search for one’s own mistakes, and to learn from them. I may be wrong and you may 
be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.”26 The thesis argues that if 
civilisations of peoples say to each other, I may be wrong and you may be right, let us 
discuss to solve our disputes, they can arrive at one set of globally shared values, 
centered on a global ethics of openness to criticism that can form the moral basis of 
global institutions of democracy and justice.  
     The main aim of the thesis is to explain how a critical rationalist ideal-type of 
rational dialogue among world civilisations operates as a cultural driving force of the 
transformation of liberal globality into an open global society via the creation of the 
global ethics of openness to criticism in which people open their own fundamental 
beliefs and values to mutual criticism. It addresses the five major layers of a rational 
dialogue among civilisations, categorising them as: (a) philosophical; (b) moral; (c) 
legal; (d) political, and (e) economic layers. The conception of ‘social learning’ is 
used as an inter-subjective dialogue, and it has defined on the basis of critical 
rationality as an inter-subjective logic of learning from criticism, covering the elite 
and masses. Viewed from Popper’s logic of scientific knowledge discovery, the thesis 
argues that social learning amongst the elite and masses follows a general rule: an 
inter-subjective learning from mutually recognised mistakes. The elite use the general 
rule in its professional sense, whereas the ordinary people use the trial and error 
method in its ordinary account.
27
        
     The thesis argues that if the absolutist epistemology rejects the need for a rational 
dialogue among civilisations, the reason is that it rests on the epistemological premise 
of ‘perfect rationality’. Viewed from such a premise, there is no need or function for a 
rational dialogue among civilisations, because they can claim that their systems of 
rationale and corresponding social institutions are perfect. Thus, their rationality does 
not need improvement brought about by dialogue with others. If the relativist 
epistemology rejects the need for a rational dialogue of civilisations, it is because it 
                                                 
26
  Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (London, Routledge: 1977), pp.231-232. 
27
 For details of this critical rationalist conception of social learning through the mechanism of inter-
subjective learning from mistakes, see: chapter 4. I have conceptualised the ideal type of an open global 
society as a process of global social learning from an inter-subjective criticism. 
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rests on the premise of ‘impossible rationality’. Viewed from such a premise, there is 
no need or function for a rational dialogue of civilisations, because there is not any 
objective criterion for a rational belife on which basis they can learn from each other. 
For this relativist epistemology, civilisations of peoples are in fact incommensurable  
rationale systems, which cannot understand each other, and there is no rational 
criterion, which can form a basis, according to which they can solve their ideational 
and material disputes.  
     However, the thesis argues that if the critical rationalist epistemology defends the 
need for a rational (open to criticism) dialogue among civilisations, the reason is that 
it employs the premise of ‘objective’ but ‘imperfect’ rationality. Viewed from this 
premise, world civilisations need to engage in dialogue with each other because their 
systems of rationale and their patterns of social organisation are imperfect and thus 
need improvement. A rational dialogue of civilisations is possible because their 
competing systems of rationality are partly objective and can be improved through a 
critical dialogue that is open to mutual criticism. Epistemologically speaking, their 
systems of rationality are not incommensurable systems. In this sense, rational 
dialogue is not only possible, but also necessary, if civilisations of peoples want to 
improve their imperfect rationality and social institutions through an inter-subjective 
dialogue. A Popperian ideal-type of rational dialogue among civilisations is simple:     
I may be wrong, you may be right let’s discuss to learn from opening our fundamental 
beliefs and values to mutual criticism and making our mutual recognised critics as a 
basis for a set of globally shared values on which basis our global social organisation 
can be established. In this way, the thesis aims to apply the Popperian logic of 
knolwedge discovery for building a critical rationalist model of dialogue among 
civilisations that can operate as the mechanism of globally shared norms formation.  
     The thesis argues that using Critical Rationalism as an epistemological  theory of  
rational dialogue among civilisations situates us in a meta-civilisational epistemic 
position because it demands that we regard that civilisations’ fundamental beliefs and 
values are in principle equally open to mutual criticism. In other words, it implies that 
none of the world civilisations can claim having perfect rationale system and social 
institutions, hence they can learn from criticisng each other’s imperfect systems of 
rationality and imperfect social institutions. One may argue that employing Popper’s 
Critical Rationalism reflects a Eurocentric or a Western approach to the very concept 
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of a rational dialogue itself. Yet, the thesis responds that even if we assume Critical 
Rationalism as Western reading of rationality, such a rationale system must be open to 
rational criticism itself. Hence, the critical rationalist epistemology can be used to 
question the fundamental beliefs of Western rationality and social institutions as well 
as it could be employed for criticising the non-Western ones. The thesis argues that 
this advanced account of critical rationalism has been offered by William Bartley, 
who called it as Comprehensively Critical Rationalism, according to which we should 
hold open all of our fundamental beliefs to rational criticism.   
      The core idea of this comprehensive account of Critical Rationalism implies that 
due to inherent imperfection of human rationality, all of our fundamental beliefs 
should be open to rational criticism. In this way, Critical Rationalism situates us in a 
meta-civilisational epistemological position in order to show how a rational dialogue 
among civilisations goes beyond fundamental beliefs of one civilisation. The thesis 
argues how this meta-civilisational position can facilitate a convergence of 
civilisations’ rationale systems towards a kind of global standard of rationality 
through making civilisational fundamental beliefs open to mutual criticism.        
     Given the general perspective of the thesis’ principal argument, in order to show 
how the thesis develops its macrosocilogy of globalisation we need to explain how the 
thesis’ ideal type of open global society and the thesis’ analytical model for analysing 
social changes through a critical rationalist model of social learning are constructed. If 
world civilisations open their fundamental beliefs about human beings and social 
order to mutual criticism; a rational dialogue among them works for the production of 
one set of globally shared values. The idea of (global) open society refers to a good 
society in which people hold their own fundamental beliefs open to mutual criticism. 
However, Popper’s conception of open society does not show how such openness of 
fundamnteal beliefs to mutual criticism situates individuals in a rational dialogic 
position to each other through which they can arrive at certain socially shared values. 
Hence, Popper’s ideal-type of open society should be sociologically reconstructed in 
order to show how openness of civilisations of peoples’ fundamental beliefs to mutual 
criticism operate as the mechanism of the emergence of one core of globally shared 
values regarding equality human beings and a rational way of social organisation of 
such equal persons. The thesis suggests this ideal-type on the fundament of the core 
assumption of equal access of people to critical rationlality.      
  12 
     The thesis argues that we requir a key shift from Popper’s theory of knowledge to 
Bartley’s theory of rationaliy to formulate a critical rationalist model of human action 
and a critical rationalist model of social order. Popper used his critical philosophy to 
make a right distinction between science and metaphysic. However, he did not employ 
that critical rationality to seperate ‘rational belief’ and ‘irrational belief’.  However, 
Bartley’s theory of rationality—as openness to criticism—provides us with a criterion 
for defining what a ‘rational belief’ is and what can be a ‘rational social order’?  In 
this sense, the thesis argues that we need to an important shift from Popper’s critical 
philosophy of human knowledge to Bartley’s critical philosophy of human rationality 
for a reconstruction of the ideal-type of open society, and its application on a global 
scale. Popper views Critical Rationalism as a moral attitude: an irrational faith in 
reason.
28
 However, for Bartley, Critical Rationalism—as a sophisticated defence of 
rationalism—does not need to have an irrational faith in reason.29 Rationalism should 
defend itself with a rational faith in reason.
30
 Bartley rightly argues that demarcating 
rational beliefs from irrational beliefs is much more fundamental than demarcating 
scientific statements and non-scientific statements.
31
 Bartley’s expansion of Popper’s 
theory of knowledge to a theory of rationality enables us to employ this fundamental 
shift for introducing a normative conception of the person due to his access to critical 
reason, which is the main micro-foundation of the ideal-type of open global society.
32
 
    The ideal-type of open global society implies that due to people’s access to critical 
rationality they can engage in a rational dialogue regarding the nature of their social 
organisation through arriving at a normative agreement over one set of social values. 
In other words, the cultural foundation of such a global society of equal and free 
persons originates from an inter-subjective dialogue that is open to mutual criticism. 
                                                 
28
 See Popper, Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2 (1977), chapter 24. 
29
 For a good review of Popper-Bartley Controversy see: Mariano Artigas, The Ethical Nature of Karl 
Popper’s Theory of Knowledge, (Berlin, Peter Lang: 1999), pp.15-95. 
30
 On Bartley's critique of Popper, see William W. Bartley III, The Retreat to Commitment, 2
nd
 ed, (La 
Salle, Illinois and London: Open Court, 1984), and J.W.N. Watkins, 'Comprehensively Critical 
Rationalism', philosophy, 44 (167) (1969), pp.57-62. 
31
 For a good review of Bartley’s theory of rationality as openness to criticism see: Noretta Koertage, 
"Bartley’s Theory of Rationality," Philosophy of Social Sciences, 4 (1974), pp.75-81. 
32
 On ‘Critical Rationalism’ as a theory of rationality see: William W. Bartley III, "Rationality versus 
the Theory of Rationality," in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, edited by Mario 
Bunqe , (USA, The Free Press of Glencoe: 1964), pp. 3-31., and  Tom Settle, I.C. Jarvie, Joseph 
Agassi, "Towards a Theory of Openness to Criticism," Philosophy of Social Sciences, (4) (1974), pp 
.83-90. For a critique of Popper's reading of the moral foundation of the open society, from a Kantian 
perspective, see: Jeremy Shearmur, "Epistemological Limits of the State: Reflections on Popper's Open 
Society," Political Studies (1990) XXXVIII, pp.116-125.   
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An open global society is a global community of equal and free persons who have 
achieved a rational consensus over openness of their social organisation to mutual 
criticism because they have opened their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism.   
    Inspired by John Rawls’ concept-model of a well-ordered society of free and equal 
persons, the thesis introduces an open global society as the process of the formation of 
a well-ordered global society of free and equal citizens who have consciously made an 
inter-subjective agreement over the nature of their social cooperation through a social 
learning process that has opened their fundamental belifes to mutual criticism.
33
 This 
sociological process-based conception of the open society also benefits from Jürgen 
Habermas’ ideal-type of dialogic community according to which the public use of 
dialogic reason by free and equal persons operates as the cultural driving forces of the 
formation of a rational social order.
34
 In addition, it uses the insights of Alexander’s 
sociological theory for addressing the key role of the culture of openness to criticism 
in the formation of legal, political, and economic institutions of an open global 
soicety.
35
 The ideal-type of open global society-- as a normative concept of globality-- 
uses the premise of people’s potential access to critical rationality for showing how 
civilisations of peoples can activate their rational capacities for producing one set of 
globally shared normes that are required for an institutional transformation from the 
existing unsatisfactory global order towards a just and free global order. 
    This ideal-type of the open global society provides a macrosociological normative 
conception of globality or global society because it links three major sub-processes of 
a global society formation, namely an open global culture, an open global politics, 
and an open global economy. This model of open global society creates systematic 
sociological linkages between dialogue of civilisations and the emergence of global 
institutions of democracy and justice. The thesis defines the ideal-type of open global 
society as a global society of free and equal citizens who consciously shape a 
universal kingdom of ends, in Kantian term, through an inter-civilisational dialogue. 
According to the ideal-type of open global society, contemporary globalisation suffers 
from an unsocial sociability, because it connects people around the world based on the 
                                                 
33
 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (London, Harvard University Press: 2001). 
34
 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, (London: Polity Press: 1998).  
35
 See Jeffery C. Alexander, "Theorizing the Good Society: Hermeneutic, Normative, and Empirical 
Discourses," The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 25 (3) (2000), pp.271-309. 
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utilitarian logic of economic competition rather than the logic of rational dialogue and 
social cooperation.  
     The thesis advances the ideal-type of open global society to an analytical model of 
social learning through which it argues that how people’s access to critical rationality 
can engage them in a kind of global cultural preparation for producing one set of 
globally shared norms. To this end, the critical rationalist model of human action is 
used to construct a critical rationalist model of social learning in which the cultural 
learning through opening fundamental belifes to mutual criticism plays the key role in 
the formation of a free and just global order. 
     In order to address the cultural function of globally shared values in the formation 
of a global society of free and equal persons, the thesis compares three concept-
models of human action and social order, namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean and the 
Kantian models. It argues that the Hobbesian and the Lockean concept-models of 
human action rest on a utilitarian principle, which implies that human’s action-goals 
are subjective utilities and they cannot be rationaly (inter-subjectively) evaluated and 
identified. However, in this utilitarian concept of human action, action- means can be 
rationaly justified. Hence, the freedom of ends finds a utilitarian meaning. Individuals 
are free to choose their own subjective ends because there is not a rational criterion 
for demarcating a ‘rational goal’ from an ‘irrational one’. The thesis argues that the 
Hobbesian and the Lockean concept-models of social order rests on such a utilitarian 
account of human action that denies the possibility of a rational (inter-subjective) 
consensus over the ultimate goals of human action.  
     The utilitarian models of social organisation—as Talcott Parsons rightly argues—
cannot address the emergence of a peaceful social order via a rational consensus 
among individuals. If individuals merely look for their own subjective goals, how a 
peaceful social order can be emergred from such competing goals. Hobbes asked that 
what happens if individuals act in a state of nature in which there is not external rules, 
constrains, laws, etc, and if people seek increasing their own personal utilities. People 
must fight each other to maximise their utilities while they compete for scare goods.
36
 
The Hobbesian model of social order implies that human action was bound to lead to 
pervasive ‘force and fraud,’ because as individuals compete for scare goods in the 
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 See Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knobl, Social Theory: Twenty Introductory Lectures, transl by Alex 
Skinner, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2009), pp.20-42. 
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absence of constraining rules each individual merely looks for his or her personal 
utility. Other people are either utilised as a means for satisfying one’s own needs or 
they are deceived about others’ intentions. Hobbes believed that only an absolute 
central power can create a peaceful social order whereas every individual pursues his 
or her egotistical untility. Since people are not shared over certain cultural values that 
can coordinate their action-goals they cannot trust each other. Hence, the war of all 




     The thesis argues that while the Lockean action model follows similar utilitarian 
account of the ultimate goals of human action, it provides us with better account of 
the emergence of a peaceful social order in terms of a consensual agreement among 
rivals over the utilitarian principles of action and social order in contrast with the 
Hobbesian resort to force and fraud.
38
 The Lockean model implies that seeking 
personal utilities by acts of exchange in the market society can improve mutual 
advantage. Truck and barter are good-natured utility-oriented activities through which 
all participant profits, and they are in fact the very condition for a durable social order. 
According to the Lockean concept-model, individuals seek their own personal utilities 




     In order to introduce its analytical model of a critical rationalist macrosociology of 
globalisation, the thesis refers to Parsons’ and Habermas’ critiques of the utilitarian 
models of action and social order. In this way, it tries to employ Bartley’s theory of 
rationality (openness to criticism) for the formulation of a new concept-model of 
human action to show how people’s openness to mutual criticism enables them to 
arrive at a normative consensus over the ultimate goals of their actions, which will be 
reflected in the society’s shared norms. As Alexander argues, Parsons leads us to 
realise the key role of the culture, as one set of shared norms, in the emergence of a 
peaceful social order. In Alexander’s words: “Parsons theorized that ‘values’ had to 
be central to actions and institutions if a society were to be able to function as a 
coherent enterprise.”40 Validating Parsons’ critique of the utilitarian models, the thesis 
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 Ibid., pp.28-29. 
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aims to use such a critique for introducing its own analytical model for addressing the 
question of how people’s access to critical rationality lead them to one set of globally 
shared values and according a peaceful (open) social order. These critical rationality-
cum-shared cultural values operate as driving forces of the transformation of existing 
utilitrain-based liberal globality into a global society of free and equal citizens. 
     Parsons formulated his model of action and his macrosociology through a critique 
of the utilitarian conception of human action. The thesis refers to Parsons’ critique to 
show how the utilitrain concept-models can be used to address the cultural logic of 
contemporary liberal globalisation. In addition, it argues about an unsocial sociability 
of emerging liberal globality due to such an utilitarin origin. In his critiques of the 
Hobbesian and the Lockean concept-models of action and social order, Parsons leads 
us to realise the reason why the utilitarian model of human action cannot address the 
emergence of a peaceful social order because it does not explain the ultimate origins 
of action-goals. If all people seek their personal (subjective) utilities, how can goals of 
different actors be coordinated in a social devision of labour?  
      Parsons rightly argues that if individuals merely pursue their egotistical utilities 
there can be no mechanism through which they be able to coordinate their competing 
interests. Instead of just pursuing their own subjective ends, they need to agree upon a 
system of shared values and common rules of behaviour on which basis they can 
pursue their personal ends while recognises same rights for others as the end in 
themselves rather than means. Validating Kantian transcendental philosophy, Parsons 
formulates a voluntaristic theory of action for addressing qualities of human agents 
might render social order possible. According to Parsons, it is wrong to assume that 
people have only very specific, individual goals and conception of utility, not all of 
which only randomly compute with those of other. However, people can use their 
rationality and moral autonomy to agree over one set of the ultimate values to which 
they orient their action-goals. Parsons’ action model rests on a normative conception 
of human action, impling that people do not merely seek their egotistical utilities but 
they use their rationality to agree on cultural values that define their ultimate ends. In 
one sense, the notion of utility arises from the ultimate value system. Values cannot 
be themselves subject to utility calculations, because they are constitutive of every 
  17 
criterion underpinning such calculations. 
41
 In this way, Parsons paves the way for a 
cultural refounding of macrosociological theory that helps the thesis to argue for 
critical rationalist models of human action and social order as analytical bases for a 
cultural sociology of globalisation.   
     The thesis refers to Habermas’ theory of communicative action to show how the 
Kantian model of human action and social order can be improved through using 
Bartley’s theory of rationality as openness to criticism. Habermas argues that people’s 
access to communicative rationality lead them to a cultural consensus regarding social 
norms. He leads us to see an important internal connection between the theory of 
rationality and the theory of society.
42
  In his critique of Parsons’ action theory, 
Habermas argues that, “Parsons begins with the monadic actor …The point of 
departure for his analysis is the singular action orientation conceived of as resulting 
from contingent decisions between alternatives. At the analytical level of the unit act, 
value standards are attributed to individual actors as something subjective; thus they 
need to be intersubjectively harmonized. … [however] This view stands in contrast to 
the idea of a cultural system of values that is intersubjectively shared from the start.”43 
Habermas argues that Parsons’ action model does not address the question of how 
actors’ access to rationality enable them to achieve an inter-subjective consensus over 
a system of common values that is intersubjectivly shared from the start and directs 
actors’ behaviors through identifying the ultimate goals of their action. 
     While the thesis refers to Habermas’ solution for reinventing Parsons’ concept-
model action to address the question of how acrors’ access to rationality enable them 
to arrive at a system of shared values as the foundation of a stable social order, it 
critisises the Habermas’ communicative action model itself from a critical rationalist 
perspective. Habermas recognises the weakness of Parsons’ singular unit of action. 
However, his communicative theory of action regards cultural traditions as merely a 
background for human actions rather than the product of a communicative action. In 
addition, it focuses on a linguistic ability of people in their mutual communication for 
arriving at a rational consensus over one set of common values.  
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     For Habermas, communicative or discursive rationality refers to people’s linguistic 
competence that enable them to use the force of better argument for arriving at an 
inter-subjective consensus. In this sense, people’s access to communicative rationality 
leads them to common social norms that direct individuals’ ultimate goals of action. 
Communicative rationality implies that an inter-subjective consensus among dialogic 
participants is the criterion of rationality. This discursive rationality assumes that 
reaching an inter-subjective understanding equals arriving at an inter-subjective 
consensus. The thesis argues that Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality rests 
on his consensual theory of truth. Hence, discursive rationality is concerned with 
rational procedures rather than rational substances. If individuals shape an ideal-type 
free discourse amongst themselves, their inter-subjective agreement identifies what 
would be the truth itself. In this way, Habermas claims that without having a common 
account of rationality or rational dialogue, dialogic partners can arrive at an inter-
subjective agreement upon what recognise as a rational consensus. In short, since 
people can understand each other, they can also arrive at inter-subjective consensus.
44
 
Viewed from communicative rationality, the unconstrained and consensus-bringing 
force of argumentative speech leads different participants to overcome their merely 




     The thesis criticises Habermas’ consensual theory of truth and his communicative 
theory of action. It argues that an inter-subjective consensus cannot be the criterion of 
rationality that enables rational agents to arrive at shared cultural values. In addition, 
it argues that mutual understanding does not necessarily lead to mutual agreement. In 
other words, understanding does not presuppose agreement: if two people understand 
each other, it does not follow that they agree upon what has been understood.
46
 Hence, 
this weakens Habermas’ argument that communication presupposes the possibility of 
agreement. Habermas might be right for arguing that communication requires as a 
condition the possibility of understanding, but this does not mean that there is such a 
tense link between mutual understanding and the emergence of an inter-subjective 
agreement. As Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva argue, this problem comes to 
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the surface especially when communication takes place between dialogic participants 
belonging to different cultures.
47
 Even if one can imagine an ideal speech situation to 
exist, it is difficult to grasp how people would reach a consensus, without a common 
reading of rationality itself, when radically different forms of life based on different 
rationale systems are at stake. Under these conditions, Habermas’ notion of ‘the force 
of the better argument’ innocuous appears problematic, because the rules of valid 
argumentation themselves are indeed part of a cultural heritage and tradition, and 
therefore open to debate and criticism. In order words, people need to be share a 
common account of rationality and rational dialogue, if their communication should 
lead them to a rational consensus. Hence, Habermas’ discursive model of an inter-
cultural dialogue-- resting upon the existence of communicative rationality-- fails to 
serve its practical purposes in the confrontation between different cultural settings.
48
 
    Taking up Critical Rationalism as the foundation of its theory of rationality, the 
thesis argues that people’s access to rationality can lead them to shared cultural values 
through the creation of an inter-subjective consensus that is open to mutual criticism. 
However, radically different cultural standpoints require opening their fundamental 
belifes in particular about the very conception of rationality itself to mutual criticism, 
if they want to enter to a fruitful rational dialouge. Hence, they must accept a common 
criterion or account of rationality, i.e. openness of all fundamental beliefs to rational 
criticism. Under this condition, the force of better criticism can lead them to some 
mutual agreement that is open to revision due to the possibliety of new criticisms. The 
thesis argues that world civilisations can enter to an inter-cultural dialouge in order to 
shape a set of global common values regarding human beings and social order, if they 
recognise such a common criterion of rationality, and accordingly if they open their 
fundamental belifes to mutual criticism. Viewed from such a critical rationalist model 
of inter-civilisational dialouge, the thesis argues that world civilisations can arrive at 
an inter-subjective consensus regarding equality of human being and a people-centric 
global organisation. The premise of people’s access to critical rationality operates 
forms the basis of such a human equality and the justification for a humane global 
governnacve. Popper terms such a premise as ‘Rational Unity of Humankind’. 
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     The thesis proposes a critical rationalist model of inter-civilisational dialouge and 
social learning in order to develop a new macrosociology of globalisation with the 
three major aims. Inspired by Theodor Adorno’s critical theory, the thesis argues that 
a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation not only addresses the emergence 
of contemporary globalisation, but also it is critical of liberal model of globality. It 
suggests the epistemic possibility of an institutional transformation of the utilitarian-
based liberal globality into a global society of free and equal persons.
49
 Of the three 
major aims, the first objective of this macrosociology of globalisation is developing a 
new epistemic-institutional analysis of contemporary globalisation. The thesis 
introduces globalisation as a global enlargement of liberal social philosophy—as an 
ideational system— and its institutional expression in the formation of a transnational 
political economy. It introduces contemporary globalisation as a macro-institutional 
change from the Hobbesian social philosophy of the struggle for political power 
towards the Lockean social philosophy of competition for economic utilities.  
     The thesis diagnoses three major cultural, political, and economic institutional 
mechanisms for this switch of the cultural logic of global ordering of people. Global 
liberalism—as a cultural core of this switch of logic— has provided cognitive inputs 
for the liberal form of globalisation. If the Hobbesian logic of war of all against all no 
longer works to organise people and societies acound the globe, the Lockean logic of 
the competition for economic utilities provides us with a better social philosophy for a 
more peaceful co-existence of radically different cultural standing points and political 
interests. Culturally influenced by such a liberal social philosophy, the collapse of the 
Cold War’s world order leads us to explore the political mechanism of contemporary 
globalisation. Since the power-based struggle between the Western and Eastern blocs 
of nation-states could not remain as the institutional logic of a sustained world order a 
new multi-centric global governance is emerging that gives the priority to economic 
competition rather than political conflict.  
     Given the cultural and political mechanisms of this liberal mode of globalisation, 
the emergence of a transnational economy is another aspect of globalisation. Once the 
cultural and political obstacles for opening ‘national economy’ to ‘global market’ 
decrease, nation states reduce their trade taxes and open their capital accounts to 
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global market. The macrosociology of globalisation analyses this interplay between 
the cultural force and institutional aspects of the development of liberal globality. The 
distinctive feature of this macrosociology is that it uncovers the key role of very idea 
of liberalism or liberal social philosophy in the formation of a transnational political 
economy--as a macro-global institutional change from superpower bipolarity to 
multi-centric global governance. 
     However, as Adorno argues, a critical sociology is critical of an unsatisfactory 
social order and thus of its subject matter of study i.e. the society itself. The thesis 
provides a macrosociological critique of liberal globalisation because of its ideational 
origin in liberal social philosophy in the context of unmasking an unsocial sociability 
of liberal globality. It argues that while the Lockean logic of ‘rivalry’ is more capable 
for social organisation of people than the Hobbesian logic of ‘enmity’, it still 
fundamentally suffers from the lack of a humane mode of social organisation, as 
Kantian social philosophy of ‘friendship’ demands.50 In the Lockean logic of rivalry, 
human beings are viewed ‘others’ who are rivals, not friends. The thesis employs the 
Kantian social philosophy of friendship
51
 to uncover the unsocial sociability of liberal 
globalisation. It argues that liberal globality suffers from one set of societal deficits 
because of (a) the lack of a global consensus on its imposed model of global social 
organisation, (b) the lack of a global accountability of liberal global governance to 
people, and (c) an uneven distribution of globalisation’s benefits and risks.    
     The thesis argues that a more important task of the macrosociology of globalisation 
is formulating a normative analysis of the possibility of transforming liberal globality 
into an open global society. To this end, the thesis addresses the five layers of an 
ideal-type global social learning. In each of these layers of global social learning, the 
epistemological logic of the ‘openness to criticism’ operates as a mechanism of social 
learning, in its own right. The thesis links this normative social learning with a 
Popperian-informed theory of understanding. As James Farr argues,
52
 this theory of 
understanding employs Popper’s theory of knowledge to address how our imperfect 
understanding shapes and how such an imperfect understanding can improve via 
opening fundamental premises of our interpretative frameworks to mutual criticism. 
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In another sense, such normative social learning implies that civilisations of peoples 
should open their fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism in order to discover their 
own mutual imperfections and reduce their mutual misunderstandings. In this way, a 
rational dialogue of civilisations acts for converging civilisations’ rationale systems 
and civilizational-based patterns of social organisations towards a global standard of 
rationality and a global model of social ordering of people.
53
   
     Viewed from this inter-civilisational model of mutual understanding and learning, 
the first layer of the global social learning refers to a philosophical learning. The 
thesis argues that a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, in its philosophical sense, 
refers to opening civilisations’ fundamental metaphysical beliefs about the univers 
and human nature to rational criticism and accordingly to modified interpretations. 
Once civilisations open their metaphysical views to mutual criticism they can reduce 
their misunderstandings via the mechanism of learning from criticism. In this way, 
their competing world-views about the universe, human nature and social organisation 
can be involved in modified interpretations, mutual adjustments, and finally they can 
arrive at some mutual agreement on a common meta-civilisational world-view. This 
global learning can converge competing world-views into a higher understanding of 
regarding the universe and human beings. The thesis argues that this philosophical 
layer of dialogue among world civilisations can create a global standard of rationality, 
paving the way for developing one set common world-views. 
     The thesis employs three case studies of the civilisations of Islam, the West, and 
China to show how such a rational dialogue amongst civilisations may be shaped 
through the mechanisms of reducing misunderstandings and self-adjustments. Given 
this philosophical layer, the second layer of global social learning refers to an inter-
civilisational moral learning. Once civilisational-based epistemologies and world-
views open their fundamental premises to mutual criticism and involve in a set of 
error-correcting and mutual adjustment processes, their systems of morality would be 
also affected. It is possible then to argue that fundamental premises of different 
systems of morality become open to mutual criticism. In a word, they actually will 
involve in a moral learning through opening their systems of morality to criticism, 
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which can lead them to a set of global moral values. The thesis argues that a global 
ethics of openness to criticism would be at the center of such moral values.
54
  
     A dialogic globalisation leads us to argue for the possibility of the emergence of a 
global normative consensus as the moral foundation of an open global society, i.e. the 
global ethics of openness to criticism. From the viewpoint of a critical social theory, 
the transformative role of such a dialogic globalisation refers to its capacity to address 
how rational dialogue among civilisations can change liberal globality to an open 
global society through creating a set of globally shared values, centred on the global 
ethics of openness to rational criticism.  
     The thesis then addresses the question of how the global ethics of openness to 
criticism can pave the way for the formation of the equal right of social criticism 
eititled for all prospective global citizens through the legal layer of such a dialogic 
globalisation. This equal legal right refers to an equal right of self-determination of 
global social order via realising the right of making global governance accountable to 
the world population. In this sense, it goes beyond the equal right of the freedom of 
expression or speech. This globally recognised legal right of criticism can operate as 
the legal foundation of a democratic global governance. The thesis argues that a 
critical rationalist account of global democracy rests on such an equal right of social 
criticism. Finally, the thesis argues that the emergence of such a democratic global 
governance will provide the political ground for an open (competitive and fair) global 
economy. All of these five layers of global social learning have been introduced as 
one set of potential and prescriptive social learning, which can be realised by the 
activation of people’s access to critical rationality.  In this sense, they can be realised, 
if th elite and masses activate their potential access to critical rationality in the context 
of a rational dialogue among world civilisations.   
1.3 Thesis Structure 
     The architecture of the thesis is inspired by its principal argument. Part I develops 
the case of a critical rationalist approach to macrosociology of globalisation. It 
indicades how the thesis’ research program employs Critical Rationalism for the 
construction of a methodology for a critical macrosociology of globalisation. Part II 
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introduces the normative ideal type of an open global society as a macrosociological 
concept. It also aims to show how this new normative ideal type of globality can be 
applied for a new critique of contemporary globalisation. Part III develops a 
macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. It advances the ideal type of open global 
society to a macrosociological analytical framework for addressing the five layers of 
a global social learning for the transformation of liberal globality into a global society 
of free and equal persons. Part IV introduces global civil society as the key agent of 
dialogic globalisation. It explores an interplay between intellectuals and global social 
movements for turing the ideal of open global society into an institutional reality. 
     Given chapter 1 of the Part I as the thesis’ introduction, chapter 2 explains the 
research methodology. It employs Critical Rationalism to introduce the methodology 
of critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. The research methodology shapes 
in the two contexts of the logic of scientific discoverty that Popper calls them the 
context of ‘discovery’ and the context of ‘justification’.55 Recognising the thesis’ 
macrosociological hypothesis as a non-empirical hypothesis, chapter 2 follows 
Popper’s argument that conjectural theory of knowledge can be applied for a logical 
examination of non-empirical hypothesis.
56
 The thesis argues that the methodology of 
macrosociology of globalisation uses the Popperian logic of knowledge discovery in 
two contexts of ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’. In conjecturing its macrosociological 
hypothesis— i.e. the possibility of the transformation of liberal globality into an open 
global society via a rational dialogue among civilisations—the research methodolgy 
uses the methods of interpretative sociology and conceptual history for exploring how 
liberal globality is shaped through an interaction between cultural crystallisations and 
macro-institutional trajectories.
57
 In the context of justification, chapter 2 uses ‘logical 
evidence’ to examine its hypothesis.  It argues that internalising Critical Rationalism 
in the logic of a critical macrosociology of globalisation needs to go beyond Popper’s 
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logic of the social sciences. Inspired by Adorno and Habermas,
58
 the chapter argues 
that a critical macrosociology of globalisation should question liberal globalisation 
because of its societal deficits. In addition, it must address the question of how an 
alternative globalisation can overcome such societal deficits. 
     Part II proceeds with chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 critically reviews three major 
normative critiques of globalisation. It introduces the nature of normative critiques of 
globalisation that paves the ground for a new normative critique of globalisation on 
the basis of the ideal type of open global society. Through its case studies of David 
Held’s, Richard Falk’s, and Jürgen Habermas's normative critiques of globalisation, 
Chapter 3 concludes that all of these normative critiques take the equality of human 
beings as their moral foundations for criticising contemporary globalisation. Hence, 
they share in globalisation’s legitimacy crisis because of its unaccountability to the 
world's population—recognised as globalisation’s democratic deficit. While all three 
case studies somehow share in their normative critiques of liberal globality, Falk’s 
critique of globalisation directly targets liberal ideology as the ideational force behind 
contemporary globalisation. 
     Chapter 4 introduces the ideal type of an open global society. It critically reviews 
Popper’s concept of the open society and its origins in Critical Rationalism.  In order 
to develop a macrosociological model of global open society, chapter 4 employs the 
insights of Bartley’s theory of critical rationalism to turn it to the moral foundation of 
a global open society. It argues that the global ethics of openness to criticism should 
be translated into global institutions of democracy and justice. Chapter 4 introduces 
the premises and institutional principels of the ideal type of open global society.              
     Part III consists of four chapters as follows. Chapter 5 provides a theoretical 
framework for the development of a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. 
It employs the critical rationalist theory of rational action to address a linkage between 
the conception of human nature and the model of social organisation. Chapter 5 
argues that if Critical Rationalism be employed for modeling rational action, a new 
micro-foundation will be provided for macrosociology. Inspired by Hans Joas’ action 
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theories’ categorisation59, chapter 5 reviews Talcott Parsons’s and Jürgen Habermas’s 
macrosociological theories. It concludes that we need to integrate Critical Rationalism 
into the micro-foundation of macrosociological theory in order to turn the ideal type 
of open global society into a macro-sociological analytical model. Chapter 5 refers to 
a three-fold classification of the relationship between the conception of human nature 
and the models of social organisation-- namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the 
Kantian ideal types of human nature and social organisation.
60
        
    Chapter 6 describes contemporary globalisation, from a critical rationalist macro-
sociological perspective. It employs chapter 5’s theoretical framework to explore how 
the cultural logic of Hobbesian global organisation has been to some extent replaced 
with the Lockean logic. Chapter 6 argues that contemporary globalisation is a macro 
global institutional change that is culturally fuelled by the Lockean ideal type of 
human nature and social order, which replaces to some extent the centrality of the 
Cold War order with a multi-centric global competition for economic interests.   
     Chapter 7 develops a sociological critique of liberal globalisation. It utilises the 
theoretical framework that developed by chapter 5 to criticise the Lockean ideal type 
of human nature and social organisation due to the Kantian social philosophy. Viewed 
from this framework, contemporary liberal globalisation suffers from a set of societal 
deficits, originating from the liberal model of social order. In spite of the domestic 
style of the liberal societies’ formation, global liberalism has not emerged through a 
citizenry-based acceptance of the liberal social organisation on a global scale. On the 
contrary, it has shaped through a top-down learning process, mainly amongst political 
and economic leaders not ordinary people. Liberal globality has linked unaccountable 
global governance with an oligopolistice global market that forces oligopoly and 
protection for the strong and a socialisation of the risks and market discipline for the 
weak.
61
 Chapter 7 concludes that contemporary globalisation’s unsocial sociability 
can be addressed as a package of cultural, political, and economic insufficiencies. 
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     Chapter 8 argues that if the lack of a global consensus on liberal form of globality 
is the ultimate origin of its societal deficits, an alternative globalisation must remedy 
this key shortage. If the Kantian-inspired ideal type of the open global society refers 
to a global organisation of free and equal persons who access critical rationalities, a 
rational dialogue among such rational agents can transform liberal globality into an 
open global society. Inspired by the works of S. N. Eisenstadt, Samuel Huntington, 
Randall Collins, Benjamin Nelson, Donald Nielson, Toby Huff, Jeffrey Alexander 
and Björn Wittrock, chapter 8 develops a sociological analysis of rational dialogue 
among civilisations. It argues that the ultimate source of the lack of global consensus 
over global social order originates from civilisations’ competing systems of rationale 
and their different patterns of social organisation. It situates the possibility of rational 
dialogue of cvilisations in the context of what Alexander calls the Strong Programme 
in Cultural Sociology in which the cultural forces are viewed as motors of social order 
formation.
62
 Chapter 8 suggests a new institutional reasoning for global democracy 
and global justice, inspired by Allen Buchanan’s moral reasoning of the international 
institutions.
63
 It highlights the global ethics of openness to criticism at the centre of a 
set of globally shared values due to people’s access to critical rationality. 
     Part IV covers two following chapters. Chapter 9 explores the existing realities and 
potential functions of global civil society—as the agent of a dialogic globalisation. It 
argues that civil society refers to a social sphere between peoples and governance, in 
which a cultural solidarity among civil society’s actors plays the key role in realising 
the ideal type of rational social order.
64
 Inspired by Jeffrey Alexander’s account of 
civil society, chapter 9 discusses a critical rationalist approach to global civil society. 
It then bases its own proposal for a global collective action frame against neo-liberal 
globalisation on such a normative concept-model of global civil society. Chapter 9 
discusses a systematic link between intellectuals, as the carriers of an alternative 
cultural model of social order, and global social movements as political agents of 
mobilising people to practically realise such a cultural ideal-type. 
     Chapter 10 summarises Critical Rationalism’s contributions to macrosociology of 
globalisation. It argues that critical rationalism—as an epistemological model of 
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rational action—provides us with a new micro-foundation for analysing cultural 
driving forces of globalisation.  Chapter 10 highlights the key findings of the thesis’ 
macrosociology of dialogic globalisation in three major areas; that is, contemporary 
globalisation; unsocial sociability of liberal globality, and an alternative dialogic form 
of globalisation. Chapter 10 finnaly outlines general themes of a ‘scientific research 
program’ for ‘building an open global society’, in particular via arguing for the need 
to formulate critical rationalist theories of human action and social learning in a 
systematic link with Jeffery Alexander’s strong programme for a cultural refounding 

















































     This chapter aims to show how critical rationalism can be used as the foundation of 
methodology of a critical macrosociology of globalisation. An application of critical 
rationalism for the development of the research methodology calls for addressing the 
question of how the core methodological idea of critical rationalism i.e. learning from 
criticism, provides a sound epistemological foundation for investigating the thesis’ 
hypothesis, and for the development of valid arguments to defend it. 
     Chapter 2 proceeds in four sections. Section 2.1 explains analytical nature of   
macrosociology of globalisation. A critical macrosociology of globalisation aims to 
address the macro institutional change on a global scale due to interplay among 
cultural, political, and economic driving forces. Section 2.2 briefly addresses the 
relationship between critical rationalism and the logic of the social sciences. Given 
Karl Popper's central role in the elaboration of this relationship, the section highlights 
a Popperian-hermeneutic reading of the logic of social sciences, offered by James 
Farr. Section 2.3 argues while Popper's logic focus the explanation of the existing 
social realities, macrosociology of globalisation must to go beyond describing the 
existing global reality. It requires an uncovering of liberal globalisation’s societal 
deficits, and an explanation of the mechanisms for the transformation of liberal 
globality into an open global society.  
     Recognising these needs, section 2.3 argues how critical rationalism can be utilised 
to develop the logic of critical social sciences. It refers to the Popper-Adorno 
controversy on the logic of the social sciences in order to use the insights for 
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introducing a critical rationalist approach to the critical social theory. Habermas’ 
hermeneutic logic of critical social theory will be also discussed. Section 2.4 employs 
the logic of critical social sciences for introducing the thesis’ research methodology.  
2.1 The Nature of a (Historical) Macrosociology of Globalisation           
       In chapter 1, globalisation is defined as a macrosociological process: a changing 
of the institutional logic of global social organisation from the centrality of struggle 
for political power to economic competition. This global social organisational shift 
takes shape within a historical process as the context of such a macro institutional 
change. This section argues that a historical macro-sociological approach to 
globalisaton is a recognised approach in Globalisation Studies. However, the thesis 
aims to advance this approach through arguing for a cultural turn in historical 
macrosociology of globalisation—what I called an epistemic-institutional approach to 
globalisation. 
     The Dictionary of the Social Sciences defines ‘macrosociology’ as an approach to 
the sociology that emphasises the analysis of social systems and population on a large 
scale, at the level of social structure, and at a high level of theoretical abstraction.
65
 
Apparently, for an historical sociology, this large-scale and structural change shape 
during a historical process. As Stephen Hobden argues, what ultimately links history 
and sociology is the study of 'time'. “Social relations do not stand apart from time. All 
social interactions are affected by what has gone before, and in the understanding of 
the present the past cannot be avoided.”66 D. Smith defines historical sociology as “a 
discipline which tries to make sense of the past (and present) by investigating how 
societies work and change.”67 For P. Abrams, historical sociology is “the attempt to 
understand the relationship of personal activity and experience on the one hand and 
social organization on the other, as something that is continuously constructed in 
time.”68 Charles Tilly argues that historical sociology situates social processes in 
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place and time.
69
 Historical sociologists identify the large scale historical societal 
changes as the subject matter of historical sociology.
70
  
     If historical sociology aims to address large-scale historical societal changes, a 
historical sociology of globalisation would target a global institutional change through 
which the nature of global social order would change from the Westphalian system to 
a post-national constellation. Hence, globalisation is recognised as a historical macro-
sociological process. This global macro-sociological process, of course, consists of 
sub-processes, namely cultural, political and economic. Perhaps the most important 
theoretical task of a historical macrosociology of globalisation is to explain interplays 
among cultural, political, and economic dynamics of globalisation in the context of a 
large-scale historical and social change. To the contrary, the existing macrosociology 
of globalisation focuses on a socio-economic approach to the large-scale global social 
change. For instance, in Globalisation and Historical Macrosociology, Giovanni 
Arrighi refers to the two historical macrosociologies of globalisation, suggested by 
Charles Tilly and Immanuel Wallerstein. Arrighi writes: 
…as a recent exchange between Tilly and Wallerstein shows each variant of 
historical macrosociology has its own blind spots and bright lights in 
recognizing globalisation as a macrosociological problem…Tilly, whose 
historical macrosociology has been squarely based on national states as 
privileged units of analysis, takes the emerging institutions of world 
capitalism so seriously as to dismiss the continuing significance of national 
states as movers and shakers of the contemporary world. Wallerstein, whose 
historical macrosociology has been just as squarely based on the world 
capitalist system as the privileged unit of analysis, upholds the continuing 
significance of national states—to the point of dismissing the novelty of the 
emerging of world capitalism [emphasis added].
71
  
     This thesis takes a critical rationalist approach to historical macrosociology of 
globalisation in which the interplay between cultural crystallisations and macro-
societal institutions trajectories serves the key role. Hence, the nature of the unit of 
analysis in the historical macrosociology of globalisation can be realised by situating 
the interplay between cultural crystallisations and global institutional change in its 
historical context. It also leads us to explore an important insight for the possibility of 
an alternative interplay between the cultural forces and institutional trajectories. This 
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chapter aims to show how critical rationalism, as an epistemological doctrine, can 
provide us with a new methodology for addressing the interplay between the cultural 
crystallisations and the global institutional trajectories. Wittrock points out that, 
“Paradoxically, globalisation studies often seem premised on assumptions close to 
those of earlier forms of theorizing about convergence and modernization. They 
describe the global and all but inevitable diffusion and impact of market interactions 
and capitalist forms of production.”72 However, a cultural turn in the methodology of 
globalisation studies calls for an epistemic-institutional approach to macrosociology 
of globalisation. The distinctive feature of this approach is that it aims to uncover the 
power of ideational forces in shaping globalisation as a macro institutional change. It 
is important to note here that the epistemic-institutional approach to globalisation 
studies refers to what James Rosenau recognises its absence: “Efforts to develop 
broad-theory [of globalisation] that explains the social, political, and cultural 
dimensions and how they interact with economic dynamics are conspicuously 
lacking.”73 He rightly argues that, “it is almost as if globalization defies the theoretical 
enterprise, being too amorphous and complex to allow for framing and testing of 
incisive and empirical hypothesis.”74 As Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva 
point out: “This is certainly not to say that social theories are necessarily independent 
of the empirical study of society…But whether they are empirically grounded or not, 
the main purpose of social theories is obviously to theorize, and there is thus a clear 
distinction between the abstract nature of social theory and the practical orientations 
of empirical sociology.”75 The thesis’ epistemic-institutional approach uses its critical 
rationalist-inspired method for a social theoretical investigation regarding how the 
interactions among cultural, political and economic dynamics of globalisation can be 
addressed in the context of a new macrosociololgy of globalisation.     
2.2 Critical Rationalism and the Logic of the Social Sciences 
     If critical rationalism should be employed to develop a new epistemic-institutional 
approach to historical macrosociology of globalisation, we need a brief review of the 
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implications of critical rationalism for the logic of social sciences. The literature on 
Popper’s critical rationalism and his logic of the social sciences is substantial. 
However, I shall merely refer to the core ideas of critical rationalism and Popper’s 
logic of the social sciences as it serves the aims of this chapter. In addition, I will 
highlight those readings of Popper’s logic that pave the way for an application of 
critical rationalism to the logic of macrosociology of globalisation. In this way, I am 
committed to the very logic of critical rationalism, as an epistemological doctrine, 
rather than to Popper’s account of critical rationalism.    
    The logic of the social sciences has been contested due to different perspectives. 
For instance, Popper introduces 'conjectures and refutations' as the logic of scientific 
discovery, whereas Imre Lakatos argues about the methodology of scientific research 
programs in which scientists investigate a series of theories-- as research programs-- 
rather than isolated theories, and they do not refute a research program if they find a 
contradicting evidence.
76
 From a radically different perspective, Thomas Kuhn claims 
that the scientific research programs are incommensurable paradigms. Hence, they 
grow and collapse as a result of a non-rationalist mechanism. In other words, the 
scientific paradigms raise and collapse due to the scientific revolutions, which cannot 
be addressed based on a rational criterion.
77
 
     If the thesis employs Popper’s logic of the social sciences for developing a new 
methodology for critical macrosociology of globalisation, the main reason is that it 
rests upon critical rationalism, as the thesis’ chosen epistemological doctrine.  For a 
critical rationalist, Popper's logic of scientific discovery is ultimately originated from 
the premise of the limit of human knowledge.    
      Popper’s logic of the social sciences follows his logic of knowledge discovery as 
Conjectures and Refutations.
78
 This conjectural theory of knowledge does not see a 
fundamental difference between the logics of the natural and the social sciences. The 
logic of scientific discovery, for Popper, refers to a problem-solving process in which 
our conjectures are tentative solutions for our problems. Our solutions cannot be 
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regarded as perfects and justified solutions, hence they must evaluate by criticism or 
refutation. In The Logic of the Social Sciences, Popper links his conjectural theory of 
knowledge with critical rationalism. He argues that our knowledge is limited by our 
ignorance. Hence, scientific problems emerge due to an awareness of our ignorance. If 
we had a perfect knowledge, i.e. an absolutist epistemological position, we would not 
have any epistemic problem to solve. If we had a perfect ignorance; that is, a relativist 
epistemological position, we would not also have any epistemic problems at all. Since 
we can have an imperfect but objective knowledge, we do know that which we do not 
know. It means that we always have an epistemic problem that can be objectively 
solved through the mechanism of conjectures and refutations. Hence, once we 
recognise our epistemic problem, then we appeal to critical reason to solve the 
problem. We formulate a conjectural solution for the epistemic problem, but we 
cannot prove such conjectural solution because of our imperfect capacity to know. 
However, we can refute the conjectural solution. The conjectural theory of knowledge 
serves both the natural and the social sciences. The reason is that our limited capacity 
of critical reasoning has created our epistemic problems, as opposed to the objects of 
our scientific inquiry, either the natural world or the social world.
79
 
2.2.1 Historical Background of Popper’s Conjectural Theory of Knowledge   
     Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge should be understood in the context of 
his historical epistemic problem. In Conjectures and Refutations, he describes how he 
developed this conjectural philosophy of sciences in a response to some problems 
associated with Hume's inductionism that shaped the need for the demarcation of 
sciences and metaphysic.
80
 A brief reference to these problems helps us to uncover the 
linkage between conjectural theory of knowledge and critical rationalism, and its 
implications for the logic of the social sciences. As Notturno argues, the historical 
importance of Popper’s solution for Hume’s induction problem and in general for the 
demarcation of sciences and metaphysic must be realised in a corresponding historical 
context of “the collapse of foundationalism, which can in turn be best understood as 
posing a problem regarding the rational authority of our beliefs. Traditional ‘bedrock’ 
foundationalism said that knowledge must be justified in order to be rational 
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knowledge…” 81 Descartes represents this foundationalism approach. For him, the 
God-given intellect provides such knowledge as a justified belief.  
     By the eighteenth century, many philosophers had questioned the epistemological 
attempt to ground rational knowledge on a priori intuition. They, in contrast, regarded 
sense experiences as the only measure of truth. But, Hume then argued that the 
attempt to ground our scientific knowledge upon sense experiences leads us to 
irrationalism, because there is no ‘middle term’ that allows us to validly infer future 
events from past experiences, and hence such inductive inferences provide only 
psychological rather than rational justification through custom and habit. Hume 
concluded that neither deductive nor inductive inferences could lead us to a rational 
knowledge. However, Kant rejected Hume’s irrationalism. Kant thought that Hume’s 
empiricism was the main root of such irrationalism, hence he returned to the need for 
a priori knowledge after all, given that irrationalism is not acceptable. Kant tried to 
explain how a priori synthetic knowledge is possible by saying that the mind imposes 
its law upon nature in order to understand it, and that all rational beings impose the 
same laws. He viewed Newtonian mechanics as a good example of what he called a 
priori synthetic knowledge. As Notturno argues, this was in fact an historical situation 
in epistemology before Einstein, and as Popper understood it.
82
  
      Popper realised that Kant’s theory of knowledge for salvaging the rationality of 
science collapsed when Einstein imposed a non-Newtonian physic upon nature. 
Einstein theoretical descriptions of the natural world were corroborated by the results 
of the experiences that he conceived in order to test them. The success of Einstein's 
theory destroyed all hopes of explaining the rationality of sciences in terms of a priori 
synthetic knowledge.
83
 Popper realised a more fundamental issue: the attempt to 
explain the rationality of science through justification had failed. He then proposed a 
non-justificationist logic of scientific discovery, emerged in this historical context. He 
recognised that both Hume and Kant viewed scientific knowledge as justified belief. 
Hence, Hume led to irrationalism because he rightly rejected the validity of an 
inductive inference. Kant led to a priori synthetic knowledge, but it was discredited by 
Einstein's physics. However, Popper found an innovative solution for both of Hume’s 
induction problem and Kant’s synthetic knowledge problem. He argued that Hume is 
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right in saying that an inductive inference is not logically speaking a valid inference, 
and Kant is right in saying that experiences and observations presuppose a priori 
ideas.  
      However, Hume is wrong in concluding that we cannot have a rational and 
objective knowledge because we cannot make a valid inductive inference, whereas we 
can formulate a valid deductive argument. Kant is also wrong in arguing that a priori 
synthetic knowledge is certainly true, where we can criticise such a priori knowledge. 
Popper writes: “When Kant said, ‘Our intellect does not draw its laws from nature but 
imposes its laws upon nature’, he was right. But in thinking that these laws are 
necessarily true, or that we necessarily succeed in imposing them upon nature, he was 
wrong.”84 This epistemological critique of Kant and Hume’s theories of knowledge 
led Popper to his own conjectural theory of knowledge.  
     Popper concludes that a conjectural theory of knowledge can solve the historical 
problem of epistemology: On the one hand, Popper’s theory uses valid deductive 
argument in which the truth of conclusion depends upon the truth of the premises. On 
the other hand, it uses empirical criticism to evaluate the truth of premises themselves. 
In this way, this logic of knowledge discovery leads us to an empirical and rational 
knowledge. As Notturno points out, “it is empirical because we test our solutions to 
scientific problems against our observations and experiences. And it is rational, 
because we make use of the valid argument forms of deductive logic, especially the 
modus tollens, to criticise theories that contradict the observation statements that we 
think are true. … we must think of knowledge and of rationality in a way that does not 
presuppose that our knowledge must be justified in order to be rational.”85 Viewed 
from this historical perspective, Popper’s epistemological breakthrough originates 
from a fundamental critique of the justificationist epistemology. 
      As William Bartley III remarks “the main originality of Popper’s position lies in 
the fact that it is the first nonjustificational philosophy of criticism in the history of 
philosophy.”86 Stefano Gattei views Popper’s philosophical breakthrough in this way: 
“How do we learn, then? Popper’s answer is: by criticizing our errors. The idea that 
anything we say can be subjected to critical examination is the core of Popper’s 
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philosophical attitude, his solution to the problem of rationality. …This is the core of 
the revolution Popper marked in twentieth century philosophy of science—rationality 
requires no foundation, only critical dialogue.”87 It is important here to note chapter 5 
will argue how Popper’s conjectural theory of learning from errors can be employed 
for developing a critical rationalist model of social learning. 
2.2.2 The Two Contexts of the Logic of Scientific Discovery 
      Keeping in mind the historical record of Popper’s theory of knowledge, we are 
now in a better position to realise his logic of the social sciences. However, we need 
to distinguish between two major contexts of this logic of scientific discovery. We can 
link the two contexts with 'conjectural' and 'refutational' steps of Popper's theory of 
knowledge. In Popper's terminology, the two contexts are called the context of 
discovery and the context of justification.
88
 These contexts also construct Popper's 
Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) model of scientific discovery. They lead us to see how 
a valid deductive argument can be tested through falsifying evidences-- called also as 
methodological falsificationism.  Viewed a science theory, either in the natural or in 
the social sciences, as an epistemic problem-solving framework under the limits of 
human knowledge, Popper argues that the two contexts of a conjectural theory of 
knowledge introduces the mechanisms of scientific discovery. This process of 
scientific discovery consists of the four major stages: (a) recognising an epistemic 
problem, (b) formulating a tentative theory or hypothesis for the problem, (c) 
eliminating errors, and (d) raising a new problem. Popper summarises this process as 
follows, which reflects the very meaning of openness to rational criticism. 
                                                  P1TTEE P2   
     Where, P1 is the original problem; TT is a tentative theory, or solution to the 
problem; EE is error elimination, or criticism, and P2 is a new problem that emerges 
as a result of criticism. The context of discovery refers to the stages of the problem 
recognition and the formulation of the research hypothesis. However, the context of 
justification refers to the error eliminating stage or criticism. The context of 
justification or the context of criticism plays the key role in Popper's theory of 
knowledge. However, the context of discovery is also very important.
89
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     We argued that this conjectural theory of knowledge implies that at the first place 
rationality of our scientific inquiry depends on recognising an epistemic problem and 
formulating it in the format of a valid deductive hypothesis. Without having a valid 
deductive theory or hypothesis, we cannot use empirical evidence to test the theory. In 
an invalid inductive formulation, the conclusions do not follow from the premises; 
hence a rejection of a premise, by empirical evidence, cannot lead us to subsequent 
rejection of the hypothesis’ conclusion. However, once we formulate the hypothesis in 
the form of a valid deductive logic, especially the modus tollens, we have provided 
the logical ground to deliver the rejection of a premise of the valid hypothesis to its 
conclusions. As Notturno points out, “in invalid and so called 'inductive' argument the 
truth of the conclusion is consistent with the truth of the premises. But inconsistency, 
ironically enough, is what really matters. In a valid deductive argument the falsity of 
the conclusion is inconsistent with the truth of the premises. It means that we cannot 
simultaneously assert the truth of those premises and deny the truth of that conclusion 
without contradicting ourselves.”90 As such, the main problem with an inductive 
argument is not that it never justifies its conclusion, but it never gives us reason to 
question its premises. In other words, an inductive argument never places us in a 
position in which we ought to choose between accepting their conclusions and 
denying their premises.  
    On the contrary, a valid deductive argument places us in such a position, hence we 
can use falsifying evidences to refute a conclusion of a hypothesis because of the 
rejection of one or more the premises.
91
 In this line of reasoning, Popper asserts that 
“[t]o give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which 
describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together 
with certain singular statement, the initial conditions.”92 The explanatory power of 
scientific theories depends upon their capacity to resistance falsifying evidences. One 
falsifying piece of evidence can refute the conclusions.  
     Recognising the two contexts of the logic of scientific discovery leads us to a key 
question for the logic of the social sciences: can we use empirical evidences to falsify 
the social sciences' hypothesis? The next sub-section argues, during the development 
of his philosophy of science and social philosophy, Popper realised that empirical 
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criticism is merely one form of his general conjectural theory of knowledge. This 
argument prepares us to argue about Popper's hermeneutic approach to the logic of the 
social sciences, whereas he introduces a qualitative-- of course not a fundamental-- 
difference between the logics of the social sciences and the natural sciences.  
2.2.3 From ‘Empirical Falsificationism’ to ‘Inter-Subjective Criticism’  
    While Popper started with the problems of induction and demarcation, as his 
historical epistemological problem, in his later works, he revised his understanding of 
a prescription for demarcation and rationality. If in the early phase of his 
epistemological thought science was demarcating the metaphysical due to its critical 
method, in his later works Popper recognises that, like science, metaphysics can 
employ a critical rationalist method. Popper repudiates the possibility of a sharp 
demarcation between science and metaphysics.
93
 He still believes that it is important 
to identify falsifiable theories, but Popper now considers this to the only one 
technique within a more comprehensive approach to rationality, conceived as inter-
subjective criticisability.
94
 For Popper, now testability was merely “a certain kind of 
arguability: arguability by means of empirical arguments, appealing to observation 
and experiences.”95 Popper rightly concludes although metaphysical theories were 
empirically irrefutable they could still be rational. In addition, it is impossible to 
eliminate all metaphysical elements from science.
96
 Due to these developments, we 
need to know how objectivity of a non-empirical hypothesis must be determined. For 
Popper, a non-empirical theory may be considered rational and objective if it is able to 
be criticised and discussed with reference to its problem situation.
97
 
     Popper argues about one method of philosophy and of natural sciences: “that of 
stating one’s problem clearly and of examining its various proposed solutions 
critically.”98 The general theory of knowledge thus becomes the “theory of problem 
solving, … of the construction, critical discussion, evaluation, and critical testing, of 
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competing conjectural theories.” 99 Popper addresses this improvement in his theory 
of knowledge in this way: “inter-subjective testing is merely a very important aspect 
of the more general idea of inter-subjective criticism, or in other words, of the idea of 
mutual rational control by critical discussion.”100 Hence, the logic of the social 
sciences, like the method of the natural sciences, "consists in trying out tentative 
solutions to those problems from which our investigation starts."
101
 In this way, 
metaphysics, the social sciences and the natural sciences involve proposing tentative 
solutions to problems, whether of the practical or theoretical type, where the method 
of problem solving is ‘trial and error’.  These different branches of knowledge 
inquiry should follow a common pattern: “P1TTEEP2. That is, human 
sciences begin with a problem (P1), and then a tentative theory (TT) is proposed to 
solve it. Next, the theory is tested, and an effort is made to eliminate errors (EE) in the 
theory. Following error elimination a new problem emerge (P2), and then the process 
begins anew.”102 As Lawrence Boland argues, a Socratic dialogic approach is central 
to Popper’s view of science. Accordingly, science is critical debate.103 However, 
Popper rightly argues that there are some qualitative differences amongst different 
branches of science in the application of this critical method.  
2.2.4 The Situational Analysis and the Hermeneutic Logic of the Social Sciences  
     Popper's Situational Analysis and its implications for his Hermeneutic Logic lead 
us to explore the aforementioned qualitative difference. As William Gorton writes, 
Popper recognises the difficulties of empirical falsification in the social sciences:   
Popper admits even in the natural science no falsification can ever be deemed 
clear-cut or final…Evidence in the social sciences is also always theory-
laden, and often to a greater degree than in the natural sciences. But social 
sciences also suffers from its own unique—and perhaps more daunting—
problems of falsification. Among the most significant is the difficulty of 
making precise predictions. Some of the reasons for this difficulty have 
already been discussed, including the lack of law-like regularities in the 
social world, the difficulty if not impossibility of conducting controlled 
experiments, the complexity of social phenomena, and the Oedipal effect.
104
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     Gorton argues the situational analysis in particular is hampered by falsifiability 
problems. As he observes, Popper argues that science tries to explain two basic types 
of phenomena: singular events and repeating events or regularities. While explaining 
the former requires scientists to invoke initial condition and universal laws, the latter 
requires construction of a model. In Gorton’s words, “social science, Popper contends, 
is usually confined to constructing models of typical social situations.”105 This is 
because “explaining and predicting singular events by universal laws and initial 
conditions is hardly ever applicable in the theoretical social science …Laws are 
simply not available in the social realm, and, owing to the complexity of the social 
world, it is difficult to isolate initial conditions.” 106 These unique features of the 
social sciences’ subject matter lead Popper to the need for modeling social theories by 
the situational logic. It is important to remember that the situational approach to 
modeling social phenomena refers to the context of discovery, rather than the context 
of justification. Any model of situational analysis needs an inter-subjective criticism 
to secure its objectivity in the context of justification. 
     Before arguing for situational analysis as a hermeneutic approach to formulating 
social sciences' hypotheses, I refer to Geoff Stokes’ analysis of Popper's reasoning for 
the situational modeling of social phenomena. I shall then explain James Farr’s 
hermeneutic reading of Popper’s situational logic that contributes to developing a new 
logic for a critical macrosociology of globalisation. Stokes points out: “Popper’s 
proposal that we construct a logic of the situation aimed to capture what he considered 
to be the most important difference between natural and social sciences, namely, the 
feature of human rationality. Because human beings are purposive and therefore 
rational in one of the sense employed by Popper, he suggests that social situations are 
just as amenable as physical events to explanation by means of the H-D [Hypothetico-
Deductive] model”107 (emphasis added). However, due to humans’ purposive and 
rational actions, modeling human actions and social orders calls for a special reading 
of the conjectural theory of knowledge.  
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     Popper argues that the fundamental problem of the social sciences “is to trace the 
unintended social repercussions of intentional human actions.”108 In addition, he 
follows methodological individualism to address the unintended consequences of 
intentional human actions. For him, the core of methodological individualism lies in 
its prescription “that the ‘behaviour’ and the ‘action’ of collectives, such as states or 
social groups, must be [ultimately] reduces to the actions of human individuals.”109 
He links methodological individualism with a tradition of the study of the social 
institutions through which ideas may captivate individuals, and new social institutions 
may be created via a critical evaluation of traditional institutions.
110
 Since Popper 
takes individuals as ultimate impetus of social order, and since he views individuals as 
purposive and rational actors, he pays a special attention to ‘human rationality’ for 
modeling unintended social consequences of human actions.  
     Having argued for methodological individualism and the epistemic primacy of 
individuals’ readings of their rational action, the situational analysis can be described 
according to the three major elements: (a) the rationality principle, (b) the social 
situation, and (c) the rational behaviour.
111
 The general relations among these key 
elements imply that since individuals act rationally, the social situations--as 
unintended outcomes of individuals’ rational behaviors-- can be analytically modelled 
through valid deductions that give the primacy to human actions as the ultimate 
driving force of social order. In this situational modeling of social orders, the 
rationality principle means that each person acts in accordance with his or her social 
situation. However, as Notturno argues, it “is not the empirical hypothesis that each 
person acts adequacy to the situation. That hypothesis is clearly false. It is, on the 
contrary, a methodological principle… It says that if we want to explain a social event 
rationally, then we must assume that the people in it acted adequately to the situation, 
or, at the very least, that they acted adequately to the situation as they saw it.”112 The 
rational behavior becomes thus an action that is adequate in the given situation.
113
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     From this point of view, a rational explanation of a social event is possible, if we 
assume that individual driving forces of the event take into consideration their social 
situation at least as they see it. Otherwise, we deal with a very confusing situation to 
address the unintended consequences of human actions, which do not follow any 
rational criterion in their conscious purposive actions. The social situation in this 
approach is a social environment or a societal problem-situation in which individual 
rational agents find themselves. This social environment consists of social institutions, 
traditions, rules, norms, organisations, as unintended consequences of human actions. 
This social environment cannot be described in psychological terms, but at the same 
time it is an outcome of intended human behaviours.
114
                       
     In sum, a situational approach to modeling unintended consequences of intended 
human actions implies while there is not a universal laws serving as the premise for a 
valid deductive hypothetic in the social sciences, we can use the rationality principle 
as an inquiry maxim to formulate valid deductive models for testing our hypotheses. 
Given human rational action, the situational model of social theories enables us to 
construct scientific models of human actions and interactions, and to use those models 
to explain social orders.
115
 There are two accounts of Popper’s concept of human 
rationality in his situational approach the logic of the social sciences. One reading 
implies that Popper utilises the notion of complete rationality to describe the 
rationality. Another implies that Popper uses the notion of learning from error to 
develop a hermeneutic logic of the social sciences. As we shall see, both readings can 
be linked to Popper's situational analysis. But, the second account is consistent with 
critical rationalism that defines ‘rationality’ as the ‘openness to criticism’.  
     In an example of the first reading of human rationality in Popper's situational logic, 
Stokes points out, “situational logic establishes an optimum [complete] model of 
human rationality by which we may explain both typical forms of human behavior 
and deviations from it in any given social or institutional situation. …Once the 
optimum rationality has been ascertained to operate as a kind of covering law that 
enables explanation to be put into the hypothetico-deductive form. One could then 
generate hypothesis in the form of prediction about how people would behave… 
Failing predictive success, one would attempt to explain why they deviated from the 
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ideal model.”116 Another example is offered by Matzner and Bhaduri. They argue that 
Popper’s concept of human rationality in his situational logic is rooted in neo-classical 
microeconomic whereas he assumes a complete informatics of rational maximising 
agents, as the main premise of his situational logic.
117
 On the contrary, Notturno and 
Farr believe that Popper’s account of rationality is not limited to the assumption of 
perfect knowledge, but it can be expanded to rationality as ‘openness to criticism’.118  
     Of particular interest for the present argument is James Farr's reading of Popper's 
situational logic as a hermeneutics approach to the logic of the social sciences. As we 
shall see, this reading is consistent with the very logic of critical rationalism itself, 
even if Popper did not focus on it. In his article entitled, Popper’s Hermeneutics, Farr 
remarks: “…by looking at Popper’s hermeneutic methodology, we are looking at 
hermeneutic methods in the social sciences. Some might take my interpretation [of 
Popper’s hermeneutics] as a mischievous or subversive one: and so it is. I deliberately 
emphasise features of Popper’s methodology which often go unremarked, and which 
therefore should cast a different light on the whole.”119 Farr’s account of Popper’s 
hermeneutics methodology leads us to a better understanding of the role of human 
rationality in the situational logic. It links Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge 
with his hermeneutic approach to the social sciences. Farr’s reading paves the way for 
replacing the Popper’s weak concept of human rationality--as an adequately behaviour 
in a given situation--with his strong concept of rationality--as openness to criticism. 
This fundamental shift puts us on an entirely new path for reconstructing Popper’s 
logic of the social sciences, as I shall argue soon.   
     Farr creates links amongst the situational analysis, the conception of rationality, 
and hermeneutics methodology of the social sciences. For him, “situational analysis 
does not, however, provide a mechanical set of rules for constructing concrete 
interpretations which would be definitive in every particular case; rather, like the 
‘logic of discovery’ generally, it only provides standards for the critical assessment of 
interpretative conjectures.”120 If we take Popper’s idea of inter-subjective criticism as 
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the reference point of objective knowledge, we will see that the objectivity of this 
interpretative conjectures is not less than objectivity of other types of scientific 
conjectures.  
     Farr distinguishes between two forms of situational analysis due the two different 
conceptions of rationality each assumes. The first form proceeds on the assumption of 
complete rationality
121
 that entails perfectly informed, instrumental behaviour 
appropriate to market situations. Complete rationality is a hypothetical rationality. 
Deviations from it are considered less and less rational on the part of the rational 
agents. A situational model based on the assumption of complete rationality of 
individuals naturally leads to the gap between theoretical model and empirical reality. 
But, it provides a hypothetical standard, a deviation from it helps us to model actual 
reality which are formed on the basis of imperfect rationality. The second form of 
situational analysis proceeds on a wider conception of rationality. In other sense, it 
does not limit itself to a special reading of rationality like a market rationality. In this 
way, it allows the situational logic to accommodate different systems of rationale in 
its wider account of human rationality as openness to criticism.
122
  
     Farr argues that this wider account of rationality can be used to elaborate Popper's 
hermeneutic logic of the social sciences. In according to the situational logic, we need 
to reconstruct agents’ rational behaviours, as micro-foundations of macrosocial order, 
in order to provide a valid deductive model of social order formation. Hence, we need 
a theory for the rational reconstruction of humans’ trains of thoughts, when they find 
themselves in the social situations. Farr argues that Popper’s conjectural theory of 
knowledge provides such a theory of rational reconstructing of the human agents’ 
actions, viewed from their own accounts of rationality. He writes:  
The kind of understanding which science provides is but a systematically 
critical version of the kind of understanding we have in ordinary life. Like 
ordinary agents, scientists approach problems with a pre-understanding: i.e., 
with ‘expectation inherent in our background knowledge’. …For Popper, 
understanding—that is, objective understanding—is essentially a matter of 
problem-solving by conjecture and refutation. The rational reconstruction of 
problem-solving rakes on this dialectical and admittedly oversimplified schema: 
P1TT EEP2. P1 is the original problem to which TT, a tentative theory or 
conjectural solution, is then offered.  In the Geisteswissenschaften (tentative) 
historical interpretation characteristically play the role of (tentative) theories. 
…The interpretation must be backed by documentation and argumentation, and 
the subjected to critical discussion. The main tools of criticism are logical 
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contradiction and falsification. When error is found, either of a logical or a 
factual, it is then eliminated (EE). Characteristically, this leaves the interpreters 
with a new or a modified problem, P2 
123
 (emphasis added). 
    We can see both contexts of discovery and refutation in this objective theory of 
understanding. A social scientist or a historian, who wants to construct a situational 
model of a historic or social event, uses the premises about how human agents defined 
their historic or social situation and how they used their own accounts of rationality in 
order to formulate an interpretative conjecture about such an event. This interpretative 
conjecture will be subjected to critical discussion by the scientific community to 
discover logical and factual contradictions. Those interpretative conjectures that 
survive such an inter-subjective criticism can be regarded objective and rational 
knowledge of corresponding social and historical events as long as have not leveled a 
new criticism. Popper rightly points out: “the theory designed to solve the problem of 
understanding is a metatheory, since it is a theory part of whose task is to discover, in 
every particular case, what P1, TT, EE, and P2 actually consisted of.”124 In Farr’s 
words, “in this way Popper forges a systematic and highly suggestive link between the 
theories of sciences, human action, and interpretative understanding” 125 (emphasis 
added).  
     Popper refers to situational analysis of Galileo's theory of the tides, as opposed to a 
non-situational analysis of it—as an episode in the history of science. Galileo 
persistently held to a theory of the tides, which denied any influence on the part of the 
moon. For this “even in our own time [Popper says] Galileo has been severely and 
personally attacked for his dogmatism in sticking obstinately to such obviously false 
theory.”126 But, Popper argues that this non-situational interpretation of Galileo's 
theory and behaviour is a misinterpretation because it proceeds without adequate 
attention to the problem-situation in which Galileo found himself.  
      In the situation as he saw it, Galileo had good reasons to hold onto his theory, and 
to deny the lunar theory. First, viewed from the Copernican tradition, he was looking 
for an auxiliary theory of the tides to advance Copernicus' simple theory of the 
circular orbits of the planets about the sun. “Galileo thought this is possible on the 
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basis of the laws of inertia and the conservation law of rotary motions. These laws 
made no mentions of the earth could alone account for the rise and fall of the tides.”127 
Popper writes, “From the point of view of method of Galileo was perfectly right in 
attempting to explain everything on this narrow basis; for only if we try to exploit and 
test out fallible theories to the limit can we hope to learn from their failure.”128 From 
Galileo's own perspective, his tenacity in holding onto a boldly simplified theory was 
not itself a sign of irrationality and dogmatism. Although, the very narrow basis of 
Galileo's theory proved to be false, and Kepler's elliptical theories of orbits and his 
theory of lunar-influenced tides, proved to be correct, a situational interpretation of 
Galileo's theory does not imply that his theory and behaviour were irrational because 
of the rejection of the theory.  
     Farr concludes that, “in trying to solve the (meta) problem of understanding how 
Galileo tried to understand and solve his own problem… Popper’s interpretation 
salvages Galileo from the charge of irrationality and dogmatism. He demonstrates 
how the rationality principle is used—viz., not as a falsifiable law, but creatively and 
sympathetically as a regulative maxim of inquiry. In this way, Popper purposefully 
reconstructs Galileo's problem-situation as Galileo himself saw.” 129 I shall argue how 
this hermeneutic approach to the logic of the social sciences can be employed for a 
rational reconstruction of the origins of contemporary liberal globalisation through 
identifying the historical-problem of those liberal thinkers, like Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith, who provided the ideational impetuses of the 
formation liberal social order.  
     It is important to note that this hermeneutic logic has been applied by so-called 
'interpretative sociology' for the study of historical macro-sociological problems. As 
Farr remarks, “the single closest theorist to Popper is undoubtedly Max Weber, whom 
Popper acknowledges.”130 Toby Huff also reminds us although Weber was not a 
supporter of the hypothetico-deductive model he argued that interpretative sociology 
aims to provide a casual explanation of social actions.
131
 Weber linked the causal 
explanation and rational interpretation with the study of all the forms of rationality in 
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a comparative historical perspective. As Huff points out, “Weber's notion of ‘rational 
interpretation,’ which included the idea that reasons and causes are related, had 
ultimately resulted in the elaboration of typologies of ‘social action’ or culturally 
embedded forms of rationality.”132 Not only did Weber recognise different forms of 
human rationality, but also he respected different rationale systems as the sources of 
different patterns of social action. Weber’s explanatory framework implied that the 
reasons and motives, which serve as the causes of social action, were derivative 
components of the implicit rational ordering of social action, imposed by a particular 
culture. The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalist is a prime substantive 
illustration of this methodological approach. Weber uses sociological ideal type for a 
rational reconstruction of typical system of rationale and corresponding social action. 
He utilised the ideal type to generate general laws related to historical phenomena. 
Weber wanted to develop a tool that would enable comparisons between historical 
phenomena.
133
 For him, the interpretation of human acts involves inferences that rest 
upon the assumption of the rational character of the actor’s motive, and thus the 
meaning of the action is directly connected to the rational context which constitutes 
the reasons or motives of such an action. He argues that the ideal types provide a 
conceptual or interpretative conjecture about how a special human rationality can be 
linked with a special pattern of social organisation in a causality manner.
134
  
     In this line of argument, Jon Hendricks and Breackinridge Peters argue that: “If 
sociology has as its goal the meaningful explanation of what happens in the social 
world it must reflect the commonsense typologies and retain the subjectively intended 
referent. Ideal types are essentially abstractions of meaningful relationships: 
meaningful to both the subject matter and the observer.”135 Weber used the ideal types 
to develop a comparative historical sociology of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Western Christianity, and Islam as the applications of his interpretive methodology of 
the social sciences. 
136
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     To summarise the preceding arguments, it refers to what Farr concludes about 
Popper’s logic of the social sciences. He rightly argues that Popper’s approach should 
be viewed in the wider context of his Critical Rationalism:  
Popper’s version is so general and disarmingly simple that it not only unifies 
the humanities and the natural sciences, but also mathematics and logic, art and 
music, ethics and moral reasoning, philosophy and metaphysics, and even 
common sense and ordinary action.
137
 In other words, the whole domain of 
critical rational thought is unified. … in Popper’s broader and arguably more 
interesting version, unified method is less significant as a characterization of 
science per se, than of human thought and critical action generally. This puts 
the whole matter in an entirely new and different light. Popper wants us to see 
unity... [of science]. And when we survey all other forms of critical rational 




      Popper leads us to realise that the differences between the natural and the social 
sciences’ methodologies may be qualitative but not fundamental. What unifies these 
methodologies is the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Conjectures and Refutations. 
2.3 A Critical Rationalist Approach to Critical Social Theory   
     Popper’s methodology of the social sciences focuses upon explaining the existing 
social order as unintended consequences of intended human actions. However, it does 
not provide a research methodology for criticising the existing social world itself. In 
other words, it does not regard the subject matter of the study itself as the object of 
critical thinking. It also cannot help us to introduce a self-liberating social change for 
overcoming the existing social orders’ contradictions. However, Critical Rationalism, 
as an epistemological theory can lead us to the logic for critical social theory, aiming 
to criticise the existing social world and to change it. 
     As Geoff Stokes points out, “since the 1950s a number of philosophers known as 
critical theorists have engaged in debate with Popper and offered a series of criticisms 
of critical rationalism. Although the ‘positivist dispute’ between Theodor Adorno and 
Popper in the 1960s is the most well known of these critical encounters, problems 
arising from it have occupied the attention of later critical theorists, such as Jürgen 
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Habermas.”139 I shall focus on the Popper-Adorno Controversy on the logic of the 
social sciences. In this way, I intend to utilise the controversy in order to argue that 
critical rationalism provides the foundation for a new logic of critical social sciences, 
whereas neither Popper nor Adorno argued for this logic. 
2.3.1 Adorno’s Critique of Popper’s Logic of the Social Sciences 
    The occasion for the Popper-Adorno Controversy was a conference held in 
Tubingen in 1961 under the auspices of the German Sociological Association on the 
logic of the social sciences. Popper formulated his views of the logics of the social 
sciences in the form of twenty-seven theses that were replied to by Adorno.
140
 This 
section is mainly concerned with Adorno's critique of Popper's logic of the social 
sciences, because we have already recognised the shortcoming of Popper's logic due 
to the lack of methodological concerns in criticising the existing social world. 
However, I shall then argue that critical rationalism, as an epistemological theory, can 
provide us with a foundation to criticise the existing social world. 
     It argued that for Popper the starting points of all scientific enquiries is a problem. 
This problem arises either due to realisation that something in our existing knowledge 
is not in order, or because a contradiction is observed between the existing knowledge 
and the existing facts. We saw that insofar as this is the case there are no fundamental 
differences between the natural and the social sciences, because both start with 
scientific problems. Popper argues that our logic of scientific problems' solving are 
not fundamentally different in the social and the natural sciences because they use the 
two steps of ‘conjectures’ and ‘refutations’. In short, “the method of science is thus 
the control of the tentative search for solutions by the sharpest possible critiques that 
is progress through trial and error.”141 Popper recognises a qualitative difference 
between the logics of the social and the natural sciences, whereas he argues about the 
situational and hermeneutics approaches to the logic of social sciences. However, he 
does not regard this difference as a fundamental one, because the logic of the social 
sciences still follows the conjectural theory of knowledge.   
     Adorno agrees with Popper on the nature of critical method: “Insofar as he 
[Popper] identifies the objectivity of science with the critical method, he raises the 
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latter to the organon of truth. No dialectician today would demand more.”142 
However, Adorno rightly argues that it is impossible to limit the critical activity of the 
social sciences to self-criticism. By self-criticism, Adorno refers to what Popper 
introduces as uncovering a contradiction in the existing knowledge of social world, in 
particular human society, as the subject matter of a sociological theory. As argued, for 
Popper, problems are located in our knowledge, in our statements about reality—what 
Popper calls the third-world; that is, the world of our objective knowledge of the 
statements, as opposed to the first-world of our mental universe, and the second-world 
of external universe.
143
 In this sense, the problems located in our knowledge or 
statements about reality. However, for Adorno, the problems of sociology, for 
example, are not created through our discovery that some aspect of our knowledge is 




     Adorno interprets the conception of logic more broadly than Popper does. He 
understands this concept as the concrete mode of procedure of sociology rather than 
general rules of thought, of deduction.
145
 Adorno recognises that Popper views the 
scientific problems as the epistemic problems, raising because of the contradictions 
between the existing knowledge and the external world, i.e., between the third-world 
and the second-world. However, for Adorno, in the final instance the problems refer 
to a problematic condition of the social world itself. In his words: 
…the problems of sociology do not constantly arise through the discovery 'that 
something is not in order with our supposed knowledge, …from the discovery 
of an apparent contradiction between our supposed knowledge and the facts'. 
The contradiction must not, as Popper at least presumes here, be a merely 
'supposed' contradiction between subject and object…Instead, the contradiction 
can, in very real term, have its place in reality and can in no way be removed by 
increased knowledge and clearer formulation.
146
  
     Adorno argues that knowledge derived from an uncritical acceptance of empirical 
facts becomes a reproduction of the existing unsatisfactory relations of society.
147
 For 
him, if we accept the contradictory nature of social reality
148
 we should go beyond 
the contradictions of supposed knowledge with the facts. We must include a self-
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criticism of social reality’s contradiction itself. Adorno concludes that our scientific 
criticism should not be only a critique for solving our epistemic problems, but also a 
critique of the existing society per se.
149
 Adorno provides us with a good illustration 
of the task of a critical social science as follows: 
… take the concept of liberal society as implying freedom and equality and, on 
the hand, disputes, in principle, the truth-content of these categories under 
liberalism--in view of the inequality of the social power which determines the 
relations between people--then these are not logical contradictions which could 
be eliminated by means of more sophisticated definitions, nor are they 
subsequently emergent empirical restrictions or differentiations of a provisional 
definition, but rather, they are the structural constitutions of society itself.
150
  
      Adorno views a critical theory of society as a sociological critique for unmasking 
contradictions of the existing social order. For him, critical theory's conception of the 
social is thus one which is opposed to society as a pure given object. It attempts to 
break down its given objects into the existent and the possible, the actually and the 
potentially.
151
 A central task of a critical theory is to criticise the contradictions of 
actually existing social order, as a deviation from a potential desirable social order. 
Criticism of ideological foundation of the society's contradictions finds an important 
place in Adorno's critical sociology.
152
    
     Adorno argues that the separation between the structure of science and reality is 
not absolute. “Nor may the concept of truth be attributed solely to the structures of 
science. It is no less meaningful to speak of the truth of a societal institution than of 
the truth of theorems concerned with it. Legitimately, criticism does not normally 
imply merely self-criticism—which is what it actually amounts to for Popper—but 
also criticism of reality.”153 In sum, Adorno's critique of Popper's logic of the social 
sciences does not refer to his critical method. It refers to his focus upon using the 
method to discover the contradictions within the existing structure of our knowledge. 
Other members of the Frankfurd School of the critical theory-- like Max Horkheimer, 
Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas--follow more or less same direction to identify 
the methodological tasks of critical social theory. For instance, Horkheimer argues 
that the critical theory of society has as its object man as the producers of their total 
historical forms of life. The conditions of reality from which the science starts it not a 
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given fact, what in each case is given depends not solely upon nature but also on what 
man wish to make it.
154
 
     Habermas argues about a critical hermeneutic logic of the social sciences that aims 
to fulfil the tasks of critical social sciences. He points out: “Critical theory aims to 
restore to men an awareness of their position as active, yet historically limited 
subjects. Insofar as it discovers which forms of constrains on human freedom are 
necessary and which are historically specific, it generates a critique of society.”155 It is 
important to note that the Horkheimer/Adorno approach to critical theory aimed to 
reinvent the Marxian social theory. They accepted Marx's critique of capitalist 
society
156
, however they tried to provide new reading for this critique. For instance, 
Adorno remarks: “In a grand manner, the unity of the critique of scientific and meta-
scientific sense is revealed in the work of Marx. It is called the critique of political 
economy since it attempts to derive the whole that is to be criticized in terms of its 
right to existence from exchange, commodity form and its immanent ‘logical’ 
contradictory nature.”157 Habermas' critical social theory differs from those of 
Horkheimer and Adorno, recognised as the first generation of the Frankfurt School of 
the critical theory, due to a distinction he makes between the instrumental and 
communicative rationality. Andrew Linklater introduces Habermas’ critical theory as 
a post-Marxian critical theory.
158
 However, these critical thinkers share the key task of 
critical social theory i.e. criticising the contradiction of existing social world.
159
  
2.3.2 Critical Rationalism and the Logic of Critical Social Sciences                                
    Adorno argues that the social sciences must unmask the contradictions of existing 
social world. He agrees with Popper’s critical method, however, he does not argue 
how the critical method can be used to unmask the unsatisfactory nature of the society 
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itself. Popper does not argue about using the critical method to criticise the existing 
social world, because he identifies the task of the social sciences as explaining the 
existing social world rather than criticising it.  In this way, neither Adorno nor Popper 
does argue for employing critical rationalism to formulate a critical social theory. 
Hence, the question as to how critical rationalism and the conjectural theory of 
knowledge can be used to develop the logic of critical social sciences remains 
unanswered. This section offers a tentative solution for applying a conjectural theory 
of knowledge, as a methodological implication of critical rationalism, for introducing 
a hermeneutic approach to the logic of the social sciences.  
     As philosophers, both critical rationalists and the proponents of critical theory 
shared the Enlightenment view that the exercise of reason could lead to emancipation, 
but as social theorists they differs in the application of the reason for a self-liberating 
social change. Critical rationalists use the social sciences for improving social orders, 
whereas, the subject matter of study, i.e. the society is given and out of self-criticism. 
Critical theorists undertake “the task of criticism as ‘ideology-critique’ and proceeded 
by the method of internal or 'immanent' critique.”160 They focus upon 'immanent' 
critique of the society as the object of the social studies itself. If they truly share in 
emancipatory role of reason and the critical method, they can be converged to develop 
a critical rationalist approach to critical social theory. How can we integrate Popper's 
conjectural theory of knowledge with Adorno's critical sociology? Addressing this 
question leads us towards a new logic of a critical macrosociology of globalisation.  
      I propose following steps for the development of a critical rationalist methodology 
for the critical social sciences: 
(a) According to critical rationalism, all of our criticisms follow the conjectural theory 
of knowledge (i.e., P1TTEEP2), in spite of the fact that it is a critique of the 
contradiction between supposed knowledge and the existing facts, or a critique of the 
contradictions of the subject matter of the study, i.e., the society itself. In this sense, as 
Popper argues, all of scientific problems are epistemic problems, even those problems 
that refer to the contradictions of the social reality itself.  
b) Our immanent critique of the society, as the object of study, uses the conjectural 
theory of knowledge (i.e., P1TTEEP2) to formulate interpretative conjectures, 
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regarding the reasons behind the society’s contradictions, by attributing the 
contradictions to irrational beliefs and actions of individual members of the society. In 
this way, the irrational reality of the society is originated from irrational beliefs and 
actions of individuals.  
c)  Our immanent critiques of the society must use the epistemological conception of 
critical rationality; that is, openness to criticism and learning from error, which is 
manifested in the critical method itself (i.e., P1TTEEP2), to judge regarding 
rationality and irrationality of individuals' beliefs and actions. It leads us to a strong 
account of the principle of rationality—opposed to Popper's weak account, defined as 
an adequate behaviour in relation with the social situation. Connecting the patterns of 
social organisation and individuals' beliefs and actions validates the principle of 
methodological individualism and the Weberian interpretative method.   
d) Viewed from the critical rationalism, the irrational reality of the society, as the 
main source of its contradictory nature, can be attributed to individuals' irrational 
beliefs and actions, as the result of their closedness to criticism. In this way, we lead 
to a critical rationalist approach to critical social theory, because we have used the 
conjectural theory of knowledge (i.e., P1TTEEP2), as an explanatory theory, 
for addressing the contradictions of the society itself. As Farr argues, Popper himself 
recognised this explanatory power of his theory of knowledge for addressing rational 
human actions. However, he did not introduce it as the foundation for the logic of a 
critical social theory.  
e) This critical rationalist approach to critical social theory provides us with a logic 
for criticising the contradictions of the society due to its individual members' 
closedness to learning from their errors. It also provides us with a new logic for 
advocating an alternative (open) social order against which the deviations of the 
existing social order from the alternative can be diagnosed. This logic also leads us to 
explore how the transition from a contradictory to a desirable social order can use a 
critical rationalist approach to social learning as an epistemic driving force of such an 
institutional change. Here the term social learning refers to an inter-subjective 
learning amongst individuals through which they learn from recognising their mutual 
mistakes and accordingly learn to correct their errors (i.e., P1TTEEP2). A 
critical rationalist approach to the logic of critical social sciences internalises the 
  56 
conjectural theory of knowledge in the logic of the social sciences by linking the 
theory of knowledge with a theory of rational human action.  
      In Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper criticises the closed society due to its the 
closedness of its individuals members to criticism. However, he does not turn this 
method into a logic for the critical social theory.  In his controversial debate with 
Popper, Adorno accepted that the critical method is a sophisticated logic of an 
objective social inquiry. However, he does not argue that such a critique of the 
contradictory nature of the society can be the subject to the conjectural logic of 
scientific discovery. Hence, the key question for Adorno is what is the difference 
between a critique, which targets a contradiction between the existing knowledge and 
the facts and a critique that targets the contradictions of the society as the object of the 
study? I argue that in both cases, a social scientist deals with an epistemic problem. 
Our conjectures about the causes of the social contradictions by no mean differ from 
our conjectures regarding the causes of the contradiction between our supposed 
knowledge and the external facts. In both cases, we must use the logic of scientific 
discovery to address our epistemic problems. 
      Popper is right in saying that in each case we face an epistemic problem, which 
must employ the conjectural theory of knowledge. Adorno is right in saying that our 
problems are not merely shaped because of a contradiction between our supposed 
knowledge and the facts, and thus they cover the contradictions of the society itself. 
However, it seems that both of them ignore the possibility of using the conjectural 
theory of knowledge to address the epistemic origins of the society’s contradictions. 
The key point here is that a  critical rationalist approach to the logic of critical social 
sciences leads us to explore how using conjecture theory of knowledge --as an 
explanatory theory of human rational action—can be used for addressing the 
contradictory patterns of social organisation. It links Critical Rationalism with the 
three major tasks of the logics of critical social sciences: explaining the existing social 
world, criticising its contradictions, and advocating an alternative social order. 
     Habermas takes a similar approach to the logic of critical social theory, using his 
notion of communicative rationality. He argues that we can criticise the contradictions 
of a capitalist society due to its instrumental rationality, as a deviation from an ideal 
type communicative rationality-based dialogic society. I argue that we can use Critical 
Rationalism and its sociological expression in the ideal type of the open society to 
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explore the closed societies’ contradictions because of their individual members’ 
closedness to criticism and learning from their errors. Along this line of reasoning, 
Habermas writes: 
…the institutions of a society are compared with the objective possibilities of 
human development, with the ideal of a rational society. In this way, actors can 
achieve a historically conditioned autonomy and so engage in rational social 
change. Therefore, critical social theory goes beyond the nomenological 
knowledge of the analytical-empirical approach in order to discover when they 
theoretical statements grasp ‘invariant regularities of social action as such’ and 




     Habermas reminds us, a critical social theory combines the understanding of 
subjectivity intended meaning with real causal mechanisms.
162
 In a word, a critical 
social theory aims to unmask social institutions’ malfunctions due to their individuals’ 
closedness to criticism. A rational social change here can be regarded as a rational 
change in subjectivity intended meaning which directly affects real causal mechanism. 
As argued before, Farr's reading of Popper's hermeneutic logic of the social sciences, 
such as Weber’s and Habermas’ interpretative sociology, aims to link the subjectivity 
intended meanings, as epistemic motor forces, with the emergence of macro-societal 
institutions trajectories as an interplay between cultural model of social order and 
social institutions of the society in question.  
2.4 The Logic of Macrosociology of Globalisation:  
       A Critical Rationalist Approach   
    We are now in a position to introduce how the logic of critical social sciences can 
be employed for developing a critical macrosociology of globalisation. Chapter 1 
discussed the three major aims of this macrosociology: (a) explaining contemporary 
globalisation, (b) criticising it because of its unsocial sociability or contradictions, and 
(c) advocating an alternative dialogic globalisation to overcome unsocial sociability of 
contemporary liberal globalisation.  
     According to the logic of critical social sciences, the first issue is defining the 
scientific problem. Secondly, a hypothesis as a tentative solution to solve the problem 
must be formulated. Finally, the conditions under which such a hypothesis can be 
examined must be defined. Since the thesis’ hypothesis is not an empirical one, the 
research methodology uses logical criticism to evaluate its tentative solution. All 
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these methodological tasks must be viewed in line with the three major tasks of the 
thesis’ research program.   
    The three aims of a critical social theory, like a critical macrosociology of 
globalisation, are not separate tasks. The opposite is the case: they are systematically 
linked. The logic of critical social sciences leads us to realise that we cannot explain 
the existing social order without recognising its contradictions or societal deficits. For 
instance, contemporary globalisation cannot be separated from its global democratic 
deficits. In addition, such societal deficits cannot be diagnosed without having an 
ideal type from which deviations of the exiting globality can be recognised. However, 
objectivity of the investigation depends on its openness to inter-subjective criticism. 
     The thesis focuses on contemporary globalisation’s macro-sociological problem. 
The problem is that the existing liberal model of globalisation suffers from a macro-
social organising problem: a global organisation of peoples through the mechanisms 
of competition for economic interests, as opposed to a rational dialogue. The thesis’ 
challenge is not only providing an explanation of this liberal mode of globality, but 
also an exploration of its causes. Due to thesis’ epistemic-institutional approach to 
globalisation research, it must explore how liberal model of social organisation, as an 
ideational force, has affected a global macro-societal institutions’ transformation. 
More fundamentally, the thesis must address the question as to how a new global 
epistemic shift in liberal pattern of social organisation can mitigate unsocial sociabiliy 
of liberal globality. 
     As noted in chapter 1, the thesis proposes a hypothesis as its tentative solution for 
globalisation's macrosociological problem: a rational dialogue amongst civilisations 
operates as a mechanism for transforming the existing liberal mode of globality into 
an open global society. The development of valid deductive arguments for supporting 
this hypothesis requires two arguments: the first supportive argument relates to 
contemporary globalisation, and the second concerns with the contradictions of liberal 
globalisation. The first implies that contemporary globalisation is a liberal model of 
global social organisation. The second implies that the contradictory nature of this 
liberal globalisation originates from an ideational structure of the liberal model itself. 
Once the thesis developed these two supportive arguments, the ground will be paved 
to defend the thesis’ main solution for globalisation’s macrosociological problem; that 
is, a rational dialogue among world civilisations.    
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     In terms of the discovery context, the thesis introduces a normative ideal type of 
globality by chapter 4 i.e. the ideal type of an open global society. This normative 
ideal type is a logically constructed normative ideal type and open to logical criticism. 
The idea of open global society is a macro-sociological ideal type that rests upon the 
premise of equal access of human beings to critical rationality. It therefore provides us 
with a global institutional outlook in which all peoples have equal rights of self-
determination. If one does not accept an equal access of humans to critical rationality, 
he or she can reject this logically constructed normative ideal type. However, if she or 
he recognises this fundamental premise, he or she cannot reject the logical outcomes 
of the ideal type accordingly unless contradict her or himself.  
     In line with this discovery context, the ideal type of open global society will be 
advanced by chapter 5 in order to develop a theoretical framework for the research 
methodology. It enables the research to explore how micro-epistemic motor forces of 
contemporary globalisation have fueled its macro-societal institutions. In this way, it 
leads the thesis methodological approach to explore how cultural crystallisations 
interplays with global institutions’ trajectories. It offers the research methodology a 
hermeneutic model of situational analysis through which the thesis connects micro-
foundation with its macro-institutional trajectories. This hermeneutic model rests on a 
critical rationalist conception of rationality. It refers to a rational reconstruction of 
human agents' trains of thought as the micro driving forces of a global institutional 
change. Beside the ideal type of open global society, a Hobbesian ideal type of 
globality based on the logic of the struggle for political power, and a Lockean ideal 
type of globality based on the logic of competition for economic interest will be 
discussed. These ideal types will be used to describe the contradictions of the existing 
liberal globality and advocating the solution to overcome such contradictions.  
     In terms of the development of valid deductive arguments in defense of the thesis's 
hypothesis, Chapter 6 utilises the method of cultural history.
163
 It looks for the 
ideational logic of contemporary globalisation in the West's cultural history. In the 
context of this cultural history, the thesis searches for the West's historical-political 
                                                 
163
 On the method of Cultural History, see Willem Melching and Wyger Velema, Main Trends in 
Cultural History, Ten Essays, (Amsterdam, Atlanta: 1994). 
  60 
problem in the past three centuries.
164
 It aims to explore how intellectual efforts for 
establishing a liberal or free society shaped the West historical-political problem.
165
 
    Viewed from the hermeneutic model of situational analysis, the thesis searches for 
a historical emergence of the very idea of a liberal society, which was developed by 
liberal thinkers like Hobbes, Locke and Hume and Smith. It also searches for 
intellectual impacts of the liberal train of thought on the emergence of a liberal model 
of social organisation in the West and its outcomes for the formation of liberal 
globalisation. In this way, a rational reconstruction of the impacts of the West 
cultural crystallisations around the liberal model of social order leads the thesis to a 
new macrosociological explanation of contemporary globalisation. The hermeneutic 
model enables the thesis to develop the first supportive argument through linking the 
West's cultural history to the emergence of a post-national political economy as a 
global institutional change from the Westphalian world order toward a liberal global 
governance.   
     In order to address the question of why contemporary liberal globalisation suffers 
from an unsocial sociability, the thesis compares the existing global reality with the 
ideal type of open global society. It employs the thesis’ hermeneutic model in order to 
investigate the reason why an institutional contradiction of liberal globality originates 
from its ideational driving source i.e. liberal social philosophy itself. Finally The 
thesis’ research methodology paves the way for exploring the transformative capacity 
of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, as a global self-liberating mechanism, 
which aims to mitigate the unsocial sociability of liberal globality and to build an 
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     Normative critiques of contemporary globalisation employ certain ideal types of 
global order for uncovering the deviations of the existing globalisation from the ideal 
types. Hence, the ideal type of global order plays the key role in normative critiques 
of contemporary globalisation. While the normative critiques rest upon the normative 
conceptions of globality, different ideal types of global order lead us to different 
normative critiques of globalisation. This chapter employs the phrase ‘globalisation’s 
societal deficits’ to argue on the contradictory nature of contemporary globalisation. 
The term ‘societal’ does not refer to one aspect of this contradictory nature. For 
instance, it does not refer to merely a political, a cultural or an economic aspect. In 
contrast, it refers to a package of societal deficits, covering those three major aspects.  
    Viewed from an ideal type of global society, the term 'global societal deficits' 
implies that if we evaluate the existing form of globality due its deviations from a 
global society of free and equal persons, we can find a package of cultural, political 
and economic deficits that construct global societal deficits. For instance, if 
contemporary globalisation suffers from a lack of a global consensus regarding social 
organisation of emerging global order or if it suffers from the lack of accountability to 
the world's populations, these different aspects of globalisation's deficits are a part of 
the global societal deficits. Normative critiques of globalisation may focus on merely 
one aspect of such deficits-- for instance on globalisation's democratic deficits. 
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However, the thesis uses the term global societal deficits in order to uncover 
globalisation's deficits as a package of cultural, political, and economic deficits.   
     This chapter aims to show the nature of the normative critiques of contemporary 
globalisation. It argues that the normative critiques logically depend upon their ideal 
types of global order. Given this reason, we do not need to provide a comprehensive 
review of all the normative critiques of contemporary globalisation. I have selected 
the three major approaches, as examples, to show the nature of the normative critiques 
and the link between normative conception of globality and normative vision of 
globalisation. The chapter’s case studies paves the way for investigating how the ideal 
type of open global society, as a new normative account of globality, can advance the 
normative critiques of contemporary globalisation.  
     Chapter 3 consists of three sections. Section 3.1 develops the first case study 
regarding David Held's normative critique of globalisation due to his ideal type of 
global social democracy. Section 3.2 presents the second case study by arguing about 
Richard Falk's normative critique of globalisation based on his ideal type of humane 
global governance. Section 3.3 provides the third case study as Jürgen Habermas's 
normative critique by arguing about his ideal type of a dialogic world society. My 
critical reflections of these normative analyses have been presented in the final sub-
section of each case study.  
3.1 David Held’s Normative Critique of Globalisation   
     Viewed from the logic of critical social theory, this brief review of Held’s 
normative critique of contemporary globalisation begins with its foundation in the 
idea type of global society democracy. Referring to the premises of global social 
democracy, I shall argue about Held’s normative analysis of globalisation. Held’s 
normative critique compares the existing form of globalisation with the ideal type of 
global social democracy. Finally, the problematic nature of Held's normative critique 
will be discussed. My criticisms of Held’s analysis originate from a critique of the 
ideal type of global social democracy itself.   
3.1.1 The Ideal Type of Global Social Democracy 
     Chapter 1 argued on the methodological function of a normative ideal type. For a 
critical social theory, a normative ideal type provides an ideal type situation model on 
which basis we can uncover the societal deficits of the existing social reality due to its 
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deviations from the ideal type. Such a normative ideal type of social order usually 
rests on certain premises about the nature of human beings. Held’s normative ideal 
type of global social democracy introduces a democratic global order, as its reference 
point, for criticising the existing form of globality.  
     Held’s principal normative argument is that if democracy is a legitimate form of 
social organisation, why should global governance not be democratic? To review the 
ideal type of global social democracy, I refer to Held’s definition of democracy. Held 
conceptualises democracy as: 
…only grand or ‘meta-narrative’ which can legitimately frame and delimit 
the competing ‘narratives’ of the good. It is practically important because it 
suggests a way of relating values to one another and leaving the resolution of 
value conflicts open to participants in a political dialogue, subject only to 
certain provisions, protecting the shape and form of the dialogue itself. 
Nevertheless, what clearly is required is a ‘precommitment’ to democracy, 
for without this there can be no sustained dialogue, and democracy cannot 
function as a decision- making process
166
 [emphasis added]. 
     Held claims that a cosmopolitan community does not require political and cultural 
integration in the forms of a consensus about a wide range of values and norms.
167
 He 
believes that a precommitment to democracy functions as such globally shared values.  
     The ideal type of global social democracy rests on certain assumptions about 
human nature. It refers to a legitimate way of global ordering of peoples due to 
recognition of certain assumptions about human nature. Held’s concept of (global) 
democracy rests upon a key premise of humans’ moral equality: each person, as a 
member of humanity, is in a fundamental sense equal, and that she or he deserves 
equal political treatment. This equality implies that all individuals should be treated 
“based on the equal care and consideration of their agency, irrespective of the 
community in which they were born or brought up”.168 Held introduces eight premises 
of the ideal type of global social democracy: equal moral worth and dignity; active 
agency; personal responsibility and accountability; consent; collective decision-
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     Regarding the first premise, Held writes: “To think of people as having equal 
moral value is to make a general claim about the basic units of the world comprising 
persons as free and equal being”170 This moral equality has an important implication 
for Held’s conception of human nature. As the second premise, Held links human 
moral equality to his active agency: human beings are capable agents for the self-
determination of their social organisation. The third premise implies that actors should 
be aware of, and accountable for, the consequences of their actions which may restrict 
or delimit the choices of others. The fourth premise means that a commitment to 
human moral equality, conscious agency and personal responsibility requires a non-
coercive political process in and through which people can negotiate and organise 
their social relations. The premise of consent, i.e. the fourth premise, constitutes the 
basis of non-coercive collective agreement and governance. The fifth premise entails 
that if the consent of all is too strong a requirement of collective decision-making, a 
legitimate public decision should follow the majority rule. According to the sixth 
premise, collective decision-making is best located when it is closest to and involves 
those whose life expectancy and life chances are determined by significant social 
processes and forces. If the decisions at issue are trans-local, trans-national then 
political associations need also to have corresponding frameworks of operation. The 
seventh premise is a principle for allocating priority to the most vital cases of need 
and, where possible, trumping other less urgent public priorities until such a time as 
all human beings enjoy the status of equal moral value and active agency. Finally, the 
eighth premise implies that all economic and social development must be consistent 




     Held categorises the eight premises in three clusters. The first cluster (premises 1-
3) set down the main organisational features of a cosmopolitan moral universe. The 
key values are that each person is a subject of equal moral concern; that each person is 
capable of acting autonomously with respect to the range of choices before them; and 
the claims of each person affected should be equally respected. In other words, they 
construct Held’s conception of human nature. The second cluster (premises 4-6) 
argues how individually initiated activity can be translated into collectively agreed or 
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collectively sanctioned frameworks of action or regulatory regimes. They shape 
Held’s ideal type of democratic social organisation. The third cluster, (premises 7- 8) 
refers to a base for prioritising urgent need and resource conservation.
172
 The eight 
premises altogether construct the ideal type of global society democracy. Held 
summarises the normative project of a global social democracy and its confrontation 
with liberal globalisation in this way: 
The project of global social democracy can be conceived as a basis for 
promoting the rule of law at the international level; greater transparency, 
accountability and democracy in global governance; a deeper commitment to 
social justice in the pursuit of a more equitable distribution of life chances; … 
and the regulation of the global economy through the public management of 
global trade and financial flows, ... These guiding orientations set the politics 
of global social democracy apart from the pursuit of the Washington 
consensus, neoliberalism, and the aims of those pitched against globalisation 
in all its forms.
173
 
    Taking ‘global social democracy’ as his normative ideal type, Held compares the 
existing liberal globalisation with the ideal type to unmask globalisation’s democratic 
deficit. His model of global social democracy advocates a set of global institutional 
reforms for establishing a global social democracy. As argued, the premise of moral 
equality plays a key role in Held’s idea of global social democracy.  
3.1.2 Globalisation as a Shift in the Scale of Human Organisation  
     Held views contemporary globalisation as a global macro-organisational shift. For 
him, “Globalisation, at its simplest, refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of 
human organisation that links distance communities and expands the reach of power 
relations across the world’s regions. …While globalisation generates dense patterns of 
transborder activities and network… it does not necessarily prefigure the emergence 
of a harmonious world society or a process of integration among nations and 
cultures.”174 In another sense, globalisation has not created a harmonious world 
society, that integrates national societies into a wider world society, but it has re-
organised national societies in the context of a transnational social order.  
     Held argues that the existing form of globalisation is a new phase of a long-term 
economic and political change in the world order. While contemporary globalisation 
shares much in common with past phases, it is distinguished by unique spatial-
temporal and organisational attributes i.e. by distinctive measures of the intensity, 
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velocity and impact of global flows of capital, power, and ideas. In addition, since 
contemporary globalisation overlaps networks and constellations of power that cut 
across territorial and political boundaries, it presents a unique challenge to a world 
order designed in accordance with the Westphalian principle of sovereignty.
175
 Held 
rightly regards contemporary globalisation as a new phase of global integration which 
is a unique challenge to the Westphalian world order.   
     To show the qualitative nature of this global shift in human organisation, Held 
situates his account of globalisation--what he calls a transformative approach-- 
between two extreme positions: the first is taken by the hyperglobalisers, like K. 
Ohmae who claims contemporary globalisation has led to the demise of the sovereign 
statehood and has undermined the world order constructed on the basis of 
Westphalian norms.
176
 The second is taken by skeptics who believe that globalisation 
is the great myth of our time and accordingly, the emergence of a new less state-
controled world order is not a global reality.
177
  
     Held’s middle position argues that globalisation is reconstituting or transforming 
the power, functions and autonomy of nation-states. He introduces Anthony Giddens 
and James Rosenau, among others, as the proponents of this middle way.
178
 For this 
approach, “globalisation is associated with the emergence of a post-Westphalian 
world order in which the institutions of sovereign statehood and political community 
are being reformed and reconstituted. In this post-Westphalian order, there is marked 
shift towards heterarchy -- a divided authority system-- in which states seek to share 
the tasks of governance with a complex array of institutions, public and private, local, 
regional, transnational and global.”179 To explain such an institutional shift in global 
organisation from the Westphalian to the post-national order, Held creates a 
distinction between the two conceptions of sovereignty. On the one hand, sovereignty 
refers to “the rightful exercise of political power over a circumscribed realm. It seeks 
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to specify the political authority within a community which has the right to determine 
the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern 
accordingly…”180, and on the other hand, there is another concept of sovereignty that 
does not refer to the entitlement to rule over a bounded territory. It refers to state 
authority in terms of the central power of the nation -- state possesses to articulate, 
and achieve policy goals independently. Globalisation as a shift in the scale of human 
organisation from the states-system toward the post-Westphalain order means that a 
nation-state's authority to articulate, manage, and achieve its national policy goals has 
been substantially undermined by transnational economic and political forces.
181
 
     Held argues about some qualitative changes in global organisation of production, 
trade and finance as important mechanisms of undermining nation state’s sovereignty. 
Economic globalisation has created a transnational economic organisation of the 
productions through rapidly developing multinational corporations. He points out: “A 
new highly specialized geographic division of labour has emerged, recasting the 
nature and form of production systems. Multinationals span every sector of the global 
economy--from agriculture to manufacturing and finance.”182 With respect to the 
transformation in global trade, Held argues that in the past, international trade formed 
largely isolated from the rest of national economy. However, economic globalisation 
has integrated transnational trade into the national system of production in modern 
national economies as if now international trade is a significant proportion of their 
domestic product. The world’s financial flows have grown exponentially, especially 
since the 1970s. 
183
  
     From a political view point, Held believes that it is important to explore the way in 
which the sovereign state is now criss-crossed by a vast array of networks and 
organisations that have been established to regulate and manage divers areas of 
international and transnational activity—trade, etc. The rapid growth of transnational 
issues has generated a multi-centric system of governance.
184
 Held recognises the 
collapse of the Cold War order as an important political mechanism of contemporary 
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globalisation. In his words: “The end of the Cold War and of the division of the world 
by two superpowers marks a new distribution of power among states, markets and 
civil society.”185 As such, a major shift in the world politics is a shift from the 
hierarchical organisation of nation-states system to a horizontal and multicentric 
political organisation. Through diversifying the distribution of political power across 
different layers and centres, political globalisation has undermined the nation-states’ 
sovereignty and their capacity for national policy-making. 
3.1.3 Globalisation’s Democratic Deficit 
     If the ideal type of global social democracy were given as a reference point, what 
can a normative critique of contemporary globalisation be? Held's normative critique 
shows that the contradictions of contemporary globalisation mainly originate from its 
democratic deficit. Since globalisation, as a global shift in the scale of human 
organisation, has not created an accountable global governance, it suffers from a 
legitimacy crisis. The idea of global social democracy implies that all sites of power-- 
including national, regional, and global-- ought to be held accountable to people. 
However, the shift from the Westphalian to the post-national order does not signal 
such an accountability to the world population.  
     Globalisation's democratic deficit originates from an institutional gap between 
global decision-makers and global decision-takers. Due to the fact that the emerging 
global governance is not an accountable governance to peoples, it cannot take into 
account peoples' needs and their contribution to solve the global problems. Under this 
condition, on the one side globalisation has led to spill over of negative externalities 
of transnational flows of capital and power. On the other side, due to an unmonitored 
global interconnectivity, the emerging global governance has not developed a global 
mechanism for preventing the negative externalities and distributing the positive 
externalities. Held refers to the works of Inge Kaul et al
186
 to address this institutional 
gap. They view the gap as a jurisdictional gap that means the discrepancy between 
national, separate units of policy-making and a regionalised and globalised world, 
which gives rise to the problem of externalities such as market volatility or the 
                                                 
185
 See Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy, (1995), p.423. 
186
 See: Inge, Kaul; Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (eds.) Global Public Goods, International 
Cooperation In The 21
St
 Century, (New York: Oxford university Press: 1999), and Inge Kaul; Perdro 
Concelcao: Katell Le Goulvev, and Ronald U. Mendoze, (eds.) Providing Global Public Goods, Managing 
Globalisation, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003).  
  70 
problem of who is responsible for them, and how they can be held to account. Another 
gap is an intensive gap that refers to the challenge posed by the fact that, in the 
absence of any supranational entity to regulate the supply of global public goods, 
many states and non-state actors will seek to free ride or the lack sufficient motivation 
to find durable solutions to pressing global problems.187 
    Viewed from its democratic deficit, globalisation has created a multicentric sites of 
power and decision-making, but there is no clear the division of labour among the 
myriad of international agencies; function often overlap, mandates frequently conflict, 
and aims and objectives too often get blurred. There are a number of overlapping 
global institutions all of which have some stake in shaping different sectors of global 
public policy.
188
 In this condition, a key global organisational problem is the lack of 
ownership of global problem.
189
 If the emerging global governance does not take the 
ownership of global problems and cannot solve them, the reason is that there is an 
institutional gap between 'global decision-makers' and 'global decision-takers. 
190
 
    The ideal type of global social democracy calls for an accountable global decision-
making system to global decision-takers whom are affected by those global decisions 
and have the equal rights to verify the decisions. Held's normative critique implies the 
contradictions of globalisation originate in this political unaccountability of global 
governance to the world's population. Given this democratic deficit, Held suggests his 
alternative model of globality (i.e., global social democracy) to overcome those 
contradictions. The main aim of this social democratic globalisation is to make the 
global governance an accountable global order to peoples in its political sense. For 
him, this accountability also provides the bases for a fair distribution of globalisation's 
costs and benefits.  
3.1.4 The Problematic Nature of Held’s Normative Critique 
     As argued, the methodological function of a normative ideal type of globality is to 
provide us with a reference point for uncovering the contradictions of the existing 
social reality as the deviations from the standard. Since Held’s ideal type of global 
social democracy rests on a concept of democracy, assuming that a pre-commitment 
of different national societies to democracy is enough for establishing a global social 
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democracy, his normative critique of globalisation focuses on the deviation of the 
emerging global order from a democratic global governance. The problem with this 
normative critique is that it assumes that such a pre-commitment to democracy does 
not need a global cultural convergence on a set of globally shared values about 
human moral equality and democracy as a desirable model of social governance. The 
key problem with Held’s model of global social democracy is that without a pre-
commitment to moral equality of human beings amongst world civilisations, they 
cannot arrive at a pre-commitment to social democracy as the best way of social 
ordering of peoples. Held’s ideal type actually assumes that without an inter-
civilisational consensus on human nature, they will not arrive at a global pre-
commitment to social democracy. In arguing for this problematic nature of Held’s 
analysis, Adam Lupel writes: “Held’s cosmopolitan democracy is designed to 
maximize self-determination; but in the absence of a pre-existing consensus, the 
institutional reform necessary to constitute such a system would tend to require 
coercive means. …his model requires convergence upon a global overlapping 
consensus: the development of a common political culture.”191 Normative ideal type 
of global order must include the need for a global consensus on social democracy. 
     Without such a global consensus, Held’s model of global social democracy must 
be unilaterally imposed on the emerging global governance. In supporting this 
argument, Heikki Patomaki and Teivo Teivainen write: Held “claims that: ‘without a 
politics of coercion or hegemony, the only basis for nurturing and protecting cultural 
pluralism and a diversity of identities is through the implementation of cosmopolitan 
democratic law…But this ‘only basis’ would presuppose that the cosmopolitan 
democratic law is neutral with respect to different values” (emphasis added).
192
 The 
problematic nature of Held's ideal type leads us to recognise the need for including a 
cultural dimension in our normative idea type of globality.  
3.2 Richard Falk’s Normative Critique of Globalisation 
    The second case study concerns Falk’s normative critique of globalisation. To this 
aim, this section starts with Falk’s ideal type of humane global governance. Viewed 
from this ideal type, the section argues that Falk’s criticism of contemporary 
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globalisation, as a globalisation-from-above, is concerned with realising universal 
human rights. Like Held, Falk emphasizes globalisation’s democratic deficits. 
However, he pays more attention to the role of liberal ideology in the formation of 
contemporary globalisation. The section argues that Falk's normative critique has not 
systematically integrated the cultural dimension in its normative critique. 
3.2.1 The Ideal Type of Humane Global Governance      
    Generally speaking, the ideal type of humane global governance refers to a model 
of global governance that realises the equal human rights, in its comprehensive sense. 
Falk argues that such humane global governance can realise the four major values of a 
cosmopolitan community. These goals consist of: (a) the minimisation of large-scale 
collective violence; (b) the maximisation of social and economic well-being; (c) the 
realisation of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice, and (d) the 
maintenance and rehabilitation of ecological quality.
193
 In one sense, Falk assumes 
that these principles are core values for humanity as a whole, in spite of their cultural 
and moral differences. The ideal type of humane global governance advocates a 
humane globalisation for realising these core values. Hence, Falk’s normative critique 
of globalisation explores the extent to which the core values are not realised by 
contemporary globalisation.  
     Falk situates his normative vision of humane global governance in the context of a 
global community of peoples with equal human rights. Falk conjectures an imagined 
community for the whole of humanity which overcomes the most problematic aspects 
of the present world scene. In his model, “the part (whether as individual, group, 
nation, religion, civilisation) and the whole (species, world, universe) are connected; 
difference and uniformities across space and through time are subsumed beneath an 
overall commitment to world order values in the provisional shape of peace, economic 
well-being, social and political justice, and environmental sustainability.”194 Falk 
assumes that those values are already shared on a global scale. If so, the ideal type of 
humane global governance is a justified model of global governance by the world 
population due to its faith in four common values that all humanity. Falk points out: 
“At the core of humane governance is the conviction that societal relations from the 
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personal to the inter-civilisational can be addressed nonviolently.”195 Like Held's ideal 
type, Falk's humane global governance rests on the fundamental assumption of human 
equality. However, Falk views this equality in terms of the four core values in which 
context all peoples actually become equal persons.   
3.2.2 Globalisation-From-Above: Liberal Ideology and Capitalist Interests   
     Similar to Held, Falk describes globalisation as a shift in the Westerphalian order 
toward the post-national order, which is imposed from above, as a result of liberal 
ideology and capitalist intensive. In this way, Falk advances Held's analysis of 
globalisation by adding an ideational force to the political and economic causes of 
globalisation. While globalisation-from-above is fuelled by such an ideological and 
materialistic force, it remains an illegitimate way of global ordering of peoples due to 
the fact that it has not realised the four key values of humanity.    
     Like Held, Falk argues that economic and political globalisation have re-organised 
modern states-system towards a post-national world order. However, for Falk, neo-
liberal ideology and capitalist incentive have operated as two motor forces of this 
global organisational change. In his words: 
Globalisation has undermined the certitudes associated with proclamation of 
a state-centric world. At the same time, globalisation has helped to conceal 
the emergent locus of real power in relation to the shaping of global 
economic policy. Leaders of states are constrained by these structural forces, 
although to varying degrees, and seem to be receptive to the interpretation of 
global market priorities as perceived through the prism of neo-liberal ideas.
196
  
     In this way, Falk rightly diagnoses a causal function for the liberal ideas and 
capitalist motivations that operate as driving forces of globalisation-from-above. In 
this global organisational change, national states are no longer dominant forces of the 
social ordering of peoples on a global scale. Political globalisation has shaped a multi-
centric global governance. Globalisation-from-above refers to an interaction between 
liberal ideas and capitalist interests. Inspired by liberal ideas and motivated by 
capitalist interests, globalisation has re-organised national economies in a capitalist 
world economy-- without a concern with the core values of humanity.
197
 Falk rightly 
argues that, “the state-centric world of Westphalian was based on neglect of the 
whole, according primacy to the parts, conceived as self-regulating, sovereign 
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economic and political units… Market-driven globalism subordinates the part to the 
whole on the basis of calculations such as profit margins, comparative efficiencies of 
production and distribution, and growth prospects ...”198 He links liberal logic of profit 
maximising with economic globalisation. A market-driven globalisation integrates its 
constituting parts through economic motivations like profits, capital expansion and 
efficiencies of scale production. This economic logic has two aspects. On the one 
hand, it refers to the liberal ideology, claiming the emergence of a global competitive 
market maximises economic profits for all. On the other hand, since the preconditions 
of such a global competitive market do not exist, economic globalisation works for a 
capitalist classes and powerful groups which have more access to the global market. 
    These ideological and operational aspects of globalisation are associated with the 
way in which transnational market forces dominate the policy scene. This pattern of 
development is identified by Falk as a ‘globalisation-from-above’, a set of forces and 
legitimating ideas that is in many respects located beyond the reach of territorial 
authority and that has enlisted most governments as tacit partners.
199
 Globalisation is a 
transition from Westphalian geo-politics to the post-Westphalian's geo-governance. 
This transition refers to a process through which the territorial state is displaced from 
its dominant role in the era of geo-politics, however such form of displacement is not 
concerted with the core values of humanity, because it follows the logic of  
maximising profits or a global competition for economic interest .
200
 This top-down 
form of displacement is not concerned with the legitimacy of the geo-governance. As 
Falk points out, “globalisation-from-above undermines the postulates of sovereignty, 
but without truly extending the sense of [a global] community.”201 In essence, the 
emergent world order after the cold war is shaping up in the short run as an attractive, 




3.2.3 The Absence of a People-Driven Globalisation 
    Falk employs his ideal type of humane global governance to uncover the societal 
deficits caused by globalisation's deviation from a people-driven globalisation. In 
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contrast to globalisation-from-above, a people-driven globalisation integrates peoples 
by a humane global governance. Falk points out: 
…people-driven globalism subordinates the part to the whole on the basis of 
human values, including such goals as ecological sustainability, alleviation of 
suffering caused by changing patterns of production and consumption, 
establishment of communities that uphold the security and economic and 




    In comparison with this people-driven approach, contemporary globalisation-from-
above deviates from the core values of humanity. One of the key contradictions of 
contemporary globalisation is while it has undermined the state-system, it has not 
created an alternative to fulfill the nation state's function. In the Westphalian order, 
the function of sovereignty was to help overcome often civic disorder and an endless 
round of feudalistic struggles that made it possible to construct commercial markets of 
sufficient scale and efficiency.
204
 However, in the post-national order such functions 
must be done through global governance. Due to the absence of a people-driven 
globality, contemporary globalisation remains unable to face many global crises such 
as global environmental, security and economic instabilities.
205
 If globalisation-from-
above cannot overcome the emerging global problems, the main reason is that it 
remains unaccountable to peoples’ needs and it does not utilise peoples’ contributions 
to solve the global problems. 
    The transnational market forces play the key role in re-organisation of peoples and 
societies in the emerging post-national order. Falk argues that ‘transnational market 
forces’ enjoys the normative support of the liberal ideology, advocating the expansion 
of markets to the global scale. However, ‘transnational democratic forces’ can 
employ the normative force of a humane global governance to re-organise peoples on 
a global scale. Falk proposes the terminology of ‘globalisation-from-below’ to 
identify these transnational democratic forces, and their implicit dedication to the 
creation of a global civil society for creating a humane global governance.
206
  
     Validating Held's model of global democracy, Falk identifies his own reading of 
global democracy in this way: “To the extent that citizen-elected representatives from 
different countries and civilisations convene formally in a climate of civility to 
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advance mutual interests and address differences, peaceful resolution of conflict 
would tend to become institutionalized.”207 Hence, any serious attempt to mitigate 
globalisation's democratic deficit must consider the creation of some type of popularly 
elected global body.
208
 Similar to Held, Falk believes that global democracy cannot be 
properly apprehended as the extension of democracy as it has functioned on the level 
of a territorial sovereign state to the global level.209 Against this background, Falk 
proposes a Global Peoples Assembly at the core of his institutional reforms for the 
creation of a humane global governance. 210 
     Falk rightly argues that achieving global democracy depends on internalising the 
sort of values and global outlook that would allow that kind of political development 
beyond the sovereign state to take place. He emphasises the importance of making 
peoples around the world much more familiar with a culture of human rights. For 
him, the essence of global democracy therefore involves a shift in expectations from a 
geopolitics of force to a geopolitics of dialogue, collaboration, and persuasion.211 In 
this way, Falk leads us to see why democracy needs a cultural dialogue on political 
democracy. He recognises that an inter-civilisational dialogue is a crucial part of this 
world's cultural preparation for the development of a humane global governance. In 
his words: “Human solidarity as a ground condition of global governance needs to be 
understood as fully consistent with civilisational diversity and the importance of 
inter-civilisational dialogue as the foundation for an acceptable normative (law and 
ethics) order"
212
 (emphasis added). In this way, the lack of a cultural dialogue 
amongst civilisations can be regarded as an important part of Falk's normative critique 
of contemporary globalisation. If globalisation-from-above suffers from a package of 
societal deficits, globalisation's democratic deficits cannot be isolated from the 
shortage of a dialogue amongst civilizations on moral equality of human beings. 
Globalisation’s democratic deficit itself originates from a cultural deficit, the lack of 
an inter-civilistaional consensus regarding the equality of human beings and 
democratic way of social order of equal persons.  
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3.2.4 Falk’s Normative Critique: A Weak Link between ‘Culture’ and ‘Politics’    
    While Falk allows us to see the importance of inter-civilisational dialogue in 
creating a humane global community, he limits the linkage between a global cultural 
preparation and the emergence of global democracy in familiarizing peoples with the  
human rights' culture. But, the function of a cultural dialogue amongst civilisations 
goes much more beyond this. Falk assumes that the four core values of humanity are 
those values that are already globally shared values. On the contrary, it seems that 
there is a notable conflict of opinions over those values amongst world civilisations 
such as Islamic, Chinese or the Western civilisations. If all civilisations of peoples 
agreed on such core values, there would not be an important role for dialogue amongst 
civilizations to create a global consensus over such values. The main cultural function 
of such a dialogue is perhaps the creation of a global consensus on the core values of 
humanity.  
     Falk points out, “the Western origins and orientation of human rights may be a 
burden in a period of greater civilisational assertiveness, but to some extent non-
Western civilisations have their own equivalent or parallel standards of approved 
conduct that have been shaped through time, including in interaction with the West. In 
this respect a global socialization process has been internalized in all civilisations a 
resonance to many basic human rights claims, although there are contested zones 
where contradictory claims are being made and important differences as to languages, 
substance, and relation to the past”213 (emphasis added). If a global socialisation 
process has internalised in all civilisations a resonance to basic human rights claims, 
what would be the role of a global dialogue in such rationalization?  This question 
leads us to the need for exploring a strong link between the cultural dialogue and 
political democracy in the normative ideal type of a global society. 
3.3 Jürgen Habermas’ Normative Critique of Globalisation 
    This section discusses Habermas' ideal type-- the dialogic world society-- as his 
reference point for a normative critique of globalisation. Contemporary globalisation 
will be reviewed from Habermas' viewpoint in order to explore how he diagnoses the 
deviations of globalisation from the ideal type. Habermas' normative critique creates a 
stronger link between the cultural and political dimensions of globalisation's societal 
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deficits. My critical reflection about Habermas’ normative critique of globalisation 
terminates this section.   
3.3.1 The Ideal Type of Dialogic World Society 
      Compared to Held and Falk, Habermas' normative critique of globalisation rests 
upon a sociological conception of world community. In one sense, the ideal type of 
dialogic world society is a normative sociological account of cosmopolitan society. 
The ideal types of global social democracy and humane global governance use the 
premise of the equality of human being, in its moral and legal senses, for defining an 
ideal type global governance rather than an ideal world community, in its sociological 
sense. It is important to note that while the phrase dialogic world society has not 
specifically been used by Habermas for the development of his normative analysis, 
such an account can be drawn from his works.    
     Habermas’ ideal type and normative critique of globalisation can be traced in his 
works in particular in his book entitled, The Postnational Constellation. It seems 
Habermas uses the premise of human's equal access to communicative rationality as 
the foundation of his ideal type of dialogic world society. Habermas' critical social 
theory implies that individuals' moral and political equalities ultimately originate from 
individauls’ epistemic equal access to communicative rationality.214 Max Pensky in 
his introduction to The Postnational Constellation introduces this issue in this way: 
Habermas argues that universality is embedded in the most basic capacities 
that we possess as persons capable of speaking, hearing, giving and accepting 
reasons for our actions, and conducting our lives correspondingly. In the most 
fundamental and distinctive human capacity-- the ability to speak to one 
another, to decide on the basis of reasons and arguments, to distinguish 
between understanding and deception-- Habermas insists we find a universal, 
if modest, basis for the great political innovations of popular sovereignty, 
legally enforceable human rights, democratic procedures…through the 
mutual recognitions of the status of personhood. The central claim of 
Habermas's theories is that the institutions based on the communicative use of 
human reason, from our moral intuitions to the institutions of the democratic 
constitutional state under the rule of law, are reasonable…215[emphasis 
added].   
     Given Habermas' account of universality, the main premise of the ideal type of 
dialogic world society is an equal access of humans to communicative rationality. 
Habermas links such an epistemic equality with the individual's legal and political 
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equality, where he argues that in our ability to speak with each other we find a 
universal basis for the rule of law and democracy. If dialogic world society rests on 
peoples' communicative rationality, peoples can use such a rationality to shape a set of 
globally shared values on human nature.  
     Andrew Linklater points out: “For Habermas, the role of communicative action in 
social existence makes the establishment of a universal communicative community 
possible. …The normative task of critical theory is to defend the ideal of universal 
communities of discourse, the sociological dimension of critical inquiry ought to 
investigate the forms of social learning which are capable of turning ideals into 
reality. …”216 The importance of the cultural sphere for creating a universal social 
democracy means that it can emerge through a social learning process in which the 
core values of human equality find a global respect. The ideal type of the dialogic 
world society creates a strong link between global culture and global politics. 
Habermas does not specifically argues on an inter-civilisational dialogue as a cultural 
mechanism for the formation of a universal dialogic community, but Linklater and 
Marc Lynch, among others, apply Habermas' theory of social learning to address the 
possibility of a universal dialogic community emerging.
217
 
3.3.2 Globalisation as the Emergence of a Post-National Constellation                     
     Like Held and Falk, Habermas describes globalisation as a global organisational 
transition from the modern states-system towards a post-national world order. The 
dynamic of globalisation is, for Habermas, reasonably clear in one respect, “it heralds 
the end of the global dominance of the nation-state as a model for political 
organization.”218 The term ‘postnational’ here means that globalisation of economic 
processes, of modes of communication and commerce, and of culture all increasingly 
reduce the role of national states in global organisation of peoples. It fundamentally 
challenges the relevance of the nation-state as a continued political model.
219
 
However, the quality of Habermas' analysis of the dynamic of globalisation differs 
from Held and Falk. Similar to their position, Habermas views contemporary 
globalisation as a ‘global system integration’ that has mainly shaped through global 
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markets forces. He writes, “This form of ‘functional integration’ of social relations via 
networks competes with an entirely distinct form of integration-- with a ‘social 
integration’ of the collective life-world of those who share a collective identity…”220 
In this way, Habermas recognises a key deviation of contemporary globalisation from 
the ideal type of dialogic world society.   
     Globalisation has opened national societies to an economically driven post-
national constellation. While not all of nation-states are democratic, the national form 
of social organisation that emerged after the American and French Revolutions has 
successfully spread over the globe. The nation state fulfils important preconditions for 
the societies constituted within determinate borders to exert a democratic form of self-
control. In post-war Europe, the democratic process-- in the context of the nation-state 
system-- has been more or less institutionalised under four dimensions. However, 
since the end of the 1970s such forms of institutionalisation have come under 
increasing pressure from the forces of globalisation. Habermas introduces the four 
aspects of the democratization process after postwar Europe in this way: (a) the 
emergence of the state as an administrative state supported by taxation; (b) 
maintaining sovereignty over a determinate geographical territory; (c) in the specific 




     The first aspect of the democratic process refers to the separation of state and 
society through the formation of an administrative state, constituted in the form of 
positive law and the differentiation of a market economy, institutionalised via the 
principles of individual private rights. ‘Law’ in this separation process operates in 
order to privatise society from the state. In this sense, the modern state is a legal state, 
limited by the rule of law and it protects the decentralised function of a market 
economy. This separation means the most important regulatory powers of public 
administration remain reserved for the state and the state's power to levy taxes 
depends on resources generated by economic activity delegated to the private sphere. 
The second aspect implies that nation-states system provides geographical condition 
for realising a self-controlled society because a state's territory will encompass the 
sphere of validity for a state-sanctioned legal order. A self-controlled society requires 
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rational-based conception of law that regulates a number of persons-- united by the 
decisions to grant one another precisely those rights. Hence, the nation-states system 
created the borders of the territorial state in which population of a state is defined as 
the potential subject of self-legislation who organises their society. 
222
 
     The third aspect implies that democratic self-determination of national societies 
can only come about if the population of a state is transformed into a nation of 
citizens who take their political destiny into their own hands. Habermas argues that a 
democratic self-organised society depends on a prior cultural integration of what is 
initially a number of people who have been thrown together with each other. Such a 
cultural integration makes the residents of a single state-controlled territory aware of a 
collective belonging. Only the symbolic construction of ‘a people’ makes the modern 
state into a nation-state.  
      Habermas leads us to see a strong interplay between culture and politics in the 
formation of the modern nation state. The fourth aspect reveals that a democratic 
mode of legitimation of political authority has been advocated by the nation-state 
system. The transition from princely to popular sovereignty transforms the rights of 
subject into the rights of human beings, into liberal and political civil rights. The 
democratic constitutional state satisfies a political order created by the people 
themselves and legitimated by their opinion and will-formation. He connects the 
democratic constitutional state with a political culture in modern democratic society 
that is rooted in ‘discourse rationality’. In this way, the rule of law and popular 
sovereignty have been legitimated through communicative use of human reason. The 
emergence of social welfare state was a result of the dialectic of ‘legal equality’ and 
‘factual inequality’, whose principal goal was secure the societal conditions to create 
an opportunity for an equal distributed basic rights possible. 
223
 
     If we take the four aspects of the democratic process into account, the role of the 
nation-state system with regard an international ordering of peoples becomes clear. 
Habermas rightly argues that after the 1970s the forces of globalisation have made the 
nation-state a problematic model of social order. For him, contemporary globalisation 
refers to a transition from the state-system to a postnational constellation in which 
nation-states no longer operate as the main units of the political and economic actions 
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on a global scale. Recognising different aspects of globalisation, Habermas claims the 
most significant dimension of globalisation is an economic one. Various features of 
globalisation, in particular its economic feature, “…weaken the capacity of the nation-
state to maintain its borders and to automatically regulate exchange process with its 
external environment.”224 Habermas argues economic globalisation has significantly 
increased global economic transactions, and is reaching levels achieved in no other 
epoch, directly affected national economics on a previously unprecedented level. 
These developments include an unparallel acceleration of capital flows, a significantly 
increased the number of transnational corporations with global production facilities, 
and the increase in direct foreign investment.
225
 Habermas evaluates the impacts of 
globalisation on the political capacity of nation states due to the four aforementioned 
aspects of the democratic process. Hence, his normative critique of globalisation 
covers the dynamics of the emergence of the post-national constellation.  
     Globalisation has opened societies to an economically driven post-national order, 
but the emerging global governance has not yet realised global public sovereignty. 
Habermas criticises this emerging world society due to its costs for transforming the 
nation-state system towards a post-national order, whereas it does not meet the 
conditions of a dialogic world society. In this way, he employs the four aspects of the 
democratic process to uncover the societal deficits of contemporary globalisation. An 
important impact of globalisation on the organisational capacity of a nation-state 
originates from increased capital mobility at the global level that makes the state's 
access to profits and monetary wealth more difficult, and consequently increased local 
competition reduces the state's capacity to collect taxes. Such negative effects of 
economic globalisation on the state's tax revenue undermine the state's capacity to 
execute its welfare state's functions. In this way, the nation-state cannot perform its 
predictable role in realising the rule of law through creating the societal prerequisites 
of individuals' equality before the law. In addition, the emerging global markets work 
to the disadvantage of the state's autonomy and its capacity for policy-making for 
their own societies, while global governance has not taken the responsibility of such a 
socio-economic regulation. As market-driven globalisation grows, the nation-state 
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loses its capacities to achieve taxes and stimulate growth, and with them the ability to 
secure the essential foundations of its own legitimacy. 
226
 
3.3.3 Globalisation’s Societal Deficits: Culture, Politics and Economy  
     The term globalisation’s societal deficits has been used here to describe Habermas' 
normative critique of contemporary globalisation due to its wider definition, as argued 
at the beginning of this chapter. Taking into consideration that Habermas' ideal type 
of dialogic world society is in fact an application of his sociological conception of 
dialogic community, it is revealed how he explores the deviations of contemporary 
globalisation from his ideal type. Globalisation has created a transnational  economy, 
but it has not created a parallel democratic global governance to regulate socio-
economic relations of peoples on a global scale because it has not involved peoples in 
an inter-subjective consensus over global shared values about a democratic model of 
governance. In this way, globalisation’s societal deficits ultimately originate from the 
absence of a global consensus on the democratic governance (i.e., a cultural deficit) 
which is reflected in the lack of a global democracy (i.e., a political deficit) and the 
lack of a global justice (i.e., a socio-economic deficit). According the ideal type of 
dialogic world society, these three aspects of globalisation’s societal deficits or 
unsocial sociability of contemporary globalisation are closely linked to each other. 
Hence, Habermas’ normative critique advances Held’s and Falk’s critiques by adding 
a strong cultural dimension, i.e. the need for a set of globally shared values, to their 
normative critiques of globalisation.           
     Habermas argues that if the democratic legitimacy of a social order originates from 
the discursive rationality, and if the democratic legitimacy provides a basis for 
legitimacy beyond nation-states system, in a post-national era neither state structure 
nor market mechanism, but popular process of collective will-formation will have to 
provide it. Such a global public sovereignty cannot be realised without creating a 
transnational public sphere that privileges communicative use of reason. Habermas’ 
normative critique of globalisation implies that the inability of post-national 
governance to realise the freedom of its citizens is a result of uncontrolled world 
economy on the one hand; and an irrational manifestations of national sovereignty on 
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the other hand.
227
 Like Held and Falk, Habermas attributes this inability to the 
unaccountability of post-national governance to the world’s population. However, 
unlike Held and Falk, he ultimately attributes these political and economic failures to 
the absence of globally shared values on global social democracy itself, originating 
form an under-utilisation of communicative rationality on a global scale. Global 
societal deficits or unsocial sociability of globalisation do not only include an 
unaccountable global governance to the world’s population and an unjust world 
economy, but also they include the shortage of globally shared values on 
communicative use of reason, reflected in the lack of a global consensus on global 
social democracy. Habermas rightly argues that the transition from the state-system to 
the post-national constellation has undermined the democratic functions of the nation-
state; however, it has not replaced a dialogic world society as an alternative way of 
global ordering of peoples.  
     For Habermas, current globalisation is a ‘global system integration’. This form of 
functional integration of global social relations via money and power competes with 
an entirely distinct form of social integration of the collective life-world of those who 
share a collective identity; a social integration based on inter-subjectively shared 
norms, and collective values. Normative critique of Habermas therefore targets this 
global system integration that has reorganised ‘national societies’ into a post-national 
constellation through a systemic force, as opposed to a social integration through an 
inter-subjective consensus. In contrast, the existence of communicative rationality can 
stimulate a global social integration by creating a global consensus on global social 
democracy. Habermas recognises a key cultural deficit of globalisation: “I see no 
structural obstacles to expanding national civic solidarity and welfare-state policies to 
the scale of a postnational federation. But the political culture of a world society lacks 
the common ethical-political dimension that would be necessary for a corresponding 
global community--and its identity formation”228 (emphasis added).  
      He concludes we will only be able to meet the challenges of globalisation in a 
reasonable manner, if we can successfully develop new forms of the democratic self-
steering of society on a global level.
229
 He does not illustrate how such a global 
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political culture can be formed to provide such a global common ethical identity. 
Habermas criticises liberal globalisation because it has not been concerned with the 
creation of such a global political culture. Linklater follows the same line of critique 
of liberal globalisation because it is unable to realise the ideals of global justice and 
global democracy. 
230
    
     The ideal type of dialogic community is applied to address the possibility of 
transforming the post-national order into a universal dialogic community.  Linklater 
defines a ‘universal dialogic community’ as a post-national community in which 
“every human being has an equal right to participate in dialogue to determine the 
principle of exclusion and inclusion which governs global politics.”231 He views such 
a dialogue an inter-societal learning process through which the power structure of the 
post-national constellation can be replaced with dialogue and consent. This inter-
societal learning refers to the recognition of “the injustice of many of the social and 
political barriers to involvement in open dialogue, and to the practice of questioning 
the rituals of exclusion which prevent the feature of communicative action from being 
more widely accepted as principle of international relations.”232 For Linklater, an 
inter-civilisational dialogue might be understood as an institutional framework which 
expands the boundaries of the dialogic community.
233
 He applies Habermas’ 
communicative theory of rationality to argue for the possibility of a consensual 
transformation of the post-national order into a universal dialogic community.
234
 
     Marc Lynch elaborates a Habermasian-inspired analysis of inter-civilisational 
dialogue to argue for the possibility of a consensual change in the existing power-
based world order. He argues for an international public sphere theory which utilises 
Habermas’ notion of the public sphere to show how inter-civilisational dialogue can 
create a global public sphere for a global communicative use of reason. Lynch applies 
Habermas' concepts of instrumental and communicative actions to address different 
approaches to an inter-civilisational dialogue, where he writes: “The presence of 
communicative action, argumentation before an audience oriented towards achieving 
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consensus, defines public sphere sites. … [global] public sphere comes into existence 
whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action 
engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity…Public spheres exist when 
action is co-ordinated through discourse oriented to the achievement of consensus.”235 
Lynch believes that communicative action can exclude power from the exercise of 
reason. A rational consensus is a consensus in which all affected parties would agree 
in the absence of force. Indeed, taking dialogue seriously at the global level suggests 
an alternative to the inevitable clash of civilisations and the primacy of force and 
violence in organising social world.
236
 For Lynch, it shows that the potential for 
communicative action can be exploited to create a global public sphere through which 
the application of the force and violence to organise global order will be illegitimated. 
In short, these applications of Habermas' ideal type of dialogic world society for 
introducing an alternative globalisation have been fuelled by Habermas' critical social 
theory and his communicative rationality. More details on Habermas' communicative 
rationality and his sociological conception of dialogic community will be discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5. But before closing this chapter, a briefly account of my critical 
reflecctions on Habermas' normative analysis of globalisation is provided. 
3.3.4 Communicative Rationality and Dialogue of Civilisations 
    We argued that Habermas does not directly engage in the question as to how a 
global political culture can be the basis of a dialogic world society. While the efforts 
of other scholars have paved the way for using Habermas' communicative rationality 
to address the role of inter-civilisational dialogue in such a global cultural 
preparation,
237
 we need to examine the epistemological capacity of communicative 
rationality for initiating such an inter-civilisational dialogue.  
     Habermas’ communicative epistemology views the mechanism of the ‘the force of 
better arguments’ as its epistemic logic for emerging an inter-subjective (societal) 
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consensus.
238
 The communicative epistemology implies that humans’ equal access  to 
linguistic ability of speaking with each other provides an epistemic competence
239
 for 
solving their conflicts of opinions, either at a national or at a global level. However, it 
seems that we need to go beyond this linguistic ability to address the possibility of a 
rational dialogue amongst civilisations.
240
 As argued in chapters 1 and 2, this thesis 
employs ‘critical rationalism’ as its epistemological theory of a rational dialogue 
amongst civilisations. According to this theory--as a conjectural theory of rationality--
our ability for a rational dialogue with each other, either at the national or at an inter-
civilisational scale, originates from our equal access to critical rationality.  
      Critical rationality refers to (a) our ability to respect the regulative idea of truth; 
(b) our ability to formulate valid deductive arguments, and (c) our ability to test our 
deductive conjectures through falsifying evidence. These epistemic competences 
enable us to shape a rational dialogue among ourselves. Chapter 2 argued about this 
conjectural theory of rationality (P1TTEEP2). This thesis finds this conjectural 
theory of rationality a powerful explanatory theory for addressing the functions of a 
rational dialogue amongst civilisations. It aims to address the mechanism of dialogue 
of civilisations through opening their systems of rationale to mutual criticism. Donald 
Nielsen criticises Habermas’ communicative epistemology due to its insufficiencies to 
provide a historical sociology of civilisations. He writes: 
Habermas’s theory appears to rest on the redemption of validity claims to 
truth, rightness, and authentic subjectivity through discourse oriented to 
understanding and agreement via the force of better reason. … the force of 
the better reason, in general or in abstract, cannot be a basis for a notion of 
consensual agreement and emancipation from distorted communication, 
because it depends itself on prior concrete historical-civilisational definitions 
of what can possibility count as a better reason. However, these collective 
definitions of what can count as the better reason are open in different 
civilisations to varying degrees of public discursive examinations. …Indeed, 
is it likely that a ‘paradigm of language’ can provide at all the general 
foundations for sociology… 241  
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     The thesis aims to employ Critical Rationalism as its epistemological foundation 
for the development of a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. Replacing 
communicative rationality with critical rationality provides us with a new logic and a 
new explanatory framework for addressing the function of dialogue of civilisations as 
a mechanism of the transformation of the existing contradictory globalisation towards 
a humane globalisation. Perhaps a key contribution of a critical rationalist theory of 
dialogue of civilisations is that: It recognises different civilisational-based systems of 
rationale, and it argues that opening these systems of rationale to mutual criticism can 
lead them to a global social learning from mutual errors (P1TTEEP2). It 
argues that it can lead them to a higher level of global critical rationality that provides 
a normative foundation for an open global society of free and equal peoples. 
However, the development of critical macrosociology of globalisation based on such a 
theory of dialogue of civilisations calls for a new normative ideal type of global 
society. The next chapter uses critical rationalism to introduce this new ideal type: the 
idea of an open global society. This new normative vision of global society provides 
us with a new analysis of globalisation’s societal deficits.  
    The main function of this chapter was to show how different normative ideal types 
of global community lead us to diverse normative critiques of globalisation. However, 
it also provided a good base for addressing the question of how the ideal type of an 
open global society must introduce a new normative logic for arriving at a global 























Chapter 4  
  
The Ideal Type of Open Global Society 
The Premises and the Principles 
 
 
     The main aim of this chapter is to employ Critical Rationalism for introducing the 
Ideal Type of Open Global Society for the development of a critical macrosociology 
of globalisation. This ideal type describes the premises and institutional principles of a 
global society of free and equal citizens due to their access to critical rationality. The 
next chapter will advance this conception to an analytical model for analysing a 
dialogic globalisation as the formation of an open global society. In this way, chapters 
4 and 5 present the thesis’ conceptual and analytical models for the development of  a 
new macrosociology of dialogic globalisation with three major aims: (i) analysing 
contemporary globalisation (chapter 6), (ii) criticising liberal globalisation (chapter 7), 
and (iii) advocating a dialogic form of globalisation (chapter 8). As Linklater argues, 
the normative task of a critical theory of world community is to defend the ideal of a 
universal dialogic community, in this case the ideal of an open global society. The 
sociological task of such a critical theory is to investigate the forms of social learning 
which are capable of turning the ideal into reality.
242
 By analogy, this chapter defends 
the ideal of an open global society, the next chapter addresses the form of global 
social learning that are capable of turning the idea of open global society into a global 
institutional reality.    
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     Chapter 4 proceeds in three sections. Section 4.1 briefly explores implications of 
Popper’s attitude of Critical Rationalism for his definition of the Open Society. It 
argues that Popper introduces the open society as a social arrangement that sets free 
critical power of human reason. Section 4.2 introduces the idea of an open global 
society. It conceptualises this ideal type as a global society of free and equal persons 
whose access to critical reason entitles them to appeal for one set of comprehensive 
rights of self-governance. The ideal type of open global society performs as a 
macrosociological regulative principle for addressing the nature of such a self-
governance. It parallels the five layers of a normative concept of the person, who has 
access to critical rationality, to the five corresponding social institutions of such an 
open global society. Section 4.3 argues that the idea of open global society leads us to 
explore new normative critique and vision of globalisation. Chapter 4, as a whole, 
uses critical rationalism to introduce a new normative model of global society.  
4.1 Critical Rationalism and Popper’s Philosophy of the Open Society  
    The literature on Popper’s critical rationalism and philosophy of the open society is 
substantial. Hence, it is neither possible nor necessary to address this literature on this 
occasion. I shall merely address the most relevant points that are directly concerned 
with my argument. To this aim, I first review Popper's Critical Rationalism and its 
implications for his conception of human nature, as a normative ideal type. Viewed 
from such a conception, I will then address Popper's idea of open society. Finally, I 
will connect Popper’s idea of open society with his social philosophy. All of these 
pave the way for introducing the idea of open global society by this chapter. 
4.1.1 Critical Rationalism and the Conception of Human Nature 
     Popper has not specifically identified the outcomes of his Critical Rationalism for 
his vision of human nature. Nevertheless, it is possible to explore such outcomes in 
his works. There is an inter-play between Popper’s epistemology and his reading of 
human nature.
243
 I focus on the outcomes of Critical Rationalism for Popper’s concept 
of human nature because of its importance in understanding the meaning of an open 
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society. As Geoff Stokes argues, it is also possible to explore how Popper’s reading of 
human nature has affected his critical epistemology.
244
  
     In order to explore the outcome of Critical Rationalism for the concept of human 
nature, as a normative construct, I first briefly introduce Critical Rationalism. It is 
important to note that this initial explanation of the essence of critical rationalism will 
be developed by the next section, whereas my critique of popper's attitude of Critical 
Rationalism will be proposed. Popper introduces ‘Critical Rationalism’ in this way:  
So what I called Critical Rationalism is an attitude which I described only in 
a roundabout way, namely I said it is the attitude ‘I may be wrong, and you 
may be right, but let us sit together and discuss matter critically, and in the 




     Critical Rationalism thus is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments 
and to learn from criticisms. This attitude rests on the premise of human fallibility. 
The attitude of ‘I may be wrong’ means my knowledge and rationality are imperfect. 
The attitude of ‘You may be right’ means your knowledge and rationality are also 
imperfect but that they may be right. The attitude of ‘let us discuss’ means through a 
rational dialogue and inter-subjective learning from criticism we may get closer to the 
truth. This epistemological logic is manifested in Popper’s conjectural theory of 
knowledge (i.e., P1TTEEP2). In this sense, the very conception of a rational 
dialogue exists in Popper’s attitude of critical rationalism. The motto that Popper used 
to formulate his critical rationalism is implicit in the three following principles that he 
thought, “form the basis of every rational discussion, that is, of every discussion 
undertaken in the search for truth.”246 The principles in Popper's words:  
1. The principle of [human] fallibility: perhaps I am wrong and perhaps you 
are right. But we could easily both be wrong. 
2. The principle of rational discussion: we want to try, as impersonally as 
possible, to weigh up our reasons for and against a theory: a theory that is 
definite and criticizable. 
3. The principle of approximation to the truth: we can always come closer 
to the truth in a discussion which avoids personal attacks. It can help us 
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     As noted in chapter 1, in this thesis, the term “openness to criticism” refers to the 
principles of Critical Rationalism. In the next section, I shall elaborate these principles 
as a middle way between absolutism (Uncritical Rationalism) and relativism (Critical 
Irrationalism). It is important to note that Popper regards himself “as a disciple of 
Socrates, that is of the speaker of Apology”248 and his method of critical dialogue. He 
also acknowledges the contributions of Kant's critical philosophy to his critical 
epistemology.
249
 Like Kant, Popper argues: “Man can know: thus he can be free.”250 
Humans' access to reason can lead them to a self-liberation through knowledge. Given 
this account of critical rationalism, the implications for Popper's conception of human 
nature are important. As Geoff Stokes reminds us, Popper does not argue about a 
theory of human nature as the basis of his social theory of the open society. However, 
it does not preclude him from holding a substantive view on the nature of human 
being.
251
 Popper's critical rationalism affects his account of persons as rational agents 
whose critical rationality can free them through establishing an open social order.
252
  
     According to Popper, the major distinguishing characteristic of human beings is 
their ability to consciously create new plans for trial and error, and transcend the 
limits of the trials previously performed.
253
 The hallmark of creative thinking is the 
selection of trails and to the refutation of errors rather than to allow them to occur by 
chance.
254
 What sets human beings apart from organisms like the amoeba is the 
ability of humans to be self-consciously critical of their knowledge. In this sense, 
person's access to critical reason or his capacity of learning from trial and error is the 
distinctive feature of human creatures. Popper recognises the importance of 'language' 
for such a critical reasoning. Human language has both descriptive and argumentation 
functions that provides a framework for a critical reasoning.
255
 However, setting free 
critical power of reason requires the attitude of I may be wrong you may right, let us 
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discuss to learn from our errors in order to get closer to the truth. Human language 
provides just a tool for realising such a critical attitude and rational dialogue. Without 
respecting the principles of critical rationalism, there is not a common criterion of 
rationality on which basis we can turn our linguistic dialogic into a mechanism of 
learning from errors and an approximation to the truth. In this sense, for the critical 
rationalist approach to the human nature, the unforced force of learning from errors 
makes a rational dialogue an epistemic mechanism for the approximation to the truth.  
     Popper recognises that human beings are self-preserving agents who set different 
ends for their lives and seek suitable means to realise the ends. Human beings have 
inborn needs or expectations.
256
 However, they have also a creative capacity for 
identifying new ends and building new means to satisfy the ends. Such capacities also 
originate from their conscious human agency. Popper acknowledges the importance of 
inborn needs such as those to love, sympathise and communicate, however the ‘need 
for regularity’ has a special importance for him.257 For Popper, the inborn ‘need for 
regularity’ motivates people to learn the laws of their natural surroundings and the 
traditions of their social environments. It also explains why peoples tend to create 
traditions and taboos.
258
 As Stokes points out:  
Popper’s conception of human nature is neither rigidly environmentalist nor 
biologically determinist. …Central to this process is the self, a ‘ghost in the 
machine’ which observes, interprets and acts in attempting to solve the 
practical and theoretical problems around it. …the self comprises two parts, 
the passionate and rational …this higher [rational] self develops a moral 
capacity which operates as a kind of cultural control upon the lower self. 
259
  
     Like Kant’s cognitivist ethics, for Popper, humans’ access to critical rationality is 
the fundament of developing such a moral capacity. In this way, Popper leads to a 
normative conception of the person. Like Kant, Popper argues that humans can know, 
thus they can be autonomous moral beings. In other words, for both of them, the 
moral equality of individuals is drawn from their epistemic equality of a potential 
access to critical reason. This normative conception of human nature plays a key role 
in the normative ideal type of the open society: people should employ their conscious 
human agency for realising their moral equality in order to claim for a legal, political, 
and economic self-governance.              
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4.1.2 Critical Rationalism and the Meaning of Open Society 
     Popper’s concept of human nature provides important epistemic and moral inputs 
for his ideal type of the open society. The central role of self-consciousness and equal 
access to critical reason in his conception of human nature leads him to a normative 
account of the open society in which the ultimate constituent unit is a critical 
rationalist knower. If people, due to their equal access to critical rationality, ought to 
use their critical reason to rationalise their personal and social life through dialogue 
rather than force, they must built a society of free and equal persons (an open society) 
upon this motto of critical rationalism. In this sense, such an open society is a society 
of free and equal persons who have activated their potential access to critical 
rationality in order to build a dialogic social organisation that respects their equality 
and freedom. This dialogic society recognises the three key principles of the human 
fallibility, rational discussion and the approximation to the truth.  
     Popper’s open society ideal is the abstraction of meaningful social organisation 
that aims to describe and to criticise an existing closed society due to its deviations 
from such an ideal type. As Ian Jarvie points out: “An ideal type, according to Weber, 
is an analytical construct built out of empirical material but, since it is an idealization, 
it corresponds to no concrete reality. The ideal type is created for purpose of thought 
and exists nowhere; it is in this sense utopian, but it is rooted in reality, so that it is 
criticizable, though not for its idealization as such”260 [emphasis added]. The ideal 
type of open society is rooted in this profound reality: all humans are fallible creatures 
and hence there is a need to employ a rationalist attitude to organise their society upon 
a rational (open to criticism) dialogue rather than force. Hans Albert summarises three 
functions of Popper’s normative ideal type of the open society in this way: 
His [Popper] idea of open society is an attempt to transform the European 
idea of freedom into a sociological construction that can be seen an ideal type 
in the sense of Max Weber. Three remarks are perhaps appropriate here. 
First: the idea of such a society is an ideal, so that a concrete society can 
approximate it more or less. Second: this ideal can be used as a standard for 
criticizing the existing social orders also as a guide for attempts to reform 
them. And third: attempts to approximate this ideal can lead to very different 
                                                 
260
 Ian Jarvie, "Popper's Ideal Types: Open and Closed, Abstraction and Concrete Societies," in Ian 
Jarvie and Sandra Pralong (eds.), Popper's Open Society After Fifty Years. The continuing relevance of 
Karl Popper, (London and New York, Routledge: 2005), p.72.  
  95 
constitutions, for in the endeavour to achieve it one has to take into account 
the different historical conditions in each case.
261
 
     Albert argues that Popper inserts the construction of his model of the open society 
into a historical, sociological and anthropological frameworks that has received 
different critical reflections. However, for a reasonable assessment of such a model, 
we need to distinguish between his normative project and his theoretical hypothesis 
and historical analyses of the closed and the open societies connected with it.
262
 
Validating this argument, I am mainly concerned here with exploring the outcomes of 
Popper's Critical Rationalism for his normative ideal type of the open society.  
     Popper integrates his normative attitude of critical rationalism in his normative 
ideal type of the open society. If human beings are fallible creatures, they need a 
rational dialogue to organise their society and to avoid the usage of force in their 
social relations. If so, the freedom of thought (i.e., openness to criticism) provides 
required epistemological fundament for the social organisation of an open society. It 
implies a systematic relationship between an ideational openness and an institutional 
openness to criticism.
263
 Since Popper's Critical Rationalism has a strong normative 
content-- due to its advocacy for taking the motto of openness to criticism --
264
 his 
ideal type of the open society also advocates an open social organisation. I will argue 
that in order to systematise normative implications of individuals' access to critical 
rationality for moral foundation of an open society, we need a sociological conception 
of the open society-- what is under-conceptualisation in Popper’s ideal type of the 
open society. 
     The idea of open society takes the rational attitude of the science as its paradigm 
to argue how the normative content of the open society originates from the normative 
attitude of critical rationalism itself.
265
 As Jarvie points out, for Popper, “the 
difference between science and magic does not lie in the content of their claims but in 
the attitude adopted to their claims. …In the case of magic and taboo the attitude is 
uncritical; its contrast is critical. The critical attitude is what Popper attempts to 
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capture and institutionalise in his methodological rules for science 
[P1TTEEP2].”266 Viewed from this critical attitude, Popper defines the closed 
society as a social organisation of closed minded peoples who arrange their social 
relations on basis of the old and modern form of magic and authority. The closed 
societies may be tribal societies, dominated by magic and taboo, irrational prejudice, 
racism and rule by hereditary groups or oligarchies, or they may be reflected in 
modern types of dictatorship, run by rulers who claim superior knowledge with which 
they can produce a good life for everyone.
267
  
     On the contrary, an open society refers to a rational (open to criticism) society that 
takes the rational motto of science to argue why social order should be established on 
the basis of dialogue as opposed to any forms of force. In an open society, social 
institutions are modified by continually monitoring of effects, and in the light of their 
ability to solve the social problems they are supposed to solve. Upon this normative 
vision, the closed society’s deviation from the ideal type of open society is ultimately 
originated from its epistemic deviation from the very attitude of critical rationalism 
itself. In this sense, an institutional transition from the closed to an open society can 
be introduced as a deep-seated epistemological transition from an uncritical motto of 
magic and taboos to the attitude of critical rationalism.
268
 
    Of special importance in Popper's ideal type of the open society for the thesis' 
macrosociological conception of an open global society is how the normative idea 
type of open society can perform as a sociological regulative idea. Under Popper's 
hand, “the ideal type of science as an institutionalisation of the attitude of open-
mindedness and rationality is given a central place in his social thinking.”269 In The 
Open Society Popper applies The Logic of Scientific Discovery at a sociological level. 
He takes the rationality of scientific institutions, as an ideal type, for a corresponding 
sociological attitude that implies that social institutions should be built to foster the 
motto of critical rationality to encourage a critical attitude towards the institutions 
themselves. Popper thinks that such a sociological connection between critical 
rationalism and the social institutions can possibly be regarded as a sociological law:                        
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There can be sociological laws, and even sociological laws pertaining to the 
problem of progress; for example, the hypothesis that, wherever the freedom 
of thought, and of the communication of thought, is effectively protected by 
legal institutions and institutions ensuring the publicity of the discussion, 
there will be science progress.
270
 
     In this way, Popper views the ideal type of the open society as a sociological law 
on which basis we can trace a deep-seated epistemic foundations of macro-societal 
institutions. In the closed society, uncritical attitudes of magic and taboos cognitively 
fuel the emergence of the closed macro-social institutions. In the open society, the 
attitude of critical rationalism fuels the openness of its macro-social institutions. If 
democracy finds an important place in Popper's conceptions of the open society, the 
reason is that for him democracy is the most important institutional manifestation of 
the freedom of thought or openness to criticism.271If we take Popper's motto of critical 
rationalism as the epistemological fundament of an open society, we can realise the 
essence of the idea of open society, as Notturno formulates:  
Open society is based on respect for other people, for their freedom and 
autonomy as rational agent—or, as Kant would have put it, for people as ends 
in themselves. It is not that we regard their ideas as evils that we have to 
tolerate for civility's sake. And it is not even that we regard them as the ideas 
of other people who have just as much right on ideas as ourselves. That, at 
best, would be paternalism. And it would have nothing at all to do with 
recognition of our own fallibility. Respect, on the contrary, means that we 
take the dissenting opinions of other seriously, and that we regard them as 
possibly true
272
 [emphasis added]. 
    This Kantian-inspired ideal type of open society views people as ends in themselves 
due to their access to critical reason. In an open society, social institutions must 
protect the freedom of thought, because individuals are regarded as equal sources of 
criticism. In this way, the normative conception of persons, as possessors of critical 
rationality, entitles them to claim the equal rights to self-governance. But, in a liberal 
democrat society, the rule of law and constitutional state are closely adopted for the 
protection of the property rights as the main source of individuals' freedom. As 
Notturno writes, “Popper contrasted open society with closed society. But, he did not 
identify it with any specific political or economic system. His experiences in Vienna 
had convinced him …[about] the dangers in socialism… But he was also well aware 
of the dangers in unrestricted capitalism…”273 Bryan Magee believes that Popper's 
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open society is a philosophy of democratic socialism.
274
 Nevertheless, Popper's idea 
of open society needs to be advanced for the development a macrosociological ideal 
type of an open society in which the culture, politics and economy find systematic 
sociological links.   
4.1.3 Critical Rationalism and Social Philosophy of the Open Society 
     Popper’s social philosophy of open society has been received notable critical 
reflections. As Hans Albert argues, Popper’s contribution to social philosophy has 
played an important role in public discussion in the last century. In his book, The 
Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper attempted to explain the intellectual bases of 
the totalitarian systems due to his ideal types of the closed and the open societies. 
However, these ideal types have scarcely played an important role in Anglo-Saxon 
discussion in the second half of the twentieth century. In contrast, the centre of Anglo-
Saxon discussion of the last part of the century largely revolved around John Rawls’ 
theories of political liberalism and justice as fairness.
275
  
     In his main work of social philosophy, The Open Society, Popper creates a close 
link between his theory of knowledge and his social philosophy. If we define social 
philosophy as a philosophical attitude of social organisation, Popper’s conception of 
the open society is the base of his social philosophy. If nobody has an intellectual 
authority to unilaterally determine what a desirable social organisation is, the society 
must be organised through a rational dialogue in which all people are viewed as equal 
sources of rationality and self-determination. Popper does not specify his social 
philosophy as the cultural base for his sociological law of the open society. In another 
sense, the question of how the attitude of critical rationalism can be turned into a set 
of shared cultural values on which basis social institutions of the open society can be 
stood is under-explanation in Popper's social philosophy. But, he generally explained 
the relationship between the motto of critical rationalism and social philosophy of the 
open society. Perhaps due to the shortage of such a macrosociological model of an 
open society in his social philosophy, Popper's philosophy is somehow regarded as a 
pro-liberal democracy model. In addition, Popper's social philosophy of the open 
society does not make a clear distinction between an open society and a capitalist 
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society. But, Popper's emphasis on democracy and justice leads us to recognise that an 
open society goes beyond a liberal democratic model of social order.   
     Popper recognises an epistemic function for democratic governance due to his 
critical philosophy of knowledge. He employs the idea that reason should be used to 
criticise and challenge instead of to justify and defend the existing social order, for 
introducing an epistemic function of democracy. Viewed from this epistemic function 
democracy is a political system in which peoples' votes (i.e., via the majority rule, 
political parties, free media, etc,) operate as an epistemic mechanism of recognising a 
political system’s errors and getting rid of the political rulers without bloodshed and 
revolution when people no longer think that they are fit to rule.
276
 Of course, this ideal 
type of democracy has not yet been fully realised anywhere.    
      Popper believes that we can use a piecemeal social engineering to construct social 
institutions for the democratic control of economic power and for our protection from 
economic exploitations.
277
 As Celia Kerstentzky points out, for Popper: “in a thicker 
conception, thus, democracy is also the ‘political control of the economic power of the 
ruled by rulers’.”278 Nevertheless, Popper’s social philosophy suffers from the lack of 
a sociological linkage among culture, politics and economy. On the contrary, we can 
see such a linkage in Haberams’ ideal type of dialogic community.279 Inspired by 
Habermas’ conception of dialogic community, in the next chapter, I will attempt to 
formulate a sociological linkage in my conception of the open society.  
4.2 Critical Rationalism and the Ideal Type of an Open Global Society   
    Chapter 3 noted that if we replace Habermas’ communicative rationality with 
Popper’s critical rationality, we can lead to a new epistemological base for normative 
ideal type of a global society of free and equal persons. This section aims to use 
critical rationalism—as a theory of rationality—to introduce the five major premises 
and the five macro-social institutions of an open global society. Given these premises 
                                                 
276
 See: Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. I (1954) ; Gray,"The Liberalism of Karl 
Popper," (1976), pp.334-345. ; Wayne J. Norman, "A Democratic Theory for a Democratizing World? 
A Re-assessment of Popper's Political Realism," Political Studies, (1993), XLI, pp .252-268, and 
Jeremy Shearmur, The Political Thought of Karl Popper, (London, Routledge: 1996).  
277
 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1971),        
p.129. For a critique of Popper's piecemeal social engineering see: Michael Freeman, "Sociology and 
Utopia: Some Reflections on the Social Philosophy of Karl Popper," The British Journal of Sociology, 
26 (1) (1975), pp.20-34., and for a reply to the critique see: Gray, "The Liberalism of Karl Popper," 
(1976), pp.342-355. 
278
 Kerstentzky, "Hayek and Popper on Ignorance and Intervention," (2007), p.50.  
279
 See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, (Cambridge, Polity: 1996). 
  100 
and principles, chapter 5 will argue that how such premises can be used for exploring 
a form of global social learning which is capable of the turning the ideal of open 
global society into a global institutional reality. These premises and principles operate 
as a regulative sociological framework for describing the nature and characteristics of 
a global society of free and equal persons. Due to the shortage of such a sociological 
account in Popper’s ideal type of the open society, I develop my own sociological 
account of an open global society through reinventing Popper's conception of human 
nature, as a normative account of the person, and by introducing the five premises 
about humans’ equality due to their access to critical rationality. As I will conclude in 
this chapter, the ideal type of open global society does not refer to a global society in 
which all of the existing world civilisations and national societies will be disappeared 
in favore of one fully united global civilisation. Such an open global society of free 
and equal persons coexists with modified civilisations and national societies through 
opening their fundamental belifes to mutual criticism. However, from a sociological 
perspective, an open multi-civilisational global society of free and equal persons —as 
a global layer of social organisation of the world population—can be regarded as a 
global human society in its own right, despite all of its internal diversities.  
4.2.1 Developing Popper’s Normative Conception of the Person 
     To expand the ideal type of open society to a global scale, we need to develop 
Popper's normative conception of the person. Popper argues that due to a person's 
access to critical rationality, he or she has the moral capacity of self-control and 
rational action. As argued, these epistemic and moral capacities justify an open 
society that can set free the critical power of reason. But, Popper’s Critical 
Rationalism does not logically lead us to a systematic link between persons’ access to 
critical rationality and their moral equality. In addition, it does not lead us to explore 
how such epistemic and moral equalities can be connected with a person’s legal, 
political, and economic rights. Popper’s sociological law of the open society aims to 
explore the possibility of setting free the critical power of human reason through a 
social arrangement that secures the publicity of rational dialogue. But his account of 
human nature is insufficient for proving required micro-foundation to address such a 
macro institutional function. I aim to develop Popper's normative ideal type of the 
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     To develop a new normative conception of the person, as micro-foundation of the 
ideal type of open global society, I begin with a shift from Critical Rationalism as an 
attitude to Critical Rationalism as a theory of rationality. Popper’s attitude of critical 
rationalism does not lead us to an epistemological necessity for justifying individuals’ 
moral equality. His normative conception of the person does not make clear that why 
peoples’ equal access to rationality justify their moral equality as well. However, if 
we view Critical Rationalism as a theory of rationality, we can conclude individuals’ 
moral equality from an epistemological viewpoint. This epistemologically informed 
moral equality then leads us to identify a set of persons’ legal, political, and economic 
equal rights. In this way, the normative conception of the person covers the five layers 
of human equality.  
     Popper defines critical rationality as an irrational faith in reason. If persons’ equal 
access to critical rationality refers to an irrational faith in reason, how can their 
critical rationality logically enforce them to take a rational (correct) moral decision? 
Suppose that a person argues that he or she has taken a moral (pre-rational) decision 
in favor of irrationalism. He or she cannot be reasonably criticised because of his or 
her moral decision. The person is free to accept or deny critical rationalism itself. In 
other words, in Popper’s conception of the person there is not a logical link between 
persons’ access to rationality and their moral capacity of choosing between ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’. If a person's access to critical rationality does not enable him or her to 
distinguish between a right (rational) and a wrong (irrational) decision, how can it be 
the source of his or her equal moral capacity of taking a right (rational) decision?  
      In Popper’s normative account of the person, the moral equality of human beings 
is not supported by the principles of critical rationalism because it is just a moral 
attitude. To the contrary, if we shift critical rationalism from an irrational faith in 
reason to a rational faith in reason, we can connect individuals’ epistemic equality--
due to their access to critical rationality-- with their equal moral capacity of taking a 
rational (right) or irrational (wrong) decision. From this viewpoint, individulas' moral 
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equality refers to their equal moral capacity to use their critical rationality to opt 
between a wrong (irrational) and a right (rational) decision. If individuals' access to 
critical rationality is defined as if it cannot cognitively inform them what are right and 
wrong decisions, we do not have in fact a rational criterion for claiming that peoples 
are moral equal beings.    
     Popper’s ethical position involves in a form of relativism because it disconnects its 
linkage with his epistemology of critical rationalism. If persons are free to take either 
a rational or an irrational faith in reason, they are also free to take a rational or an 
irrational decision in favour of an open or a closed society. This relativist ethics does 
not provide a moral foundation for the open society. However, when we shift from 
critical rationalism as an attitude of rationality towards critical rationalism as a theory 
of rationality, we are led to a reasonable moral foundation for the open society. 
Jeremy Shearmur recognises the relativist nature of the ethical foundation of Popper’s 
idea of open society, and introduces its remedy: 
The ethical theory of Popper’s Open society threatens, against his wishes, to 
lapse into a form of relativism. This consequence is avoided if a closer 
parallel that Popper himself allows for is drawn between his ethical theory 
and his epistemology. This [closer parallel] produces a fallibilistic ethical 
intuitionism, in which the judgments of the individual are subject to criticism 
by the judgments of others. From this, however, an epistemological rationale 
is provided for the [moral] autonomy of the individual…281  
     Popper does not allow such a closer parallel between his epistemology (critical 
rationalism) and his ethical theory, since he has already rejected critical rationalism a 
rational faith in reason. If critical rationality finds a rational base itself, the person’s 
access to critical rationality informs his moral decision, as a rational decision. From 
this perspective, individuals are equal moral beings because they have equally armed 
with critical reason in order to make their moral decisions accountable to their critical 
rationality. Regarding critical rationalism as a theory of openness to criticism (i.e., 
P1TTEEP2), ethical beliefs can be subjected to an inter-subjective criticism. 
That moral debate is epistemological in character. In other sense, when we define 
critical rationalism as an openness of all of our beliefs to an inter-subjective criticism, 
the rationality of our moral decisions can be tested through such a mutual criticism. 
This refers to what Shearmur argues as the judgments of the individual as subject to 
criticism by the judgments of others. So, an epistemological rationale is provided for 
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moral decision and moral autonomy of the person. This new link between Critical 
Rationalism and ethical theory of an open society leads to a moral base for the open 
society: an ethics of openness to criticism.  
     Such a linkage between epistemology and ethics leads the normative conception of 
the person to the following key outcomes. Persons’s epistemic equality of access to 
critical rationality justifies their moral equality of taking a right (rational) decision.  
Our equal access to critical rationality leads us to our equal moral capacity for 
employing our rationality to identify what is a right (rational) or a wrong (irrational) 
decision. Once this logical linkage between the person's epistemic competence and his 
moral autonomy was established, the way is paved for establishing the subsequent 
linkages among those capacities and the person's equal legal, political, and economic 
rights. These rights shape the five layers of the person's fundamental equalities in the 
context of an ideal type critical rationalist normative concept of the person.  
     The person’s critical reason entitles him or her to an equal moral right of criticism. 
In other words, if individuals are entitled to equal moral autonomy, they must also 
have an equal right to establish a rational social order for realising such moral 
autonomy. This legal equality will be realised, if peoples have equal political right to 
actualise such a legal right of establishing a rational social order. Without such a 
political right, individual members of society cannot realise their moral and legal self-
governance. Persons's equal political right of criticism entitles them for an equal 
economic right of having a decent life because of their contributions to social division 
of labour. In this way, the five layers of the person's equalities are originated from his 
equal access to critical rationality. Popper's normative conception of the person 
recognises that the person's access to critical rationality justifies his or her moral 
equality. But, due to the disconnection between his epistemology and his ethical 
theory, there is not a logical way to argue that the person's access to critical rationality 
is the main source of his or her equalities in a wider societal sense.
282
  
     It is important to note this normative conception of the person recognises that the 
individual's desires are the impetuses of their self-preservation activities. But, it 
argues that human desires can be rationally managed by a higher-self that cognitively 
informs them rightness or wrongness of their moral decisions for realising the desires. 
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The ideal type of open global society rests on a normative conception of human nature 
that implies individuals can rationally justify their moral decisions. The ideal type 
acknowledges that actual individuals may not activate this critical rationality for 
taking a correct moral decision due to personal or social reasons. However, such an 
inactivation does not refute the normative conception of the person, because it does 
contradict the person's potential access to critical reason. An ideal type refers to a 
latent capacity that can be realised, but it has not been actualised yet. As Jarvie argues 
an ideal type is an idealisation that is "created for purpose of thought and exists 
nowhere; it is in this sense utopian, but it is rooted in reality, so that it is criticizable, 
though not for its idealization as such."
283
 As such, the critical rationalist conception 
of human nature refers to a logically constructed normative conception of the person.  
     John Rawls use a normative conception of the person for formulating his ideal type 
of a well-ordered society. He employs the notion of 'the veil of ignorance' to abstract 
his normative account of human nature for the formulation of his model-conception of 
a well-ordered society. In his words, “the veil of ignorance implies that persons are 
represented solely as moral person and not as persons advantaged or disadvantaged by 
the contingencies of their social position, the distribution of natural abilities, or by 
luck and historical accident over the course of their lives.”284 The normative 
conception of the person in the ideal type of open global society refers to a moral 
person whose potential access to critical rationality is abstracted from his social and 
historical conditions. However, is it still very rooted in fundamental human and social 
realities; that is, the principle of human fallibility and the possibility of a rational 
social dialogue through learning from mutual criticism. It is important to note that 
Habermas's ideal type of dialogic community stands on the similar premises of human 
access to communicative rationality. The moral persons of Habermas are able to use 
their communicative rationality in order to shape a rational social order.
285
               
 
4.2.2 Epistemology and Social Philosophy of an Open global Society 
    The normative conception of the person rests upon the application of Critical 
Rationalism for defining the five layers of human fundamental equalities. In order to 
use this new normative conception of the person as a micro-foundation of our macro-
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sociological model of open global society, I briefly address this theory of rationality. 
It not only reinforces the introduced five-layer normative conception of the person, 
but also leads to an epistemology and social philosophy of open global society.  
    As one of the best students of Popper’s critical epistemology, William Bartley III 
recognises that Popper's defence of rationalism, as merely an attitude, cannot be a 
strong defense against rationalist identity. The ultimate aim of Bartley was to advance 
Popper’s attitude of critical rationalism to a theory of rationality. An aspect of 
Popper’s critical rationalism that annoyed Bartley was his 'irrational faith in reason'. 
Bartley realises that whilst Popper strongly emphasises the conjectural character of 
all human knowledge and in this way he adopts an anti-dogmatic position in which 
there is no place for any dogmatic or irrational faith, his critical rationalism rests upon 
an irrational faith in reason, as a moral decision in favour of rationalism.
286
 I am not 
about here to enter into an informal debate between Bartley and Popper over this issue 
in detail, I merely refer to the core debate as it provides the grounds for justifying the 
preceding arguments regarding links amongst the five layers of the human equality 
and its implications for moral foundation of an open global society.   
     Popper denies the possibility of a ‘comprehensive rationalism’—the attitude of 
one’s not being prepared to accept any proposition that is neither based on argument 
nor evidence. He concludes thus that rationalism must rest on a pre-rational decision: 
no rational argument will have an effect on a man who does not want to adopt a 
rational attitude. Hence, critical rationalism needs an irrational faith in reason as a 
moral decision in favour of rationalism.
287
 Bartley rightly argues that if our defence 
of rationality rests upon a moral decision, an irrationalist may reasonably argue that 
he or she has taken a moral decision in favour of irrationalism.
288
 Hence, critical 
rationalism must provide us with a theory of rationality, not just a moral attitude, 
resting on an irrational faith in reason.  
     According to Bartley, “just as in the Christian tradition the essence of being a 
Christian, or of Christian identity, had been traditionally subordinated to the essence 
of the Christian message, so in the rationalist tradition rationalist identity has often 
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been subordinated to the essence of rational belief.”289 He reminds us ‘comprehensive 
rationalism’ was an effort to introduce the essence of rationalist identity. However, 
the criterion it introduced for a rational belief was a justified true belief. 
290
 In this 
way, comprehensive rationalism claims that we can justify all of our beliefs. Bartley 
validates Popper's critical philosophy as “the first nonjustificational philosophy of 
criticism in the history of philosophy.”291 Popper discovered that our scientific 
conjectures (beliefs) cannot be justified. However, they can be falsified. In this way, 
criticism becomes the criterion of rationality of scientific knowledge. As argued in 
chapter 2, with the latter developments in his philosophy, Popper accepted that inter-
subjective criticism is the criterion of an objective and rational knowledge. Popper 
partly incorporated Bartley's critique in new version of chapter 24 of The Open 
Society.
292
 While Popper accepted Bartley's argument in that ‘criticism’ is the essence 
of a rationalist identity, he did not argue about critical rationalism as a theory of 
rationality and rational action. 
     In Rationality Versus the Theory of Rationality, Bartley develops his critique of 
Popper and argues for a comprehensive critical rationalism. He rightly notes, “Popper 
has throughout his writings practiced nonjustificational criticism without explicitly 
discussing it in general terms.”293 Bartley wants to explicitly introduce openness to 
criticism as a theory of rationality. He writes:             
Implicit in such a nonjustificational approach are a new philosophical 
program and new conception of rationalist identity. The new framework 
permits a rationalist to be characterized as one who holds all his beliefs, 
including his most fundamental standards and his basic philosophical position 
itself, open to criticism; who never cuts off an argument by resorting to faith 
or irrational commitment to justify some belief that been under severe critical 
fire. I shall call this conception comprehensively critical rationalism.
294
  
     Bartley’s critique of Popper has received different reflections from philosophers295. 
Along the same line of reasoning, Tom Settle, Ian Jarvie and Joseph Agassi, argue for 
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a theory of openness to criticism.
296
 My special interest in Bartley’s theory of 
rationality as ‘openness to criticism’ relates to the grounds that it provides us for 
defending preceding arguments, implied that individuals' access to critical rationality 
justifies their human equality in a wider societal sense. If we employ Bartley’s theory 
of rationality as our epistemological theory of the person’s equal access to critical 
rationality, we lead to the five-layer normative conception of the person that provides 
the micro-foundation of a macro-sociological model of an open global society. It is 
important to note that an important link between the theory of rationality and a theory 
rational action is recognised as micro-foundation of macro-sociological theory. I will 
argue in detail about this in the next chapter. It is important to note that an application 
of Bartley's theory of rationality for identifying how a rational dialogue among world 
civilisations is possible implies that they should open their fundamental belifes to 
mutual criticism in order to shap a dialogic position to each other.  
     In Reading Habermas, David Rasmussen points out: “…the sociological and the 
philosophical projects can be brought together in such a manner that social theory 
according to Weber and company can be integrated with a philosophical theory 
conceived as a theory of rationality.”297 This link between epistemology and social 
theory is logically established by a theory of human action. If Critical Rationalism is 
our epistemological theory of rationality, what would the implications be for our 
theory of action and sociological theory? Rasmussen argues that Habermas’ critical 
sociology originates from his communicative theory of rationality and communicative 
action.
298
 Habermas’ communicative epistemology also informs his discursive 
theories of ethics, law and democracy.
299
 By analogy, we need to address the 
outcomes of Bartley’s theory of critical rationality for a critical rationalist 
macrosociology. I will discuss this issue in detail in chapter 5. The present argument 
refers to the outcomes of such a link between the theory of critical rationality and the 
five-layer normative conception of the person. It is important to note that linking the 
theory of rationality with the normative conception of human nature leads us to a 
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cognitivist model of human society. As William Outhwaite argues, this cognitivist 
model views the society as more or less an outcome of conscious human agency.
300
  
     Upon the normative account of the person, a sociological concept of open society 
describes the institutional principles of a global society of free and equal persons in 
which individuals activate their potential access to critical rationality to agree about 
certain global shared values for their global social organisation. If they do not arrive at 
such globally shared values, they cannot establish those global social institutions that 
are needed to protect them as free and equal persons. The sociological ideal type of 
open global society links the person's access to critical rationality with moral capacity 
of individuals to achieve one set of globally shared values regarding how global order 
can be organised to treat all peoples as free and equal persons. In this way, the whole 
idea of open global society depends upon critical rationalism as an epistemological 
theory of rationality that justifies the five layers of the equality of the person. It leads 
to the exploration of the reason why critical rationalism can address the function of 
rational dialogue amongst civilisations of peoples. 
    To illustrate the essence of the idea of open global society, I make a close 
inspection of the epistemological logic of Critical Rationalism to address the nature of 
a rational dialogue among civilisations. As argued before, Bartley’s critical rationality 
defends the rationalist identity as a rational faith in reason. It introduces Critical 
Rationalism as a theory of rationality that shifts the criterion of rationality from 
‘justification’ to ‘criticism’. This shift plays a key role in introducing the logic of a 
rational dialogue amongst civilisations. If individuals, as rational moral persons, 
should activate their critical rationality for solving their disputes, they must follow the 
ethics of openness to criticism. If we address what is the essence of theory of critical 
rationalism, we can argue that why a rational dialogue of civilisations is a feasible 
global project. 
     Inspired by Mark Notturno’s Science and the Open Society,301 I use the following 
threefold categories to locate Bartley’s theory of rationality (openness to criticism) in 
a middle way between two competing epistemologies. It paves the way for arguing 
the possibility of the emergence of a global ethics of openness to criticism, if 
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civilisations take the motto of critical rationality. It leads us to explore a key link 
between epistemology and social philosophy of open global society. The threefold 
category is as follows: 
 Uncritical Rationalism (Absolutism) 
 Critical Rationalism (Openness to Rational Criticism)  
 Critical Irrationalism (Relativism)  
     I follow Popper's ethics of critical rationalism: I may be wrong, you may be right, 
let us discuss to get closer to the truth. 'I may be wrong' means my rationality is limit. 
'You may be right' means whilst your rationality is also limited, you may be partly 
right. ‘Let us discuss’ means that I learn from your criticism of my limited rationality 
and you learn from my criticism of your limited rationality. In this way, the theory of 
critical rationalism, as ‘openness to criticism’, means that we both should open our 
fundamental beliefs to a mutual criticism and leaning from our socially recognised 
errors, and in this way to get closer to the truth, as the source of our open-ended 
consensus. In this sense, the criterion of openness to criticism can be applied at a 
rational dialogue amongst civilisations, if they activate their motto of critical 
rationality. From this point of view, taking a moral decision in favour of such rational 
dialogue would have an epistemological necessity and dynamic. It implies that their 
critical rationality advocate that they ought to do so, if they do not want to contradict 
themselves.         
    The three epistemological doctrines can be defined due to their premises about the 
criterion of rationality. The first one, Uncritical Rationalism or absolutism implies 
that we can justify the rationality of all of our beliefs. It uses deductive or inductive 
logic for justifying the beliefs. Hence, the criterion of rationality is 'justification' and 
the logic of rational discourse is either inductive or deductive. The third epistemology, 
Critical Irrationalism or relativism, implies that we cannot justify our beliefs, hence 
neither deductive nor inductive logic can justify our beliefs. Like an absolutist, a 
relativist assumes that 'justification' is the criterion of rationality. But, the second 
epistemology (critical rationalism) implies that we cannot justify any of our beliefs 
but we can criticise all of them, as Bartley argues. Critical rationalism accepts the 
imperfection and the objectivity of our rational beliefs, because it has shifted the 
criterion of rationality from ‘justification’ to ‘criticism’.302 As Notturno writes: 
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Rationality, according to Popper, is not so much a property of knowledge as a 
task for humans. … We are rational to the extent to which we are open to 
criticism, including self-criticism; and to the extent to which we are willing to 
change our beliefs when confronted with what we judge to be good reason. 
We are, in short, rational to the extent to which we are willing to appeal to 
reason and argument, as opposed to violence and force, to resolve our 
dispute
303
 [emphasis added]. 
    Given that rationality is here taken as the openness to criticism, the aforementioned 
epistemologies have far-reaching outcomes for the possibility and the need for a 
rational dialogue of civilisations. If we follow Uncritical Rationalism, civilisations do 
not need a rational dialogue, because they have their perfect systems of rationale and 
they do not need to learn from other civilisations. They do not need dialogue, because 
they are right and others are wrong. If we follow Critical Irrationalism, civilisations 
do not require a rational dialogue because there is no truth in their universe, deserving 
to be learned. Their systems of rationale remain incommensurable paradigms that 
cannot rationality discuss and learning from each other. Popper rejects this Kuhnian 
claim as the Myth of Framework.
304
However, if we follow Critical Rationalism, there 
is a strong epistemological necessity for a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. If 
all human civilisations are the human-made historical constructs, all of them rest upon 
their imperfect rationale systems. Hence, they must say to each other I may be wrong, 
you may be right, let us discuss to learn from our mutual criticism. 
     In order to develop this critical rationalist logic of dialogue amongst civilisations--
as a moral foundation for a multicivilisational open global society, we require a closer 
inspection of the very criterion of rationality as criticism versus justification. I use the 
insightful arguments of Mark Notturno to address this criterion. Without a direct 
involvement in Bartley-Popper debate, Notturno leads us to see what the essence of a 
critical rationalist theory of rational dialogue is. If we aim to explain the essence of a 
rationalist identity, we have two options: using 'justification' as our criterion of 
rationality or using 'criticism' as our criterion. If we are an irrarionalist, we need 
neither justification nor criticism to test the rationality of our beliefs. We can choose 
whatever we please! A critical rationalist theory of dialogue addresses following three 
questions: (a) what is the function of a valid deductive argument in a rational 
dialogue? (b) what is the function of a falsifier evidence in a rational dialogue?, and 
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(c) what is the function of the regulative idea of the truth in a rational dialogue? They 
shape a theory of rationality to address a global ethics of openness to criticism.
305
 
     The first question: What is the function of a valid deductive argument in a rational 
dialogue? For a critical rationalist theory of dialogue, neither deductive nor inductive 
inference can justify the rationality of a knowledge claim. Inductive inference cannot 
verify it, because in an inductive argument the truth of the conclusion is consistent 
with the truth of premises, but the inconsistency of the premises cannot falsify the 
argument's conclusions. Hence, if we use an inductive inference, we cannot refute the 
conclusion of the arguments due to the inconsistency of the premises. As such, an 
inductive argument does not logically force a rational dialogue to choose between the 
truth of its conclusions and the falsity of (one or more) of their premises.  
     A valid deductive inference cannot justify rationality of a belief because we cannot 
absolutely verify its premises, but a valid deductive argument (especially the modus 
tollens) can transmit the inconsistency of the premises of arguments to its conclusions. 
Hence, it acts as the logic of criticism. When we use a valid deductive inference in our 
rational dialogue, and if the conclusion of our deductively valid argument is false, 
then one or more of its premises must be false as well. Hence, such a rational dialogue 
logically forces dialogic counterparts to accept the falsity of their conclusions due to 
the falsity of their premises. A valid argument logically forces us to learn from 
criticism, if we do not want to contradict ourselves. Only a valid deductive argument 
allows us to exercise rational control over an inter-subjective dialogue, because we 
cannot simultaneously assert the truth of the premises and deny the conclusions 
without contradicting ourselves. A valid deductive argument presents us with a set of 
mutually exclusive alternatives. We can choose to accept its premises, in which case 
we must also accept its conclusions; or reject one or more of its premises, in which 
case we must reject its conclusions as well.
306
 Hence, the first principle of a rational 
dialogue is the usage of a valid deductive argument. The global ethics of openness to 
criticism implies that if we use valid deductive arguments in their moral dialogue with 
other civilisations, there is an epistemological necessity that leads us to a set globally 
shared values, because we must be ready to accept the falsity of our arguments, if our 
premises are false. In this way, there is an epistemological mechanism for exercising a 
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rational control over the dialogue among conflicting moral opinions. A good example 
for this claim is an actualised rational dialogue and an open-ended consensus amongst 
global community of scientists who are committed to the motto of scientific methods. 
Remember that Popper extended the scientific method to his social philosophy of the 
open society, and this thesis aims to internalise Critical Rationalism in the ideal type 
of an open global society.         
     The second question: What is the function of falsifier evidences in a rational 
dialogue? For a critical rationalist theory of dialogue, a falsifier evidence, either 
empirical or logical, criticises the premises of a valid deductive argument. In this way, 
it plays a key role in a rational dialogue as a process of learning from criticism. 
Without such a falsifier evidence, a valid deductive argument cannot work as the logic 
of criticism. We use a falsifier evidence to show that one or more premises of our 
counterpart's arguments contradict the facts. In this way, we want to persuade our 
counterpart that his or her conclusions cannot be true due to the falsifier evidence. The 
key criterion of rationality, as openness to criticism, is that we must use falsifier 
evidences to criticise the premises of our valid deductive arguments. The growth of 
our rationality, as the growth of scientific knowledge, through a rational dialogue, is 
depended on the criticisms of the premises as the mechanism of learning from errors   
(i.e., P1TTEEP2).    
     However, such falsifier evidences do not act as conclusive disproof. As we cannot 
absolutely justify our arguments, we cannot absolutely refute the premises of a valid 
deductive argument. Like an uncritical rationalist, we do accept the possibility of a 
rational dialogue via a valid deductive inference. But, unlike a critical irrationalist, 
we must not regard criticism as conclusive disproof, because if we absolutely refute 
rationality of a belief, it means that it is absolutely wrong, however due to the limits 
of knowledge, we cannot prove that it is absolutely wrong. In this way, the middle 
way of critical rationalism becomes clearer through recognising the role of falsifier 
evidence. Critical Rationalism differs from Uncritical Rationalism and Critical 
Irrationalism because they both views justification as the criterion of rationality. For 
Uncritical Rationalism, since we can justify all of our belief, we can have an absolute 
rational belief. For Critical Irrationalism, since we cannot justify our beliefs, we 
cannot have any rational belief at all. On the contrary, Critical Rationalism shifts the 
criterion of rationality from justification to criticism. This theory of rationality 
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implies that we can criticise all of our beliefs: critical rationality means all of our 
opinions must be open to endless criticism.
307
  
     A rational dialogue amongst world civilisations is possible, if they open their 
fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism. When they use valid deductive arguments, in 
such an open dialogue, they can logically demand that their dialogic counterparts 
accept the falsity of their conclusions if the premises are criticised. In this way, their 
rational dialogue can be converged towards an open-ended consensus due to a mutual 
correction of socially recognised criticisms. However, they should take the criticisms 
as an inconclusive disproof, because their criticisms and the resultant consensus is 
always open to new line of criticisms. If they view their criticisms as conclusive 
disproof, they remain closed to learning from new line of criticisms. Hence, the 
second principle of a rational dialogue is looking at falsifier evidences as un-finished 
sources of the growth of our rationality through learning from new line of 
criticisms.
308
 If civilisations open their systems of rationale to other civilisations' 
criticisms, they have actually engaged in producing a meta-civilisational ethics of 
openness to criticism as moral foundation of a multi-civilisational open global society.   
     The third question: What is the function of the regulative idea of the truth in a 
rational dialogue? Due to our limited rationality, we cannot fully match our rational 
conjectures with the fact. However, if we take this impossibility as an absolute 
disconnection between the conjectures and the facts, we already have denied the 
objectivity of our rational conjectures. A critical rationalist position implies that we 
cannot fully match our conjectures with the facts because we have rejected 
absolutism. However, we cannot also absolutely disconnect our conjectures with the 
facts because we have already rejected relativism. As such, we can imperfectly match 
our conjectures with the facts. The correspondence theory of truth and the regulative 
ideal of truth refer to such an imperfect matching. Without the regulative idea of the 
truth, we cannot claim that our conjectures are rational and objective. The principle of 
approximation to the truth rests upon the acceptance of the regulative idea of truth. An 
important function of the regulative idea of the truth, in a rational dialogue, is that it 
leads us to see how criticising the premises of deductive arguments through 
elimination of errors (i.e., P1TTEEP2) approximates the dialogue to the truth. 
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As such, a rational dialogue amongst competing moral values can be converged 
towards a revisable moral consensus. The third principle of a rational dialogue is that 
a revisable inter-subjective consensus among dialogic counterparts is possible due to 
their respect for the regulative idea of truth. The global ethics of openness to criticism 
implies that an approximation to a common global ethics is a feasible global project 
due to an epistemological necessity that is engaged in a rational dialogue amongst 
civilisations.                                                    
     According to the preceding arguments, the essence of a rationalist identity are (a) 
making valued deductive arguments; (b) using falsifiers evidences, either factual or 
logical, to criticise the premises of our valid arguments, and (c) respecting the 
principle of the approximation to the truth. If individuals' access to rationality refers to 
their capacity to be rational moral creatures, they can be engaged in an inter-
civilisational dialogue regarding one set of globally shared values that are necessary 
for creating those global social institutions that protect universal human rights. Such a 
rational dialogue uses persons’ capacity for rational dialogue with each other as the 
motor force of the emergence of a global ethics of openness to criticism. In this way, 
the critical rationalist theory of rationality leads us to the moral foundation of the ideal 
type of open global society. As I will argue later, this moral foundation justifies a 
global social democracy, because the global ethics of openness criticism recognises 
all persons as equal possessors of the rights of making global governance accountable 
to their demands, and equal possessors of the right of having a descent life.   
      Before ending this sub-section, it is worthy of note that such an ideal type of open 
global society--as a Kantian imaginary global community-- should not be seen as an 
unrealistic utopia. In Theorizing the Good Society, Jeffrey Alexander points out:     
If we study the social movements, the scandals, the crises, the individual and 
group demands for inclusion and exclusion in contemporary societies, we 
find that these very practical actions refer to the existence of an imaginary 
world of a very utopian kind. The world Kant imagined as a priori is, in 
empirical terms, a regulative if imaginary ideal. The people who inhabit this 
ideal sphere are conceived of as "our equals" in status, a status that is neither 
economic, political, religious, or ethics but specifically human. At the basis of 
this imagined community there exists an idealization of the "free and 
autonomous individual", an actor who is conceived as inherently possessing 
fundamental capacities and rights. These individuals are believed to form a 
community, membership in which exhibits solidarity of a collective binding 
type. … It creates the notion of "the people". These are imagined, however, 
only as a people of a very specific type, namely, those who are capable of 
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    Alexander argues that the historical constructed existence of such an idealized 
community within the hierarchical and segmented cultural and organisational 
structures of developed societies has created in democratic and semi-democratic 
societies a fundamental tension between ‘the ideal’ and ‘the real.’ He calls this 
imaginary sphere as the sphere of civil society, which struggles to turn the ideal of a 
community of the ends into a social reality. As he reminds us, because democracy 
allows self-motivate action, the people who make up it must be considered as being 
capable of activism and autonomy as opposed to being inactive and reliant. They must 
be seen as rational and reasonable rather than passionate. Persons who are active, self-
governing, rational, quiet and realistic will be capable of forming an open social 
relationship, rather than secretive one.
310
 In other words, Alexander shows that the 
ideal type of a democratic community is closely rooted in human equal capacities and 
rights.  
4.2.3 An Institutional Outlook for an Open Global Society     
     The five premises of the normative conception of the person refer to the five major 
capacities and rights of human beings as ends in themselves. The ideal type of open 
global society employs these premises to introduce the institutional structure of a 
global society of free and equal persons. The idea does not introduce a mechanism of 
employing human capacities in order to realise the institutional principles. However, it 
does defend the ideal type as a logically constructed normative ideal type of global 
order that is rooted in human beings' real capacities and rights. It shows that if we 
accept the premise of the five-layer of the normative conception of human nature, we 
must also recognise the need for the emergence of parallel global social institutions to 
realise those human capacities and rights. As Linklater reminds us, the task of a 
normative ideal type of global order is defending it as a legitimate normative goal. 
However, this ideal type, as a conceptual framework, must be developed into a 
theoretical framework that addresses the forms of global social learning, capable of 
turning the ideal type into an institutional reality.
311
 Parallel to the five premises of 
our normative conception of person, an open global society requires the five 
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institutional principles to introduce a desirable social organisation of an alternative 
humane globality. These five institutional principles can be suggested as follows: 
 The Institution of Global Freedom of Thought 
 The Institution of Global Ethics of Openness to Criticism  
 The Institution of Global Law of Humanity 
 The Institution of Global Democracy 
 The Institution of Global Competitive Market 
    The Institution of Global Freedom of Thought: If human beings are equal in their 
potential access to critical rationality, they need a global cultural institution to set free 
their critical rationality. I call this global cultural institution as the institution of a 
global freedom of thought. Like other social institutions, cultural institutions play an 
organisational role in a social ordering of peoples. A cultural institution provides an 
ideational space and shared values for justifying certain models of social organisation. 
Since individuals are rational moral beings, they need a cultural justification for the 
legitimising their pattern of social organisation. A cultural institution refers to such an 
ideational justification and shared values for a special model of social organization 
that rests upon the society's world-views.
312
 The cultural models of social organisation 
assume certain premises about the person as the ultimate units of social organisation. 
The institutions of global freedom of thought refer to a meta-civilisatonal sphere that 
protects the epistemic equality of persons through making them available alternative 
systems of rationale. The freedom of thought requires an access to alternative systems 
of thought. However, the existing civilisational-based cultural spaces do not provide 
such a global freedom of thought. The main function of the institution of global 
freedom of thought is to provide persons alternative systems of rationale to enable 
them to exercise their freedom of thought as the essence of an open global society.       
    The Institution of Global Ethics of Openness to Criticism: If human beings are 
equal in their moral capacity to choose their moral values, they require a global ethical 
institution to protect their moral equality. Peoples are organised in nationally or 
civilisational-based moral systems, hence their moral freedoms are limited to those 
schemes of morality. In other words, they do not have the required moral freedom to 
choose other civilisations' schemes of morality. The institution of global ethics of 
openness to criticism refers to a meta-civilisational ethics, which protects moral 
equality of peoples by providing them alternative schemes of morality. The existing 
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pre-global systems of morality do not provide alternative ethical schemes for peoples 
to choose. The global ethics of openness to criticism is in fact a meta-civilisational 
moral institution-- which whilst it respects civilisational-based moral systems-- 
provides peoples with alternative systems of morality that can be selected by 
themselves.
313
          
     The Institution of Global Law of Humanity: If human beings are equal in their 
legal rights for determining how their social organisation should be taken form, they 
need a global legal institution to protect their legal equality. In contemporary national-
based legal systems or international law, the legal rights of persons are mainly limited 
to their nationally recognised rights. While a set of minimum legal rights are globally 
recognised for all peoples, the legal rights are mainly defined due to individulas' 
national citizenship. If the existing nationally-organised legal systems do not protect 
persons’ equal rights of criticism for making emerging global governance accountable 
to their demands, a meta-national legal system is required to satisfy such a legal 
equality. The global law of humanity refers to this meta-national legal institution that 
protects persons’ legal rights, in spite of their national citizenship. At the core of this 
global legal right is an equal legal right of criticism that enables peoples to realise 
their moral autonomy beyond their national citizenship. 
314
 
     The Institution of Global Democracy: If human beings are equal in their political 
rights of self-governance, they need a global body politic that is answerable to the 
world populations. In the existing global governance, a post-national layer of political 
governance has been shaped. But, it is not an accountable body politic to the world’s 
population. The institution of global democracy refers to a post-national democratic 
governance which protects the person's right of political criticism to make global 
governance accountable to the prospective global citizens. The institution of global 
democracy goes beyond one civilisation’s model of democracy. It aims to protect the 
rights of peoples to make global governance accountable to the world's population, 
wherever global relations affect their personal life.  
    The Institution of Global Competitive Market: If human beings are equal in their 
socio-economic rights of having a decent life, they need a global economic system, 
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which protects such a right. While the emerging post-national economy has to some 
extent opened national economies to a global market, the benefits and costs of this 
new global division of labour is highly unevenly distributed. The institution of global 
competitive market refers to a global market in which equal rights of peoples for 
having a decent life can be realised by providing them equal opportunity to enter into 
a global economic competition. If the existing distribution of economic resources and 
benefits does not satisfy a decent life for the majority of the world’s population, it 
requires some key institutional reforms.  
    The five major macro-societal institutions of an open global society do not aim to 
provide us with an imposed institutional blueprint of such a global society of free and 
equal persons. Without a dialogue among world civilisations, one cannot address the 
institutional structure of open global society in detail. The institutional principles 
provide a model-conception to understand the institutional nature of an ideal open 
global society. I will develop this model-conception to a theoretical framework by 
chapter 5 and a macro-sociological analysis of the formation of open global society by 
chapter 8 that will provide a more details about the institutional structure of the open 
global society. The premises and the institutions of open global society can be 
summarised in this way: 
1) The concept of the open global society is an ideal type, so that a concrete global 
social order can approximate it more or less. This ideal type can be used as a 
normative standard for criticising the existing global social order, and also as a guide 
for attempts to reform it.  
2) The ideal type of open global society rests on a normative conception of the person as 
a 'rational moral agent' whose critical rationality cognitively fuels his moral capacity 
to choose between 'wrong' and 'right' action.  
3) The main and the first premise of the ideal type is the equal access of persons to 
critical rationality, i.e., their capacity to make valid deductive arguments, to use 
falsifier evidences to criticise the valid arguments, and to approximate to the truth.  
4) The second premise of the ideal type is a person’s moral capacity of rationalising 
their actions through opening them to criticism to achieve a cognitive moral 
autonomy.  
5) The third premise of the ideal type is a persons’ equal legal right of criticism, i.e., 
their equal right to use their moral autonomy to appeal for a legal self-governance. 
6) The fourth premise of the ideal type is a persons’ equal political right of criticism, 
i.e., their equal political right for demand a political self-determination. 
7) The fifth premise of the ideal type is a persons' equal economic right of criticism, i.e., 
their equal right to having a decent life. 
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8) The first and the main institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global culture 
of the freedom of thought which creates a meta-civilisational culture for protecting 
persons’ freedom of thought by providing access to alternative rationale systems.   
9) The second institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global ethics of 
openness to criticism that produces a meta-civilisatinal ethics for protecting persons’ 
diversity of ethical choose by providing access to alternative moral systems. 
10) The third institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global legal system that 
creates a global law of humanity for enabling peoples to make global governance 
accountable to their needs whereas global decisions making affect their lives. 
11) The fourth institutional principles of the ideal type refers to a global political system 
that produces a global democracy for realising peoples’ equal rights to the self-
determination on a global scale, whereas global political decisions affect their lives.  
12) The fifth institutional principle of the ideal type refers to a global economic system 
which creates a global competitive division of labour for realising peoples’ equal 
rights to having a decent life.        
13) The open global society, as a global society of free and equal persons, refers to a 
global layer of peoples’ social organization on a global scale, which can coexist with 
local, national, and regional layers of social ordering of peoples. While it organises 
peoples on a planetary scale, it does not refers to a single global civilisation in which 
civilisational-based systems of rationality, of moral systems, of legal orders, of 
political systems and economic organisations lose their own meanings at all.     
14) The open global society’s conceptions of freedom of thought; the ethics of openness 
to criticism; the rule of law; democracy and social justice differ from those nationally 
or civilisational-based readings of the conceptions. However, they are systematically 
informed by the critical rationalist theory of rationality.            
4.3 Towards a New Normative Vision of Dialogic Globalisation 
     The macrosociological ideal-type of the open global society has used critical 
rationalism to present a schematic picture of a potential global society of free and 
equal persons as a global layer of social ordering of peoples. This ideal-type leads us 
to explore the deviations of the existing global order from the ideal type. In this way, 
it leads us to develop a new normative critique and a new vision of globalisation. If 
contemporary globalisation suffers from one set of deep societal deficits, the main 
reason perhaps is that globalisation has interconnected the whole world, but it has not 
created an accountable global organisation to peoples. Our global social (dis)orders 
are ultimately originated in the absence of such a global layer of social organisation. If 
civilisations have not arrived at a pre-commitment to global social democracy, the 
cultural reason is that they do not share about a common vision regarding the equality 
of human beings. The human rights are defined for them based on radically different 
world-views. Hence, without one set of globally shared values regarding human 
equality, a global layer of democracy and justice cannot be established through a 
consensual procedure.     
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     The thesis develops a new normative vision of dialogic globalisation on the basis 
of the premises and institutional principles of the ideal type of open global society. 
While this ideal type leads us to trace the deviations of liberal model of globality from 
a dialogic globalisation, we need to advance the ideal type to a theoretical framework. 
The idea of an open global society implies that humans' access to critical rationality 
can logically provide the epistemological foundation of a rational dialogue amongst 
civilisations. However, the ideal type itself cannot address such rational dialogue--as a 
global social transformative mechanism that aims to change the exiting global order 
towards an alternative open global order. The next chapter uses critical rationalism to 
provide a theoretical framework to address such a transformative function. In this 
way, it will introduce rational dialogue amongst civilisations as a form of global 
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Chapter 5  
  
Towards an Analytical Framework for 




    The ideal type of open global society introduced the premises and social institutions 
of such a global society of free and equal persons. But, it does show how human 
capacities  can be used to create such an open global order. This chapter uses the ideal 
type for the development of an analytical model to address the mechanisms of an open 
global society formation. The model leads us to explore the transformative functions 
of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. It employs the principles of Critical 
Rationalism to introduce a critical rationalist form of global social learning. 
    Chapter 5 begins with section 5.1 that utilises critical rationalism to advance the 
normative conception of human nature to a critical rationalist model of human action. 
To this end, it critically reviews three competing models of human action, namely the 
Hobbesian, the Lockean and the Kantian action models, and their implications for 
analysing the emergence of social order. It critically reviews Kantian-inspired models 
of action that are suggested by Talcott Parsons and Jürgen Habermas. It argues that 
these Kantian-inspired models can be advanced by a critical rationalist model of 
human action. Section 5.2 applies the critical rationalist model to introduce a critical 
rationalist form of social learning as a mechanism of social changes. In this way, it 
provides a micro-foundation for a macrosociological analysis of transition form a 
closed to an open global society. Section 5.3 applies the critical rationalist model of 
social learning at a global scale to argue for a global social learning through a rational 
dialogue amongst civilisations. It aims to show how people's access to critical 
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rationality enables them to engage in such global social learning, operating as the 
mechanism of one set of global social changes.  
5.1 Towards a Critical Rationalist Model of Human Action 
     Sociological theory is concerned with human action at the micro-level and social 
order at the macro-level. As Milan Zafirovski argues, sociological theory achieves an 
integration between the analysis of individual actions and analysis of the formation of 
social order.
315
As Hans Joas reminds us, sociology requires a fundamental theory of 
action that is able to define various types of action according to how they differed, 
especially from rational action. For him, such a sociological theory refers to a theory 
of society, as an interconnection of actions that goes beyond merely the unintentional 
linking of actions motivated by self-interest. It aims to analyse the formation of 
human society as the result of a normative agreement amongst individual members of 
the society.
316
 Viewed from this micro-macro link, a macrosociology of dialogic 
globalisation, aiming to address the formation of an open global society, requires a 
theory of human action that rests upon the premises of the ideal type of open global 
society, in particular the premise of the person's access to critical rationality.  
5.1.1 Three Competing Models of Human Action 
     In order to advance the conception of human nature to a critical rationalist model 
of human action, it is important to recognise a key function of action theories in the 
development of sociological theories. According to Hans Joas: 
In sociology, the classical thinkers of the discipline in this century who have 
shaped mainstream theory formation—be they Max Weber and Talcott 
Parsons—attempt to ground not only their own studies but also the discipline 
as a whole in a theory of action. …Almost all of the most important 
contemporary [sociological] theories can be characterized in terms of a 
specific theory of action…. The best-known and most significant of these are 




     Joas provides an analysis of the emergence of competing action theories and their 
impacts on the emergence of sociological theories. In the same line of reasoning, 
Jeffrey Alexander writes, “every macrotheorist of social systems or institutions makes 
assumptions about how individuals act and interact; these assumptions are crucial to 
                                                 
315
 Milan Zafirovski, "Unification of Sociological Theory by the Rational Choice Model," Sociology, 
33, (1999), p.509. 
316
 Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action, (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1996), p.35. 
317
 Ibid., p.2.  
  124 
their large-scale theories even when they not made explicit—as, indeed, they usually 
are not.”
318
 Hans Joas believes that Parsons' argument regarding action theories is the 
best way to introduce the central discourse on the implications of action theories for 
sociology.
319
 He situates Parsons' action theory in a major confrontation between a 
Kantian model of human action and a Hobbesian one. Parsons introduces his theory of 




     Parsons claims that his theory of action uses the insights of a common conception 
of action theory which can be detected in the works of four representative authors 
from four countries; namely; Alfred Marshal (England), Vilfred Pareto (Italy), Emile 
Durkheim (France), and Max Weber (Germany). Joas argues that Parsons' claim about 
such common conceptions is criticised. Nevertheless, his central debate about a major 
confrontation between the Kantian and the Hobbesian models remains a valid 
argument in the discourse of action theories.
321
 I argue that we can add a Lockean 
model of human action as a middle ground between the Hobbesian and the Kantian 
models of human action. This Lockean model refers to a different version of the 
utilitarian model of action, but it should be separated from the Hobbesian model. In 
this way, the three competing models of human action can be categorised as follows: 
 The Hobbesian Model of Human Action 
 The Lockean Model of Human Action 
 The Kantian Model of Human Action 
     I situate Parsons and Habermas' models of human action in the Kantian model. A 
Popperian-informed (critical rationalist) model of human action advances the Kantian-
inspired models of human action. A critical review of the Hobbesian action model is 
the starting point of my discussion in this section. To introduce the Kantian model, 
Parsons' critique of the utilitarian model of action will be discussed, and followed by 
Habermas' critique of Parsons' action theory. Finally, I will propose the critical 
rationalist action model, as an alternative for Habermas' communicative action model.  
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     It is important to note that the action theory plays an explanatory role for the 
sociological analysis of the emergence of a peaceful social order, because it addresses 
the causes of human actions as the ultimate impetuses of social order. A human action 
refers to a goals-means framework in which context the dynamic of human actions 
can be addressed. Hence, a theory or a model of human action must lead us to see how 
'action-goals' take shape, and operate as the ultimate causes of human behaviours. It 
also must lead us to explore how ‘action-means’ work to realise the action-goals. In 
this sense, the key function of a model of human action is to address the ends-means 
framework as the context of human action's formation. An action theory can be linked 
with the theories of rationality because human rationality affects choice of action's 
goals and means. Competing models of human action provide a different analysis of 
human action's ends-means framework and their relations with human rationality. 
They lead us to see different causality analyses of the motor forces of human action 
that pave the way for different sociological analyses of the emergence of social order.     
     The Hobbesian Model of Human Action: Thomas Hobbes put the following 
question for modern sociological theory: How could persons whose tendency in the 
conditions of nature is to act egoistically develop a peaceful social order?
322
 Hobbes' 
action model provides a micro-foundation to address this macro-sociological question. 
In the Hobbesian model of human action, the passions or desires determine action-
goals and reason is a servant of the passions or desires. For this model, reason is the 
faculty of devising means to secure what one desires. Desires are random and there is 
no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of desires themselves.
323
 
The Hobbesian model is a utilitarian model of action because it views desires or 
utilities as the ultimate ends of action.
324
 In this model, action-goals are subjective and 
have been separately shaped for each person. In this sense, action-goals are viewed as 
given and exogenous to the ends-means framework. People use their reason for not 
rationally justifying their action-goals but for finding the best means to satisfy the 
given goals for which there is not a rational criterion. For the Hobbesian model, 
reason cannot identify the rightness or wrongness of action-goals. If action-goals are 
subjectively determined by each person and are unique to that person, they do not 
                                                 
322
 Op. cit., p.9. 
323
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons: 1962), pp.64-87. 
324
 Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, (1968), p.90. 
  126 
have a necessary relation with other peoples' action-goals. The others only constitute 
the means or conditions for the fulfillment of one's own goals.
325
  
     The Hobbesian goals-means framework rests upon a pessimistic epistemology that 
rejects the possibility of a achieving a rational consensus on action-goals amongst 
individuals. For Hobbes, “The conflict of opinions over the good has produced the 
war of all against all… The incompatibility of opinions regarding the good has 
produced absolute evil.”326 In the absent of a rational consensus over the action-goals, 
individuals adopt in their subjective ends the most effective available means. These 
means are found to be the force and fraud. The others become the means for the 
individual's own ends. In this way, peoples become enemies of each other and can use 
force and fraud to make others their own means.
327
 As such, the state of nature would 
inevitably be the state of war. As Istvan Hont argues, the Hobbesian model refers to 
“the opposite of society as a shared system of values …[but] a state of permanent 
hostility, or war…”328 If private appetite is the measure of good and evil, and the 
desires determine human action and if the reason is a servant of the passions; peoples 
cannot have a shared value-set to which they locate the origins of their action-goals.  
     Alexander Wendt argues that Hobbes’ account of human nature leads to a culture 
of enmity in which individuals do not recognise each other as equal persons. Hence, 
they use the force and fraud in order to enforce others to act as the means for realising 
their own ends. The logic of enmity is the ‘war of all against all’, in which actors 
operate on the principle of ‘kill or be killed’. This social philosophy originates from 
Hobbes' action model: action-goals are subjective and cannot be rationaly evaluated. 
Hence there is no a rational foundation on which they can base and organise their 
social order.
329
 Hobbes' action model fuels his political philosophy.
330
 Since there is 
no a mechanism for people's self-preservation in an anarchical society or in the state 
of permanent hostility, each person has the absolute right to self-preservation. 
However, in order to realise this absolute right, persons must give up their own rights 
to another person or to the assembly of them, i.e. Leviathan: an absolute power that 
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makes social order possible. But, the paradox of Hobbesian solution to the emergence 
of a peaceful social order, is that it aims to concentrate power in the hands of a single 
authority in the hopes that this dictator will prove a partial exception to the rule that 
human are bad and should be regarded with distrust.
331
 As Parsons argues, the 
Hobbesian model of human action does not provide us with a micro-foundation for a 
sociological analysis that aims to address the possibility of a peaceful social order. 
332
      
     The Lockean Model of Human Action: John Locke’s model of human action shares 
attributes with the Hobbesian model in terms of “a plurality of discrete individuals, 
each pursuing his own ends independently of the others. Though there is not explicit 
statement that these ends are random, as there is in Hobbes’s work, yet it is quite clear 
that Locke entertains no clear conception of any positive model of relation between 
them.”333 Locke does not argue that a rational consensus on the ultimate goals of 
actions is possible. The only explicit treatment of action’s goals is that of the natural 
rights, which humans hold by nature. However, these natural rights are to be regarded 
as the universal conditions of the attainment of individual ends, not as the ultimate 
ends in themselves. They are the things that all rational persons want as the means 
regardless of the character of their action-goals.
334
 The Lockean model shares with the 
Hobbesian model saying that humans are rational in looking for suitable means to 
realise their goals.
335
 As A.P. Brogan writes, “Locke’s doctrine concerning the nature 
of human action is both egoistic and hedonistic…The egoistic or selfish theory is 
taken so much for granted by Locke.” 336 Given our previous arguments, the Lockean 
model of human action is a utilitarian model that limits the rationality of action to the 
rationality of its means as opposed to the rationality of its goals.    
     It is important to note that, as David Levy argues, that Locke's model of action is a 
theological utilitarian model. In this model, action-goals are subject to some kind of 
rational judgment but not because humans can rationally justify action-goals. Locke 
argues that peoples' rational faith in religion, like the Christian theology, create some 
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moral constrains on their goals. As Levy points out, “…theological utilitarianism 
presupposes a system of belief in which an action goal is articulated that is of higher 
order of important than any other goal the individual may conceivably have.”337Locke 
assumes that individuals possess sufficient rationality to follow the God's commands, 
limiting their action goals. Unlike Hobbes, Locke recognises that humans' moral 
freedom to respecting the God's commands is rooted in their access to rationality.
338
 
However, he does argue that human reason cannot independently provide judgments 
for the rightness and wrongness of the action-goals. In Levy’s words: “For Locke, this 
[moral] motive is provided by Christian revelation of the reality of heaven and hell. In 
Locke's polemical account, classical philosophy does not provide a foundation for 
principle behavior. …Moral choice is utility-maximizing when the infinite value of 
the side-payments promised in Christian revelation are taken into account.”339 Locke 
uses this action model for the development of his theories of 'property right' and 
'constitutional state'. 
     Since the moral imperatives for Locke are determined by divine revelations, he 
employs the action model to draw his social philosophy. All individuals are God's 
property, such that no one has the right to harm himself or anyone else. God gave the 
world to humanity as a whole. God gave humans reason. With these three revelations, 
Locke argues that property could have arisen rightfully. 
340
 If the property right is a 
natural outcome of a rational faith in the Christian moral codes, and if the most urgent 
and important human need is to survive, individuals require social institutions to 
protect their property right. However, the person's right to property is essentially prior 
to the institution of society, independent of a consensus with others. Unlike Hobbes, 
Locke rightly argues that for protecting this natural right, individuals cannot give up 
their own rights in favour of an absolute monarchy that is unaccountable to them. 
Locke's model of human action provides a micro-foundation for his macro-analysis of 
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the need for establishing a constitutional state.
341
 For Locke, the right to property is a 
non-negotiable right, because it has already been justified by a faith in Christian 
theology. However, people can agree on a social contract, in terms of a constitutional 
state, to protect their non-negotiable natural property rights.
342
  
     As Wendt argues, the Lockean social philosophy rests on a model of the person as 
‘rival’ rather than ‘enemy’. Nevertheless, “like enemies, rivals are constituted by 
representations about Self and Other with respect to violence, but these representative 
are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they 
recognize their sovereignty, their ‘life and liberty’ as a right.”343 This logic of rivalry 
implies that individual members of society are equal because of their natural right to 
property. However, they are not equal because of their equal access to reason. As E.J. 
Hundert points out, “liberalism’s most distinctive feature is its assertion of individual, 
pre-political property rights, and views this claim as part of a comprehensive social 
philosophy of the individual’s place in society.”344 Their social agreement is a 
consensus amongst rivals who maximise their own utilities, whereas their property 
rights are protected by a constitutional state. But there is no a rational consensus 
regarding their action-goals. This social consensus leads rivals to a commercial 
society, as a middle ground between the society as a system of shared values (the 
Kantian model of social order) and the society as the war of all against all (the 
Hobbesian model of social order).
345
  
      In a commercial society, rivals “can enter into a network of reciprocal associative 
relationship before or without forming common values, because they might find that 
association is the only way to guarantee survival. They would associate not because 
they love…They would be guided by the utility offered by human association and 
cooperation. …market sociability is transactional, and its principle is utility.”346 These 
utility maximising competitors seek for their own subjective goals because the 
Lockean model, like the Hobbesian model, assumes that they cannot employ their 
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critical reason to agree on one set of shared action-goals. In this sense, the Hobbesian 
and Lockean models of human action are shared in this key premise of the utilitarian 
model: a rational dialogue amongst conflicting opinions over the good is not possible, 
hence action-goals are purely determined subjectively. 
347
              
      The Kantian Model of Human Action: Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Immanuel 
Kant’s critical philosophy implies that individuals’ access to critical reason enable 
them to enter into a rational dialogue about the ultimate goals of their action. In other 
words, Kant does not limit human reason’s usage to merely finding suitable means for 
realising action-goals. Kant assumes that individuals can utilise the reason to make an 
independent moral judgment regarding the rightness or wrongness of their action-
goals. Kant’s cognitivist ethics connects his critical philosophy with his ethical 
theory.
348
 In his analysis of the Metaphysic of Morals, he argues that since all human 
beings are rational agents, each of them should regard the other as an end per se. As 
such, the main moral principle is that peoples should treat each other as the end per se 
rather than means. The Kantian model of human action refers to a moral action that 
recognises others as the end in themselves due to their access to critical reason. 
349
 It 
is worthy of note, as Alexander argues, different assumptions regarding the action's 
relative rationality separates action models from one another.
350
  
     Viewed from Kantian conception of human nature, he was a political thinker of the 
Enlightenment who perhaps best captured the tremendous moral ambiguity of 
commercial sociability.
351
 As Hont writes, “he saw the need for a science of society 
which could complement his ethical theory and could give historical meaning to his 
moral teleology. He recognised, however, that anybody who wanted to become a 
Kepler or Newton of the science of humankind had to accept that mankind, through 
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the civilizing process, could develop a model 'law-governed social order'.”352 For 
Johan Heilbron, the new moral philosophy was most clearly reflected in the work of 
Kant. “Moral rules were obligations and their rational foundation was one of his best-
known contributions.”353 Kant was fully aware of the contradictions involved in the 
commercial sociability, what he called ‘unsocial sociability’.354  
      He realised that in commercial society, individuals are forced to cooperate with 
others (rivals) yet they are thinking only of themselves. If individuals cannot agree on 
shared values, their utilitarian sociability rests on their separated ends. This model of 
social cooperation  was regarded as an unsocial sociability in which individuals do not 
recognise others as ultimate ends in themselves, because the others matters as much as 
they are useful means for realising one's own ends. They may respect each others' 
equal right to property, but they do not recognise the others as ends in themselves 
because of their equal access to critical reason and as equal moral beings.
355
 
     On the contrary, as Wendt argues, the Kantian philosophy refers to a philosophy of 
friendship. Individuals can be involved in a social cooperation in which others are 
viewed as friends (ends in themselves) who can arrive at a rational consensus 
regarding how their social order must be organised to satisfy the interests of all 
persons.
356
 Kant believed that a social learning in the form of reaching an agreement 
about universal moral principles--which are present in human reason--can lead 
individuals to a normative agreement over their action-goals as the moral basis of 
their social order.
357
   
     Talcott Parsons has tried to formulate a Kantian-inspired sociology on the basis of 
Kantian conception of the human nature. To this end, Parsons uses Kant’s cognitivist 
ethics to introduce a human action model, implying that action-goals are shaped 
through individuals' voluntarily normative orientations to the society's value systems. 
Parsons' action theory recognises that action-means refer to suitable ways of realising 
of normatively orientated action-goals. But he rightly argues that, in addition, 
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individuals have a moral capacity to choose their normative orientations to their 
action's goals, in the context of the society's value system. Hence, peoples can 
collectively agree on one set of ultimate action-goals as a reference point for their 
social cooperation. As noted, Parsons’ theory of action is called as a voluntaristic 
theory of action.
358
 This theory implies that human beings enjoy a certain moral 
capacity-- due to their access to reason-- that enables them to choose their normative 
orientations to a value system. This moral capacity leads them to a societal agreement 
regarding a set of common action-goals. The emergence of a peaceful social order is 




     Parsons uses the Kantian logic to criticise the utilitarian model of action, in its the 
Hobbesian or the Lockean version. The key difference between Parsons' theory of 
action and the utilitarian theory of human action refers to the possibility of achieving 
a rational consensus amongst individuals over action-goals. As argued, the utilitarian 
action model does not recognise such an epistemological possibility. For utilitarians, 
action-goals are subjective and private, unique to each person. Hence, individuals' 
action-goals are separately determined. Using the Kantian logic, on the contrary, 
Parsons argues that because of humans' access to reason, individuals are able to arrive 
at a set of common action-goals on which basis they can regulate their social relations. 
Parsons argues that the utilitarian theory of action is unable to address the origin of 
action-goals because it views action-goals as given and as an exogenous to the goals-
means formwork. If they are determined outside of the framework, how can the 
framework (the model of action) address their origins?     
     Parsons argues that the freedom of human choice refers to the individuals' ability 
to employ their reason to inform their moral decisions. In this sense, humans' moral 
freedom implies that they can select their normative orientations in relations to the 
society's value system. However, for the utilitarian theory of action, action-goals are 
subject to random variation. This conception of choice freedom is insufficient for 
addressing voluntaristic nature of human action, as Parsons argues.
360
 The utilitarian 
model of action fulfils a necessary condition for conceptualising the actor's freedom 
of choice: the ends can be different, independent of the means. But, it does not 
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provide a sufficient account of the freedom of choice, because so long as normative 
concept of human action relates only to the effectiveness of the means to successfully 
realise the ends, and so long as, beyond such decision maxims, no values or rationality 
are permitted to regulate selection of the end themselves; the utilitarian model of 
action cannot lead us to explore how actors make a mistake in terms of their selections 
of action-goals. However, if our access to reason leads us to realise the 'rightness' or 
'wrongness' of our moral decision, our moral freedom must reflect itself in our choice 
of action-goals.
361
 The Kantian cognitivist ethics implies that we can select our action-
goals due to our access to reason. Hence, our rationality is the ultimate impetus of our 
moral choice.    
     As argued in the Hobbesian and the Lockean models of action, if we regard the 
passions or interests as the main impetus of human actions, the reason becomes a 
servant of those variables. Under these conditions, human rationality just finds an 
instrumental function: matching suitable means to subjectively determined goals. In 
this case, humans are not free to choose their own action-goals. However, if we view 
the passions and interests as servants of human reason, reason empowers us to select 
action-goals themselves. If so, action-goals cannot be merely subjective ends. Human 
rationality shapes them inter-subjectively. For Parsons, action-goals form through 
individuals’ voluntarily orientations to the society’s value system. As such, their 
normative consensus over a set of common action-goals leads them to a consensual-
based social cooperation for achieving the goals. However, the utilitarian action 
model is insufficient for addressing the emergence of a peaceful social order because 
it has already ruled out the possibility of arriving at a rational consensus over action-
goals. Even in the case of a liberal society, people’s inter-subjective consensus over 
liberal values paves the way for the formation of liberal social instituions such as a 
constitutional state and a market economy.  
     Parsons rightly argues that if we limit the freedom of action-goals to their random 
variation we cannot address the emergence of a peaceful and free society:    
There would be no guarantee that any large proportion of such goals would 
include a recognition of other people's ends as valuable in themselves, and 
there would thus be no necessary limitation on the means that some, at least, 
would employ to gain their own ends at the expense of others. The relations 
of individuals then would tend to be resolved into a struggle for power—for 
the means for each to realize his own ends. …Insofar, however, as 
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individuals share a common system of ultimate ends, this system would, 
among other things, define what they all hold their relations ought to be, 
would lay down norms determining these relations and limits on the use of 
others as means, on the acquisition and use of power in general. Insofar, then, 
as action is determined by ultimate goals, the existence of a system of such 
ends common to the members of the community seems to be only alternative 
to the state of chaos—a necessary factor in social stability.362    
     As noted, Kant believed that individuals can arrive at a normative consensus over  
the moral foundation of a law-governed social order because of their access to reason. 
Parsons provides a sociological explanation of the need for such a moral foundation 
by linking his normative theory of action to his sociological analysis. Individuals can 
share a common system of ultimate ends due to their moral freedom for taking a 
normative orientation to such a common value system. Insofar as individuals' actions 
are determined by the ultimate goals, such a value system makes possible a peaceful 
social cooperation. Parsons acknowledges that, “this [normative] position of Kant's is 
clearly of central important to the general theory of action. We hold that it is locus of 
the most fundamental underlying premises or assumption of social ordering at the 
human level.”363 Richard Munch explains this Kantian core of Parsons' action theory 
and its outcomes for modern sociological theory. 
     Munch points out that, “just as Kant developed his theory of [social] action as an 
alternative to philosophical utilitarianism, Parsons developed his theory of action as 
an alternative to sociological utilitarianism. This alternative Parsons terms 
voluntaristic action theory. …As soon as a centralized force does not provide a factual 
order by causality determined compliance, social order is only possible as long as the 
actors voluntarily consent and bind themselves to common normative frame of 
reference.”364 Parsons’ solution for a peaceful social order originates from his Kantian 
model of human action in which humans' access to rationality make them moral 
agents capable of arriving at a normative agreement. However, a key question for 
Parsons's theory of action and his sociological theory are that why individuals agree 
on different value systems as the moral foundations of their different patterns of social 
organisation. 
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     Parsons believes that sociologists should take the historical diversity of normative 
agreements as a given fact, and then they should attempt to determine what are the 
ultimate value-systems relevant to understanding human actions in a given society at a 
given time? 
365
 But, if we move from the level of domestic society to a global scale, 
we cannot take this value system's diversity as a given fact. From the Kantian 
cosmopolitan viewpoint, if all human beings are ends in themselves, due to their 
access to reason, their submission to universally accepted values must lead them to a 
global value system. Hence, we need to develop our human action's model as if it can 
address the possibility of a rational dialogue amongst competing value systems. In 
other words, the emergence of various value systems must be addressed as an 
indigenous variable of our human action's model and our sociological analysis.              
     Parsons does not enter into the debate regarding how a rational dialogue amongst 
individuals has led them to their normative orientation to the value-system itself. 
However, we can find such a debate in Habermas’ communicative theory of action 
and his critical sociology of dialogic community. Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action can be regarded as a Kantian-inspired action model since it gives the primacy 
to a dialogic reason as the impetus for human action. He replaces the subject-centric 
rationality with a communicative rationality as the basis of his communicative theory 
of action. His action theory is in fact a critique of the utilitarian model of action. More 
fundamentally, Habermas’ theory of action leads us to an epistemic dynamic of social 
order formation: a social learning process through which peoples rationally agree on 
the normative foundation of their social order. It enables us to explore how a rational 
dialogue amongst competing value systems is possible and why it can lead us to a 
common value-system on a global scale.   
     Habermas rightly argues that in order to address the question as to how action- 
goals are inter-subjectively defined and determined, we need first to explain how 
individuals' access to a communicative reason enables them to agree on such mutual 
definition of action-goals. Addressing the formation of action-goals must be an 
indigenous part of a human action model, which must address how such inter-
subjectively shared action-goals emerge. Habermas criticises Parsons’ action theory 
because of his failure to address the epistemic nature of individuals' normative 
orientations towards their value-system. He attributes this failure to epistemological 
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basis of the Parsons’ action theory: a subject-centred rationality. It means that the 
individuals' rationality is shaped through a one sided relation between the knowing 
subject and the subject matter of the study. From the Kantian view, if individuals’ 
action-goals is shared, the reason is that they can use their subject-centred rationality 
to recognise particular norms by submitting to universally-accepted values that 
present in human reason. Habermas believes that actors' rationality does not form 
through such one sided relation. In contrast, his communicative rationality refers to a 
discursive model of reason that defines human rationality as the product of an inter-
subjective consensus. Habermas’ theory of rationality shifts the criterion of rationality 




     I shall argue about problematic nature of Habermas’ communicative epistemology 
in the next sub-section. Nevertheless, his theory of communicative action significantly 
contributes to the development of a critical rationalist model of human action, because 
it leads us to explore how the moral order (value-system) of the society is shaped 
through a rational dialogue amongst individuals due to their access to reason. On a 
global scale, we can apply this dialogic logic to argue for the possibility of a rational 
dialogue amongst civilisations' value systems. But Parsons’ action theory does not 
provide us such a framework. Keeping this in mind, Habermas defines rational action 
in this way: 
Actions or symbolic expressions are ‘rational’ insofar as they are based on 
knowledge which can be criticized. …[It] links the term ‘rational’ to the 
notion of intersubjetive assessment and thereby points towards a broader 
concept of communicative rationality in which various participants overcome 
their merely subjective views and, by virtue of the mutuality of rationally 
motivated conviction, assume themselves of both the unity of the objective 
world and the intersubjectivity of their life-relation [emphasis added]. 
367
  
     Habermas’ action model implies that persons’ access to communicative rationality 
enables them to arrive at an inter-subjective consensus regarding action-goals. Hence, 
the value system is not exogenous to the action model. In the communicative action 
model, ‘language’ is medium of reaching an inter-subjective consensus. Habermas 
views communicative action as a ‘speech act’. He believes that while Weber and 
Parsons distinguish various types of human action and link them to the establishment 
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of social relationships, their subject-centred model of goal-directed action is the 
reference point of their action theories. The communicative theory of action shifts this 
reference point to an inter-subjective model of goal-directed action that can address 
the question of how action goals themselves are inter-subjectively determined.
368
 
Habermas’ action theory advances Parsons’ voluntaristic action model. It enables us 
to explore how a rational dialogue among individuals can bring about a social learning 
for the formation of the society’s value system. Delanty reminds us the contribution of 
Habermas’ social theory to the development of social theory in twenty century is 
substantive: “The most ambitious attempt after Parsons to impose a synthesis of 
theoretical traditions in social theory was that of Jurgen Habermas. …In this pivotal 
work Habermas attempted to reconcile the critique of instrumental reason—from 
Marx through Weber to the Frankfurt School—with the functionalist tradition and 
symbolic interaction, from Durkheim and Mead to Parsons.”369 Habermas’ sociology 
can be advanced by employing critical rationalism as a new base for defining rational 
action.   
5.1.2 Critical Rationalism and the Origins of Action-Goals  
     Critical Rationalism as an inter-subjective theory of rationality can lead us to a 
new analytical model of human action that aims to address the origins of human's 
action-goals. As argued, a theory of human action is a theory that addresses the causes 
of human action. Inspired by the Kantian cognitivist ethics, Critical Rationalism, as a 
theory of human rationality, leads us to argue for a new model of rational action in 
which human actions are rational insofar as they are open to inter-subjective criticism. 
If human actions are different patterns of human action's goals-means, the key reason 
is that different patterns of rationality influence human action's goals-means. Different 
patterns of human action's goals-means in turn pave the way for the emergence of 
different patterns of social organisation. If we take critical rationality as the basis of 
our model of rational action, we can categorise different rationale systems and 
different patterns of social organisation due to their closedness or openness to inter-
subjective criticism. Peoples in different societies follow different rationale systems to 
shape their value systems as ultimate sources of their action-goals. In a word, a 
critical rationalist model of action can describe and evaluate human action through 
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connecting their goals-means frameworks to actors’ closedness or openness to inter-
subjective criticism and learning from mistakes.  
      A critical rationalist action model leads us to explore how the rationale systems 
operate as the epistemic driving forces for human actions and social organisation. But, 
as noted above it goes beyond the description of the existing social organisations due 
to their closed or open rationale systems. It causes us to evaluate those patterns of 
social organisation due to closedness or openness of their systems of rationale to inter-
subjective criticism. For critical rationalism, the criterion of a rational action is its 
openness to inter-subjective criticism rather than its origin in an inter-subjective 
consensus. Due to their access to critical rationality, individuals can enter into a 
rational dialogue that is open to inter-subjective criticism in order to shape normative 
order of their social order. An the center of this normative order we can situtate the 
ethics of openness to criticism. 
      As noted earlier, the ethics of openness to criticism would be the value system of 
such an open society. In his defence of Bartley's theory of critical rationality, Noretta 
Koertge recognises the importance of such a theory for the development of a new 
rational action model. She argues that while the theory of rational action must be 
linked with a theory of rational belief, we must acknowledge that the question of the 
rationality of 'ends' is largely ignored, whereas the rationality of 'end' is closely 
connected with the rationality of our beliefs. For her, Bartley's theory of rationality 
provides a sound basis for linking the rationality of our beliefs with the rationality of 
our actions through a critical rationalist justification of the action's ends themselves.
370
    
      In comparison with Habermas’ communicative action theory a critical rationalist 
model of action becomes understandable. Habermas' theory of communicative action 
rests upon his consensus theory of rationality. Based on this theory, he builds his 
discourse theory of ethics. Individuals use their communicative rationality to enter 
into a moral-practical learning process regarding how society should be organised to 
satisfy the interests of all persons. Communicative rationality introduces an inter-
subjective consensus as the criterion of rationality and rational action. The discursive 
ethics implies that “only those norms are valid to which all affected persons could 
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agree as participant in rational discourse”.371 The discursive principle is not just a 
moral principle; it covers morality, law and democracy.
372
 A critique of Habermas' 
communicative rationality affects his critical social theory of a dialogic community, 
as a whole. 
     Habermas’ discursive model of rationality originates from his consensus theory of 
truth. The consensus theory of truth implies that the truth of a statement rests on a 
rational consensus. Habermas claims that facts are not things or events on the face of 
the globe, rather, they are derived from a state of affairs, and a state of affairs that are 
the propositional content of statements.
373
 Given this linguistic definition of the facts, 
the truth-problem emerges as an inherently discursive affair. Habermas is then in a 
position that the truth-problem centres on the validation of claims made in language 
rather than on the verification of experiences. For him, the logic of truth discovery is a 
consensus of all. This epistemological logic shapes Habermas' critical social theory as 
a whole. People can understand each other hence they arrive at an inter-subjective 
consensus. Habermas assumes that there is a necessary link between reaching 
understanding and arriving at an inter-subjective agreement.
374
 As Jeffrey Alexander 
writes, “Habermas has claimed that engaging in communication assumes the capacity 
for reaching rational agreement. Understanding is identified with agreement, and 
agreement is identified with unconstrained cooperation. Agreement, understanding, 
and the lack of constraint add up to rationality.”375 For Habermas, an unconstrained 
cooperation requires an ideal speech situation with a collection of at least four 
requirements: (i) unrestricted participation; (ii) equality of chances to contribute or 
terminate discourse; (iii) equality of status, and (iv) equal degree of truthfulness and 
cooperative motivations.
376
   
     Habermas’ consensus theory of truth and his communicative theory of rationality 
have been criticised from different angles. One important line of critique refers to the 
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relation between ‘truth’ and ‘consensus’. Paul Healy argues that in developing his 
consensus theory of truth, Habermas does not address the question of why consensus 
can yield truth. He points out “in the absence of a demonstrated intrinsic guaranteeing 
criterion of truth, consensus cannot be a logically guaranteeing criterion of truth. 
…Perhaps, as Habermas himself (borrowing from Dewey) suggests, his theory is in 
this regard best identified as one of 'warranted acceptability'. If this is so, then 
Habermas' principle error is that of confusing warranted acceptability with truth.”377 
Consensus cannot be the criterion of truth or rationality, but it can lead us to the 
process of truth discovery.
378
 From a critical rationalist viewpoint, the regulative idea 
of the truth acts as an epistemological maxim for the approximation to the truth. 
However, an inter-subjective consensus itself cannot be the criterion of the truth. For 
critical rationalism, inter-subjective criticism as opposed to inter-subjection consensus 
is the logic of the approximation to the truth. Hence, openness to criticism is the 
criterion of rationality, as was argued in detail in chapter 4.    
    Another line of critique of Habermas’ theory of the truth relates to the ideal speech 
situation, as an ideal type to achieve a rational consensus. Alessandro Ferrara rightly 
argues that: “the ideal speech situation supposedly allows for an ongoing critique of 
the adequacy of the paradigm within which we are operating. This assessment, in turn, 
cannot be done except by bringing the whole paradigm into a comparison with 
reality…Thus rational consensus cannot be the only or the fundamental criterion of 
truth, because in every judgment on the validity of a statement considerations of 
consistency and correspondence retain a decisive, yet unacknowledged, role.”379 He 
leads us to realise that the ideal speech situation does not contribute to the correct 
selection of the best argument amongst several competing ones, but rather defines the 
one deemed the best as the argument to which it is rational to consent. In addition, the 
consensual theory of truth implies that the truth of a statement depends solely on the 
properties of the context within which we have been persuaded about the validity of 




                                                 
377
 Paul Healy, "Is Habermas's Consensus Theory A Theory of Truth?," Irish Philosophical Journal, 4 
(1987), p.150., Also see JariI. Niemi,”Habermas and Validity Claim,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, 13 (2) (2005), pp.227-244. 
378
 Healy, ibid., pp.148-150. 
379
 Ferrara, "A Critique of Habermas's Consensus Theory of Truth," (1987), p.48.   
380
 Ibid,. pp.52-53. 
  141 
     For a critical rationalist, the selection of the best argument amongst competing 
ones takes shape through criticism rather than consensus. In this sense, the force of 
better criticism makes an ideal speech dialogue a rational context in which dialogic 
participants can approximate to the truth via eliminating errors. In sum, Habermas' 
logic of a rational consensus through the force of better argument does not lead us to 
explore how competing arguments arrive at revisable rational agreement, because 
consensus does not address the logic of knowledge discovery. Upon the Popperian-
informed logic of knowledge discovery, the mechanism of the approximation to truth 
is learning from criticism (errors).        
     These epistemological critiques of Habermas’ consensus theory of truth affect his 
communicative rationality and his discursive theories of ethics, law and democracy. I 
suggest using critical rationalism as an alternative theory of rationality, as Bartley 
argues, and accordingly as a new basis for an alternative model of a rational action. 
Critical Rationalism does not equate understanding with a rational agreement. It 
argues that a rational agreement is possible if participants in a rational dialogue accept 
a common criterion of rationality. They may understand each other, but due to their 
different criterions of rationality, they will not achieve an inter-subjective agreement. 
For this theory of rationality, our inter-subjective consensus is always revisable and 
does not require a perfect consensus. In contrast, it leads us to be concerned with the 
absence of an inter-subjective disagreement. Any inter-subjective disagreement can 
shift our open-ended consensus to a new one that is still open to new criticism. In this 
way, the logic of truth discovery is an inter-subjective learning from disagreements or 
criticisms. As Lawrence Boland argues, Popper’s theory of learning refers to the 
discovery of the errors in one’s knowledge.381 If we recognise Critical Rationalism as 
our theory of rationality, our action model must be also reinvented to accommodate  
new definitions of human rationality and rational action, and a new model of social 
(inter-subjective) learning.       
     Critical Rationalism, as a theory of rationality, addresses the origins of action-
goals, resulted from an inter-subjective dialogue among open-minded persons that 
leads to a system of shared values. This critical rationalist action model provides the 
ground for addressing the emergence of the ethics of openness to criticism as the 
moral foundation of an open social order. It means that if people use their critical 
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rationality, they can arrive at a revisable inter-subjective consensus over the ethics of 
openness to criticism. The ethics of openness to criticism leads us to law and politics 
of openness to criticism. For a critical rationalist, individuals' access to critical 
rationality can logically force them to enter into a rational dialogue with other open-
minded persons to achieve a revisable inter-subjective consensus over their action-
goals. When people recognise each other as equal rational moral beings because of 
their equal access to critical reason, they can form the legal order of the society on the 
basis of the person's equal legal right of criticism. This equal right of criticism makes 
social order accountable to peoples' needs, when it is supported by a politics of 
openness to criticism. Peoples are equal possessors of political rights of questioning 
their social governance.  
     The critical rationalist model of human action advances the five-layer normative 
conception of human nature towards a critical rationalist model of human action, 
because it turns the premise of humans' access to critical rationality to an explanatory 
variable for addressing the origins of action-goals. Ian Jarvie has tried to apply 
Popper’s theory of the third world-- as a social product of open-minded peoples-- to 
address the process of social order’s formation. He argues that socially acting persons 
on the model of critical rationalist agents can form their social order. In his words:   
…the social [the third world] is an independent realm between the hard 
physical world and soft mental world: This realm, reality, world, whatever we 
choose to call it, is very diverse and complex and people in society are 
constantly striving by trial and errors [critical rationality] to come to terms 
with it; to map it; to coordinate their maps of it. Living in an unmanageably 
large and changing society permits neither perfect mapping, not perfect 
coordination of maps. This means that the members of the society are 
constantly learning about it; both the society and its members are in constant 
process of self-discovery and of self-making.
382
    
     The critical rationalist-inspired human action model provides a micro-foundation 
to address such societal self-discovery and self-making. Viewed from the ends-means 
framework, a human action is determined by its action-goals. The critical rationalist 
model provides us with an explanatory framework to address self-discovery and self-
making process of an open society formation because it leads us to explore the origins 
of action-goals in humans' access to critical rationality. In the five-layer conception of 
human nature, we can see the linkage amongst five capacities of human beings. 
However, the critical rationalist model of human action introduces humans’ access to 
                                                 
382
 Ian. C. Jarvie, Concepts and Society, (London, Routledge: 1972), p.165.  
  143 
critical rationality as a driving force of a rational human action. If social orders are 
ultimately outcomes of conscious human agency, persons’ access to critical rationality 
plays the key role to address the emergence of an open social organisation. 
     However, we still need to advance this critical rationalist form of human action to 
a sociological model of social learning through which people's access to critical 
rationality lead them to a macro-institutional transition from the closed society toward 
an open society. In this way, we aim to explore a critical rationalist form of social 
learning that aims to transform macro-social institutions of the closed society into an 
open society. Popper recognised that his theory of knowledge can be used to address 
ordinary peoples’ model of knowledge formation,383 but he did not turn his theory of 
knowledge into a theory of rational action because he defines critical rationality as 
merely an irrational faith in reason. In Conjuctures and Refutations, Popper writes:   
My interest is not merely in the theory of scientific knowledge, but rather in 
the theory of knowledge in general. Yet the study of the growth of scientific 
knowledge is, I believe, the most fruitful way of studying the growth of 
knowledge in general. For the growth of scientific knowledge may be said to 
be the growth of ordinarily human knowledge writ large...
384
  
     Popper identifies his theory of knowledge a general theory of ordinary peopel's 
knowledge formation. However, he does not employ it as an epistemological base for 
a theory of human rational action as micro-foundation of a macrosociological theory. 
As argued, perhaps the main reason is that he does not introduce openness to criticism 
as as a theory of rationality. In Realism and the Aim of Science, Popper argues about 
three entirely different activities, which are all called 'learning'. He writes: 
I shall call them (1) learning by trial and error (or by conjecture and 
refutation); (2) learning by repetition proper); and (3) learning by imitation 
(or by absorbing a tradition). … Only the first of these three ways of learning, 
learning by trial and errors, or by conjecture and refutation, is relevant to the 
growth of our knowledge; it alone is 'learning' in the sense of acquiring new 
information: of discovering new facts and new problems, practical as well as 
theoretical, and new solutions to our problems, old as well as new.
385
 
     Popper recognises the importance of the learning by trial and errors method, but as 
noted earlier, he does not lead to this key fact that the conjectural theory of knowledge  
through a conjectural theory of rationality can  provide the foundation of a new model 
of social learning that aims to address the process of the formation of social orders. 
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Among contemporary social scientists, David Harper, as an economist, employs 
Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge to provide a new micro-foundation for 
macro-economic theory.  Harper argues that, “theories of the growth of (scientific) 
knowledge can provide significant insights into how market operates and how 
economic agents learn from their experiences within the market. …there is a need for 
a growth-of-knowledge conception of economic agents, which could lead to a more 
dynamic view of economic learning goes beyond the narrow 'mainstream' view of 
rationality as typifies by a maximising behavioural postulate. … [this approach 
characterizes] entrepreneurs as Popperian decision-makers and the market process as 
a Popperian learning procedure …” 386 But, we require to go beyond economy, and 
argue for an application of Popper’s conjectural theory of knowledge in 
macrosociology that aims to address an interplay amongst culture, politics and 
economy. This thesis is an effort to internalise the Popperian conjectural theory of 
knowledge, in its modified version by Bartley’s conjectural theory of rationality, in 
macrosociology via a critical rationalist model of social learning--as the mechanism of 
a conscious social transformation from the closed to an open society.   
5.2 Critical Rationalism and Social Learning for Building an Open Society  
    The critical rationalist model of human action operates a micro-foundation for a 
macro-sociological analysis of a deep-seated institutional transition from a closed to 
an open society. This section argues for a macro-sociological framework of the 
emergence of an open social order through introducing a critical rationalist form of 
social learning. In this way, the critical rationalist model of human action leads us to a 
theoretical framework for analysing a transformation of the closed society into an 
open society that is applicable at a global scale. I will use the insights of Habermas’ 
theory of social learning as the mechanism of an emancipatory social change. I will 
also argue that Popper's argument for a piecemeal social engineering is insufficient to 
address a fundamental transformation that is required for altering a closed society to 
an open society.  
5.2.1 A Critical Rationalist Model of Social Learning 
     A sociological theory of society addresses the question as to how a society works 
and changes. Hence exploring mechanisms of social order formation and social order 
change find a central place in sociological theories. It was argued that human actions 
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are the ultimate impetus of social order formation. Parsons and Habermas’ theories of 
actions provide the micro-foundations for their sociological analyses of the emergence 
of a peaceful social order. Habermas’ macrosociology can significantly contribute to 
the development of a critical rationalist sociological framework for analysing the 
transition from a closed to an open society. It paves the way for using critical 
rationality to explore a systematic link between the theory of rationality and theories 
of ethics, law and politics. This sub-section introduces a critical rationalist form of 
social learning, as the mechanism of a conscious social transformation from the 
closed society to an open social order. 
     Parsons uses his voluntaristic theory of action to develop a sociological theory 
regarding the emergence of social order. I merely refer to his theory insofar as it is 
concerned with the present argument. Parsons' sociology has created functional links 
amongst four components of the social system; namely societal community, culture, 
politics and economy. He uses his theory of action for addressing the emergence of 
social system through explaining an interaction amongst these four components. 
Parsons gives a central role to the societal community in his analysis. The norms are 
structural components of societal community at the core of social system. Due to 
individuals' moral freedom, they voluntarily orient their action-goals towards the 
norms. These normative orientations lead individuals to a value system whose main 
function is creating social integration. Parsons views societal community as a network 
of interpenetrating collective loyalties and memberships, shaped by voluntarily 
consensus on a value-system or ultimate action-goals. In his words, “It is members' 
consensus on value orientation with respect to their own society, then, that defines the 
institutionalization of value patterns. …self-sufficiency in this context concerns the 
degree to which the institutions of society have been legitimized by the consensual 
value commitment of its members.”387 Parsons' voluntaristic theory of action 
constructs a micro-foundation for his sociological analysis concerning the role of 
normative consensus in the emergence of social order. The societal functions of polity 
and economy are also addressed according to this normative consensus.  
     For Parsons, the legal and political sub-systems of the society work together to 
realise such a normative consensus: “A complex normative order requires not only 
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enforcements, however, but also authorization interpretation. Court systems have very 
generally come to combine the determination of obligations, penalties, …What treats 
a phenomenon as political insofar as it involves the organization and mobilization of 
resources for the attainments of the goals of a particular collectivity”.388 The function 
of economic sub-system is the differentiation of autonomous structures that 
necessitates the development of a generalised monetary medium in association with 
the market system.
389
 In Parsons' macrosociology, culture, polity and economy find 
their ultimate origins in the societal community, which is shaped through normative 
orientations of individuals to the society's value system. However, in this sociological 
analysis, the formation of the value system itself is to some extent under-explained. 
Put differently, the mechanisms of a social learning process through which individuals 
use their rational reason for taking such normative orientations to the value system is 
under-explained in Persons' sociological framework. Parson's theory of action does 
not lead us to explore such a social learning process. 
     Habermas’ macrosociology uses communicative theory of action—resting on his 
consensual theory of truth—to present us an insightful sociological argument on the 
basis of which we can apply critical rationalism to address the aforementioned social 
learning process. Habermas' critical sociology leads us to see how individuals' access 
to communicative rationality can activate their moral capacity for shaping a discursive 
ethics on the basis of which the functions of a discursive law and polity are addressed. 
My intent here is not to argue in detail about Habermas’ sociological theory of 
interaction amongst rationality, ethics, law, polity and economy. The aim is using the 
insights of Habermas' macrosociology of dialogic community to explore how critical 
rationalist model of human action contributes to the development of a theoretical 
framework to address the emergence of an open society.  
    Habermas’ macrosociology employs his discursive model of action to address the 
function of a dialogic form of social learning through which peoples arrive at an inter-
subjective consensus on normative base of their social orders. As Linklater points out:  
The notion of ‘communication action’ lies at the heart of Habermas’s analysis 
of social learning. His pivotal observation is that human subjects make claims 
about the truth, rightfulness, sincerity and intelligibility of their views 
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whenever they are involved in an attempt to arrive at an understanding with 
each other. A commitment to be guided by the unforced force of the better 
argument is made wherever subjects bring their respective views before the 
tribunal of open discussion and explore the prospects for an inter-subjective 
consensus. Habermas's account of discourse theory of morality exalts features 
of communication which are universal in that they arise whenever human 
beings cooperate to reach an understanding. …This is why Habermas claims 
that the very first speech act already anticipated the creation of a 
communicative community which includes the whole of humankind.
390
  
    Habermas’ analysis of social learning is derived from his discursive model of 
human action, rooted in his communicative theory of rationality. He believes that 
persons’ access to communicative reason enables them to enter into a social learning 
through which they will arrive at inter-subjective consensus regarding the normative 
order of society. In other words, Habermas advances Parsons’ analysis of the origins 
of action-goals from their normative orientation to the society’s value system to their 
communicative competence that enables them to justify the value-system itself. If 
people activate their rationality, they can turn their mutual understanding into an inter-
subjective consensus over social norms. The transformative capacity of such a social 
learning refers to its ability to change normative base of society from a pre-discursive 
towards a discursive ethics. 
     In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas leads us to see interactions amongst the 
discourse ethics and discursive law and polity. He elaborates on these connections on 
the basis of his communicative model of action. He argues that the absence of the 
conception of life-world in Parsons’ the social system does not allow him to address 
the question regarding how social learning can provide a rational basis for normative 
orientations of persons to the value system. The conception of life-worlds refers to a 
complex of interpenetrating cultural traditions, social orders, and personal identities in 
which individuals learn to use their communicative competence to organise their 
social relations based on a rational discourse rather than force.
391
  
     Habermas defines discourse ethics as it covers both morality and law. Once the 
ethical foundations of society find a discursive character, law operates a dual 
character: “on the one hand, legal rights and statuces must provide something like a 
stable social environment in which persons can form their own identities as members 
of different traditions and can strategically pursue their own interests as individuals; 
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on the other hand, these laws must issue from a discursive process that makes them 
rationally acceptable for persons oriented toward reaching an understanding on the 
basis of validity claims.”392For Habermas, the discursive democracy refers to a 
political system in which “voting, for example, should not simply aggregate given 
preferences but rather follow on a process of ‘thoughtful interaction and opinion 
formation’ in which citizens becomes informed of the better arguments and moral 
general interests.”393 In terms of the function of economic sub-system, Habermas 
believes that; “Modern societies are integrated not only socially through values, 
norms, and mutual understanding, but also systematically through market and the 
administrative use of power. …Both media of system integration, money and power, 
are anchored via legal institutionalization in orders of the life-world, which is in turn 
socially integrated through communicative action.”394 These interactions amongst 
rationality, ethics, law, polity and economy construct the structure of Habermas' 
macrosociology of dialogic community.  
     Recalling preceding critiques of Habermas’ discourse model of human action, my 
proposed critical rationalist action model leads us to a new sociological analysis of the 
emergence of a dialogic or open society. Individuals' access to critical rationality 
operate as an epistemic impetus for shaping their rational actions in terms of engaging 
in an inter-subjective learning from socially recognised mistakes, which is open to 
criticism and transforms the normative structure of a closed society into the ethics of 
openness to criticism. The concept of social learning here refers to an inter-subjective 
criticism (P1TTEEP2). A critical rationalist model of social learning follows a 
Popperian logic of scientific discovery: an inter-subjective learning from an inter-
subjective criticism. If persons are equal possessors of critical rationality, they can use 
their conjectural rationality for entering into a societal scale of trials and errors, as 
Jarvie noted before. If they follow the logic of critical rationality in their rational 
action, they will arrive at an ethics of openness to criticism as their recognised social 
norms for solving their disputes. In this way, such an activation of critical rationality 
operates as an epistemic engine for the emergence of the ethics of openness to 
criticism, which constructs a moral foundation for an open society. In this way, the 
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critical rationalist action model provides a new explanation for normative orientations 
of peoples to the value system of an open society.  
      The ethics of openness to criticism creates the central core of normative order of 
an open society. However, this ethics must be turned into a legal system if open-
minded persons want to legalise the ethics in the constitutional structure of their 
(open) society. Hence, those open-minded persons can go on to establish a legal 
system that devotes an equal right of criticism to all persons in order to form and re-
shape the society’s legal order so as enables them to realise their moral autonomy and 
self-governance. Once open-minded persons transformed the legal structure of a 
closed society towards a legal system that is open to inter-subjective criticism, the 
way is paved for the emergence of a political consensus on the equal political rights of 
persons to make their political governance accountable to their votes. Finally, people 
who have arrived at such a political consensus need to go further to give an equal 
economic right to all persons, which causes the society's economic system to be hold 
accountable to peoples’ demands of having a decent life.    
     A deep-seated epistemic transformation from a closed ‘philosophy’ and ‘value 
system’ into an open ‘philosophy’ and ‘value system’ to criticism is the key epistemic 
impetus of a macro-societal institutions’ transition from a closed to an open society-- 
in its wider sociological sense that covers law, politics, and economy. These epistemic 
and institutional transformations can occur through a critical rationalist ideal type of 
social learning. In this way, Habermas’ ideal type of social learning, which rests on 
his communicative rationality, can be re-invented by using the critical rationalist 
models of action and social learning. People enter into an inter-subjective learning 
from their mutually recognised mistakes where they deal with establishing a peaceful 
social order. The transformative role of this ideal type of social learning process refers 
to its capacity to persuade dialogic counterparts to accept the outcomes of their 
rational dialogue, if they want do not contradict themselves. I argued how respecting 
the principles of Critical Rationalism; namely (a) regulative idea of the truth, (b) the 
valid deductive arguments, and (c) falsifier evidence necessitates that we accept the 
outcomes of a rational dialogue. The critical rationalist ideal type of social learning 
can be elaborated by dividing it into internal five layers as follows: 
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 A philosophical layer of social learning  
 A moral layer of social learning  
 A legal layer of social learning 
 A political layer of social learning 
 An economic layer of social learning 
    These five-layers of an ideal type social learning mutually reinforce one another. 
However, my argument focuses on causality relations from the philosophical layer to 
a moral layer; from the moral layer to a legal layer; from the legal to a political layer, 
and finally from the political layer to an economic layer.  
    The philosophical layer of the social learning refers to an inter-subjective learning 
from opening different metaphysical views and rationale systems to mutual criticism. 
Since dialogic participants in such an ideal type learning process respect the principles 
of critical rationalism, the logical force of better criticism necessitates them to adjust 
their previous world-views, due to learning from their critical dialogue, toward a new 
metaphysical view: a metaphysic of openness to criticism. At this philosophical layer, 
peoples learn to regard all of their metaphysical views as equally imperfect yielding a 
capacity to learn from an inter-subjective criticism. The philosophical outcome would 
be an open metaphysic that in turn paves the way for the emergence of an open ethical 
system to criticism. If peoples regard the other's world-view as an incorrect 
metaphysic, they account associated moral systems as an invalid ethics. Hence, the 
ethics of openness to criticism requires the pre-existence of the metaphysic of 
openness to criticism. The transformative role of the philosophical layer of social 
learning refers to the ground that it can provide for the emergence of the ethics of 
openness to criticism as the moral foundation of an open society. This ethics 
constructs value-system of the open society to which open-minded persons orientate 
their action-goals. In other words, individuals rationalise their action's goals-means 
through respecting the central social norm of openness to criticism. Peoples' actions 
become rational because they rest on a social knowledge that is objective and rational 
due to its openness to criticism.  
    The ethics of openness to criticism itself is the output of a moral learning process. 
In this moral layer of social learning, people learn to regards all members of society 
as equal moral beings (ends in themselves) because of their potential access to critical 
rationality. People's access to critical rationality enables them to judge regarding the 
rightness or wrongness of their moral chooses. Once peoples recognise such a moral 
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equality, they have actually learned to establish the core value of an open society, i.e. 
the ethics of openness to criticism. The transformative role of this moral dimension of 
such a normative social learning is that it opens the closed systems of morality to 
inter-subjective criticis of other morality schemes. Peoples accept moral equality of 
others as the central value of their social organisation, if they want do not contradict 
themselves.  
     As Shearmur points out, “he [Popper] suggested that the idea of the validity of an 
ethical norm can play a role in moral argument similar to that of the regulative idea of 
truth in science. Popper himself did not discuss these ideas further …however, all that 
we need is that idea that claims about moral judgment and about the validity of moral 
theories may be the objects of inter-subjective discussion. …For once one applies 
critical rationalism to ethics, he and other citizens are accorded dialogic rights of an 
enhanced character…”395 But, Popper did not systematically integrate this critical 
rationalist ethics in his social theory of open society that must address the formation 
of an open society as an epistemic-institutional social change. 
     The ethics of openness to criticism leads peoples to another layer of social learning 
that involves in more institutional feature: a legal layer of social learning. Individuals 
create legal institutions to realise their own rationally justified value-systems. They 
orient their action-goals to this value system. However, if the value system does not 
find a legal manifestation, individuals do not know what would be outcomes of 
respecting or violating the value-system. The legal system signals them how they 
should organise their action's goals-means to respect the legal outcomes of the value 
system. The legal learning process refers to an institutional building process within 
which individuals validate each others as equal sources of legal criticism. 
     If the legal system must reflect the ethics of openness to criticism, it must shape a 
legal code of practice in which all persons have equal right of making the law-making 
process accountable to their own views. The transformative role of this legal openness 
to criticism is that it makes the closed legal systems accountable to peoples' views. 
Once peoples recognise each other as equal legal sources of criticism, they actually 
learn to establish those legal institutions that respect their legal equality before the 
rule of law. As Habermas’ discursive theory of law implies, the law must be 
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accountable to people's dialogic reason. The legal right allows for peoples' self-
governance because it enables peoples to observe the legal codes of practice that they 
have already agreed. 
     The political layer of the ideal type social learning gives peoples the equal rights to 
create their political self-governance. It requires that they realise their legal rights by 
establishing a parallel political system that is accountable to citizens' criticisms. This 
political openness means that peoples are entitled to a political power to make their 
social governance accountable to their votes. Building a democratic governance refers 
to a political layer of such a social learning process that makes the political system 
open to citizens' critical votes. Once peoples recognise the others as possessors of an 
equal right to political criticisms, they actually learn to institutionalise this legal 
equality in the context of a political democracy, which is accountable to peoples' votes 
and removable by their refutation.  
     The transformative role of the political layer of social learning is that it enables 
peoples to change a closed political system to an open one. This political learning for 
creating a democratic governance informs people to recognise their equal rights of 
having a decent life. Hence, people go on to call for the establishment of a fair 
economic division of labour for realising such a decent life. However, this requires an 
equal right of free entrance to economic competition. People therefore can use their 
equal political power to make economic governance accountable to their decent life. 
In other words, they learn how to realise their right to having a decent life through 
establishing a competitive and fair economy. The transformative function of the 
economic layer of social learning for making economic institutions accountable to 
people’s decent life can be viewed in its role in removing those institutional barriers 
that prevent free and fair entrance of potential economic actors to market competition.  
     The transition from the closed society towards the open society is a deep-seated 
epistemic and institutional transformation. The ideal type five layers of philosophical, 
moral, legal, political, and economic learning refers to an emancipatory social change 
in which individuals’ access to critical rationality perform as micro epistemic motor 
force of a macro-institutional change. The metaphysical and ethical dialogues can 
transform the cultural foundations of the closed society toward the culture of openness 
to criticism. This fundamental cultural change can enable people to claim for their 
equal rights of self-governance and a decent-life. In this way, the critical rationalist 
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ideal type of human action has provided a new micro-foundation for a new macro-
sociological analysis based on its own ideal type social learning model. In this way, 
Critical Rationalism, as a theory of human rationality is internalised into the ideal 
types of human action and the normative sociological analysis of the open society 
formation that can be regarded as a conscious social rationalisation process. 
     This analytical framework enables us to explore the role of competing models of 
human action in the formation different patterns of social organisation through social 
learning processes. In this way, we can use a critical rationalist analytical model of 
sociological analysis to show how the Hobbesian ideal type of human action leads to 
an anarchical type social order, or the Lockean ideal type of human action leads to a  
liberal model of social organization. It enables us to address the question of how the 
Kantian-inspired ideal type of human action can lead to an open society of free and 
equal citizens.  
      It should be acknowledged that the aforementioned analytical model of a critical 
rationalist form of social learning should be developed through further empirical 
investigations in order to show people have already used critical rationality or the 
method of learning from errors to rationalise their actions and their social organisation 
in the existing more or less open societies, and how they can improve their learning 
and open social order. To this end, Jeffrey Alexander’s microempirical model of 
action and macrosocial order can be employed.  
      In short, Alexander’s microempirical model views “action as moving along two 
basic dimensions: interpretation and stratergisation. Action is understanding, but it is 
also simultaneously practical and utilitarian. These two dimensions of actions should 
be conceived as analytic elements within the stream of empirical consciousness”396 
Alexander discusses that interpretation consists of two different processes: one, 
typification and another invention. By the former he invokes “the phenomenological 
insight that all actors take their understanding of the world for granted. They do so 
because they fully expect that every new impression will be ‘typical’ of the 
understanding of the world they have already developed … Even if we encounter 
something new and exciting we expect this newness and excitement to be 
understandable.” 397 Upon this micro-foundation, socialisation, an inter-subjective 
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process, means learning to typify within the framework provided by one’s particular 
world.  
      For Alexander, “every member of the collectivity must learn to explain, to name, 
to discover the typical terms of every possible situation. The most basic rule for 
acquiring sociological citizenship is ‘no surprises,’ and typification is the 
characteristic of consciousness upon which such inclusion depends. …To be 
socialized into world is to take your understanding of it for granted, and to live in that 
world is to document every new object as evidence for this ontological certainty.”398 
As a theory of rational and objective understanding, as argued by chapter 2, James 
Farr has led us to see how Popper’s critical rationalism can be used as an explanatory 
theory of human action in terms of one set of problem-solving conjectures and 
refutations.
399
 Alexander’s approach to microempirical model of action can pave the 
way for a new Popperian-informed empirical theory of action. In chapter 10, I will 
argue about the need for further inquiries into such kind of applied research for the 
formulation of a macrosociological theory of globalisation.  
     The second element of Alexander’s microaction model is ‘strategisation’: “Action 
is not merely understanding the world, it is also transforming and acting upon it. 
Actors seek to carry out their intentions through praxis …and for this reason they 
must act with and against other peoples and things. Such practical action certainly 
occurs only within the confines of understanding, but within the terms of clearly 
understood events it introduces the strategic considerations of least cost and most 
reward. To act against the world requires time, energy, and knowledge.”400 Our 
critical rationalist action model also considers this instrumental aspect of rational 
action because it defines a rational action as an action whose goals and means are 
rationalized through basing them upon an objective knowledge which is resulted from 
learning from errors (P1TTEEP2). In this way, both elements of Alexander’s 
micro-empirical model can have a critical rationalist account.  
      Alexander utilises his micro-empirical action model to advance Parsons’s 
macrosociology. In short, he discusses that “the social system constitutes a major 
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environment for action by providing actions with real objects. …these objects are 
human beings. The division of labor and institutions of political authority provide 
crucial settings for individual interpretation and strategization. …Solidarity is another 
significant dimension through which the social system exercises its environing 
effects.”401 Alexander’s macrosociology recognises that, “actors do not encounter the 
objects of social systems simply as external objects, even as objects that are normally 
defined. They encounter those objects from within, as the referents of symbol 
systems, which means, for all practical purposes, as symbols themselves. Symbols are 
signs that have a generalized status, that provide categories for understanding the 
elements of social, individual, and organic life. This understanding is the ‘meaning of 
life’. …These symbols, in other words, form a system of their own. This cultural 
system …has an independent internal organization whose principles of functioning 
inspires and constrains interpretative action and straregization in complex ways.”402 
Alexander improves our understanding of the socio-cultural environment of human 
action. However, we need still to explore how such a societal environment can be 
reproduced through a conscious social learning, which can be originated from one set 
of emancipatory human actions. The critical rationalist model of human action 
enables us to critises the existing social system due to its cultural, political, and 
economic closedness to rational criticism. In this sense, social transformative capacity 
of human action itself should be included in such a micro-empirical model of action.     
5.2.2. Civil Society and Social Learning for Creating an Open Society  
    The preceding arguments implied that the transformation of a closed into an open 
society is a conscious social change via different layers of social learning. Popper's 
idea of piecemeal social engineering does not cover such a deep-seated epistemic-
institutional transformation,
403
 because Popper has not defined Critical Rationalism as 
a theory of rationality and an epistemological base for addressing conscious social 
change. Popper's idea of piecemeal social engineering refers to those social reforms, 
which can take place within a liberal democracy, rather than a radical transition from 
the closed to an open society, which may require a critique of liberal democracy itself. 
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The conceptions, such as civil society and public sphere do not play a notable role in 
Popper's social philosophy of the open society.
404
 Nevertheless, Popper recognises 
that transition from the closed to an open society is a conscious social change: 
…the transition from the closed society to the open takes place when social 
institutions are first consciously recognized as man-made, and when their 
conscious alteration is discussed in terms of their suitability for the 
achievement of human aims or purposes.
405 
     However, Popper's idea of piecemeal social engineering does not allow him to 
explore how can such a radical institutional transition be addressed as a social 
learning process based on the critical rationalism analytical model of social change. 
The ideas of man-made social institutions and their conscious alteration need to a 
more radical model of social engineering, compared with the piecemeal social reform. 
The transition from the closed to the open social institutions is a fundamental social 
transformation that takes place through an emancipatory social learning in which civil 
society plays the key role.  
     In chapter 9, I will argue in detail about civil society’s concepts and its role in 
realising a social transformation from the existing closed world order into an open 
global society. Here I very briefly argue regarding the functions of civil society in 
realising the five layers of social learning for building an open society. To this end, I 
very briefly refer to Habermas' and Alexander's approaches to civil society. In short, 
civil society is defined as an independent societal sphere between people and the 
governance.
406
 However, there are very different analyses of this independent social 
sphere in civil society's literature. Viewed from a more or less cultural approach to 
civil society, we can link emancipatory functions of civil society in the formation of a 
normative social learning for building a free and just society. In this cultural account, 
concept-models of Habermas and Alexander regarding civil society deserve an 
especial attention. Habermas views civil society those more or less spontaneously 
emergent associations, organisations, and movements that, attuned to how societal 
problems resonate in private life spheres. For him, the core of civil society comprises 
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a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on 
questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres.407 
     If we use our critical rationalist model of problem-solving to address the epistemic 
function of civil society, we can explore a key role of civil society in activating 
peoples' potential access to critical rationality for realising social learning for building 
an open society. It is important to note that whilst people potentially have access to 
critical rationality, their actual existing rationality is shaped within their existing 
cultural environments. In this sense, ordinary people can be informed regarding their 
potential access to such rational capacity by people how have already activated such a 
capacity. If we call them intellectuals, they can play a key epistemic function to invite 
ordinary peoples into the five layers of a critical rationalist social learning, which are 
required for a transition from the closed to the open society. 
    Alexander leads us more concrete cultural core and epistemic function of the civil 
sphere. I will argue in details about Alexander's analytical model of civil society in 
chapter 9, but it suffices to note here that he devotes a substantive core to the cultural 
content of civil society. In The Civil Sphere, Alexander points out:  
…civil society should be conceived as a solidary sphere, in which a certain 
kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally defined and to some 
degree institutionally enforced. To the degree that this solidary community 
exists, it is exhibited and sustained by public opinion, deep cultural codes, 
distinctive organizations—legal, journalistic and associational—and such 
historically specific interactional practices as civility, criticism, and mutual 
respect. …Civil society is a sphere of solidarity in which individual rights 




      Alexander also views the social movements as social transformative devices that 
construct translations between the discourse of civil society, which rests upon an 
idealised social order—demanding for concrete collective actions, and specific 
institutional reforms that fulfill such an idealised commitments.
409
 In chapter 9, I will 
use Alexander’s account of civil society to argue for a critical rationalist concept of 
global civil society as the global agent of a dialogic globalisation.    
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5.3 Macrosociology of Dialogic Globalisation: 
       A Critical rationalist Analytical Framework 
    I discussed the critical rationalist model of human action and social learning. The 
main premise of these models is humans' access to critical rationality. It refers to a 
rational unity of humankind. As such, the critical rationalist models of human action 
and social learning are not limited to a national-scale of social ordering of peoples. 
Indeed, their applications are global. An open global society of free and equal persons 
is the subject of the thesis' inquiry. The thesis employs these models, as its analytical 
framework, to formulate a critical macrosociology of dialogic globalisation.  
    The critical rationalist model of human action operates as a micro-foundation for a 
macrosociology of globalisation with three aims: an analysis of contemporary form of 
globalisation; a critique of the contradictions of existing forms of globalisation, and an 
introduction of an alternative dialogic globalisation. The critical rationalist model of 
human action leads us to investigate those forms of social learning that have been 
motor force of contemporary globalisation. If the Kantian style of human action and 
social organisation is not the impetus of contemporary liberal globalisation, we need 
to explore micro-foundation of globalisation-- as a macro-institutional change-- in the 
Hobbesian and the Lockean-styles of human action and social ordering of peoples on 
a global level. The three competing models of human action and social organisation 
lead us to develop a macrosociology of contemporary globalisation. 
    The critical rationalist action model implies that human action and social learning 
are ultimately the outcomes of those systems of rationale that are operating to shape 
the normative bases of the social order. On a global scale, such systems of rationale 
should be explored as an epistemic motor force of a global institutional change. Our 
models of human action and social learning empower us to trace the link amongst the 
epistemic and institutional changes on a global scale. For instance, contemporary 
globalisation is described as a macro-institutional change from the Hobbesain to the 
Lockean model of social order because of an epistemic shift from the Hobbesian to 
the Lockean-style of human action. The critical rationalist model of social learning 
enables exploration of global social learning processes that have transformed the 
Hobbesian style of thought and action into the Lockean-styles of thought and action. 
In this sense, our theoretical framework paves the way for a sociological analysis of 
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contemporary liberal globalisation as a global social learning that cognitively fuels the 
emergence of a liberal globality. 
     The critical rationalist ideal types of action and social learning lead us to explore 
the contradictory nature of liberal globality. If peoples are viewed as rivals as opposed 
to friends, a global organisation of peoples on the basis of such vision suffers from the 
same problems that it faces at the national level. An epistemic critique of the liberal 
globality will shape an important part of a macrosociology of globalisation. Compared 
to the Kantian models of human action and social learning, the Lockean model leads 
global order to a global commercial network. Unsocial sociability of this utilitarian 
based global organisation of peoples refers to making human beings the means for 
satisfying the goals of powerful groups and countries rather than ends in themselves. 
This epistemic critique of globalisation uses the competing models of human action 
and social learning in order to unmask the contradictions of the liberal form of 
globality due to its origins in the liberal philosophy of action and the liberal model of 
social organisation. 
     More fundamentally, the critical rationalist models of human action and social 
learning enable the exploration of the transformative roles of a dialogic globalisation. 
If the existing form of globalisation is contradictory and problematic, what forms of 
global social learning can transform it into a global society of free and equal citizens? 
Recognising macro-institutional changes as the outcomes of a deep-seated epistemic 
shift, the critical rationalist macrosociology of dialogic globalisation explores the 
ideal type forms of global social learning through which the Lockean-styles of action 
and social ordering of peoples can be systematically transformed into the Kantian-
styles. This macrosociology of dialogic globalisation must address the transformative 
functions of a rational dialogue amongst world civilisations and its implications for 
altering the institutional structure of emerging liberal globality to a multi-civilisational 
open global society.                         
      
       
       
 
 









Chapter 6  
 
Contemporary Globalisation: 
Global Liberalism and Transnational Political Economy  
 
 
    This chapter describes contemporary globalisation as an epistemic-institutional 
shift from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition for 
economic interests. The emergence of global liberalism addresses a global epistemic 
shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy. This global epistemic shift 
has paved the way for a global institutional transition from the Westphalian order to a 
transnational political economy. Contemporary globalisation is described as an inter-
play between globalisation of liberalism and the emergence of a transnational political 
economy. This chapter develops a new macrosociological analysis of contemporary 
globalisation to address an interplay between the cultural force of liberalism and a 
transnational constellation of politics and economy. 
     The chapter proceeds in five sections. Section 6.1 reviews two major approaches to 
globalization: a connectivist and an institutional approach. It chooses the institutional 
approach to globalization. Section 6.2 develops the institutional approach to include 
the cultural dimension. To develop a macrosociology of globalisation, three following 
sections address cultural, political, and economic dynamics of contemporary 
globalisation. Section 6.3 argues that global liberalism has shaped the cultural model 
of contemporary globalisation that refers to an epistemic shift from the Hobbesian to 
the Lockean models of human action and social organisation. Section 6.4 explains the 
institutional implications of global liberalism for the formation of a multi-centic 
global governance. Section 6.5 argues that global liberalism and the collapse of the 
Cold War order have provided cultural and political conditions for the emergence of 
transnational markets.  
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6.1 Two Competing Approaches to Globalisation 
     The literature relating to the conception of globalisation is substantial; hence, a 
comprehensive overview of this literature on this occasion is not possible. However, 
as Mathias Albert argues, an overview of globalisation concept must take into account 
different disciplinary backgrounds.
410
 This chapter argues for a sociological 
conception of contemporary globalisation in which an interplay amongst cultural, 
political, and economic globalisation is central. From a sociological view, it is 
important to know how the three aforementioned sub-processes of globalisation—as a 
macro social organisational change—have interacted to shape globalisation.411 
However, it seems that the concepts of globalisation have been mainly focused on an 
expansion of global interconnectivity, as opposed to a global organisational change. I 
shall distinguish between two competing accounts of globalisation in order to pave the 
way for a new approach contemporary globalisation as a global epistemic-institutional 
transformation from the Hobbesian logic of the struggle for political power to the 
Lockean logic of the competition over economic interests.     
6.1.1 Globalisation as the Expansion of Global Interconnectivity  
     As George Modelski points out: “An institutional approach [to globalisation] might 
best be contrasted with a ‘connectivist’ one in which globalisation is seen primarily as 
a condition of interdependence.”412 According to connectivist approach, globalisation 
refers to “growing interconnectedness reflected in the extended flows of information, 
technology, capital, goods, services, and people throughout the world.” 413 This global 
interconnectivity also implies the movement of the world as a whole in the direction 
of unicity—meaning oneness of the whole world as a single interconnected socio-
cultural unit. As Robertson and White write, “This, in turn, indicates that the 
singularity of the world increasingly diminishes the significance of territorial 
boundaries…hence the emphasis on borderlessness in much of the literature on 
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globalisation.”414 Some scholars, like Roland Robertson, add a 'global consciousness' 
dimension to this global interconnectivity. Robertson believes that the two most 
important general features of the process of globalisation are: “(1) extensive 
connectivity, or interrelatedness and (2) extensive global consciousness, a 
consciousness which continues to become more and more reflexive.”415 Globalisation, 
as the expansion of global interconnectivity, does not imply whether the expansion of 
global interconnectivity involves a global institutional change or not. It views 
contemporary globalisation as a more or less transnational space of social relations. 
These global social relations may be economic, political, cultural or technological. 
They have connected people around the globe. 
      For instance, Anthony Giddens defines globalisation as “the intensification of 
worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local 
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”416  
Malcolm Waters views globalisation as “a social process in which the constraints of 
geography on social and cultural arrangement recede and in which people become 
increasingly aware that they are receding.”417 Jan Aart Scholte defines globalisation as 
“…ongoing large-scale growth of transplanetary—and often also supraterritorial—
connectivity. …[for him] this conception of globalization has a distinctive focus. It is 
different from ideas of internationalization, liberalization, universalization and 
westernization.”418 The connectivist approach acknowledges that transplanetary 
connectivity affects institutional features of the emerging world order. But, it does not 
highlight globalisation as a global institutional change. Martin Shaw discusses that 
globalisation has changed political organisation of the Cold War order to a Western 
Global State, but he does not devote an especial institutional meaning to such a global 
organisational change.
419
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6.1.2 Globalisation as the Emergence of Institutions of Planetary Scope  
    The institutional approach to globalisation situates global interconnectivity into a 
global institutional context, within which the movement of the world as a whole in 
direction of unicity finds a macro-societal institutional meaning. In addition, it leads 
us to explore a link between a global social learning process and such a global social 
organisation change. Modelski rightly argues that the institutional approach has been 
developed by David Held and his collaborators, and goes beyond the ‘connectivist’ 
approach.
420
 As noted in chapter 4, Held describes globalisation as a transition in the 
global scale of human organisation that links distant communities and expands the 
research of power relations across the world’s regions.421 Held points out: 
…the historical wave [of globalisation studies] drawing upon the historical 
sociology of global development, was principally concerned with exploring 
in what way, if any, contemporary globalisation could be considered novel or 
unique—whether if defined a new epoch, or transformation, in the socio-
economic and political organization of human affairs—and if so, what the 
implications were for the realization of progressive values and projects of 
human emancipation (emphasis added).
422
 
     Like Held, Habermas views globalisation as a social organisational (institutional) 
change on a global scale. Max Pensky reminds us, “for Habermas…it [globalisation] 
heralds the end of the global dominance of the nation-state as a model for political 
organization.’Postnational' here means that the globalisation of markets and of 
economic processes generally, of models of communication and commerce, of 
culture, and of risk, all increasingly deprive the classical nation states of its formally 
assured bases of sovereign power.”423 For the institutional approach to globalisation, 
global interconnectivity is analysed in the context of a global institutional transition 
from the Westphalian order towards a post-national political economy in which 
national sovereignty no longer plays the main institutional role in global social 
organisation.   
     As Modelski rightly argues, the institutional approach to globalisation analyses the 
expansion of global interconnectivity in the context of a set of global organisational 
changes. These global organisational changes refer to the infrastructure of global 
interdependence or “a new architecture of world order.”424 He leads us to see that such 
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a global interconnectivity is “the product of a set of organizational and institutional 
arrangements. They derive from the organisations that originate and manage these 
flows; the regimes that facilitate and govern them… and the systems of knowledge 
that guide them.”425 Modelski defines globalisation as the construction (and/or 
emergence) of the institutions of a planetary scope. He links this institutional 
approach to globalisation with a global social learning process. This process of social 
learning provides an explanatory framework for addressing the emergence of a post-
national political economy. He recognises this global social learning as a global 
problem solving process that regards the formation of institutions of a planetary scope 
as an organisational solution to deal with the global problems.
426
  
6.2 Global Social Learning:  
       An Epistemic-Institutional Approach to Globalisation 
    The institutional approach can be advanced to a macrosociological conception of 
globalisation, if we recognise global social learning as an epistemic mechanism for a 
global institutional change. Recalling preceding arguments regarding social learning 
and institutional changes, an epistemic-institutional approach to globalisation refers to 
an interplay between ideational force and a social institutional change. However, we 
must distinguish between this epistemic-institutional account of globalisation and 
those macrosociological analyses of globalisation that give the primacy to the 
economic or political forces of globalisation. As noted in chapter 1, globalisation is 
recognised as a macrosociological process. Scholars like Wallerstein and Tilly have 
adopted historical macrosociologies of globalisation.
427
 They have not argued about 
such a macrosociological process as a global social learning process, originating in an 
epistemic shift in the logic of global social organisation. The epistemic-institutional 
approach aims to develop a macrosociology of globalisation that describes it as a 
global institutional change that originates in a global epistemic shift from the 
Hobbesian to the Lockean logic of social organisation. The term epistemic-
institutional refers to an inter-play between global liberalism and transnational 
political economy. In this way, I argue for a radical cultural turn in the conception and 
analysis of contemporary globalisation. It should be noted here that this epistemic-
institutional approach to globalisation leads us to define the conception of globality 
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(what is global?) based on a sociological account. From such sociological perspective, 
globality refers to a global condition or a global structure in which social organisation 
of people creates a kind of global sociability. On this meature, contemporary globality 
refers to a global market sociability.  
      Björn Wittrock recognises that Globalisation Studies require such a radical 
cultural turn to explore the epistemic impetus of global institutional changes: 
…globalisation studies often seem premised on assumptions close to those of 
earlier forms of theorizing about convergence and modernization. They 
describe the global and all but inevitable diffusion and impact of market 
interactions and capitalist forms of production. …[But] the formation of 
modernity cannot be reduced to the processes of transformation in political 
and economic practices… Instead, it has to be located within the context of a 
deep epistemic and cultural shift as well. … In recent years one may even 
speak of something of a school of new historical sociologists, such as Johann 
Arnason, Johan Heilbron, Hans Joas, and Peter Wagner, who trace historical 




     A historical macrosociology of contemporary globalisation must therefore trace an 
inter-play between the ideational force of global liberalism and the emergence of 
post-national institutions. This macrosociological approach is an epistemic approach 
to globalisation because it recognises a key role of the ideational force of liberalism in 
shaping the post-national political economy. It is also an institutional approach to 
globalisation because it views globalisation as a macro-institutional change from the 
centrality of the struggle for political power to competition over economic interests. I 
will use the three competing models of human action and social learning, argued by 
chapter 4, in order to apply this epistemic-institutional approach in order to describe 
contemporary globalisation.
429
        
6.3 The Emergence of Global Liberalism as a Global Epistemic Shift 
     A critical rationalist macrosociology of globalisation employs the epistemic-
institutional approach in order to explore a cultural dynamic of globalisation in which 
context the political and economic dynamics of globalisation are shaped. This cultural 
dynamic of contemporary globalisation leads us to discover a global epistemic shift 
that has cognitively fuelled the emergence of a post-national political economy. In 
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order to address this global epistemic shift, I begin with a cultural historiography of 
the Western liberal-democratic model of social organisation.    
6.3.1 Toward a Cultural History of the Western Liberal-Democracy  
     Contemporary globalisation refers to a macro-institutional change in the world's 
political economy over the past two decades, but the cultural origins of this global 
institutional change date back to the past two centuries. In this sense, globalisation is a 
historical macro-sociological phenomenon whose epistemic impetus originates in the 
Enlightenment in Europe where its institutional manifestation was realised in the form 
of a liberal-democratic model of social organisation. Stephen Gill argues that the neo-
liberal globalisation is “the latest phase in a process that originated before the 
dawning of the Enlightenment in Europe, and accelerated in the nineteenth century 
with the onset of industrial capitalism and the consolidation of the integral nation-
state.”430 In order to explain how a global epistemic shift in the logic of social 
organisation has influenced globalisation, I refer to an argument offered by Barry 
Buzan and Richard Little that reveals why globalisation is a global institutional 
change, which has been fueled by liberal social philosophy. They write:   
The globalisation argument is not just that economic interaction is becoming 
more and more important in the day to day life of units [nation states], but 
also it is transforming the units themselves. The pursuit of liberal goals that 
are seen to be essential to the promotion of the late twentieth century 
capitalism requires a big reduction in the state’s control of the national 
economy, and a general opening of borders to economic transactions. …If the 
military-political sector is losing dominance as the defining process of the 
[nation-state] system, and if globalisation is pushing the state out of many 
aspects of the economy, can the traditional dominance of the Westphalian 
state as the defining unit of the international system be maintained?
431
  
     A significant reduction of the state's control of the national economy does not 
indicate merely an expansion of global trade and investment. It leads us to a deeper 
transformation within the social organisation of current world order: an institutional 
transformation from the centrality of the struggle for political power to a competition 
over economic interests. In this institutional transformation, power politics loses its 
defining role in favour of competition for economic interests. Economic globalisation 
ultimately originates from a change in the political function of the nation states. But, 
the emergence of this transnational political economy itself originates from the pursuit 
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of a liberal logic: a notable reduction of state control over the society, referring to a 
global epistemic shift towards liberalism as a globalising social philosophy. As Buzan 
and Little point out, “for liberals, the forty years of Cold War are now depicted not as 
a struggle for power, but as an ideological battle between capitalism and communism 
from which capitalism has emerged triumphant.”432 The central argument of this 
chapter is that the emergence of global liberalism had cognitively fuelled the collapse 
of the Cold War political order through which an enabling environment was created 
for the emergence of a transnational economy. A critical rationalist approach to 
macrosociology of globalisation explains how the emergence of global liberalism, as a 
global epistemic shift, led to the collapse of the Cold War as a political source of the 
emergence of a transnational economy.   
     A transition from the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy in the West can 
be understood as an epistemic-institutional development. This epistemic-institutional 
transformation enabled the West to be a winner of an inter-bloc competition with the 
Eastern bloc during the Cold War era. The emergence of global liberalism can be 
addressed on two major levels: a) the rise of Western liberalism, and b) the 
globalisation of the Western liberalism. The first level refers to as an epistemic-
institutional change within the Western societies that led to one set of shared values 
among the Western peoples regarding liberal-democratic model of social organisation. 
The second level refers to the expansion of the Western liberalism to a global scale 
that refers to a global expansion of the liberal model of social organisation. The 
emergence of global liberalism cognitively justified an institutional change in the 
world-order in favour of the liberal model of social organisation. I will situate my 
analysis of the global epistemic shift towards liberalism in the context of a move from 
the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy. It is important to note this global 
epistemic shift shows a different pattern of social learning in comparison with its 
domestic counterpart, i.e., an epistemic shift for the formation of the Western liberal 
democracies. But the general logic of social organisation is to some extent the same. 
     The Emergence of Liberal Democracies in the West: A central argument is that the 
Western modern societies emerged through a conscious social transformation in 
which liberal ideas and values were publicised through a social learning process. In 
other words, through a social learning process Western peoples arrived at a more or 
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less normative consensus regarding the liberal values, in Parsons' sense. This 
normative consensus paved the way for an institutional transformation from 
monarchies into liberal-democracies. I will apply the critical rationalist analytical 
framework developed in chapter 5, to show how a micro-foundational change in the 
Western peoples' behaviours led to a macro- institutional change in the Western social 
institutions. To this aim, I use the Hobbesian and the Lockean models of human 
action and social organisation for a rational reconstruction of a historical 
transformation from pre-liberal to liberal-democratic societies in the West. Along this 
line of reasoning, I will refer to a cultural historiography of an interplay between the 
epistemic and macroinstitutional change, leading to the Western liberal democracies. 
The main task of this cultural historiography is to uncover the epistemic role of 
liberalism, as a set of ideas and values, in the emergence of modern social institutions 
in the Western societies.  
    A cultural historiography of the Western modernity over the past three centuries 
suggests that a deep-seated epistemic transformation occurred at the turn of the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.
433
 This cultural historiography leads us to 
explore the ways through which distinctively modern conceptions of human nature 
and social order emerged during the great transition in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Eisenstadt argues that central to this distinctively modern 
conception of human nature was: 
…an emphasis on the autonomy of man: his or her …emancipation from the 
fetters of traditional political and cultural authority. In the continuous 
expansion of the realm of personal and institutional freedom and activity, 
such autonomy implied, first reflexivity and exploration; second, active 
construction and mastery of nature, including human nature. This project of 
modernity entailed a very strong emphasis on the autonomous participation of 
members of society in the constitution of the social and political order…From 
the conjunctions of these different conceptions arose a belief in the possibility 
that society could be actively formed by conscious human activity. 
434
   
    The notion of autonomy of human cognitively fuelled the behaviours of modern 
man. In Enlightenment and the Institution of Society, Keith Baker argues that an 
essential relation was formed between this autonomy of human beings and emergence 
of the modern concept of society. In this way, this conception of the individual, as a 
conscious human agent, led to a social belief in the possibility of a conscious re-
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construction of social order—what Karl Polanyi called the ‘discovery of society’. As 
Baker elegantly remarks, “its discovery disengaged from the religious representations 
in which it had hitherto expressed its own existence. Not until the ideological primacy 
of individual interests was postulated…could constrain upon those interest be 
discovered in the operation of an autonomous social order subject to its own laws.” 435 
In other words, once individuals cognitively recognise themselves as autonomous 
rational agents, capable of the social reconstruction of their own social order, modern 
social institutions of liberal democracy emerged. It was a conscious epistemic-
institutional transition from the traditional account of human beings-- as the subjects 
of monarch rules-- to a modern account of the individual, assumed to the equal 
members of a self-determined liberal democracy.     
    This historical emancipation from the traditional authorities to the modern concept 
of the individual refers to a deep-seated epistemic transformation that manifested 
itself in the intellectual history of liberalism and an institutional development of the 
liberal-democracies. The critical rationalist sociological framework allows us to see 
how such a micro-foundational transformation in the Western people's conception of 
the person towards a rational moral agent, led to a macro-institutional change from 
monarchies to liberal-democracies. In his cultural history of liberalism, Pierre Manent 
describes the European’s epistemic-institutional problem in this way:   
For almost three centuries this political doctrine [liberalism] constituted the 
principle current of modern politics in Europe and the West. … One of the 
principle ‘ideas’ of liberalism, as we know, is that of the 'individual.' The 
individual is that being who, because he is human, is naturally entitled to 
'rights' that can be enumerated…How can rights be attributed to the 
individuals…it is on this idea…that the liberal body politic was progressively 
constructed. … the content of modern liberalism derives from a fundamental 
orientation towards politics chosen by early-modern Europeans in order to 
free themselves from the intellectual and spiritual influence of the Catholic 
Church; that adopting this orientation required the theoretical materials 
provided by the founders of liberalism. 
436
  
      The epistemic-institutional problem of Europe and the West during the 
Enlightenment was how to shape a new social order to rescue individuals from the 
intellectual and institutional influence of the Church. Hence the key question for the 
present argument is 'how did the founders of liberalism pave the way for a social 
learning of the liberal-democratic models of human nature and social organisation?' 
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The emergence of the Western liberal-democracies was an intended conscious social 
change brought about by a public recognition of liberal models of human action and 
social order. Recalling the preceding arguments about the functions of the 
intellectuals and social movements in a conscious social transformation, the founders 
of liberalism provided an ideational frame of reference within which early-modern 
Europeans made their fundamental choices towards the liberal accounts of human 
action and social order. In other words, the early modern Europeans realised that if 
they wanted to free themselves from the intellectual influence of the Church, the 
liberal account of human nature and social order would be an effective alternative. In 
this way, they opted to become the individual who was equally entitled to the self-
construction of their social order, rather than the subjects of the monarchies. 
     Manent argues that the period preceding the establishment of liberal societies in 
the West is conventionally called an ancient regime that can be also referred to as the 
era of absolute or national monarchies.
437
 In this way, the deep-seated epistemic-
institutional shift, about which Wittrock argues, refers to a historical transformation 
from absolute monarchies into liberal-democracies in the Europe and the West. 
Hence, if we want to address such a profound transformation, it is necessary to 
explore how early Europeans' pre-liberal accounts of human nature and social order 
developed into a liberal account of human nature and social order. Additionally, it is 
necessary to discuss how this epistemic change led to an institutional reformation of 
the absolute monarchies and developed into social institutions of liberal-democratic 
societies. 
    To address such a social transition from monarchies to liberal-democracies, it is 
important to address the question as to how did the very idea of the individual emerge 
and how it cognitively guided Europeans to construct an individualistic social order 
freeing themselves from the authority of the church. The European theological-
political problem centred around the question as to how the monarchy could be 
superseded with a people-centric social order. This fundamental question manifested 
after the fall of the Roman Empire, during which the Catholic Church's solution for 
establishing such a humane society was unsuccessful. Instead, the Europeans were led 
to an absolute monarchy. The Hobbesian models of human action and social order 
reveals the function of the European absolute monarchy.  In this sense, the transition 
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from the absolute monarchy to a liberal-democracy was an epistemic-institutional 
transformation from the Hobbesian to the Lockean model of social order.  
    To challenge with the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church proposed the spiritual 
idea of 'salvation'. However, the idea of salvation did not provide an institutional 
alternative for social organisation to the Roman Empire. In addition, it had been 
assigned by God himself and by his Son the mission of leading human beings to 
salvation, for which the Church, was the unique vehicle. Since all human actions are 
faced with the alternative of good and evil, the church had a duty to oversee all human 
actions, in particular rulers' actions. The contradictory nature of the Catholicism's idea 
of salvation was that whilst the church did not suggest an institutional alternative for 
the Roman Empire, it preserved the right and duty to oversee the rulers and everything 
that could place this salvation in peril. This logically led to the church claim's of a 
supreme spiritual power in which peoples were free to organise themselves within the 
social sphere as they saw fit. Ironically, at the same time, such spiritual power was 
imposing a theocracy on them. The European theological-political problem, after the 
fall of the Roman Empire, was searching for a social order between the city-state and 
an empire, given the imposed the spiritual power of the church. 
438
  
     Early Europeans found that in facing with the church, the city-states were 
relatively weak, hence it would be difficult to challenge it. As for the Empire, the key 
problem was not its political weakness, but rather the Empire's political sphere of 
influence was far from the radiating centre of the Christian presence, the pope. Hence, 
they searched for a middle way. It was national absolute monarchy. Like the emperor, 
and unlike the city-state, the king, as the head of the national monarchy, was able to 
claim to 'divine right' over his peoples because all power comes from God. Yet in 
contrast with the emperor, the king did not lay claim to a universal monarchy, 
whereas the church's universality was a given condition. In addition, the natural 
position of a monarch's subjects was one of obedience that suited the church's 
intellectual authority better. In national absolute monarchies, people's beliefs in the 
church's teaching remained unchanged and cognitively supported by the institutional 
performance of the absolute monarchies, because natural position of a monarch's 
subject was one of obedience which was consistent with both the monarchy and the 
church. Hence, the absolute monarchies raised the key questions regarding what an 
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individual's rights should be and what an individualistic social order that liberates 
peoples from the spiritual influence of the church should be?    
    Pre-liberal thinkers, like Thomas Hobbes, and liberal thinkers, like John Locke, 
provided the intellectual foundations for a conscious social transition from absolute 
monarchies to liberal-democracies, in Europe in particular, as well as in the West in 
general. I argue while pre-liberal thinkers, such Hobbes, were generally rescuing 
peoples from the monarchical social order, their ideas about human nature and social 
organisation actually re-produced the intellectual base and institutional functions of 
the absolute monarchies. On the contrary, liberal thinkers like Locke, among others, 
criticised the absolute monarchies and provided a new intellectual foundation for a 
self-governing individualistic society in the Europe and the West.                           
     Hobbes’ critique of the church’s intellectual influence targeted the micro-
foundation of the church's teaching about the human nature. The church's salvation 
thesis implied that since mankind has a good soul, if he follows the commands of 
God, his life will be emancipated. As argued in chapter 5, Hobbes suggested an 
alternative model of social order. However, the Hobbesian alternative did not 
contradict the absolute monarchy, but rather it paved the way for the emergence of the 
authoritarian style of social order. Hobbes developed his political philosophy as an 
institutional solution for overcoming the national monarchy’s contradictions. As 
Peinhart Koselleck argues, “Hobbes’s doctrine of the State grew out of the historical 
situation of civil war [in England]. …Hobbes asks what causes civil war. …To get the 
bottom of civil warfare… He develops an individualistic anthropology, one 
corresponding to a human nature that has come to view its social, political, and 
religious ties as problematical.”439 The Hobbesian model of human nature implies that 
humans are egoistic and power loving and their reason is a servant of their passions. 
They cannot overcome their conflict of opinions over the good. He employed this 
individualistic anthropology to get to the bottom of the civil war in England. 
440
 
    The natural outcome of Hobbes’ model of human action is the war of all against all 
as the state of nature. Hobbes believed that England's civil war was a good example of 
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this state of nature. In his eyes, the political and religious strife of his country was 
only a particularly rounded manifestation of behaviours natural to human beings when 
they live without undisputed masters. Viewed from this micro-analysis, Hobbes 
argues for two major causes of the civil war: a secular cause was found in the 
influence of the universities that educate the elite; and a religious cause was found in 
the influence of Puritans, who are made up of lay people. The former cause stems 
from Greek and Roman models of glorifying freedom. The latter cause stems from a 
religious conception attributing to everyone who shares the right and duty to obey 
individual inspiration. Hobbes argues that these causes conspire to stimulate the spirit 
of disobedience and consequently the civil war. Such a spirit of disobedience was not 
rooted in the real nature of human beings. The former originated from the Greek and 
Roman's belief in that individuals can use their reason to peacefully live together. The 
latter originated in the Protestantism belief that God bestows his grace on anyone who 
approaches him with a pure and humble heart. Hobbes claims that the experience of 
the civil war showed that humans neither as rational creature, nor as a holy creature 
could address such a social catastrophe in England. In contrast, the egoistic nature of 
human reveals the origins of the civil war. He proposes that if all persons give up their 
rights to a central absolute monarchy, a peaceful social order becomes possible. In this 
way, while Hobbes aimed to find a realistic solution for the social disorders of his 
society, he re-produced the institutional logic of the absolute monarchy.
441
  
     The Hobbesian models of action and social order reflect the reality of the absolute 
national monarchies in early modern Europe. However, it does not lead us to those 
intellectual bases that cognitively fuelled a conscious social transformation from the 
monarchies into liberal democracies. John Locke was among the most important 
liberal thinkers whose ideas of human nature and an individualistic social order found 
a public recognition. David Hume and Adam Smith, amongst others, developed the 
Lockean model of liberal-democracy. Europeans gradually changed their religious-
informed conception of human nature and model of social organisation to the liberal 
accounts of the individual and social organisation. This epistemic transformation led 
Europeans to a new set of social institutions, called later a liberal-democratic model of 
social organisation.  
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     As argued in chapter 5, John Locke introduced another version of the utilitarian 
social philosophy. While he agreed with Hobbes in that individuals cannot rationally 
overcome their conflict of opinions over the good, he did not arrive at the conclusion 
that the war of all against all is necessarily the state of nature. Locke recognised that 
the civil war was a good approximation of the war of all against all, but he rejected 
that the civil war as the truth of political life. It was only in exceptional circumstance 
from which nothing general can be inferred for organising 'ordinary' social life. Locke 
criticised the micro-foundation of Hobbes' macro-political philosophy, implying that 
since individuals are egoistic and power-lowing, the state of nature is essentially the 
state of war. While Hobbes believed that individuals exists only through a kind of 
negative sociability, that of war, hence they have the absolute right of self-
perseveration, Locke argued that the most fundamental human right is the right to 
property. He developed a liberal conception of the person in which the main concern 
of the individual is satisfying his material needs and the main right of the individual is 
the right to property to make sure the realisation of such material needs. As noted in 
chapter 4, Locke provided a theological utilitarian account of human action for 
justifying the person's fundamental right to property. Locke derived his institutional 




    Locke's social philosophy rests upon his new conception of the individual. Once 
this conception found a public acceptance, a liberal society emerged. A liberal society 
is a society of liberal-minded persons who exercises equal right to property and self-
governance in order to satisfy their needs. Locke developed the right to property into a 
political right to self-governance through shaping a constitutional state. However, the 
property right remained as the most fundamental element of his social philosophy. 
    As argued in chapter 5, Locke uses his theological utilitarianism to defend the 
individual's right to property, wherein all individuals are God's property, so that no 
one has the right to harm himself or anyone else. God gave the world in common to 
human. God gave people reason. With these three revelations, Locke argues that 
property could have arisen rightfully.
443
 If the property right is a logical outcome of a 
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rational faith in the Christian morality, and if the most urgent and important human 
needs are their materialistic needs to survive, individuals require social institutions to 
protect their property rights. Locke argues that in order to protect their natural right to 
property, individuals cannot give up the right in favour of an absolute monarchy. If all 
peoples are egoistic and power-loving, none of them can be exempted from this 
general rule. Locke's conception of human nature provided a micro-foundation for his 
macro-solution for establishing a constitutional state to protect the right to property.
444
 
For him, people can agree on a social contract, in terms of a constitutional state, to 
protect their property right.
445
 The right to property led Locke to the individual's right 
to political self-governance. 
    As Manent reminds us of Locke's view of society, in its essential elements, the 
society is born before the political institutions. What Locke allows us to see is the 
development of a liberal society from its modest beginning in a liberal (wo)man who 
pursue their self-preservation whilst regarding the others as economic rivals, as 
opposed to political enemies. However, they come to a societal agreement regarding 
how their economic relations can be organised to protect their property right, as the 
main means for their material survival and individual freedom.
446
 These liberal-
minded peoples can establish a representative political organisation to protect their 
natural right to property. But, such political institutions do not have an absolute right 
to govern the people. It must be itself be subjected to the laws it enacts.   
    The Lockean model of social order provides a reasonable institutional solution for 
creating a liberal society in which social institutions protect the rights of individuals. 
Keith Baker argues that a fundamental shift from traditional societies toward modern 
society in the West occurred when liberal thinker like Locke and Mandeville proposed 
their solutions for a social order based on the action of free and equal individuals.
447
 
In this way, liberal society originated from a conscious social change through which 
liberal ideas and values were socialised. As Tom Young writes: 
Liberal society and liberal democracy are forms of social and political order 
which require citizens who think of themselves as individuals, characterized 
by material interest between which there can be trade-offs. Market and civil 
society constitute spheres of interaction for such individuals. Yet, far from 
‘the’ market and civil society being ‘spontaneous’ social developments, as 
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liberal myth requires, to be effective they must be penetrated and shaped by a 
modernizing state, a modernizing state moreover which is driven by a ruling 
elite armed with new forms of expertise … [emphasis added].448 
     When early Europeans recognised new conception of the individual, a deep-seated 
epistemic shift-- from the individual as the subject of a monarchy’s rules to the 
individual as possessor of equal right to property and self-governance-- occurred. 
Such an epistemic shift in the concept of the individual led to an institutional self-
making of liberal-democracies. The ideas of liberal thinkers, like Locke among others, 
provided cognitive inputs for those emancipatory social movements whose purpose 
was to realise a society of free and equal persons. Such an emancipatory social 
learning informed Europeans that if they want to realise their rights of self-
governance, they must contribute to a societal-institutional change from a monarchy 
to a liberal-democracy: a new institutional order that aims to protect the property right 
and self-governance. Friedrich Hayek points out that, “throughout the greater part of 
the nineteenth century the European country which seemed to be nearest to a 
realisation of the liberal principles was Great Britain. There most of them appeared to 
be accepted not only by a powerful Liberal Party but by the majority of the 
population, and even the Conservatives often become the instrument of the 
achievement of liberal reforms. …In the intellectual sphere during the second half of 
the nineteenth century the basic principles of liberalism were intensively 
discussed.”449 In the same line of analysis, Habermas discusses that the republican 
preferences of the bourgeoisie first emerged in opposition to the hidden and private 
activities of the King's household in patrimonial absolutist regimes. This bourgeois 
preference for open and public relationships culminated in the conversation-filled 
coffeehouse and salons of the eighteenth-century British and French commercial 
centers. According to Habermas, it was in these public houses that the emerging 
middle classes debated plan for establishing liberal democracy in a rational manner.
450
    
     Later liberal thinkers developed the Lockean models of human action and social 
order. Such developments affected the emergence of liberal-democratic societies in 
the Europe and the West. For instance, David Hume and Adam Smith, amongst 
others, criticised Locke's theological utilitarianism. They believed that “political order 
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rested on no deeper foundation than opinion and put their faith in the tendency of the 
modern socio-economic order to generate sufficient social cohesion to carry the 
weight of the political community.”451 Locke’s political philosophy was not directly 
confronting the intellectual influence of the Catholic theology. It aimed to modify it in 
the context of the Protestant theology that recognised the property right as a God-
given right. However, Hume and Smith did not see such a link between the Church 
theology and the intellectual foundations of the modern liberal society as a necessary 
relation.
452
 Hence, they suggested a secular ideational foundation for a liberal society 
in which individuals look after their self-interests, without a need for a theological 
justification for their equal rights to property and the creation of a representative state. 
In this sense, they changed epistemic foundation of the liberal model of social order 
from a theological towards a secular utilitarianism in which individuals agree upon a 
secular social contract for protecting their rights to property and self- governance.  
      For them, liberal society was a middle ground between the Hobbesain absolute 
monarchy and the Kantian rational society. Once individuals recognised each other as 
useful means for their ends, they would have entered into a social contract, guided by 
the liberal conception of the individual, as a utility-maximising agent. A liberal 
society is created by liberal-minded peoples who regard themselves as useful means 
for each others. Hence, the liberal model of society reflects market sociability--a form 
of social organisation that its principle is utility, what Kant called an unsocial 
sociability.
453
 Different accounts of liberalism were shaped in Europe and the West 
that cognitively fuelled diverse forms of social order,
454
 but a set of liberal-democratic 
ideas and values are more or less shared amongst these. As Peter Wagner writes: 
I do think…that individualism-cum-liberalism has been an organizing centre 
for social and political thought during the past two centuries [in the West], 
this is to say that hardly anybody could avoid referring to this--itself rarely 
spelt out--discourse, affirmatively or critically. I do not think, though, that a 
commitment to “modernity” …irrefutably demands a commitment to this 
discourse. My conclusion could thus be summarized as saying that there was 
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     Wagner discusses modern political philosophers of liberalism, from Hobbes to 
Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau tried to address the question of how human nature 
would lend itself to a political order without externally imposed unity and rules of 
action. So-called democratic revolutions in North America and in France gave 
institutional expression to the political aspect of a broader culture of the individual 
autonomy, which was a key element of the emergence of the modern societies.
456
    
6.3.2 The Emergence of the Western Liberal-Democracies’ Bloc  
    As Wittrock argues, the historical process of economic and political modernity in 
Western Europe and North America in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries shows that there have been differences between countries. “It is simply not 
true that all these countries have had roughly similar types of economic and political 
institutions in this historical period.”457 However, there have been similar cultural 
orientations in the intellectual and institutional landscape of Europe and the West in 
the course of the past two centuries. The liberal-democratic form of social ordering of 
peoples has been central to this cultural constitution of Western modernity.  
    The institutional projects of Western modernity--be they a democratic nation-state 
and a liberal market economy-- cannot be understood unless their grounding in the 
profounded cultural or epistemic shift is recognised. These institutional projects were 
premised on new assumptions about human beings, their right and agency. As 
Wittrock argues, these epistemic changes entitled promissory notes that came to 
constitute new affiliations, identities and ultimately, institutional realities.
458
 It was 
argued that at the core of these promissory notes was the epistemic shift from the 
conception of a person as the subject of monarchy's rule to a person who entitles the 
equal right to property and self-governance. In this sense, an epistemic-institutional 
shift from the Hobbesian to the Lockean social philosophy leads us to the cultural 
constitution of the Western modern liberal societies. The liberal ideas and values were 
central in the cultural constitution of the Western modernity however these ideas and 
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values have found various interpretations in the Western countries. In addition, there 
have been some exceptional ideologies and political regimes in the West that did not 
follow this cultural constitution namely Nazism and Fascism.   
    The liberal model of social organisation implied that individuals or nations can 
shape a liberal form of social order through making their social cooperation useful for 
each other. In the twentieth century, the Western liberal democracies were faced with 
a common ideological and institutional rival, i.e., the communist bloc of nation states 
under leadership of the Soviet Union. The liberal logic led them to a political and 
economic cooperation in order to make them one bloc of nation states in their 
conflicting position to the Eastern bloc. Without such cultural sharing around liberal-
democratic values, they could not trust each other in order to find themselves reliable 
partners of such political and economic cooperation. In spite of their internal 
differences, they came to form a Western bloc of liberal-democracies. The cultural 
constitution of Western modernity-- in terms of some common account of the 
individual's rights to property and self-governance-- enabled them to form such 
political and economic bloc in the form of the Western bloc of nation-states.        
    The emergence of liberal global governance has originated from such a cultural 
sharing amongst the Western liberal-democracies. Viewed from the Lockean models 
of action and social organisation, the Western nation states found such a collation a 
useful cooperation for their confrontation with the Eastern rival. In order to survive in 
a bipolar world order of the twentieth century, such a political and economic collation 
was useful for all of them. While they were rivals of each other within the West, the 
liberal logic convinced them to shape a Western-collation of liberal-minded states to 
engage in an inter-bloc competition. Their cultural sharing concerning liberal ideas 
and values, in particular the liberal conception of the person, justified such political 
and economic collation. In this way, liberalism, as an ideational system, paved the 
way for the emergence for the Western bloc of liberal-democracies in a bipolar world 
order. While not all of the Western societies had similar accounts of liberalism and 
liberal society, the liberal logic enabled them to overlook their internal differences in 
favour of a global scale of cooperation that was useful for all of them. The Western 
liberal-democracies learned to overlook their internal differences in favour of an inter-
national cooperation for securing cooperative gains resulting from their unified 
political and economic position in their competition with the Eastern bloc of nation-
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states. Hence, the emergence of global liberalism originated from an inter-societal 
learning amongst the Western liberal-democracies, informed by their cultural sharing 
over the liberal ideas and values. 
6.4 Cultural Logic of Global Liberalism and Political Collapse of the Cold War  
    This section argues that the emergence of global liberalism, which originated from 
the aforementioned cultural sharing among liberal-democratic countries in the West, 
played a key epistemic role in the collapse of the Cold War political order. It leads us 
to illustrate how the emergence of global liberalism, as a global epistemic shift 
towards a liberal mode of global organisation, had paved the way for a political 
change from bipolar to multi-polar global governance. From a cultural perspective, a 
comparative ideational advantage of the Lockean model of social organisation-- due 
to its more realistic premises about human nature compared to the Hobbesian model-- 
leads us to explore the cultural causes of the political collapse of the Cold War. In a 
word, this section shall argue that the ideational logic of liberalism was a significant 
cultural motor force of the end of the Cold War, because it enabled the Western bloc 
of nation-states to better organise their domestic and international affairs, compared 
with their Eastern rival.
459
   
6.4.1 The Emergence of a Bipolar Political Order  
    From the perspective of historical sociology, the emergence of twentieth century's 
bipolar order can be better understood in the context of socio-political conditions of 
the nineteenth century. The nineteenth had often been demarcated by the end of a set 
of pan-European wars, in 1815 and the beginning of another, in 1914. Michael Mann 
has defined this century as a long century, beginning with the industrial revolution 
around 1790 and ending in 1914.
460
 I am not about here to argue in detail about the 
historical conditions of the emergence of the bipolar world order in the twentieth 
century. My aim is merely to outline a Hobbesian style of the conflict of opinions as 
the cultural motor forces of the emergence of the Cold War political order.  
    Andrew Linklater argues that in a transition from territorial states towards a nation-
state world order of the twentieth century we should remember that the world was not   
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“naturally divided into nations. States played a central role in creating national 
cultures not least by building education systems that promoted common values and 
loyalties. …Turning point in modern history was the French Revolution, which 
created the idea of the ‘nation in arms’ along with national conscription.”461 Historical 
sociologists, like Martin Shaw, argue that preconditions of the bipolar order of the 
twentieth century were prepared in nineteenth-century developments. As Shaw 
argues, in the nineteenth century, “the national-international order was consolidated. 
The economic and political infrastructure for total war was created… Modern mass 
militarism developed at the core of society: not only in the technological 
'industrialization' of warfare, but in the creation of conscript mass armies and other 
means of modern state mobilization, including the socio-cultural forms of mass 
society which were to serve total war.”462 While liberal democratic societies were 
emerging as domestic forms of social organisation in the West, the modern Europe of 
nation-states, as an international political order, was formed in the nineteenth century. 
      In Shaw’s words, “it was consolidated only after the revolutions of 1846 and 
German and Italian unification in the 1870s and fully realized through the twentieth 
century—in the revolutionary waves of 1917-19, 1944-45, and even 1989-91. …The 
dominant form of the state was not, therefore, simply a nation-state, but the nation-
state-empire within an international state-system.”463 Each European nation-state-
empire, such as the British and French nation-state-empires, was looking to build a 
world-order in its own right due to their ideologies and socio-economic interests. With 
the Soviet Union’s Communist Revolution in 1917, a new ideological battle began 
between the Western liberal-democracies and the Eastern communist bloc.  
    While the pre-1917 world was an international state-system in which nation-state-
empires have paved the way for the emergence of a Hobbesian-style war of all against 
all, the post-1917 world was a bipolar states-system, and each of them was operating 
as a global military/political empire. It shaped a cold war of two major blocs of states 
against each other. As the Hobbesian model of social order implies, the conflict of 
opinions over the good is the ultimate source of the political struggle for power. The 
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emergence of the Cold War or bipolar world order was a political manifestation of an 
ideological battle between liberal-democracies and communist states. Hence, the 
political organisation of these two antagonistic blocs of the Cold War order originated 
from their ideological conflicts over the model of social organisation itself. 
    In his historical sociology of the states-system, Linklater recognises the difference 
between the Hobbesian and the Kantian approaches to historical sociology of the 
states-system. For him, these approaches can be distinguished in this way: “the 
Hobbesian or Machiavellian approach which concentrates on long-term historical 
processes that include the rise of fall of hegemonic powers…the Kantian approach 
which focuses on long-term historical processes in which visions of the unity of the 
human race influences the development of states-systems.”464 The Hobbesian model 
indicates the reality of the Cold War political order. Cold War politics shaped due to a 
conflict of opinions over the good between the two blocs of nation states.   
     Due to such ideational conflict over how to organise peoples, the bipolar order 
followed the Hobbesian-style cold war of all against all. In this cold war, the struggle 
for political power was a defining feature of world politics. The absence of one set of 
inter-blocs' shared values regarding the conception of a person and the mechanism of 
social ordering of peoples was the cultural deficit of the Hobbesian Cold War order.  
However, as the Hobbesian social order faced overwhelming social critics on a 
domestic level, it had also faced with similar crises on a global scale. The post-1917 
bipolar world order led to the international political and economic crises that paved 
the way for the collapse of the Cold War order.                
6.4.2 The Cultural Logic of a Bipolar Cold War and Its Political Outcomes 
    The bipolar world order emerged where there was not an inter-national consensus 
upon how international society should be organised to satisfy the interests of all parts. 
Each of the two states-blocs used their own ideas and values to organise their 
domestic and international affairs. The substantive conflict of opinions over models of 
human action and social order between liberal democracies and communist states was 
reflected in their inter-bloc cold war. They entered into political and military races—
as a defining feature of the Cold War order. This Hobbesian-style of international 
order originated from a profound cultural source: if the liberal West and the 
                                                 
464
 Andrew Linklater, The English School of International Relations, (2006), p.190. 
  183 
communist East could not arrive at an ideological consensus regarding how to 
organise their inter-societal relations, the natural outcome of this unsolved conflict of 
opinions was an inter-bloc cold war. In this sense, the political architecture of the 
Cold War order had a profound cultural source.  
    As Robert Keohane argues, “the Soviet Union chose an essentially Hobbesian path: 
internally, by constructing a centralized authoritarian state and externally, by seeking 
autarchy and being suspicious of international cooperation and its institutionalized 
forms.”465 From a domestic point of view, the political and economic crises of the 
Soviet Union were the natural outcomes of a Hobbesian style of social organisation. 
The low economic growth and low political legitimacy are logical outcomes of 
absolute monarchies. An arrogation of all the key property rights to the state—that is 
to the Communist Party-- did not create a competitive economic sphere for an 
endogenous economic growth. In addition, the absence of a market economy, whereas 
a centralised economic planning was the mechanism of resource allocation, led to an 
inefficient usage of the production factors and inappropriate division of the outputs.
466
 
The central economic planning led to inappropriate resource allocation that could not 
rightly respond to consumer needs and mobilise producer supplies. The results were a 
low economic growth, high rates of poverty, unemployment and inflation, and an 
unjust distribution of wealth.  If we add a heavy investment on arm-race to this list, it 
would be easy to understand why the Soviet system, faced with overwhelming 
economic and political crises, collapsed.     
     From an international perspective, the Soviet Union was unable to make credible 
international commitments. Due to its Hobbesian logic, as Shaw points out, “the 
whole Soviet Union's system was built on the notion of threats both internal and 
external, so that mobilization for war was the only way of mobilizing the 
economy.”467 This approach to international order made the logic of enmity a defining 
feature of the world-order. For the Soviet Union, the international market was not 
playing the same role as it did for its Western rival. For the liberal model, economic 
growth depends upon an institutional framework of market exchanges. Improvement 
in productivity results from the division of labour, whereby the division of labour is 
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limited by the extent of the market. Markets are defined as economic frameworks over 
which transactions can take place at similar prices. This approach to economic growth 
calls for political action to remove exchange barriers. The Western international 
policy was removing the barriers to meet required economic growth. However, 
Hobbesian monarchs had incentive to expand the internal market, since they would 
capture part of the gains from trade, but the time horizons for them were shorter than 
those of the state that they controlled; thus, they had incentive to capture immediate 
gains at the expense of the long-term economic growth.
468
 The Soviet Union's 
economy did not use the international market as an important source of domestic 
economic growth to finance its political-military competition with the West. 
However, as I will argue in the next chapter, the Western bloc established an unjust 
global economic order to finance their military-political race with the Eastern bloc.           
     In contrast, due to this Lockean model of social organisation, the liberal-
democracies were more successful in managing their internal and external socio-
economic affairs. In addition, as Mary Kaldor argues: “the West needed a Soviet 
threat to legitimize the construction of the Western bloc. The Soviet system did 
represent an undesirable alternative, even though few people at that time viewed it as 
a territorial threat.”469 The Western bloc used shared ideas and values to form and 
legitimise the construction of the Western bloc. From the domestic perspective, the 
market-based national economy, under the protection of a constitutional state, secured 
the right to property, as an important source of economic development. In comparison 
with the Soviet Union's centralised economy, the Western commercial societies led to 
more likely growth rate, a better resource allocation, and lower unemployment, 
poverty, and inflation rates during the Cold War era. The liberal West expanded 
domestic markets to a global scale through setting up of certain international 
economic rules, which provided the West required financial resources to meet the 
costs of its military and political competition with the Eastern enemy.  The Cold 
War’s political economy was shaped due to the different the Western and Eastern 
cultural models of social organisation. As Shaw writes: 
Instead of a single dominant bloc, therefore, two antagonistic blocs formed, 
Western and Soviet, through the military dependence (forced, in the case of 
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the Soviet bloc) of the secondary members-state on the respective leading 
states or 'superpowers'. Within each bloc, the core states had similar political 
systems and ideologies. … This meant that from the mid-1940s, state power 
in the northern industrial world was increasingly configured in a radically 
different way from the whole of the previous historical period. Before 1939 
there had been a large number of more or less autonomous nation-states, of 
which the major states constituted rival world-empires, and between which 
competition could ultimately lead to arrange of possible wars. Now there 
were two competing state-blocs, whose rivalry dominated world politics… A 
world dominated by two blocs, major Western and minor Soviet, was very 
different indeed from the previous national-international world based on rival 
European empires
470
 [emphasis added]. 
     Along the same line of analysis, Kaldor argues that the emergence of the Cold War 
order prefigured new methods of political organisation that arose because of the 
limitation of the nation-state system. The Cold War order was a way of reconciling 
the attachment to nation-state with the need for a larger political organisation.
471
 In 
one sense, while world politics required a macro political organisation to manage the 
political affairs on a global scale, the conflict of opinions over the good between the 
two antagonistic blocs led such a post-1914 political order to a new Hobbesian 
political order in which two antagonistic blocs dominated the world politics.   
6.4.3 An Inter-Bloc Social Learning and Institutional Reforms 
    The contradictions of the Hobbesian Cold War led to an overwhelming series of 
domestic and international crises. At the domestic level, the Soviet Union faced with 
economic and political catastrophes and at the international level, political and 
military tensions between antagonistic blocs increased. In Keohane's words, the 
Hobbesian logic was self-defeating: it created internal oppression, external strife, 
economic decay and political tension.
472
 The contradictions of the bipolar world-order 
paved the way for a socio-political learning and policy reforms on an inter-bloc scale. 
These learning processes and policy reforms started from the political leadership of 
the Soviet Union and led to the revolutions of 1989.
473
 
    Global leadership is regarded as a global political institution. As Fluvio Attina 
argues, global leadership is a global institution that gives uniform direction to the 
global political system by selecting and executing coherent programs and strategies of 
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government with regard to the world's problems and relations between state actors.
474
 
Given these functions of global leadership, the Soviet Union's leadership played an 
important role in ending the Cold War order. This role can be addressed through inter-
bloc social learning and institutional reforms through which the contradictions of the 
Hobbesian Cold War were recognised. The Soviet Communist Party, in particular 
Mikhail Gorbachev, initiated a domestic and international learning process with 
comparing relative advantages and weakness of the Western and the Eastern models 
of social organisation. The political leadership of the Soviet Union realised that the 
Hobbesian model of social organisation has been the major source of the Soviet's 
domestic problems and international inefficiencies. 
     As Shaw reminds us, the upheavals in the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s were 
anticipated by the democratic revolution throughout the Soviet bloc over the previous 
three decades. However, the political and economic changes of the mid to late 1980s 
were the fundamental changes at the centre of the Soviet bloc, when Gorbachev 
became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985.  Gorbachev clearly 
understood the complexity of his regime's crises. To overcome these crises Gorbachev 
proposed an economic restructuring plan (perestroika), a political openness reform 
(glasnost) and an international détente. 
475
 Gorbachev's analyses of the roots of the 
Soviet's crises lead us to explore inter-bloc socio-political learning that started from 
the Soviet's society, but expanded to the global level.  
    Gorbachev skillfully started a public communicating with his own party and 
peoples on the one hand, and with the West's political leadership and the world on the 
other hand. He aimed to justify his radical economic and political reforms at both the 
domestic and international levels. In Gorbachev, Man of the Twentieth Century? Mark 
Sandle argues how in his initial 14-15 months in power Gorbachev “contained a 
number of the key speeches, broadcasts and media appearances which was the first 
signs of a distinctive Gorbachevian message emerging.” 476 Gorbachev was aiming to 
publicise his lessons learned about the origins of the domestic and international crises 
in order to justify his reform’s plans. 
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     In his pathology of the Soviet's social crises, Gorbachev highlighted the economic 
and political problems that had been not addressed as a major source of the Soviet's 
crises. He described the roots of his society's socio-economic underdevelopment in a 
misunderstanding of socialism as a centralised economy and an authoritarian political 
system. In fact, he criticised the Hobbesian reading of socialism in favour of a 
democratic socialism.
477
 Gorbachev linked his lessons learned about the deep-seated 
epistemic roots of the Soviet's crises with a historical consciousness. For him, the 
knowledge of the fatherland history, specially the post-October period, allows people 
to draw a lesson today for renewing their society and tap more fully the potentials of 
socialism by recognising the importance of his economic and political reforms.
478
 The 
nature of an epistemic-institutional transformation that occurred in the Soviet society 
will be revealed from his analysis of the outcomes of the 1989 revolution:  
Society has acquired freedom and liberated itself politically and socially … A 
totalitarian system, which has deprived the country of an opportunity to 
become wealthy and prosper a long time ago, has been liquidated. A 
breakthrough on the way to democratic transformation has been 
accomplished. Free elections, free press, religious freedom, representative 
power bodies and multiparty system have become a reality and human rights 
have been recognized as the highest principle. A movement towards a mixed 
economy has started. Equality of all forms of property is being established. 
…The economic freedom of the producer has been legalized and enterprising, 
joint-stock companies and privatization have started to gain force. … We are 
living in a new world. The Cold War is over [emphasis added].
479
  
    Gorbachev's analysis clearly shows that the Soviet Union was experiencing an 
institutional transition from the Hobbesian model of social order towards the Lockean 
model. These political and economic reforms were originating from a deeper 
ideational reform or epistemic shift in the Soviet's political leadership that rooted in 
an inter-bloc social learning from the outcomes of the Western and the Eastern models 
of social organisation for peoples' life. In fact, there was a close linkage between 
domestic reforms in the Soviet bloc and the collapse of the Cold War. Once the 
Soviet's political leadership learned from his own critique of the Soviet' social 
organisation's errors (i.e., P1TTEEP2), it launched one set of the domestic and 
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international reforms which notably affected the defining feature of bipolar world 
order as a political system on the basis of the struggle for power.  
     The collapse of the Cold War, as a macro institutional change on a global scale, 
was originated from the refutation of the Hobbesian model of social organisation. In 
the Western societies, the transition from the Hobbeian to the Locaken model of 
social order took place by the liberal social movements from below. However, in 
Soviet society and in its affiliated nation-states, such epistemic-institutional transition 
was mainly a social learning and institutional reform from above that was leaded by 
Soviet political leadership. The collapse of bipolar world order can be regarded as an 
outcome of an epistemic-institutional shift from the Hobbesian to the Locakean model 
of social order. Soviet Union's political leadership initiated such a transition, which 
was deeply originating from the social crises of the Hobbesian-style of social order-- 
inside of the Eastern bloc and between two antagonistic blocs of nation-states.  
6.4.4 The Collapse of the Cold War and the Emergence of Global Governance  
    The advantages of the Lockean model of social organisation made the West as a 
winner of the end of the bipolar order. The Eastern bloc recognised this advantage, 
while it tried to provide a socialist reading of its democratic and market reforms. The 
emergence of global liberalism was an epistemic and institutional outcome of such a 
discourse between the Western and the Eastern models of social organisation. As 
Buzan and Little points out, “for liberals, the forty years of Cold War are now 
depicted not as a struggle for power, but as an ideological battle between capitalism 
and communism from which capitalism has emerged triumphant.”480 While the liberal 
model of social organisation itself suffers from a deep unsocial sociability, as I will 
argue in the next chapter, its relative advantage in comparison with the Hobbesian 
model, turned it into a globalising model of social organisation. Given this 
background, the end of the Cold War resulted in important outcomes for the 
emergence of multi-centric global governance. 
     The Lockean models of human nature and social order rest upon more realistic 
assumptions. The Hobbesian model implies that individuals are egoistic agents who 
cannot arrive at a rational consensus upon their social organisation; hence, the state of 
nature is necessarily the state of war. The Lockean model implies that individuals can 
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agree on some basic rights, hence the state of nature is not necessarily a war of all 
against all. The Hobbesian model claims that in the condition of war of all against all, 
each person has the absolute right to self-preservation. But since they cannot achieve 
a societal consensus on how organise their social relations for their self-preservation, 
they must give up their absolute right to a central absolute power.  
      The Lockean model rightly implies that if all human beings are egoistic agents, 
why should some of them be excepted from the general rule? The Lockean model 
suggests a constitutional state that is an accountable body politic to people hence it 
can avoid an absolute monarchy and the condition of war of all against all. The 
Lockean model implies that the individuals' right to property and self-governance 
provides the legal grounds for a competitive market economy. This advantage of the 
liberal model-- due to its more realistic assumption of human nature and its more 
reasonable institutional solution for a peaceful social order-- led to new global 
political order in which the political struggle of superpowers was no longer the 
defining feature of world politics. 
     The collapse of the Cold War paved the way for the expansion of the Lockean 
model on a global level in terms of the emergence of more constitutional states and 
market economies. In addition, it changed the very nature of international political 
organisation. As Buzan and Little argue, the pursuit of liberal logic refers to a 
qualitative change in the function of the nation state as the main units of the 
Westphalian world order. With the collapse of the Cold War, the military-political 
sector is losing dominance as the defining process of the system. Instead, the liberal 
logic requires a big reduction in the state's control of the national economy. As a 
result, the end of Cold War led to the emergence of a new global governance in which 
the struggle for political power is no longer the defining feature of the world politics. 
Instead, a global competition for economic interests has shaped the political 
organisation of the nation-states and non-governmental actors.
481
 In her critique of 
liberal globalisation, Jackie Smith recognises liberal ideology as a system of thought 
that sees market economy as the most efficient and effective mechanism for allocating 
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the resources of society, while challenging the notion that the state should perform 
regulatory and redistributive tasks in a liberal society.
482
   
     The end of the Cold War removed some constraints on the development of a more 
consensual-based world order,
483
 because the Hobbesian conflict of opinions over 
good were to some degree superseded by the liberal beliefs in the possibility of a 
consensus on the basis of the individual's rights to property and self-governance. The 
key outcome of this ideational change for world politics was a move from the bipolar 
rivalry toward a multi-centric global governance. As Tom Young remarks, “the 
dynamics of the Cold War paradoxically strengthened the elements of pluralism 
within the [global] system. Universalism was constrained by superpower rivalry… the 
demise of the Soviet bloc removed that shelter. We can now see the postwar period as 
a deviant phase. Since the end of the Cold War the universal elements of the liberal 
project have come to the fore.”484 The end of the Cold War meant that the global 
political order could no longer be managed by the two superpowers. When the 
military-political struggle was superseded by a competition for economic interests, the 
Cold War order was replaced by multi-centric global governance. In fact, political 
globalisation refers to this institutional transformation from the bipolar order to a 
multi-polar political order, what is called global governance.
485
  
     The liberal model of global order advocates a kind of cultural and political 
pluralism on a global scale. While it claims that radically different cultural standing 
points and political interests cannot arrive at a rational consensus over the good, they 
can agree upon one set of basic human rights like the right to property and the right to 
self-governance. In this way, it shifts the reference point of a global consensus from 
the conflict of opinions over the good to the acceptance of one set of basic rights that 
are necessary for the emergence of global governance. If radically different cultural 
viewpoints and political interests agree on the individual's right to property and self-
governance, and if such rights must be protected by the rule of law that global 
liberalism does not need more than a global consensus regarding such rights and law. 
The post-Cold War governance is multi-centric global governance, whereas the 
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plurality of the cultural and political systems does not create an institutional obstacle 
for shaping a new global political order.  
     The defining feature of this global governance is an economic competition 
amongst societies rather than a political struggle between the two antagonistic super-
powers. If competing national economics accept global liberalism's rules of the game, 
they have also accepted a new global political order. The emerging global governance 
follows the liberal logic of social organisation in terms of giving the primacy to 
economic logic of social cooperation. In the same line of reasoning, Ronnie Lipschutz 
describes the post-Cold War order as an organisational change that has shifted world 
order from bipolarity to multi-polarity: 
…anarchy, as the organizing principle of the international system, is 
withering away. This is the result not so much of sudden changes in the 
global political scene—a shift from bipolarity to multipolarity or unipolarity--
as the long-term acceptance of liberalism as a global ‘operating system’… 
Moreover, the provision of security by states has become problematic… 
because of the growing 'density' of the global system. This, paradoxically, 
provides the political space for non-state actors to create alliances and 
linkages across borders and around the globe 
486
[emphasis added].     
     Like a domestic liberal society, in a liberal global order the main social organising 
principle is individuals' usefulness to each others. Viewed from this perspective, after 
the collapse of the Cold War, we are moving toward a global commercial order whose 
major aim is regulating an economic competition rather than a political struggle. This 
emerging global governance is not a hierarchical political order. It consists of multi-
centric political organisation in which nation-states, non-governmental, civil society 
organisations, and private sectors make a contribution.
487
 The multi-centric concept of 
governance is privileged over recent decades. For instance, James Rosenau defines 
governance as an 'order' plus 'intentionality'.
488
 Scholars such as Jackie Smith view 
liberal global governance as a capitalist global order. Globalisation “refers to global 
economic integration, which is essentially the expansion of global capitalism. This is 
the form of global integration advanced by neoliberal globalizers.”
489
  She reminds us 
that liberal globalisation follows its interests by advocating a model of national state 
that favors capitalist interests as it was argued in terms of turning the logic of the state 
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into the logic of liberal man who pursues its economic interest rather that an struggle 
for political power.
490
 In chapter 4, I discussed this linkage between liberalism and 
capitalism.  
      In the same line of reasoning, Jeffey Alexander points out that “the possibility for 
civil control, as opposed to military violence or political domination, can be traced 
back to the idea of the social contract, to the Lockean vision of consensual agreement 
and persuasion in contrast with the Hobbesian resort to force and fraud.” 
491
 For him, 
globalisation has emerged as a response to the trauma of the 20
th
 century and as a 
global change from the Hobbesian logic of struggle for power to the Lockean logic of 
consensual agreement. Alexander views globalisation's origins in the Enlightenment's 
idea of world peace and global justice.
492
          
6.5 The End of the Cold War and the Emergence of a Transnational Economy 
     Globalisation of liberalism facilitated an institutional change from an international 
economy to a post-national economy. The critical rationalist macrosociology of 
globalisation analyses the formation of such a post-national economy in the context of 
cultural and political globalisation. As argued in chapter 5, one of the main functions 
of such a macrosociology is to explain how a global epistemic shift towards the liberal 
model of social organisation has reflected itself in a post-national political economy 
as a macro institutional change from the centrality of the struggle for political power 
to a competition over economic interests. Viewed from the institutional approach, 
economic globalisation refers to an institutional change in the very logic of global 
economic organisation. It does not merely imply an explanation of global trade and 
investment or a global manufacturing of goods and services. This section aims to 
explain this economic institutional change, as a global economic learning process. 
6.5.1 The Liberal Logic of Economic Competition  
      It was argued that the Lockean model of social organisation gives the primacy to a 
competition amongst economic rivals, whereas the individuals' rights to property are 
protected by a constitutional state. For the liberal model, the rights to property is the 
key institutional requirement of the emergence of a competitive market. Some 
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proponents of market economy, such as the Austrian School of Economics,
493
 argue 
that the property right provides legal requirment for a free entrance of economic 
agents to economic competition. They introduce market competition as an economic 
learning process, facilitiated by the property right. Hayek introduces this learning 
process in this way: 
In a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among 
many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different 
people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate 
the parts of his plan. …We must look at the price system as such a mechanism 
for communicating information if we want to understand its real function--a 
function which, of course, it fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more 
rigid…The most significant fact about this system is the economy of 
knowledge with which it operates…494(emphasis added). 
     The liberal logic implies that the individual's right to property and self-governance 
are necessary conditions of the function of market prices and accordingly for shaping 
economic competition. Openness of market economy to free entrance of economic 
agents plays a key institutional role in the shaping of a competitive market economy. 
The rule of law and the constitutional state provide the legal and political institutions 
for protecting the individual's right to property and their free entrance to economic 
competition. In this way, economic agents form market competition through using 
market prices as learning framework. David Harper summarises relations in this way:  
…entrepreneurial profit presupposes the institutions of private property and 
associated market prices. The institutions of private property and money are 
essential for guiding entrepreneurs in their judgments of the potential 
profitability of alternative ventures…In contrast, a socialist system of 
economic organization is based on constitutionally established public or state 
ownership of the means of production, which implies the absence (or 
constitutional abolition) of private property tights, markets, and market prices 
for production resources. …It is only the imagination and alertness of single 
mind—namely, that of the central planner—that shapes the pattern of 
decisions made within the single attempted plan. However, without markets 
for productive resources, the socialist-planning agency cannot allocate 




      Viewed from such a concept of economic competition and its legal and political 
preconditions, we now can explore how the emergence of liberal global governance 
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has paved the legal and political pre-conditions for the formation of a post-national 
world economy.  
6.5.2 The Cultural Politics of the Emergence of a Transnational Economy 
      From a connectivist point of view, economic globalisation is often regarded as an 
expansion of global economic relations like global trade and investment.
496
 However, 
from the institutional perspective, economic globalisation is viewed as an institutional 
change: a systematic openness of national economies’ actors to global markets for the 
formation of a post-national sphere of economic activity. In this post-national market, 
the logic of economic activities-- like trade, investment, and production-- differs from 
an inter-national economy. The nation-states are no longer the main economic actors 
in this post-national economy. Instead, the private sectors construct the structure of 
global market and determine its regulative principles. But, without global liberalism 
and liberal global governance, the transition from inter-national to this post-national 
economy was not possible. The cultural politics of the post-national economy refers to 
the preconditions that were provided by an interplay between the globalisation of 
liberal social philosophy and the emergence of liberal global governance.          
     The globalisation of liberal social philosophy provided an ideological pre-
condition for reducing the legal and political obstacles to free entrance of national 
economies' private sectors to global markets. Stephen Gill describes this ideological 
environment as a spatial expansion of the liberal definitions of social purpose and 
possessively individualist patterns of actions and politics.
497
 If the liberal model calls 
for a significant reduction in the state's role in economy in favour of the private sector, 
economic globalisation is a logical consequence of such an ideological justification.  
     While the emergence of global liberalism has provided an encouraging cultural 
space for justifying the liberalisation of national economies, the end of the Cold War 
has paved the way for reducing the legal and political obstacles for opening national 
economies to emerging global markets. This cultural politics of contemporary global 
liberalism provides an institutional framework for the emergence of the post-national 
economy. During the Cold War era the ideological and political conflicts between the 
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two antagonistic nation-state blocs prevented national economies from opening their 
private sectors to global markets. But the end of the cold war to some extent removed 
such legal and political impediments.
498
 From an economic perspective, the post-Cold 
War provided a more enabling environment for opening national economies to global 
markets. In this sense, economic globalisation finds a close relation with the rise of 
global liberalism and the end of the Cold War order. 
6.5.3 Economic Dynamics of the Transnational Economy 
     The pursuit of liberal logic demands a notable reduction in the state’s share in 
economy at the national or global levels. When the Hobbesian logic of the struggle for 
political power was superseded with the end of the Cold War, there was no longer an 
institutional obstacle to prevent national economies from opening their private sector's 
activities to a post-national economic space. On the contrary, nation states have found 
themselves in an encouraging political environment that enabled them to perform as a 
liberal unit of economic action. Nation-states realised that in order to adapt their 
national power to the conditions of new global political order, they must create an 
fundamental change in their Cold War-based economic policies. If they want to 
maximise their economic utility, they must look at other nation-states as economic 
rivals rather than political enemies.  
      Under this new global political order, economic function of the nation-states 
changed. This institutional change can be described in this way: since nation-states are 
not principally established for performing an economic function, given the new global 
political condition, they must liberalise their private sectors for an active entrance to 
global markets. This economic policy change on behalf of nation states led to the 
formation of a post-national economic sphere in which nation-states themselves are no 
longer a regulative agency. In this way, a transnational gathering of private sectors 
emerged.  
     The expansion of the global flows of trade and investments and global exchange of 
goods and services are the outcomes of the emergence of this new post-national 
institutional environment for economic activities. This institutional change was 
occurred through a global economic learning process in which nation-states 
recognised that their Cold War economic policies must be radically changed.  
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     While empirical data shows the increasing trend of the expansion of global trade 
and investments after the end of the Cold War,
499
 some argue that such expansion of 
global trade and investment is not unprecedented. Through a brief review of this 
argument, the qualitative nature of contemporary economic globalisation will be 
better realised. Paul Hirst and collaborators argue that current economic globalisation 
is not unprecedented. They write, “it is one of number of distinct conjectures or states 
of the international economy that have existed since an economy based on modern 
industrial technology began to be generalized from the 1860s….In some respects, the 
current international economy has only recently becomes as open and integrated as 
the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914.”500 They define an international 
economy as an economic framework in which the main entities are national 
economics. International trade and investment produce growing interconnection 
between these national economics. The importance of trade, in contemporary highly 
internalised economy progressively, is replaced by the centrality of investment 
relations between nations that increasingly act as the organising principle of the 
international economy. But, relative separation of the domestic and the international 
framework continues in terms of economic policy-making. In this highly 
internationalised economy, the basic processes of resource allocation and production 
and the formation of the prices of the key variables all takes place principally in 
national economic spaces. In fact, they do not regard a post-national space of 
economic activity as an independent sphere.  
     In a globalised economy, national economies and their international interactions 
have been shaped by global processes. Economic actors and activities become 
disembodied from their national economies and domestic policies, whether private 
corporations or public regulations.
501
 From this view, a transnational economy can be 
regarded as a globalised economy in which the nation-states are no longer the main 
units of international economic activity. However, Hirst et al establish their argument 
in the context of an international economy, as opposed to a transnational economy. 
Hence, they use a quantitative comparison to show that contemporary economic 
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globalisation is not a significant development in history of world economy. Given 
such definitions of ‘inter-national’ and ‘trans-national’ economy, they write: 
A key question…is whether the integration of the international system has 
dramatically changed since the Second World War. Clearly, there has been 
considerable international economic activity ever since the 1850s, but can we 
compare different periods in terms of their openness and integrations? One 
way of doing this is to compare trade to GDP [Gross Domestic Product] 
ratios. …Apart from the dramatic difference in the openness to trade of 
different economies…the startling feature is that trade to GDP ratios were 
considerably higher in 1913 than they were in 1973…the evidence also 
suggests greater openness to capital flows in the pre-First World War period 
compared to the period up to the mid-1990s.
502
 
     However, this comparison does not take into account the content of international 
trade and investments. For instance, in 1913 the major part of trade to GDP ratios was 
the trade of raw material while in 1990s was manufacturing production. Hence, this 
qualitative difference is not reflected in such a quantitative comparison.  
     From an institutional perspective, the level of openness of national economies to 
global markets can be measured by two key policy variables: (a) taxes on trade, and 
(b) openness of the capital account. The first policy variable i.e. trade taxes regulates 
the policy framework of international trade. If national economies want to reduce the 
legal obstacles for free trade of goods and services, they must reduce their taxes on 
trade. In this way, they encourage their private sectors to increase their economic 
activities across national borders. The trade taxes act as a regulative policy tool to 
organise the global trade of goods and services.  
     The same can be said about the capital account. When national economies open 
their capital accounts to international investments, they facilitate their private sectors' 
entrance to foreign investments. The end of the Cold War encouraged national 
economies to use these two key policy variable in order to reduce their trade taxes and 
open their capital account to facilitate their private sectors' entrance to global markets, 
whereas the centrality of the struggle for political power was shifted to a competition 
for economic interests. John Gerard Ruggie writes: “international economic regimes 
provide a permissive environment for the emergence of specific kinds of international 
transaction flows…”503 Reducing trade taxes and opening capital accounts have been 
two major components of national economies’ liberalisation and privatisation policies. 
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In this sense, just a quantitative comparison between the pre-1917 and post-1990s 
world economy cannot reveal a qualitative institutional change in the world economy. 
     Geoffrey Garrett argues that there has been a strong correlation between the 
growth of international economic flows and liberalisation of national economies: “the 
correlation between global trade flows and (unweighted) average taxes on trade … 
between 1973-1995 was 0.89. …a similar pattern [can be seen] with respect to 
international capital flows (combined portfolio and FDI) and the portion of countries 
in the world with open capital accounts …it was only in the 1990s that countries in 
large numbers opened their capital accounts.”504 According to him, the conventional 
wisdom of economic historians implies that the world economy is no more globalised 
today than it was 100 years ago. But, there is a qualitative difference between these 
periods. As Garrett points out: 
In the 1870-1914 period, the bulk of-and the fastest growth in –world trade 
was in raw materials (agriculture and minerals), as the industrial revolution 
reduced the costs for the first industrial nations of extraction and 
transformation from their colonies. Today, international trade is dominated 
by manufactures… Trade in services was unheard of 100 years ago, but it is 
of considerable and rising importance these days. The nature of international 
capital movements also clearly differs between the two epochs of 
internationalization. …The basic features of today's multinational firms--
captured in management jargon such as breaking up the international values 
chain and global strategic alliances--have no historical parallels. One clear 
indication of the proliferation of multinational production is the estimate that 
intrafirm trade…comprises roughly one third of all global trade.  505  
     These qualitative differences enable us to explore an institutional change that 
occurred after the Cold War in the world economy. The quantitative amount of global 
trade and investment may not be more than a hundred years ago however the very 
logic of international economic activity has changed. In a post-1990s world economy, 
the key development is not about the amounts of global trade and investment. The key 
point is that national economies have systematically liberalised their economic policy 
to facilitate their private sectors' participation in a global competition for economic 
interests. This openness to global markets has created a transnational institutional 
framework for different types of economic activities that are no longer under the 
supervision of national states. The qualitative difference between pre-1914 and post-
1990s world economy refers to a new institutional framework that is created for post-
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national economic activities: the emergence of a post-national constellation of private 
sectors that have created their own self-governing sphere of transnational economic 
activities. They act as liberal units of economic activity that follow the liberal logic of 
economic competition. Hence, they are no longer very committed to the economic 
interests or economic policies of their nation-states. The behavioural logic of the 
transnational economy goes principally beyond an international economy in which 
the main units of economic actions were national economies. The nation-states have 
losed their economic control over this emerging transnational markets, as much as 
they lose their political sovereignty over liberal global governance.        
    The economic dynamics of globalisation has created such a transnational economy, 
where the globalisation of liberal social philosophy and the end of the Cold War have 
provided the cultural and political infrastructures of such a post-national economic 
activities. Within such cultural and political environments, national economies have 
learned to play a new economic function in order to adopt themselves to the global 
organisational shift from the centrality of the struggle for political power to 
competition for economic interests. To this end, they liberalised their national 
economies through reducing their trade taxes and opening capital accounts. These 
policy changes have led to a transnational pattern of production, trade and investment. 
In this post-national economy, the private sectors are the main economic actors. When 
governments liberalise national economies, they shaped a new institutional sphere for 
their private sectors’ transnational economic activities.  




























Unsocial Sociability of Liberal Globalisation  
 
 
     Contemporary liberal globalisation through its post-national culture, politics and 
economy has created more enabling environments for peoples' participation in global 
decision-making. However, if this liberal globalisation is evaluated on the basis of the 
Kantian-inspired ideal type of an open global society, it suffers from serious societal 
deficits or unsocial sociability in Kant’s terms. This chapter advances the normative 
critique of globalisation, offered by chapter 3. To this aim, it provides a sociological 
critique of liberal globalisation that covers three major aspects of globalisation's 
unsocial sociability; namely the cultural, political, and economic deficits. It tries to 
link the three aspects of globalisation's societal deficits in the context of a macro-
sociological critique of emerging liberal globalisation.  
     The chapter consists of five sections. Section 7.1 briefly argues about the key 
developments in liberal social philosophy and liberal model of social organisation, 
from its classical version to the modern liberalism, in order to provide a better ground 
for comparing the Lockean and the Kantian model of social organisation, in the 
context of the idea of open global society. Employing this idea, section 7.2 explores 
the cultural deficits of contemporary liberal globalisation. It argues that the absence of 
a global consensus upon liberal model of globality is ultimate source of globalisation's 
unsocial sociability. Section 7.3 argues about the political deficits of liberal global 
governance. Given the absence of a global consensus regarding how global order can 
be organised to satisfy the interests of all persons, globalisation’s political deficits 
referred to an unaccountability of liberal global governance to the world’s population.  
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     In the context of these cultural and political deficits, section 7.4 explains 
globalisation's economic deficits. It argues that whilst the post-national economy has 
to some extent opened global market to a free entrance of potential economic actors, 
such a post-national market cannot be still regarded a competitive global market. 
Section 7.5 integrates the three dimensions of liberal globalisation's societal deficits in 
a macro-sociological critique of globalisation that shows how problematic nature of 
the liberal model of global social organisation has been systematically reflected in the 
contradictions of the emergent post-national political economy. As argued in chapter 
2, the approach of a critical social theory's is employed in order to link institutional 
contradictions of liberal globalisation with its deep-seated epistemic origin in liberal 
social philosophy. This epistemic-institutional critique of liberal globalisation leads us 
to a macro-sociological analysis of globalisation's unsocial sociability.         
7.1 A Critical Review of Liberal Social Philosophy 
     In order to develop a macrosociological critique of liberal globalisation, this 
section paves the way for a more advanced comparison between the Lockean and the 
Kantian models of human action and social organisation. The Kantian-inspired ideal 
type of open global society is the reference point for an epistemic-institutional critique 
of liberal globalisation. It is important to note that the term social philosophy here 
refers to the cultural model of social organization, which rests upon a conception of 
human nature. In this way, the key developments in liberal social philosophy can be 
linked with the progress in conceptions of human nature or the models of human 
action. Whilst it is not possible to provide a comprehensive review of liberal social 
philosophy's developments during the past centuries here, these developments are 
very briefly described from classical to modern liberalism by referring to some key 
liberal thinkers: from John Locke to David Hume and Adam Smith, and from 
Friedrich Hayek to John Rawls.
506
  
7.1.1 From Locke’s Theological Liberalism to Hume-Smith’s Secular Liberalism   
    As Richard Falk argues, “the history of liberalism is complex and contradictory, 
and includes an early-century emphasis, most obviously in the writing of John Locke, 
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on property rights and minimalist governments.”507 However, a key development in 
liberal social philosophy was a move from the Locke's theological utilitarianism to the 
Hume-Smith's secular utilitarianism. 
     Liberal social philosophy was developed when Locke’s theological liberalism was 
suppressed by Hume-Smith’s secular liberalism. But, the utilitarian logic of liberal 
model of social order did not change, in which individuals are merely useful means 
for other's ends. According to this logic, individuals follow their own subjective goals 
but they rationalise their social relations in order to employ the others’ contributions 
to realise their ends. Locke constructed his social philosophy based on a theological 
account of human nature: God-give reason leads individuals to follow the revelation. 
Locke’s Christian theology leads him to a theory of property rights. As David Levy 
argues, the classical liberal, like Locke, argued that action-goals can be rationalised on 
the basis of theological morality. He calls this theological approach to human's action-
goals a theological utilitarianism, in which individuals' utility-maximising behaviours 




     The rational faith in Christian morality let people know how to choose their action-
goals based on Christian moral code of practice.
509
 “If a rational morality specifying 
the [action] goals to which people ought to aspire is the constant, then individuals who 
accept this morality ought to bend to its imperatives.”510 Locke's social philosophy 
implies that the individual’s rights to the property and self-governance are originated 
from a theological utilitarianism. In this sense, for Locke, “without a Christian 
political ontology the image of a decent and ordered political world (of justice and 
rights, freedom and toleration) was simply not credible.”511 This religious conception 
of a liberal social order was later criticised by Hume and Smith.   
     As John Dunn argues, Hume and Smith did not believe that Christian theology can 
provide a moral justification for rationalising human's action-goals. They argue for a 
new utilitarian morality that can be called a secular moral philosophy. Dunn points 
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out that: “Hume and Smith, political theorists, largely are the skeptical and secular 
idiom… believed that political order rested on no deeper foundation than opinion and 
put their faith in the tendency of the modern socio-economic order to generate 
sufficient social cohesion to carry the weight of the political community.”512 Hume 
argues that the Lockean moral theology cannot lead us to what really motivates 
human action. For Hume, while the primary task of reason is the discovery of the truth 
or falsehood of matters of fact, it does not determine rightness of human action. 
Human reason can only influence human action indirectly in its capacity as “slave of 
the passions”.513 In this way, Hume makes a return to the Hobbesian moral 
philosophy. Hume does not search for the moral origin of human action outside of the 
society. He believes that all standards of morality are established historically and due 
to social needs for making a social order beneficial for those who look at each other as 
useful means for their ends.  
    The utilitarian social philosophy does not require a theological moral justification. 
It can be addressed based on a secular utilitarianism. For Hume, individuals' needs are 
unlimited, but the resources to satisfy them are generally scarce. “If every man had a 
tender regard for another, or if nature supplied an abundantly all our wants and 
desires…the jealously of interest, which justice supposes, could no longer have place; 
nor would there be any occasion for those distinctions and limits of possession, which 
at present are in use among mankind.”514 In order to search for a moral foundation of 
human action and its outcomes for the individual’s right to the property and self-
governance, Hume argues that the emergence of these rights cannot be attributed to 
the individual’s rational faith in Christian morality. In contrast, due to human's limited 
generosity, imperfect reason and scarcity of the means of satisfying human needs, the 
nature of these circumstances gives rise to the stability of possessions, of its 
transference by consent, and of the performance of promises. Hume views property 
rights as an unintended outcome of those moral requirements of social life that are 
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originated from human’s limited generosity and intellectual imperfection and the 
unalterable scarcity of the resources.
515
  
     Hume and Smith used the aforementioned reasoning to introduce liberal society as 
a secular-based commercial society. As Dunn reminds us, for Hume and Smith, “a 
commercial society was rather an alternative model of imagining how human beings 
can form a society, for example a sustained form of common living, if they did not 
share such bonding principles as ones offered by Christianity. …Commercial society 
was a middle-way between these two polar [i.e., the Hobbesian and the Kantian's 
models of human society]…They would associate [in this commercial society] not 
because they loved or even cared for each other not for any other noble purpose but 
because they could be useful for each other.”516 In this manner, Hume and Smith 
provided a secular utilitarian foundation for liberal society. Since people are useful 
means for satisfying each other's ends, their action would be guided by the utility 
offered by such commercial-based social cooperation. Their society would emerge out 
of the practice of exchanging either goods or services. The commercial society rests 
on market sociability (or unsocial sociability in Kant's terms) that its principle is 
utility: usefulness of humans to each other.
517
 Like Hume, Adam Smith argues that the 
bonding agent of Christian sociability is love and fellowship. However, the sociability 
that holds together the commercial society of those--who do not love each other, who 




7.1.2 Friedrich Hayek, Human Ignorance and a Liberal Society 
     Friedrich Von Hayek is among the most influential proponents of modern or neo-
liberalism. Stephen Gill points out: “Newliberalism is also associated strongly with 
some neoclassical political economics, especially in traditions established during and 
after the Second World War at the LSE (by F.A. Hayek)…”519 In Hayek and Modern 
Liberalism, Chandran Kukathas introduces Hayek's social theory of a liberal society 
as an important attempt to reinvent classical liberalism. Hayek “insists that …he is 
returning our attention to the neglected insights of the early thinkers of classical 
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liberalism…”520 However, his aim is the reconstruction of the logic of liberal society 
due to a conception of human nature in which a special attention is paid to human 
ignorance and its outcomes for the emergence of spontaneous social order. Kukathas 
points out: “Hayek’s defense of liberalism … is grounded in a comprehensive social 
doctrine. It offers a political philosophy for modern society…”521 John Gray regards 
Hayek’s modern liberalism as the rebirth of classical liberalism in order to formulate a 
new philosophy for a liberal-democrat society.
522
  
    The micro-foundation for Hayek's modern philosophy of a liberal society does not 
change the main principle of secular utilitarianism. It just reinterprets such a utilitarian 
philosophy on the basis of the assumption of a radical human ignorance. In The 
Constitutions of Liberty, Hayek writes, “the Socratic maxim that the recognition of 
our ignorance is the beginning of wisdom has profound significance for our 
understanding of society. …This fundamental fact of man's unavoidable ignorance of 
much on which the working of civilisation rests has received little attention.”523 
Norman Barry remarks, “underlying all Hayek's social philosophy is a theory of 
knowledge. The most significant features of this theory is Hayek's emphasis on man's 
ignorance.”524 Barry rightly argues that Hayek's conception of ignorant man may be 
well considered as an alternative account of the Hobbesian egoistic man. Hayek 
attempts to advance liberal social philosophy through using the key premise of 
ignorant man in social theory of liberal society. In this way, Hayek's theory of 
knowledge provides micro-foundation for his modern social philosophy of liberalism.   
    While Hayek has used both Hume’s and Kant’s epistemologies to formulate his 
ignorance-based theory of knowledge and social philosophy, his analysis of liberal 
society is mainly influenced by Hume's skeptical or anti-rationalist epistemology. In 
order to highlight the importance of human ignorance as a key explanatory variable of 
analysing the emergence of a spontaneous social order, Hayek rejects conscious 
human agency as the impetus of the social order's formation. In his words, “the 
conception of man deliberately building his civilisation stems from an erroneous 
intellectualism that regards human reason as something standing outside nature and 
possessed of knowledge and reasoning capacity independent of experiences. But the 
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growth of the human mind is part of the growth of civilisation; it is the state of 
civilisation at any given moment that determines the scope and the possibilities of 
human ends and values.”525 Given this conception of human nature, Hayek concludes 
that, “the classical arguments for tolerance formulated by John Milton and John Locke 
and restated by John Stuart Mill and Walter Bagehot rests, of course, on the 
recognition of this ignorance of ours. It is a special application of general 
considerations to which a non-rationalist insight into the working of our mind. …all 
institutions of freedom are adaptations to this fundamental fact of ignorance, adopted 
to deal with chances and probabilities” (emphasis added). 526 If humans’ radical 
ignorance is so fundamental to a spontaneous formation of liberal institutions of 
freedom, the most important aspect of a social theory of a liberal society is to address 
how such a society has emerged under the condition of human's radical ignorance in 
which every individual is free to identify their own ends and means for satisfying their 
action-goals.  
     For Hayek, the conception of individual liberty refers to the absence of coercion.
527
 
By coercion, he means, “such control of the environment or circumstance of a person 
by another… Coercion is evil precisely because it thus eliminates an individual as a 
thinking and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in the achievement of the ends 
of another. Free action, in which a person pursues his own aims by the means 
indicated by his own knowledge, must be based on data which cannot be shaped at 
will by another.”528 In this sense, the conception of human's action-goals, as Parsons 
and Habermas argue about that, is not included in Hayek's model of human action due 
to his notion of human radical ignorance. For Hayek, ignorant men cannot achieve a 
common societal knowledge on which basis they establish their social order because 
the free action of a liberal (wo)man rests on his or her own subjective knowledge of 
the ends. Hayek reproduces the classical notion of liberalism in a modern way in 
which a rational consensus over action-goals is impossible. Hence, human rationality 
can be used to check the rationality of action’s means but not for the rationalisation of 
action’s goals. Upon such a micro-foundation, Hayek defends the institutions of 
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freedom, similar to the case with property rights, a constitutional state, and market 
economy as social institutions of a free society that protect human freedom from  
coercion. He writes: 
Since coercion is the control of the essential data of an individual's action by 
another, it can be prevented only by enabling the individual to secure for 
himself some private sphere where he is protected against such interference. 
…The recognition of private or several property is thus an essential condition 
for the prevention of coercion… the rule of law means that government must 
never coerce an individual except in the enforcement of a known rule, it 




     Hayek's social theory of liberal society is not fundamentally different from Hume 
and Smith's theories in terms of its main organisational principle, i.e. the notion of the 
usefulness of individuals to each other. Hayek's social philosophy follows the 
Humean anti-rationalist epistemology for justifing an impossibility of a rational 
consensus over humans' action-goals due to his conception of ignorant (wo)man. 
However, Hayek's conception of liberty under the rule of law and constitutional state 
advances the classical social philosophy of liberal society in terms of how the 
coercion as the control of an individual's action by another can be prevented by the 
protection of the property rights and self-governance under the rule of law. Perhaps 
this line of Hayek's contributions to social philosophy of liberal society originates 
from his usage of Kantian logic of regarding the rule of law as a key institution of 
treating human beings as ends in themselves rather the means for other's end.  
     In Principle of a Liberal Social Order, Hayek emphasises that “the test of the 
justice of a rule is usually (since Kant) described as that of its ‘universalizability,’ i.e. 
of the possibility of willing that rules should be applied to all instances that 
correspond to the conditions stated in it (the ‘categorical imperative’).” 530 Hayek 
applies Kantian universalisability to the maxims that make up the legal order yields 
liberal principles of justice, which confers maximum equal freedom upon all.    
7.1.3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, and a Well-Ordered Society 
     John Rawls’ political liberalism and its implications for a new account of liberal 
society—as a well-ordered society of free and equal persons— has found an important 
place in the Western political philosophy. Whilst it does not seem that Rawls has 
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fundamentally changed the organising principle of secular utilitarianism, in terms of  
an impossibility of a rational consensus amongst conflicting opinions over the good 
(i.e. the ultimate goals of human action), he has provided a new pluralistic  account of 
a liberal-democratic society.  In contrast to Hayek, Rawls’ normative concept of the 
human nature refers to a conscious human agency and its outcomes for the conscious 
social formation of a liberal-democratic society.   
      As Peter Jones points out, “the problem that concerns Rawls is this. In modern 
democratic societies people hold a variety of different and incompatible religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines. …Rawls describes the existence of these diverse 
doctrines as ‘the fact of pluralism’. …[If so,] what sort of theory can provide the basis 
for a stable society characterized by reasonable pluralism?”531 Rawls defines a stable 
society, under reasonable pluralism, a society whose members voluntarily accept its 
structure hence they supports the society’s orderliness without any need for force. 
Given this account, Rawls claims that a political theory that rests on a comprehensive 
moral doctrine is potentially at odd with the many other comprehensive doctrines to 
which the democratic society’s citizens are committed. In this way, Rawls aims to 
formulate the concept of a well-ordered society so that it can address the possibility of 
a political liberalism without standing upon just one comprehensive moral doctrine.
532
  
      Hence, his conception of liberal society is merely a political conception, separated 
from a particular moral content. Rawls’s account of justice has adapted to his political 
concept of a well-ordered society, so that remains independent of any comprehensive 
moral doctrine.
533
 Hence, for Rawls, the idea of a well-ordered society of free and 
equal citizens substantively rests on his belief in a rational consenses among 
competing account of the good and accordingly the ultimate goals of human action is 
not possible. Hence, it does not change this base of the liberal model of social order.  
      For Rawls, “a well-ordered society is one which is regulated by a public 
conception of justice and in which members view each other as free and equal moral 
persons.”534 However, this equal membership must be understood in the very context 
of Rawls’ political account of both ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’. Like aforementioed 
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liberal accounts of freedom and justice, Rawls’s political liberalism stands on an 
subjective epistemology which rejects the possibility of an inter-subjective consensus 
over human’s action goals. A key question for Rawls’s model of a well-ordered 
liberal society is that if people cannot rationally agree upon one moral doctrine, how  
have they agreed over such a political conception of liberty and justice as the 
organising principle of their democratic society. Rawls employs a Kantian rational 
constructivist approach to address the above equation, whereas he tries to remain 
outside of the Kantian moral doctrine as one comprehensive moral doctrine itself.   
      Rawls rightly argues what distinguishes Kantian constructivism is a normative 
conception of persons as equal and free rational agents who construct their social 
order through a reasonable social agreement and social cooperation. He argues that 
the societal role of a conception of justice—i.e. the equality of every members of the 
society, as ends in themselves – means that a just social order should enable all of its 
member to make mutually acceptable to one another their social institutions. This 
mutually reasonable consensus constructs the political culture of a liberal-democratic 
society.  
     The two basic model-conceptions of this political conception of justice as fairness 
are “those of a well-ordered society and of a moral person. Their general purpose is to 
single out the essential aspects of our conception of ourselves as moral persons and 
our relations to society as free and equal citizens. They depict certain general quality 
of what a society would look like if its members publicly viewed themselves and their 
social ties with one another in a certain way.”535 A liberal democratic order is a well-
ordered society of equal and free citizens who have consciously agreed upon one set 
of liberal-democratic values whose core is a political conception of liberty and justice. 
     Rawls’ model-conception of the person, as a rational agent, differs from Hayek’s 
ignorant person, but what joins them into a common category of the liberal model of 
social organisation is that both of them reject an epistemological possibility of a 
rational or inter-subjective agreement among conflicting opinions over the good. In 
other words, a well-ordered liberal society is a conscious social agreement amongst 
liberal-minded persons who regard each other as equal possessors of the rights to the 
property and self-governance. However, such a liberal society still does not include a 
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non-liberal moral doctrine, because Rawls assumes that liberal and non-liberal 
societies cannot agree on the very conception of a liberal (wo)man as equal and free 
persons and accordingly cannot agree upon the political culture of a liberal 
democracy. In another sense, liberal and non-liberal persons cannot agree upon one 
set of political conceptions of liberty and justice, because they follow radically 
different moral doctrines! If individual members of a pluralist liberal-democratic 
society can agree over such a morally non-sensitive political conception of freedom 
and justice, why can individual members of an international society of liberal and 
non-liberal persons not arrive at an overlapping consensus upon such a political 
conception? 
536
 I will argue about this in more detail in chapter 8.  
     Rawls’s liberal persons are not those people who can arrive at an epistemological 
consensus over their ultimate action-goals, as Parsons’ and Habermas’ persons can. In 
Rawls’ liberal democracy, “a political conception of justice must be one that can be 
endorsed by widely different and opposing though reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.”537 But, these reasonable doctrines cannot agree on one conception of the 
good or the ultimate action action. Rawls claims that since there is no reasonable 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine affirmed by all citizens, the political culture 
of a liberal democratic society is limited to an overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.
538
 He writes:  
…a conception of justice is supported by an overlapping consensus. It means 
that it is supported by a consensus including the opposing religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations in the 
society effectively regulated by that conception of justice. These opposing 
doctrines was assume to involve conflicting and indeed incommensurable 
comprehensive conceptions of the meaning, values and purpose of human life 
(or conceptions of the good), and there are no resources within the political 
view to judge those conflicting conceptions (emphasis added).
539
  
      Rawls regards incommensurablity of competing accounts of the good as a given 
fact, which shows that he links the existing moral pluralism with a type of relativist 
epistemology.  As such, the political culture of a liberal-democratic society indicates 
an overlapping consensus of incommensurable doctrines. Rawls accepts a kind of 
epistemological relativism, because he claims that no one set of beliefs can be proven 
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more truthful than another. Put differently, there is not a rational and objective belief. 
Despite the irrationality of our beliefs, as reasonable people, we must be able to reach 
on overlapping consensuses about the principles that we share. Only by virtue of such 
an overlapping consensuses will we then be able to pursue our distinctive values to 
the maximum degree.
540
 However, as Alexander argues, “how do we get to be 
reasonable about the pursuit of beliefs when we are fundamentally unreasonable in 
finding them? How can we be rational about them when we irrationally ‘cherish’ them 
as sacred?”541 Rawls faces a difficulty to rationally justify an irrational faith in liberal 
social order. If there is not any objective belief, our overlapping consensus cannot be 
excepted from the general rule. 
     As Jones points out: “an ‘overlapping consensus’ is a partial consensus achieved 
amongst reasonable comprehensive doctrines when those doctrines, despite their 
different and conflicting content, ‘overlap’ in supporting the political conception of 
justice.”542 Given this partial consensus, according to Rawls, liberal persons have 
agreed over a political conception of justice and freedom as the core value of their 
own well-ordered society. If Rawls is right about the possibility of an overlapping 
consensus among incommensurable doctrines within a liberal society, he must also 
expand this notion of a well-ordered society to a global scale, which covers moral 
doctrines of other world civilisations like Islamic or Chinese civilisations. But, he 




     In his critical review of Rawls’ political liberalism, Samuel Scheffler argues that 
the overlapping consensus in a liberal society is a social consensus upon liberal values 
rather than an overlapping consensus among radically different moral doctrines within 
liberal society. These liberal values do not actually cover non-liberal values. A liberal 
democracy tolerates non-liberal values insofar as those values do not confront the 
liberal values. Such non-liberal values do not play a similar key role as liberal values 
in the cultural constitution of a liberal democracy.
544
 In one sense, Rawls’ analysis of 
overlapping consensus over the political conception of justice, as a liberal value itself, 
does not actually include those non-liberal moral doctrines, like Islamic or Chinese's 
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moral systems, that may actually exist in a liberal society, but their political accounts 
of justice is different from the liberal account. Nevertheless, it seems that Rawls has 
described the pluralistic nature of a liberal society better than Hayek due to his more 
realistic premises regarding human nature and the political culture of liberal society.  
     It is important to note that Rawls’ conception of human nature and his cooperative 
model of social organisation can be viewed as a Kantian approach to the formation of 
a well-ordered liberal society. But, Rawls’ model of social cooperation still suffers 
from a Lockean content becuase it does not recognises the possibility of a rational 
consensus regarding the ultimate goals of human actions. In this sense, in Rawlsian 
concept-model, social cooperation among liberal (wo) men has not been shaped based 
on a normative agreement concerning the ultimate goals of  liberal persons, but on an 
overlapping consensus over this principle that each person should follow his or her 
moral doctrines of what is a good life, i.e. the freedom of the ultimate ends. This 
distances the Rawlsian model of social cooperation based on such an overlapping 
consensus from the Parsonsian and the Habermasian models of social cooperation 
based upon an inter-subjective consensus over the ultimate goals of human actions.  
7.1.4 A Kantian-Inspired Critique of Liberal Democracy 
     Istvan Hont rightly reminds us that, “the Enlightenment political thinker who 
perhaps best captured the tremendous moral ambiguity of commercial sociability was 
Immanuel Kant. …Kant was fully aware of the contradiction involved in calling 
commercial sociability… His famous phrase that the sociability underlying modern 
commercial society was ‘unsocial sociability’… fully captures its explosively 
paradoxical content.” 545 As argued, the moral foundation of a liberal society rests on 
a social consensus on liberal values. The liberal values refer to a utility-based unsocial 
sociability. This unsocial sociability implies that individual members of liberal society 
cannot achieve a rational agreement upon their action-goals, because the goals are 
purely subjective. Liberal-minded peoples organise their social cooperation upon the 
utility-maximising principle. If Kant rightly argues that such a liberal society deeply 
suffers from an unsocial sociability, the reason is that such type of social order does 
not ultimately recognise the other as equal and free persons.  
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     It is possible to argue that liberal-democratic model of social order-- from the 
classical to the modern liberalism-- is committed to the key premise of liberal values 
as the moral foundation of a liberal democratic society. This moral foundation has  
been interpretated differently by liberal thinkers from Locke to Hume and Smith, and 
from Hayek to Rawls, amongst others. However, a key common feature of liberal-
democratic society is a liberal account of the person on which basis individual 
members of the society cannot rationally overcome their conflicts of opinions over the 
good. Hence, they follow a utilitarian logic on the basis of which their action-goals 
are subjective and unique to themselves, but their action-means can be rationalised in 
terms of their capabilities for satisfying action-goals. In this way, human actions are 
motivated by the utility principle, and individuals can merely rationalise their action-
means for realising their subjective goals. In this sense, a type of instrumental 
rationality is an inseparable part of liberal social philosophy.  
    Before Kant, in his critique of liberalism Jean-Jacques Rousseau recognised the 
unsocial sociability of a liberal society. For him, the condition of modern liberal 
(wo)man is contradictory. Due to the unsocial sociability of liberal society, modern 
liberal (wo)man is forced to collaborate with others, yet she or he is thinking only of 
her or himself. This reasoning directly targets the utilitarian philosophy of a liberal 
democracy. If individual members of society have nothing in share with others unless 
a usefulness of others for their ends, social cooperation is merely established upon 
self-interests and self-love. As Manent points out:  
Rousseau asks; what happens to the soul of someone who lives according to 
the maxims of such a [liberal] society? Everybody is obliged to live by them, 
since all the citizens are dependent and competitors. Since they are 
dependent, they are obliged to do no harm to each other. As competitors, they 
are obliged not to do good, or at least not to want to do good to each other. 
None of the great human passions can emerge in such society. Instead of the 
active love of fellow citizens …we find that self-love (amour-popre) is the 
unique passion of modern man.
546
  
     Rousseau accepts that self-love is the most powerful drive in human action, but 
denies that it is a 'natural' drive. For him, a commercial liberal society as purely based 
on the utilitarian view of human nature creates not only tremendous social misery and 
injustice but in the end leads to an unstable political order.
547
 After Rousseau, it was 
Kant, who criticised the utilitarian foundation of a liberal society, where he introduced 
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a liberal sociability as an unsocial sociability. Kant argued that the moral foundation 
of a free society should not be derived from an empirical study about how and why 
people behave-- as liberal thinkers such as Hume and Smith believed. For Kant, such 
a moral bases and rules should be regarded as ‘duties’ and were not to be confused 
with factual questions of how and why people behave.
548
  
     This Kantian-inspired critique of the unsocial sociability of a liberal society was 
developed by sociologists like Parsons and Habermas. As argued by chapter 5, they 
criticised the utilitarian logic of social organisation according to which peoples cannot 
arrive at a rational consensus regarding their ultimate action-goals. Habermas 
advanced the Kantian critical epistemology to a theory of communicative rationality 
on which basis individual members of the society can enter into a rational dialogue 
about the moral foundations of their society. He developed a comprehensive social 
theory of a dialogic community in which moral and legal bases of social order are 
subject to a rational dialogue among individual members of society. 
     Robert Wokler writes: “over the past thirty years, Jürgen Habermas—perhaps the 
best-known enthusiast of Enlightenment principles among contemporary social 
theorists – has promoting validity on their behalf and against their detractors, in 
promoting eighteenth-century ideas of rational and critical discourse … bourgeois 
public sphere, comprised of citizens committed to the pursuit of indefinite social 
progress through all the richly textured mediums of self-emancipation.”549 Thomas 
McCarthy argues that Habermas's idea of a ‘discourse ethics’ is “a reconstruction of 
Kant's idea of practical reason in terms of communicative reason. …it involves a 
procedural reformulation of the Categorical Imperative; rather than ascribing to others 
as valid those maxims I can will to be universal laws, I must submit them to others for 
purposes of discursively testing their claim to universal validity.”550 Habermas 
criticises liberal democracy because it does not recognise the possibility of a rational 
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consensus among conflicting opinions over the good, where such a consensus is 
possible and has occurred over liberal values in the context of liberal democracy. 
551
  
     A fundamental difference between a Kantian-inspired dialogic social democracy 
and the Lockean liberal-democratic society is that the former regards all moral and 
legal foundations of social order as open to a rational discourse, whilst the latter  
claims that the society's moral and legal foundations cannot be justified through  a 
rational dialouge. In one sense, a liberal-democratic society rests upon a kind of 
relativist epistemology. However, for Habermas, “…rational political opinion- and 
will-formation is at all possible, the principle of [discursive] democracy only tells us 
how this can be institutionalized, namely, through a system of rights that secures for 
each person as equal participation in a process of legislation whose communicative 
presuppositions are guaranteed to begin with.”552 A liberal democracy does not 
emphasise such a system of rights. Locke believed that the individual's right to 
property is a prior right to socially constructed institutions of the society. Hayek's 
defence of liberalism also does not give liberal-democracy such a discursive legal 
foundation. Rawls' political liberalism separates persons' moral equality from their 
political and legal equalities in his political concepts of freedom and justice.
553
 David 
Miller argues about a confrontation between liberal democracy and social democracy 
in this way:   
Empirically, liberals did not believe that a just society was compatible with 
an unrestricted franchise. Social justice meant, as we have seen, the 
distribution of material rewards according to deserve, within a framework of 
formal equality. As essential means to this end, the liberals defended private 
property, freedom of contract and limited government. But would property be 
safe and government remain limited if political rights were extended to the 
whole population, including the propertyless masses? Few liberals thought 
so: somehow a line had to be drawn so that those who might threaten the 
property system were excluded. …political rights should not be extended 
beyond the point at which property might be endangered 
554
[emphasis added].  
     Although modern liberals recognise the political equality of people, such equality 
is not fully institutionalised in the legal systems of existing liberal democracies. For 
instance, it is not clear that if fellow-citizens of a liberal-democracy want to radically 
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revise the social institutions of private property and limited governance, how the 
society's legal systems allow them to create such a radical institutional change. 
However, as Miller argues, the ideas of democracy and social justice are closely 
related. If each person is equally entitled to self-respect and moral equality 
irrespective of his or her merit, we can justify their political equality in terms of their 
legal rights of self-governance that is prior to their rights to property. In this way, the 
individual political rights must be extended beyond the point at which the property 
right might be criticised. 
555
 
     It was argued in detail in chapter 5 that there are good reasons for using Critical 
Rationalism as a theory of rationality to address the function of a rational dialogue 
amongst individual members of the society on conflicting opinions over the good. 
Critical Rationalism led us to the ideal type of global open society. As a Kantian-
inspired conception of a global society of free and equal persons, the ideal type of 
open global society can be used to criticise the cultural constitution of a global 
commercial society. It was argued that the moral-foundation of an open society rests 
upon a dialogic ethics: the ethics of openness to criticism. Peoples can enter into a 
rational dialogue about their social organisation, if they activate their critical 
rationality. This epistemic-based moral openness to criticism enables the legal system 
of open society to improve through learning from an open-ended legal criticism. 
Political democracy in such a society of open-minded persons rests on the ethics of 
openness to criticism and the equal legal rights of social criticism.  
     The open society differs from a liberal-democracy because it refers to a social 
organisation in which all of legal, political and economic orders are open to criticism. 
If we extend the ideal type of open society to a global scale, an open global society 
refers to similar equal rights, as described in detail in chapter 4. The ideal type of 
open global society leads us to explore the societal deficits of contemporary liberal 
globality. When we take into account liberal social philosophy's key developments, 
from its classical to its modern manifestations, the main characters of a liberal-based 
social order can be compared with the ideal type of open global society in which the 
principle of social organisation is a rational dialogue and friendly social cooperation 
amongst individuals, rather a utility-maximising behaviour amongst competitors. The 
societal deficits of liberal globalisation originate from the unsocial sociability of the 
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liberal model of social ordering of peoples. Our Kantian-inspired ideal type of open 
global society provides a normative reference point from which to criticise an 
unsocial sociability that is manifested in the liberal mode of globalisation.                   
7.2 The Cultural Shortfalls of Liberal Globalisation 
     As argued previously, contemporary liberal globalisation originates from a global 
social learning from which the Hobbesian culture of enmity was to some  extent 
suppressed with the Lockean culture of rivalry. If we compare this new global cultural 
environment with the Kantian culture of friendship and cooperation, we can explore 
the cultural shortfalls of emerging liberal globalisation. The Lockean model of social 
organisation, from its classical to its modern forms, implies that societies of peoples, 
at the national or a global scale, cannot overcome their conflicts of opinions over the 
good. In this sense, different cultural viewpoints remain incommensurable paradigms. 
They can merely achieve a consensus over basic rights such as the individual's rights 
to property and self-governance. While the liberal model advocates the possibility of 
arriving at such a consensus, the existing global reality shows that world civilisations 
have not yet accepted the liberal concepts of the person and social order in their 
profound cultural senses. The emergence of a global liberalism has been a top-down 
social learning that has been occurred among elite rather than ordinary peoples. In 
this sense, despite of the domestic style regarding the emergence of liberal society, on 
a global level ordinary peoples have not directly been involved in a social learning 
through which the conception of liberal (wo)man could be publicised. 
     Viewed from the idea of an open global society, contemporary liberal globalisation 
suffers from the lack of a cooperative mentality amongst societies or civilisations of 
peoples.
556
 The main reason perhaps is that the civilisations' cultural positions over 
the good are still radically different. There is not a global consensus on one concept of 
the person amongst national societies. Hence, they are not culturally prepared for 
recognising the liberal model of global organisation as a legitimate model of globality. 
     As argued, one of the key features of liberal model of social organisation refers to 
what Tom Young remarks: “Virtually all contemporary liberal theory takes as its 
starting point various 'rights' which are not amendable to democratic change.”557 For, 
instance, Locke claims that the property right is not an amendable right to democratic 
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change. Hayek takes the same position. In contrast, in an open global society, there is 
not such a starting point. The starting points are amendable to a democratic change by 
the world's population. The transition from a Hobbesian conflict of opinions over the 
good towards the Lockean consensus upon such non-amendable rights was a 
significant progress. But, it is still far away from a rational consensus upon the good 
amongst civilisations of peoples. In Multiculturalism in a Global Society, Peter 
Kivisto criticises liberal model of global organisation due to its intolerance with 
respect to illiberal values.
558
 From a Kantian cosmopolitan view, David Hollinger 
argues for the need for going beyond liberal multiculturalism. In his account of a 
global society, cultural diversity is not limited to an overall liberal value but it 
provides a global cultural environment in which individuals are in a position to pick 
and choose from multiple cultural values,
559
 among which liberal values are just one 
set of values.  
     In chapter 4, I argued about the institution of global freedom of thought as the 
foundation of the idea of open global society to show the need for such a global 
multiple cultures that is open to criticism. The global unsocial sociability of liberal 
globalisation ultimately originates from its cultural deficit in terms the lack of a global 
consensus upon the liberal conception of the person and the utilitarian principle of 
social ordering of peoples. This cultural deficit leads us to the political deficits of 
liberal globalisation: an unaccountability of liberal global governance to the moset of  
the world's population.        
7.3 The Political Insufficiencies of Liberal Globalisation 
     At the national level, liberal social movements, via some bottom-up revolutionary 
changes, led liberal democracies to a constitutional state under the rule of law that has 
made liberal nation-states to accountable to their own peoples. However, liberal 
globalisation has not created a global democratic system, accountable to the world's 
population. The emerging post-national political system, as a transition from 
superpower rivalry to multipolar global governance has created a more open global 
governance to the participation of different global actors. However, it is still deeply 
unaccountable to the world population. This unaccountability of emerging global 
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governance to the prospective global citizens has been widely recognised. In James 
Bohman's words, “talk of a ‘global democracy deficit’ comes from many quarters.”560 
Viewed from the idea of an open global society, a major reason for this ‘global 
democracy deficit’ is that accountability of global governance has not been a key 
concern for liberal globalisation. As Richard Falk recognises:  
The new geopolitics of world order tends to be economistic in the sense of 
being restructured in accordance with global market forces. These dynamics 
have generated a setting for political life that is increasingly associated with 
'globalisation'.…In the context of global governance, liberalism has managed 
to promote the idea of international organization, but only as an instrument of 
statecraft and geopolitics, not as an alternative based on a real shift from 
unilateralism and militarism to world community procedure.
561
  
     In the absence of a democratic global state, liberal globalisation has turned the 
nation-state to an agent of a global oligopolistic market. Political globalisation has not 
created a global constitutional state under a global rule of law. The political 
dimension of existing liberal globalisation suffers from a deep-seated global 
democracy deficit due to the lack of a democratic global state. Under these conditions, 
opening national borders to global markets converts nation-states to agents of global 
capitalism, because the benefits and costs of such an openness are not accountable to 
national societies's citizens. In this way, nation-states actually serve the functions of a 
global oligopolistic market. For Jackie Smith, liberal globalisation advances a model 
of the state that favors global capitalism and employs its multilateral institutions—
such as International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and World Trade 
Organisation—to enforce national states to do liberal policies. Hence, the state's 
policies are accountable tocapital rather than to the people.
562
   
    Chris Brown reinforces the above argument by reasoning that whilst contemporary 
globalisation does create a sense of universal connectedness, it does not generate an 
equivalent sense of community based on shared values.
563
 Liberal globalisation has 
not created the ethical resources for democratic global governance, because the 
transition from the Hobbesian bipolar order to Lockean global governance has not 
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replaced the struggle for power with rational dialogue and human solidarity. Hence, 
the unsocial sociability of liberal globality reflects in the lack of global governance's 
legitimacy. The ethical resource for creating a democratic world community cannot be 
provided with the logic of competition for interests. Linklater discusses a movement 
from egotistical moral system to a Kantian ideal of thinking from the standpoint of all 
others as providing such an ethical resource.
564
 Held and McGrew refer to democratic 
deficits of liberal global governance in this way: 
In a post-imperial world, the institutional infrastructure of global governance 
legitimizes a new form of a global domination… In effect, global governance 
is essentially liberal global governance since promotes and advances the 
project of a liberal world order in which global markets, the international rule 
of law, liberal democracy and human rights are taken as the universal 
standards of civilisation. … Of course, these values are not promoted in a 
balanced way, as is evident by the priority that is attached to the expansion 
and reproduction of global market. …liberal economics normally wins out 
against other liberal values. This is principally because the project of liberal 
global governance is informed by an unwritten constitution that structurally 
privileges the interest and agenda of Western globalizing capital, more often 
than at the expense of the welfare of the majority of nations, communities and 
the natural environment…565    
    As such, it is possible to argue that liberal global governance is mainly concerned 
with liberal economic values, as opposed to the individual's political and social rights 
to make global governance and global economy accountable to the world's population. 
In other words, while liberal global governance has created a more sensitive political 
system to the human rights, it has not yet realised the political right of prospective 
global citizens to make their global order accountable to their needs. As Habermas 
reminds us, the nation-states are losing their central positions in shaping global 
decision-making, but “in an interdependent world community there is less and less 
congruence between the groups of participants in a collective decision and the total of 
all those affected by their decisions.”566 According to Haberams: 
Neoliberal theory deals with private subjects who 'do and permit what they 
will' according to their own preferences and value orientations within the 
limits of legally permissible action. They are not required to take any mutual 
interest for one other; they are thus not equipped with any moral sense of 
social obligation. The legally requisite respect for private liberties that all 
competitors are equally entitled to is something very different from the equal 
respect for the human worth of each individual
567
 [emphasis added]. 
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     Habermas rightly argues that neo-liberalism does not pay enough attention to the 
republican idea of self-legislation because “it closes itself from the intuition that 
citizens can be free only if they can regard themselves as both the authors and the 
addressees of the law at the same time.”568 Against this background, liberal global 
governance has created a more enabling political environment for respecting private 
liberties, but such a global political progress is something very different from the 
emergence of a democratic global governance by which an equal respect for the 
human worth of each individual must be protected. The Kantian-inspired ideal type of 
open global society rests upon such an equal respect for all persons due to their equal 
access to critical rationality. The global ethics of openness to criticism provides the 
moral resource that is required for the emergence of a global democratic governance, 
which is accoutble to the world population and removable by them.                           
7.4 The Economic Deficits of Liberal Globalisation 
     Liberal globalisation's economic deficits should be discussed in close relationship 
with its cultural and political shortcomings. Stephen Gill, amongst others, recognises 
this issue, arguing that globalisation is part of a broad process for restructuring 
political economy and culture. Viewed from the logic of liberal global governance, we 
can understand a problematic nature of contemporary economic globalisation. As Gill 
writes: “the current phase of economic globalisation has come to be characterized 
increasingly not by free competition as idealized in neo-classical theory, but by 
oligopolistic neoliberalism, oligopoly and protection for the strong and a socialization 
of their risks, market discipline for the weak.”569 As argued before, a free economic 
competition, according to the liberal model, requires the protection of property rights 
and a minimal constitutional state.  
    However, liberal global governance does not create such preconditions on a global 
scale. In Alexander's words: “there is not a world government to curb a hegemonic 
state bent on defending its interests. The nascent global civil sphere has none of the 
institutions that, in a fully functioning democracy, allow public opinion to produce 
civil power and thus regulate the state, such as independent courts, party competition, 
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and elections.”570 Hence, the collapse of the Cold War order and the emergence of 
post-national world economy have not created the legal and political preconditions of 
a free global economic competition. Instead of such a free competition, economic 
globalisation has been characterised by an oligopolistic global market. This uneven 
transnational economy socialise its risks by exporting the negative externalities to less 
developed economies. It serves to reduce state spending on social services, where 




     Viewed from the ideal type of open global society, the emergence of an open 
global economy depends on pre-existence of a global democracy, a global rule of law 
and untimely pre-existence of a global culture of the freedom of thought. But, liberal 
globalisation has merely transformed the bipolar world order into a multi-polar 
governance that has realised none of these preconditions of a competitive global 
economy. This multi-polar world order does not refer to a democratic global order. If 
this multi-polar order becomes accountable to the world population, it provides the 
pre-condition of a free entrance of economic agents to global market. The absence of 
such a global political accountability is closely linked with an unevenness of 
economic globalisation. This uneven globalisation perhaps can be regarded as the 
main manifestation of contemporary globalisation's economic deficits.  
     Empirical research shows that economic globalisation has led to an uneven 
economic growth and integration in the world's different regions. These regional 
differences can be traced to those cultural and political pre-conditions that affect the 
level of openness of national economies to global market. National economies have 
opened to the global market in different quality and quantity, hence their benefits 
from economic globalisation have been widely unequal. This inequality is reflected in 
various levels of integration of national economies in world economy.    
     In his empirical study of cross-national variations in a global economic integration, 
Garrett argues that, “the magnitudes of enduring cross-national disparities in 
international economic flows and foreign economic policies are sufficiently large that 
they cannot be dismissed as mere noise on the path to a single seamless global 
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market.”572 He explores the effects of four types of variables that received 
considerable attention in the political economy of emerging global market: economic 
size, the level of development, the balance of power between pro- and anti-market 
forces and the effects of formal political institutions.
573
 As in the post-cold war era, he 
writes, “in the 1990s, for example, foreign economic policies were much more liberal 
in the OECD nations than in the world's poorest countries…There are at least two 
clear differences between the two groups. The OECD countries are wealthy and have 
long histories of stable democracies; the poor countries have much shorter (if any) 
democratic histories.” 574 While the end of the Cold War order was a transition from 
bipolarity to multi-polarity, it did not refer to a similar level of liberalisation of 
national economies towards the global economy in terms of reducing their trade taxes 
and opening their capital accounts.  
      Once the bipolar world order was suppressed by a liberal global governance, the 
political conditions were to some extent provided for a more free entrance of private 
sectors into the global market, but developed countries and less-developed countries 
had radically different domestic capacities to benefit from this new global political 
environment that was provided for by the collapse of the Cold War. In this way, due 
to pre-existence of enabling domestic environments, developed countries have had 
much more ability to use the new global environment to facilitate their private sectors' 
active participation in the emerging global markets. Jackie Smith writes, “since the 
1980s, neoliberal proponents have made significant headway in transforming the state 
from an entity concerned with ensuring some level of social welfare to one devoted to 
providing a secure and productive environment for global capital.”575 This 
transformation of the state’s function turns it to a global agent of global capitalism 
that co-exists with liberal global governance. The global economic institutions have 
effectively influenced states' economic policies by making access to international 
financing contingent upon adherence to ‘structural adjustment’ policies. 576 
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     Paul Hirst et al. refer to the aforementioned cross-border variation as evidence of 
their claim that implies the world economy is far from being genuinely 'global'. They 
point out: “trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the Triad of 
Europe, Japan/East Asia and North America.…these major economic powers, 
centered on the G8 with China and India, thus have capacity… to exert powerful 
governance pressures over financial markets and other economic tendencies. Global 
markets are thus by no means beyond regulation and control…objectives of economic 
governance are limited by the divergent interest of the great powers and the economic 
doctrines prevalent among their elites.”577 In other words, the post-national economy 
is concentrated on the economic activities of developed countries' private sectors. In 
this sense, the post-national economy is an oligopolistic global market in which the 
major economic activities are managed by large transnational firms, originated from 
developed countries' private sectors. Whilst transnational corporations have emerged 
as powerfull competitors of those state-based economic activities on an international 
level,
578
 such transnational firms are themselves affiliated with developed countries.  
     Leslie Sklair, amongst others, links the function of transnational corporations with 
the emergence of a global capitalist class. He argues that economic globalisation has 
created new groups of transnational investors as members of a transnational capitalist 
class whose aims and functions goes beyond national interests. In this sense, the 
global capitalist economy is mainly located in the major transnational corporations. 
The members of the transnational capitalist class drive the post-national economy. 
They manage the post-national manufacturing.
579
 Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder 
point out:  
The major beneficiaries of financial deregulation and the revolution in 
information technologies have been the multinational corporations. Since the 
mid-1970s the multinationals have grown more rapidly than the world 
economy. In 1975, the fifty largest industrial corporations worldwide had 
sales of $ 540 billion and $ 25 billion in profits. In 1990, sales figures for the 
tope fifty had climbed to $ 2.1 trillion and their profits has reached $70 
billion. …Some of the larger multinationals continue to have sales figures far 
in excess of the GDP of smaller national economies. 
580
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     If the major beneficiaries of economic globalisation are transnational firms as the 
economic actors of emerging post-national economy, and if they are under influence 
of the powerful and wealthy classes in developed countries, globalisation suffers from 
the absence of an economic accountability to the world population as well. Viewed 
from the open global society ideal type, existing economic globalisation is far behind 
an open and competitive global economy that must facilitate a free entrance of all 
potential economic agents to global market, allowing them to achieve a decent life 
through their active participation in world-wide economic activities. Given such an 
economic unaccountability, contemporary globalisation has not used the global 
market's opportunities for a reduction of world poverty and income inequality.  
      Robert Hunter Wade points out: “If the number of people in extreme poverty is 
not falling and if global inequality is widening, we cannot conclude that globalization 
in the context of the dollar-Wall Street regime is moving the world in the right 
direction, with Africa’s poverty as a special case in need of international attention. 
The balance of probability is that –like global warming—the world is moving in the 
wrong direction.” 581 For Ino Rossi, while economic globalisation has brought a new 
level of economic integration to the world economy, not all national economies share 
equally in the economic benefits produced by increased economic transactions.
582
  
      Thomas Pogge writes, “I see the appalling trajectory of world poverty and global 
inequality since the end of the Cold War as a shocking indictment of one particular, 
especially brutal path of economic globalization that our governments have chosen to 
impose. …but a different path of globalization [is possible], involving political as well 
as economic integration, that would fulfill human rights worldwide and afford people 
everywhere an opportunity to share the benefits of global economic growth.”583 
Pogge’s argument implies that the lack of such human rights worldwide can be 
closely linked to world poverty and income inequality, and if economic globalisation 
is unable to face with such poverty and income inequality, the key reason is that 
global governance has not realised such world-wide human rights.      
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7.5 A Macrosociological Critique of Liberal Globalisation  
     From a macro-sociological perspective, the three major societal deficits of liberal 
globalization--or what was called the unsocial sociability of liberal globality-- are 
systematically interconnected. Throughout the preceding arguments, we have seen 
such an interconnection. This section uses the insights of the preceding arguments to 
summarise liberal globalisation's unsocial sociability.   
     It started with the cultural deficits of contemporary globalisation, then led to the 
political and economic dimensions of globalisation's unsocial sociability. As argued in 
chapter 3, such a connection among various aspects of the contradictory nature of 
contemporary globalisation is recognised by global thinkers such as Habermas, Falk, 
and Held. Viewed from the open global society ideal type, however, such a linkage 
finds a different interpretation. As introduced in chapter 4, the ideal type of open 
global society can be used as a normative ideal type to unmask the contradictions of 
the existing global reality.  
     From a cultural perspective, the expansion of liberal model of social organisation 
to a global scale suffers from an unsocial sociability because it advocates a mode of 
social organisation on the basis of a global economic competition as opposed to a 
rational dialogue among civilisations of peoples. The liberal model of post-national 
social organisation views individuals as competitors rather than rational agents who 
can organise their global social relations based on dialogue and consent. As Habermas 
argues, this liberal model deals with individuals who do and permit what they will 
according to their own preferences within the limits of legally permissible action: a 
freedom of choice under the rule of law. Individuals are not required to take a mutual 
interest for one other, because they are just competitors and not friends. However, the 
legally requisite respect for the private liberties that all competitors are equally 
entitled to is something very different from the equal respect for the human worth of 
each individual as a human being.
584
  
      For the ideal type of open global society, the cultural shortfalls of contemporary 
liberal globalisation originate from its Lockean premises about human beings and 
their social ordering according to the principle of economic competition rather than a 
rational dialogue over human action-goals. The unsocial sociability of a global 
commercial community refers to the logic of competition over economic interests 
                                                 
584
 Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, (2001), p.97. 
  227 
without a notable concern with achieving a rational agreement amongst prospective 
global citizens over how the global rules of this global competition should be justified 
by all who would be affected by the rules. The existing liberal model of global 
organisation leads to a unilateral imposition of the model on the rest of the world 
without their pre- consensus. The reason is that the need for such a global consensus 
has been outside of the model, whereas it does not rest upon an equal respect for the 
human worth of individuals. The maximum capacity of the existing liberal model of 
global organisation is to advocate the need for establishing a global rule of law under 
which individuals can secure their freedom of choice: individuals who do and permit 
what they will according to their preferences within the limits of global legally 
permissible action. But even this ideal type global liberalism is not still concerned 
with a global consensus on how emerging global community should be organised 
through a rational dialogue in order to satisfy the interests of all persons. In practice, 
the existing liberal globality has not realised the ideal of a liberal social order as it has 
been actualised on a domestic level.  
     The unsocial sociability of liberal globalisation is also reflected in the political 
insufficiencies of liberal globalisation. The unsocial sociability manifests its political 
nature in the lack of an accountability of liberal global governance to the most of the 
world's population. As Held and McGrew argues, emerging global governance is 
essentially a liberal global governance while promotes and advances the liberal model 
of world order in which global market, the international rule of law, and liberal 
democracy are taken the universal standard of civilisation. But, since there is not a 
global consensus regarding the liberal conception of the person and liberal model of 
social organisation, globalisation of liberalism suffers from a global democratic 
illegitimacy. As a result, Held and McGrew rightly remind us that liberal values are 
not promoted on a global scale in a balanced way, as is evident by the priority that is 
attached to the expansion and reproduction of global markets. In this way, liberal 
economics wins out against other liberal values like the global rule of law and global 
democracy. This is principally because liberal global governance is informed by a 
liberal model of social order, in which economic rights, in particular property rights, 
are prioritised over other political and civil rights like the right of self-governance 
through democratic procedures. As a result, liberal global governance privileges the 
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interests and agenda of Western globalising capital, often at expense of the welfare of 
the majority of world’s population.585  
     The existing global governance has created a more enabling political environment 
for the participation of more global actors in global decision-makings. However, it 
still is too unaccountable to the world’s population. The democratic deficits of liberal 
global governance originate from its cultural logic: the superseding the Hobbesian 
logic of the struggle for political power by the Lockean logic of competition over 
economic interests. If we take the Kantian logic of rational dialogue as our normative 
reference point, the democratic deficits of liberal global governance can be recognised 
in the very premises of the liberal models of human nature and commercial society. 
The unsocial sociability of liberal globality is reflected in such a global democratic 
deficit. Liberal global governance is not principally shaped for the creation of a global 
democratic governance, accountable to peoples and removable by them, but for a 
multi-centric global political system, which to some extent has suppressed the 
struggle for political power with competition for economic interests. The political 
deficits of liberal global governance have led us to the economic unevenness of liberal 
globalisation.  
     Uneven economic globality is another aspect of liberal globalisation's unsocial 
sociability. While there is strong correlation between the growth of transnational 
economic flows and the liberalisation of foreign economic policies around the globe, 
the growth of transnational economic flows has been unequally distributed across the 
world's regions and countries. Different countries and regions have very unequally 
benefited from economic globalisation. Perhaps one of the major reasons for this 
cross-national variation in this post-national economic integration and enjoying its 
benefits originates from very different domestic capacities of countries and regions in 
terms of their ability to open their national economies to global market. The liberal 
logic of economic globalisation has forced national economies to open their private 
sectors to global markets, but such openness has occurred due to internal capacities of 
the national economies. While national economies have differentially opened up their 
private sectors to global market, the emerging global economic governance has not 
been concerned with altering the existing cross-border variation towards an equal 
opportunity for the private sectors' participations in the global market. 
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     The thesis' macro-sociological critique of liberal globalisation leads us to explore  
systematic linkage among the three cultural, political, and economic aspects of liberal 
globality's unsocial sociability. In this sense, the uneven distribution of economic 
benefits and risks of globalisation is internally linked with the unacceptability of 
liberal global governance to the world’s population, and such an unaccountability is 
closely connected with the social philosophy (the cultural model) of global liberalism. 
This social philosophy rests upon the utilitarian logic of global competition for 
economic interests as opposed to the logic of rational dialogue amongst civilisations 
of peoples for the creation of a global society of free and equal citizens, as reflected in 
the ideal type of open global society. As I shall argue in the next chapter, the ideal 
type of open global society is defined to provide a normative standard from which the 
deviations or unsocial sociability of the existing liberal globality can be unmasked and 
overcome by a dialogic form of the development of globality.      













































Towards a Dialogic Globalisation 




    This chapter uses the ideal type of open global society and the critical rationalist 
model of social learning to argue for an alternative dialogic globalisation. It will argue 
that liberal globalisation's unsocial sociability can be overcome through a rational 
dialogue amongst world civilisations. The chapter explains this rational dialogue as an 
ideal type global social learning through which the Lockean logic of liberal globality 
can be superseded with the Kantian logic of an open global society. An expression of 
such an ambition can be found in Jackie Smith’s question of: 
…how people have come together to articulate and promote ideas of a global 
society that differ dramatically from the world economy promoted by far 
more powerful corporate and political actors. These people and the 
movement they comprise have been labeled “anti-globalization,” but as we 
will see, in reality they are not anti-global but rather they work toward a 




     Due to the centrality of an inter-civilisational dialouge in this alternative account of 
globalisation, section 8.1 explains the cultural logic of civilisational formation. To this 
end, it refers to competing systems of rationality, as the cornerstone of such a cultural 
logic. Section 8.2 reviews three major world civilisations of Islam, West and China to 
explore how such systems of rationality have influenced the patterns of social 
organisation. In this manner, section 8.2 paves the way for exploring the reasons why 
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a dialogue of civilisations would be a dialogue of competing systems of rationality. 
Section 8.3 argues that a rational dialogue amongst competing systems of rationality 
and patterns of social organisation is possible if the open their fundamental beliefs to 
mutual criticism.  It attempts to explain reasons why such a rational dialogue can 
transform liberal globality into a multi-civilisational open global society. Section 8.3 
argues for the five layers of such an ideal-type global social transformation. Section 
8.4 explores macro-institutional outcomes of such a global transformation. It employs 
Critical Rationalism to address a moral institutional reasoning for critical rationalist 
accounts of global democracy and global justice.  
8.1 The Cultural Logics of Civilisational Formation:  
        Competing Systems of Rationale 
    The central argument of this chapter is that individuals, as equal possessors of 
critical rationality, can be involved in a rational dialogue on a global scale regarding 
their global social organisation. However, since they have been already categorised in 
radically different civilisations, such a rational dialogue amongst them must take 
place in the context of an inter-civilisational dialogue that recognises their different  
systems of rationality and cultural identities. This leads us to the need for an 
exploration of the cultural logic of civilisational formation. This section argues that 
competing systems of rationale have been central to the cultural logic of civilisational 
formation. A critical rationalist approach to a dialogue amongst civilisations refers to 
a dialouge among competing systems of rationale that makes fundamental premises of 
those systems open to mutual criticiam. Referring to sociological accounts of 
civilisation, this section defines a civilisation as the highest level of cultural grouping 
of peoples on the basis of a common account of rationality and shared accounts of 
human nature and social organisation. The sociological approach to civilisation is 
used for developing a macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. 
8.1.1 Civilisations as ‘Highest Cultural Grouping of People’ 
     In order to address the central role of the systems of rationallity in the civilisational 
formation and their implications for a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, a brief 
review of the major approaches to the sociology of civilisations, especially those 
approaches that pay special attention to the cultural logic of civilisational formation is 
required. Donald Nielsen argues that, “the creation of a new science of civilisations 
  232 
remains a neglected item on the agenda of contemporary sociology.”587 S. N. 
Eisenstadt believes that the early 1970s was a starting point for a civilisational return 
in sociological analysis.
588
 In Civilisations in World Politics, Peter Katzenstein 
outlines three major sociological theories of civilisations, developed by Eisenstadt, 
Collins and Elias.
589
 We can add an ‘interactionists’ approach to civilisational 
analysis—suggested by scholars such as William McNeill, Jack Coody and Janet 
Abu-Lughod. They argue about a long-term mutual intercourse and influence amongst 
civilisations.
590
 However, on the contrary, Samuel Huntington focuses upon the clash 
of civilisations instead of dialogue amongst them.
591
 In contrast with Huntington's 
thesis that takes the cultural differences as the main source of the clash among 
civilisations, proponents of the idea of civilisational dialogue rightly argue that inter-
civilisational exchanges have not been limited to conflicts of opinions and institutions, 
but positive encounters and dialogue. From this perspective, the idea of dialogue 




    The importance of those sociologies of civilisations that defends the dialogue of 
civilisations for the present argument is that they have paid attention to a key role of 
competing accounts of rationality to address the dynamics of civilisational formation. 
A brief review of the conception of civilisation in these civilisational analyses leads us 
to the central role of competing accounts of rationality in these sociological analyses.  
As Johann Arnason argues, the recovery of civilisational analysis is closely linked to a 
broader cultural turn in the human sciences. He writes: 
Comparative civilisational approaches accept the primacy of culture, but at 
the same time, they strive to avoid the cultural determinism familiar from 
twentieth-century sociology, especially from the Parsonian version of 
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functionalism. To situate this twofold strategy within contemporary cultural 
sociology, it seems useful to link up with the distinction between a strong and 
a weak program for the sociological analysis of culture proposed by Jeffery 
Alexander and Philip Smith. The strong program, also described as cultural 
sociology, stresses the constitutive role of culture in all domains and across 
the field of social life… civilisational analysis is, first and foremost, a 
particularly ambitious version of the strong program; its emphasis on 
different cultural articulations of the world, as well as on the large-scale and 
long-term social-historical formations crystallizing around such articulations 
adds new dimensions to the autonomy of culture [emphasis added].
593
 
    The critical rationalist approach to macrosociology of a dialogic globalisation 
validates Alexander’s strong program in cultural sociology because it gives the 
primacy to the cultural motor of social change. Hence, a dialogue amongst 
civilisations emphasises the cultural driving forces of dialogic globalisation. As 
argued in chapter 1, peoples' access to critical rationality can act as the cause of the 
formation of some shared values on a global scale if world civilisations open their 
fundamental cultural beliefs to mutual criticism. I will argue in more detail regarding 
Alexander’s strong program in cultural sociology in chapter 10. It suffices to note that 
for cultural sociology, “socially constructed subjectivity forms the will of 
collectivities; shapes the rules of organizations; defines the moral substance of law; 
and provides the meaning and motivations for technologies, economies, and military 
machines.”594 This chapter takes this strong approach to cultural sociology in order to 
explore the substantive role of civilisational cultural logics, in terms of their rationale 
systems, in the emergence of socially constructed subjectivity and its profound 
implications for different patterns of social organisation across civilisations. 
     Against this background, while Huntington introduces a civilisation as the highest 
cultural grouping of people, it creates an unnecessary linkage between cultural 
identity of a civilisation and its political performance as a global political actor.
595
 In 
this manner, for Huntington, a civilisation operates as a kind of mega nation-state that 
transfers its cultural identity to its world politics. As such, conflicts of opinion 
amongst civilisations, including their competing systems of rationality, leads directly 
to a political conflict on an inter-civilisational level. On this basis, Huntington uses 
                                                 
593
 Johann P. Aranason, "The Cultural Turn and the Civilisational Approach," European Journal of 
Social Theory, 13 (1) (2010), p.67. Also see: Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip Smith, "The Strong 
Program in Cultural Sociology," pp.11-26., in Alexander, The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural 
Sociology, (2003) and Johann P. Aranason, "Civilisational Analysis, Social Theory and Comparative 
History," in G. Delanty (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory, (London, 
Routledge: 2006), pp.230-241.    
594
 Alexander, The Meaning of Social Life, (2003), p.5. 
595
 See Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations, (1996), pp.125-174.  
  234 
the conception of civilisation, as a kind of mega nation-state, to develop a new 
Hobbesian logic of the struggle for cultural hegemony and to address the outcomes of 
such a struggle for the post-Cold War political order.  In this way, civilisations 
become the major political building blocks of the post-Cold War world order.
596
  
      As Katzenstein argues, whilst Huntington's main thesis of clash of civilisations 
refers to the growing importance of civilisational unit in the analysis of the post-Cold 
War order, its dependency upon an internal cultural unity of civilisations
597
 dismisses 
“the key importance of the internal pluralism of civilisational constellations.”598 In 
addition, it does not pay enough attention to constructive aspect of civilisational 
intercourse. Nevertheless, the idea of dialogue of civilisations can utilise the insights 
of Huntington's definition of civilisation for the development of a dialogic model of 
world order. According to Huntington, a civilisation is the highest cultural grouping 
of people and the broadest level of cultural identity that people have. People can and 
do redefine their civilisational identities, and as a result the composition and 
boundaries of civilisations change. Huntington argues that civilisations' world-views 
shape the cultural logics of their social grouping of peoples. But he does not link this 
cultural logic to the systems of rstionality. 
599
 
      Eisenstadt develops an epistemic-institutional account of a civilisation. For him, 
“the central core of civilisations is the symbolic and institutional interaction between 
the formulation, promulgation, articulation, and continuous reintegration of the basic 
ontological visions prevalent in a society, its basic ideological premise and core 
symbols on the one hand, and on the other the definition, structuration and regulation 
of the major arenas of institutional life.”600 For Eisenstadt, civilisations' ontological 
visions and ideological premises have led to particular social-institutional features.  
     In comparison with Huntington, Eisenstadt does lead us to see how the cultural 
logic of civilisations affects the institutional structures of civilisations.
601
 He argues 
that a civilisational world-view cognitively fuels the cultural logic of social ordering 
of people around one set of ontological visions and moral values. He recognises that 
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civilisations are internally pluralistic units of analysis and externally building blocks 
of the emerging world order, what he prefers to call a global civilisation of modernity 
that has been emerged through an inter-civilisational dialogue regarding modernity. 
However, it seems that Eisenstadt's analysis of the existing performance of inter-
civilisational dialogue about modernity is an overestimation of the function of such 
capacity in the creation of a global civilisation. Nevertheless, it paves the way for 
exploring the conditions of an ideal type rational dialogue among civilisations for 
creating a multi-civilisational global society. 
     Randall Collins’ definition of a civilisation also contributes to understanding the 
cultural logic of civilisational formation and the inter-civilisational dialogue. Collins 
argues that competing schools of thought affect the cultural logic of civilisations. He 
views civilisations as zones of prestige and social contact. Inter-civilisational relations 
are composed of competing social networks, which are cognitively informed by 
competing schools of thought. Collins points out:  “my approach to civilisations is to 
stress their characters as networks of social action, and as historical phenomena. …the 
conception of civilisation as a zone of prestige directs our attention both to social 
activity and to cultural varity.”602 Collins's account of civilisation is drawn from his 
work on the comparative history of philosophies and the social networks, which have 
carried them.
603
 The reading of civilisation leads us to see the social networks of 
intellectuals as the agent of cultural dialogue amongst civilisations, originating from 
the schools of thought. Collins does not directly discuss about the role of competing 
systems of rationality in the emergence of competing schools of thought. This link can 
be traced to the works of other sociologists of civilisations like Benjamin Nelson and 
Donald Nielsen.  
      Norbert Elias’ analysis of the civilising process also contributes to the conception 
of civilisation. Elias applies his civilising process's analysis at the European level.
604
 
Andrew Linklater and Stephen Mennell have employed Elias' analysis to develop an 
inter-societal analysis of such a civilising process.
605
 Katzenstein validates Nelson's 
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sociology of civilisations as a global application of Elias's civilising process theory.
606
 
Of special interest of Nelson's conception of civilisation and his sociological analysis 
for the present argument is that it leads us to explore the link between competing 
accounts of human rationality and the cultural logic of civilising process on an inter-
civilisational scale. While both Eisenstadt and Collins argue about the cultural 
dynamics of civilisational formation via the social networks of elites and intellectuals, 
they do not lead us to recognise a key function for competing accounts of rationality 
as an epistemic impetus of such intellectual networks. Nelson argues that his 
comparative sociology of civilisations
607
 advances the works of Joseph Needham and 
Max Weber. For him, civilisations are distinctive structures of collective and 
historical consciousness, resting on different levels of rationalisation, and competing 
rationale systems. Nelson connects civilisational identities to competing rationale 
systems. These alternative systems of rationale have led to competing world-visions 
regarding the universe, the human nature and social institutions. From such a 
perspective, Nelson defines civilisations in this way: 
By the civilisations of peoples I wish to refer to the governing cultural 
heritages that constitute the accepted milieus of 2 + n societies, [or] 
territories, areas which generally enjoy or have enjoyed a certain proximity. 
These strongly-based acceptances will normally be discovered to constitute 
configurations of the following elements: identities of language, the highest 
level of technology of the group, which I would call the 'prime material 
facilitations and skills', of the group; the central patterns reciprocities 
including juridical rules; the fundamental canons governing the decision-
matrices in the spheres of opinion and act…the taken-for granted structures 
of consciousness, comprising cultural world-views, logics, images of 
experience, self, time, the beginning and the end, the extraterrestrial 
powers.
608
    
     Nelson righly recognises competing systems of rationale as the cultural logics of 
civilisational formation. He argues that there are various ‘cultural logics’ which serve 
to regulate the possibilities of thought and action. The most important of these 
elements are those which Nelson “designates as ‘rationales,’ or ‘rationale-systems’ 
which are the 'fundamental canons governing the decision-matrices in the spheres of 
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opinion and act.”609 The civilisations' rationale systems are in fact the “structures of 
reason, explanations, procedures establishing requirements in respects to truth, virtue, 
legality, fittingness.”610 In this way, Nelson links civilisational rationale systems with 
the cultural dynamics of civilisational complexes. He argues that three civilisational 
Consciousness Types have influenced the formation of civilisations. In Consciousness 
Type 1, civilisations are shaped on the basis of those world-views which assert an 
absolute authority of magical-prescriptive structures. He believes those sacro-magical 
structures anchored a wide variety of archaic civilisations, including Ancient China, 
India, Judaism, as well Greece and Rome in their early phases.  
      With Consciousness Type 2, Nelson views “a decisive breakthrough occurs…in 
which all [peoples] are enjoined to enter into mediation, producing a faith-structure of 
consciousness. The faith-structure requires that all individuals and groups, however 
differentiated, are under the obligation to engage in continuous purgation and 
catharsis of evil thoughts… The faith-consciousness already implies a kind of logos or 
world soul in which participation is accessible through psychic conformities.”611 The 
faith-structures provide potential for universal participation, and hence lay the 
necessary foundations for further total rationalisations. Nelson locates the main 
historical breakthrough from sacro-magical structure to the faith structure in the 
transition from Judaism to Christianity in the Hellenistic and Roman eras.
612
 
However, Nelson's historiography of the three consciousness types is mainly drawn 
from the historical recorder of West and it does not seem as an outcome of a universal 
historiography. Nelson's sociology of civilisations nevertheless leads us to explore 
those cultural logics that shape civilisations' consciousness structures and the inter-
civilisational exchanges. 
      In Globalisation and Civilisations, Mehdi Mozaffari defines civilisation as “a 
junction between a world vision and a historical formation. In other words, when a 
specific world vision is realized through a historical formation, this fusion is called 
civilisation.”613 Robert Cox views civilisation as “a correspondence between material 
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conditions of existence and inter-subjective meanings.”614 For David Inglis “…a focus 
on inter-civilisational interactions can lead to productive reapprochements between 
civilisational analysis and globalisation theory… The pioneering work in this regard 
of Benjamin Nelson is shown to provide a basis for future civilisational analysis of 
globalisation. …”615 Validating this civilisational return in globalisation studies, a key 
link can be traced between competing rationale systems and sociology of civilisations. 
8.1.2 ‘Rationale Systems’ and the ‘Logics of Cultural Grouping’ of People  
     We need to explore relationships amongst (a) civilisational account of rationality, 
(b) civilisational world-visions, and (c) civilisational models of social organisation. 
Validating Nelson's analysis, Toby Huff writes, “understanding the cultural rationales 
becomes a key to understanding the breakthroughs and resistances to such in the 
spheres of act and opinion in the realms of theology, philosophy, law, and science. 
According to Nelson, rationales so conceived are at the heart of orderly social 
process.”616 Nelson himself notes “without such rationales, orderly social process and 
social accounting are unthinkable; the work of the world does not get done. Social and 
cultural regressions to the so-called 'state of nature', manifest themselves when the 
established rationales go out of the phase or lack a compelling and vital center.”617 
Huff rightly argues that the conception of rationales promises to open one of the most 
fruitful lines of inquiry to be pursued specially as it applies to the comparative and 
historical sociology of science.
618
  
     Nelson's sociology of civilisations needs to be advanced for the formulation of a 
macrosociology of globalisation, with the aim of addressing the formation of a multi-
civilisational open global society. Donald Nielsen's critical reconstruction of Nelson's 
sociology helps us to develop such a macrosociology of globalisation. While Nielsen 
believes that the creation of a new science of civilisations remains a neglected item on 
the agenda of contemporary sociology, he finds Nelson's sociology of civilisations an 
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insightful departure point for the formulation of such a new science of civilisations.
619
 
My intention is to show how Nielsen's critique of Nelson's sociology contributes to 
our understanding of the cultural logic of civilisational formation and its outcomes for 
a macrosociology of dialogic globalisation.        
     Nielsen validates Nelson's sociology of civilisations because it allows us to see 
reasons why “comparative historical research needs to focus on actual variations in 
the operation of reason, rationale, rationalizations, etc. across civilisations.”620 
Nielsen believes that “despite Weber's early warning on this matter, we still lack a full 
historical and sociological analysis of the ideas and institutions connected with the 
various notions themselves of reason, rationales, rationalization, rationalism, 
rationality, etc”621 (emphasis added). He views Nelson's sociology as an attempt to 
advance Weber' comparative sociology of world religions.
622
  
     In Nielsen view, they are “the systems of rationales that constitute the structures of 
consciousness of societies. Such categories serve as hinges on which turn the basic 
rationales and the concrete modes of reasoning of historical actors. They define the 
worlds in which people live. Changes in the collective meanings and the institutional 
embodiments of these categories or the elaboration of wholly new categories and 
meanings mark decisive turning points in the civilisational histories of mankind.”623 
Nielsen elaborates this line of reasoning for a critical reconstruction of Nelson's 
sociology of civilisations with a direct attention paid on competing rationale systems 
as the cultural logics of civilisational formation. Nielsen links competing rationale 
systems with different types of civilisational consciousness, which operate as the 
mechanisms of cultural groupings of people around one set of common world-visions. 
For him, civilising process is a socio-cultural process that occurs not only at the level 
of world-views, but also at the level of social institutions and involves the relation of 
the 'concrete individuals' to 'universal norms' in all spheres of human life.
624
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      Nielsen argues that Nelson's sociology of civilisations leads us to realise that “the 
‘macro’ concept of civilisational complexes points to the highest level categories 
constituting the structures of consciousness of civilisations, but they are experienced 
and put to work by individuals in real ‘micro’ situations and predicaments where 
conduct, opinion, thought and imagination take place.”625 It is important to note that 
while Nelson's sociology of civilisations has advanced Weber's legacy, it suffers from 
a Eurocentric tendency. Nelson's sociological analysis of consciousness-types 
“focuses on the advancement of rationalization processes in the West, yet it is framed 
by an equally strong concern with the pre-consciousness of civilisational patterns, the 
inter-civilisational character of cultural production, the centrality of intercivilisational 
conflicts, and the shifts in global civilisational ascendancy.”626 However, it does not 
properly address inter-civilisational encounters of the consciousness-type shifts. It 
takes the Western model of rationalisation as its reference point for judging about 
other civilisations' rationale systems. 
     According to Nielsen, Nelson follows Weber's Eurocentric reading of Western 
rationalisation path: “Weber's way of posing his questions frequently involves asking 
why in one civilisation (the 'West') cultural developments of 'universal significance 
and value' emerged which did not occur independently elsewhere… It too easily 
becomes a study of the 'success' and (especially) the 'failure' of civilisations in the 
gestation of particular cultural forms (for example, modern science) abstracted from 
universal history. It obscures a more central question: what structures, histories and 
experiences did actually occur in different civilisations?”627 Nielsen's critique implies 
the need for a new historical sociology of inter-civilisational relations in which 
competing rationale systems are recognised as the epistemic impetuses for inter-
civilisational exchanges. He writes, “intracivilisational conflicts on an increasingly 
global scale over the meaning of a rationalized structure of consciousness have 
resulted in competing conceptions of 'rationality' itself” 628 (emphasis added).  
     Along the same line of reasoning, Jack Coody reminds us that one of the major 
sources of inter-civilisational conflict has been the West's tendency to regard its 
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system of rationale as a superior account of rationality. In his words, “one tendency 
has been to ascribe to Europe the ability to modernize, whereas others could but 
copy.”629 Goody attributes this superiority claim to a particular rationality: a Western 
rationality, originated from the Greek’s philosophy and logic that developed during 
the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment.
630
 However, viewed from 
other civilisations' perspective, Western rationality is an imperfect rationality hence it 
must be open to mutual criticism. In a modified world-systems perspective, Abu-
Lughod challenges Eurocentric reading of civilisational intercourse in which Western 
rationality play the key role. However, such a world-systems point of view has been 
critised by Donald Nielsen due to an insufficient attention to the key role of the 
cultural logic of civilisational formation.
631
  
8.2 ‘Rationality’ and ‘Social Organisation’ in Three World Civilisations:  
       Islamic, the Western, and Chinese Civilisations  
     I argued that one of the major sources of the clash of civilisations originates from 
their competing accounts of rationality. This section illustrates concrete examples of 
such competing systems of rationale and their outcomes in social institutions in three 
major world civilisations.
632
 These three case studies show how competing systems of 
rationale operate as epistemic sources of the formation of macro-societal institutions 
on a civilisational scale. It, as a whole, prepares us for the next section to address the 
central questions of why a rational dialogue amongst civilisations can work through 
opening civilisations’ systems of rationale to mutual criticism. It is also important to 
note that these case studies are focused on those particular aspects of civilisational 
formation and intercourse that is concerned with (a) civilisational world-views, (b) 
civilisational accounts of human nature and (c) civilisational models of social ordering 
of peoples. Hence, many of other aspects of inter-civilisational exchanges such as the 
trade of sciences and technology remain peripheral to the main focus of these cases 
studies. I will explore centrality of three systems of rationale, so-called as three 
civilisational wisdoms that are reflected in the three patterns of social organisation in 
these civilisations.      
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8.2.1 Islamic Civilisation: The Wisdom of God and Islamic Social Order  
    Sub-section 8.2.1 explains the Islamic system of rationale in following pages and 
its outcomes for the Islamic conception of human nature and the Islamic model of 
social organisation. It also argues how Islamic world-visions affect the institutions of 
Islamic society as a community of believers. It explores relations between the wisdom 
of God and the institutions of the Islamic society. Finally, it briefly argues that the 
Islamic civilisation has been involved in some intellectual and institutional reforms, 
particularly in terms of a set of new interpretations and understandings of the wisdom 
of God, of the Islamic account of human nature and the Islamic pattern of social 
organisation.       
     Rationality in Islamic thought is understood on two major levels. On the first level, 
in Islamic thought, human beings are possessors of the God-given faculty of reason, 
which enables them to recognise the wrong and the right and to think about the 
universe and themselves.
633
 On the second level, Islamic thought implies that once 
individuals have arrived at a rational faith in the First Principles of Islam; namely the 
Unity of God, God as Creator of the Universe, and God as the Master of the Day of 
Judgment, they follow the wisdom of God to organise their personal and social life as 
such principles demand.
634
 The wisdom of God is embodied in the final revelation 
that God delivered in his final messenger: the Prophet Mohammad. This wisdom is 
later collected in the holy book of Islam, i.e., The Quran and the Hadith (i.e. the 
behaviours of the Prophet). Hence, in Islamic civilisation, the wisdom of God (i.e. 
The Quran and the Hadith) constructs the main source of Muslims' rational behaviour. 
    A rational faith in the First Principles, that is key to the Islamic world-vision, leads 
people to a rational acceptance of the wisdom of God, because God has perfect 
knowledge of the universe; of the Day of Judgment, and He knows how people should 
act to achieve the best life. When Muslims (i.e., peoples who recognised the First 
principles) become faithful in the wisdom of God, they employ God's commands—
called Shariah law—in their personal and social life. In this way, they consciously 
shape macro-social institutions of an Islamic community of believers: called as the 
Ummah. The essence of Islamic civilisational identity, therefore, becomes the belief 
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in the wisdom of God, which is manifested in Muslims' personality and their Islamic 
patterns of social organisation through a social learning of the message of the Prophet 
Mohammad.  
    The centrality of divine wisdom in Islamic rationality does not mean that Islamic 
thinkers and Muslims have not used independent sources of reason and rationality for 
an independent understanding of the universe and human nature. Islamic philosophers 
used Greek philosophy to develop Islamic theology, and they used empirical methods 
to develop sciences and technology under the civilisation of Islam. In A History of 
God, Karen Armstrong discusses the developments of science and technology under 
Islam.
635
 However, the present argument aims to uncover the centrality of the wisdom 
of God in shaping the key directions of Islamic rationale system and Islamic social 
institutions—what distinguishes Islamic civilisation's identity from other civilisations.       
     In order to explore how the wisdom of God has shaped a distinctive conception of 
rationality and an epistemic foundation for Islamic social institutions, we need to 
briefly review the principles of Islamic world-visions. The first principle is the Unity 
of God (tawhid). The word ‘Islam’ itself means the act of submitting to the Unity of 
God. The conception of the Unity of God has been developed through the formation 
of Islamic philosophy and theology.
636
 Some Islamic philosophers argue that they 
have developed the meaning of the Unity of God, drawn from teachings of the Quran 
itself. The Quran defines the Unity of God in this way: there is no god but Allah' (la 
ilaha ill Allah). Perhaps one of the most profound readings of this Quranic message 
has been developed by Muhyid Din-Ibnul Arabi. According to him, the Unity of God 
means that the being of all things is God. In other words, every part of the world is the 
whole universe: the God.
637
  
     The Unity of God as an ontological world-vision not only rejects the worship of 
false gods, but also denies the very existence of such gods. God's Unity leads Muslims 
to the second most important principles of the Islamic world-vision: God as the 
Creator of the universe. If there is nothing except God, or if the whole universe is God 
itself, He does not have a beginning. And if the whole universe is God, there is no end 
                                                 
635
 See Karen Armstrong, A History of God (London, Ballatine Books: 1993).   
636
 See William, M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, (UK, Edinburgh University Press: 1985).  
637
 A.E Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Myhuid Din Ibnul Arabi (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1939) p.56. The same line of argument was developed by an Iran Islamic Philosopher called 
Mulla Sadra. His philosophy later termed as 'Hekmatt Mottallieh', see Watt, (1985) p.153. 
  244 
to His existence.
638
 If the God is prior to everything, He must be the Creator of the 
universe, including human beings. While everything has its own beginning and end, 
only the God, whose existence is absolute, can be the Creator of  the whole universe. 
The concept of God as the Creator leads Muslims to the purpose of creation of the 
universe and humankind. The Islamic thought proposes that the purpose of creation is 
the evolution of creatures towards God Himself. The idea of the Day of Judgment 
implies that human beings will be returned to life on the Day of Judgment to see the 
consequences of their actions in this world.  
     If the wisdom of God should be followed by peoples who have accepted Islam-- as 
their ontological vision of the universe, of the human nature and the proper way of 
social life-- they should follow God's commands in their personal and social life. 
Hence, they must collectively establish a community of pious peoples who have 
accepted the First Principles of Islamic faith. The laws of God must be 
institutionalised in social institutions of Islamic community: the Ummah. The Ummah 
as community of believers has been described by the Quran in this way: “You have 
become the best Ummah are raised up for the mankind, enjoining the right and 
forbidding the wrong, and having faith in God.”639 From the Islamic point of view, the 
Ummah is that portion of the world population to whom the messenger of Islam is 
sent, and who accepted the wisdom of God; that is, Islamic faith. The Shariah law 
defines the institutional structure of the Islamic society. As such, the Shariah vision of 
Islam finds a central place in the entire corpus of Islamic thought. However, there are 
different interpretations amongst Islamic schools of thought -- like Shi'ism and 
Sunnism-- on the content of the Shariah law. Nevertheless, they share in this belief 
that the main sources of the Shariah law are the Quran and the Hadith. It is important 
to note that human reason cannot play a central role in the Shariah vision of Islam, 
because it by definition rests upon God's commands.   
     The meaning of rationality for Muslims--in their highest cultural grouping, i.e., 
Islamic civilisation--refers to the wisdom of God which is mainly reflected in the 
Shariah vision of Islam. Historically speaking, the Shariah law has been developed by 
an Islamic science of law, called Figh. The Quran and the teachings of the Prophet 
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(the hadith or the Sunna) are the main sources of the Shariah law.
640
 In the early 
formative age of Islamic Figh, the Quran and the Sunna were regarded as the two 
main sources of divine knowledge that preserved the unity of the Shariah vision.
641
 
However, with the development of Islamic Figh, analogical reasoning (Qiyas) and 
consensus of religious scholars (Ijma) were added to the main sources of the Shariah 
law in order to draw those religious duties that could not be directly discovered by a 
reference to the main sources. There are various readings as to how these sources 
should be used to explore the God's commands, but there is no doubt that they merely 
must explore the message of the Quran.
642
  
     As Amira Bennison argues, the conception of Islamic Ummah gained its tangible 
form in the juridical sphere: to be a Muslim means the acceptance of Islamic Law, the 
Shariah.
643
 Marshal Hodgson argues that we can situate the Shariah vision of Islam at 
the center of the Islamic ideational system, which played the key function in the 
integration of Islamic civilisation despite all its internal diversity.
644
 The Shariah 
vision of Islam has close relation with the Islamic ontological vision. Fazul Rahman 
argues that the concept of Shariah refers to “the divinely ordained pattern of human 
conduct.”645 The word Shariah is used as the highway of good life, which is reflected 
in the divinely given code of conduct.
646
 Recognising that wisdom of God is central to 
Islamic system of rationale, it leads us to explore the cultural logic of Islamic 
civilization formation. In this way, we realise how Islamic rationality affects the 
concept of an Islamic person and how such personality influences Islamic pattern of 
social institutions according to the wisdom of God. 
     Islamic civilisation, historically speaking, emerged because peoples accepted the 
wisdom of God as the epistemic source of their proper code of social conducts. 
William Montgomery Watt provides us with a sociological analysis of how such 
public acceptance of the wisdom of God led to the emergence of Islamic societies. In 
Islam and the Integration of Society, he argues that, in the course of its historical 
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formation, Islamic civilisation realised a kind of social learning process through 
which peoples accepted the wisdom of God. Once peoples became faithful in Islamic 
world-visions, they accepted the Shariah law as their actions' guidelines and practised 
it in their social behaviours.
647
 The historical formation of the Islamic ideational 
system started from the acceptance of the Islamic world-visions and took its macro-
societal institutional shape by practising the Sharaih law in the Muslim communities.  
     The Islamic civilisation was shaped because it created a historical and large-scale 
social learning around its world-visions about the God, about an Islamic conception of 
the person and about an Islamic ideal-type of social organisation. It created a 
civilisational-scale social consensus regarding the wisdom of God. In his study of the 
historical development of Islamic civilisation, Mozaffari points out, “the entire 
[Islamic] system was cemented by a message determining the world vision of the new 
Community.”648 While Islamic civilisation has found different institutional shapes in 
its affiliated societies, a general guideline for addressing Islamic civilisation's 
formation is exploring how Muslims have applied their readings of the Shariah vision 
to shape their social institutions. For instance, two major political systems amongst 
Islamic societies-- called Khalafat and Emamat—can be recognised due to their 
different readings of the Shariah vision of Islam.
649
  
     Islamic civilisation has been involved in intellectual and institutional reforms.
650
 
Some of the Islamic reformists argue that these intellectual and institutional reforms 
originate from epistemological developments that have led to new understandings of 
the wisdom of God. For instance, an Iranian scholar, Abdolkarim Soroush, employs 
Popper's critical epistemology to show how Muslims' understandings of Islamic faith 
have changed because of the developments in their non-religious knowledge. 
651
 This 
line of reform in Islamic thought leads to what he calls an Islamic social democracy, 
as institutional reforms that seek to reconcile Islamic model social organsiation with a 
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social-democratic pattern of ordering peoples.
652
 Many Islamic countries like Turkey, 
Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Egypt have experienced such a line of ideational and 
institutional reforms.
653
 Perhaps, the recent uprisings in the Middle East can be linked 
with people's call for an Islamic democracy. Taking into account this brief case study 
of Islamic civilisation, we can argue that one of the main channels of a rational 
dialogue of civilisations is new interpretations of their systems of rationale. From this 
perspective, opening the civilisational rationale systems to mutual criticism can be a 
mechanism of the reinterpretation of the rationale systems and new account of social 
ordering of peoples due to such a reinterpretation.  
8.2.2 Western Civilisation: Liberal Wisdom and Liberal Democracy 
     Western civilisation also shows close links between rationality, human nature and 
social organisation. Whilst Western civilisation originates from Greek's rationalist 
philosophy and Roman civic organisation, its ideational fundament and social 
institutions, over past three centuries, have been shaped on the basis of a liberal 
wisdom, reflected in the liberal-democratic model of social organisation.    
     The Greek heritage of intellectual thought, in particular its commitment to rational 
dialogue and decision-making through dialogue, is viewed as the origin of Western 
civilisation.
654




 centuries in 
Europe,
655
 that paved the way for the later rationalisation of Western societies in the 
17
th
 and the 18
th
 centuries. Wittrock argues that European paths to the formation of 
distinctly modern societies, in the last two centuries, are rooted in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. An important element was the so-called Papal Revolution, and its 
outcomes for the long-standing de facto separation of ecclesiastical and mundane 
power. According to Wittrock, in the same period, universities were formed as a self-
governing corporation with at least partial autonomy.
656
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     Along with the same line of argument, Toby Huff points out that in the eleventh 
century Europe had a thousand-year-old religious tradition, but it had lost much of 
Rome's heritage, especially the Roman legal tradition, as well as the major portion of 
Greece's heritage. In his words, “it is not surprising, therefore, that when the European 
translators, such as Adelard of Bath (fi. 1116-42), Gerard of Cremona (ca. 1114-87), 
and Michael Scot (1217-35), among others, began to encounter the rich intellectual 
heritage of the Middle East (largely in Spain), they quickly became enthusiasts of and 
promoters of the wisdom of their Arab masters.”657 The early modern Europe in the 
12
th
 and the 13
th
 centuries employed Islamic and Chinese civilisations' achievements 
for developing new accounts of human rationality and human nature. As Huff reminds 
us, it was “a philosophical view of man as a rational being possessed of reason, who 
could arrive at ethical and moral truths unaided by revelation (emphasis added).” 658 
This refers to a key switch in the system of rationale of Western civilisation, from the 
wisdom of Christianity to the wisdom of independent reason. 
     As Wittrock argues, while early modern Europe paved the way for such new 
conceptions of rationality and human nature, an entirely new account of conscious 
human agency was shaped in the 17
th
 and the 18
th
 centuries. In Chapters 6 and 7, it 
was argued how the Western social philosophy was developed for a self-liberation 
from intellectual authority of the Catholic Church by introducing new accounts of 
rationality, human nature and social organisation, suggested by liberal thinkers like 
Hobbes, Locke and Hume, amongst others. It is true that the modern conceptions of 
human nature and the liberal-democratic form of social organisation were ultimately 
originated in Europe's early modern philosophical view of man as a rational being 
possessed of reason; however, actual formation of these epistemic and institutional 
developments occurred over the previous three centuries in Western civilisation. 
     During the intellectual reforms-- from its early modern Europe type to its post-
Enlightenment form-- the meaning of the God-given agency of human reason was 
notably changed. It was an important change from the conception of human being as a 
rational agent who could use his reason to understand the message of the God towards 
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a new account of rationality as an independent source of ethical and moral truth. In 
this sense, the cultural logic of Western civilisation shifted from the centrality of the 
wisdom of Christian God to the centrality of an unaided human reason. This shift in 
the cultural constitution of Western civilisation occurred when a model of rational 
inquiry was established on which basis everything was examined for the purpose of 
finding the causes and giving the reason thereof.
659
  
     Scholars like Peter Abelard, amongst others, sought to explicate the separation 
between the autonomous forces of nature and those of the divine explanations 
whenever they could be worked out. 
660
 William Conches argued that “it is not the 
task of the Bible to teach us the nature of things; this belongs to philosophy.”661 But, 
these early modern waves did not stop here “they went on to examine and even 
criticise the Bible and to suggest that if a message of the Bible contradicts reason and 
the natural order, it should not be taken literally.”662 Toby Huff connects this deep-
seated epistemic shift in the conception of human conscious agency with an 
institutional revolution in early modern Europe. For him, at the center of this 
development, “one finds the legal and political principle of treating collective actors 
as a single entity--a corporation.”663 The legal principle of treating collective actors as 
a single entity brought in its train constitutional principles establishing such political 
ideas such as constitutional government. However, he acknowledges that medieval 
European constitutionalism was unable to deter rulers who trampled on the social and 
political rights of the citizenry. With the arrival of the modern nation-state, this 
problem became acute and led to various forms of political revolutions. Also, given 
the tripartite division of powers in modern constitutional state, the idea of rule of law 
found an institutional form in Western liberal democracies.
664
  
    As Wittrock reminds us, the deep-seated epistemic transformation, which occurred 
at the turn of the 18
th




 leads to explore the conceptions of 
rationality and human nature in the modern phase of Western civilisation. Chapters 6 
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and 7 argued about Western modern rationality and its close relationship with a liberal 
wisdom-- what is called as the Lockean ideal types of human nature and social 
organisation. Here I briefly refer to those arguments to argue how the liberal wisdom 
constructs the system of rationale in Western civilisation. While the West replaced the 
centrality of the God's wisdom with an independent human reason, the modern 
expression of this conscious human agency is reflected in the liberal wisdom. Hence, 
if we identify this liberal wisdom with a kind of relativist epistemology, the centrality 
of God's wisdom has been suppressed with the centrality of liberal wisdom. This new 
account of rationality introduces human beings as utility-maximising agents who 
employ their faculty of reason to achieve their personally defined action-goals through 
rationalising their action-means to the subjective ends.  
     Over the past three centuries, Western civilisation became a liberal civilisation, as 
an intellectual and institutional liberation from an authority of the Catholic Church. 
As Manent argues, the key philosophical and political questions of Europe over the 
past three centuries are related to how peoples can build a new human association, 
free from the authority of the Catholic Church.
666
 This does not imply of course that 
contemporary Western societies are entirely non-religious societies, or religion does 
not play an important role in these societies.
667
 It implies that religious wisdom has 
lost its previous defining function in Western understandings of human reason and 
rationality, and in the Western readings of human nature and social organisation.  
     Chapters 6 and 7 argued in detail about the liberal conceptions of rationality, 
human nature and social organisation by referring to the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, 
Hume, Hayek and Rawls, as some important liberal thinkers. Liberal wisdom defends 
the co-existence of rivals under the rule of law instead of the Kantian logic of a 
rational dialogue and social cooperation among individuals as end in themselves. The 
centrality of liberal wisdom and its outcomes for liberal democratic model of social 
order does not imply a lack of alternative logics of human rationality in this 
civilisation. The West, as a whole, has always included alternative readings of 
rationality and social order beyond liberal wisdom and liberal democracies: for 
instance from  social democracy to Communism.    
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     The wisdom of liberalism leads us to recognise a set of shared ideas and values in 
the Western civilisation around the conception of liberal (wo)man and liberal-
democratic social order. A liberal (wo)man uses her or his faculty of reason to find 
suitable means to satisfy her or his action-goals under the protection of the property 
right by the constitutional state. The liberal wisdom and liberal conception of human 
nature have been micro-foundations of social institutions of the liberal-democratic 
model of social order. In sum, Western civilization, as a highest cultural grouping of 
liberal-minded peoples has used liberal world-views and values to organise people in 
the context of liberal-democratic nation-states.  
8.2.3 Chinese Civilisation: Chinese Wisdom and  
           The Family Pattern of Social Order 
    The main sources of rationality and human nature's concept in Chinese civilisation, 
like Islamic and Western civilisations, are its philosophical viewpoints. In response to 
the question of what was the philosophical basis of Chinese civilisation, we can argue 
about Confucianism as one of the most important schools of thought, which plays a 
central function in the formation of ideational system of this civilisation. However, 
Taoism and Buddhism are also important for exploring the cultural logic of Chinese 
civilisation. This subsection focuses on Confucian social philosophy,
668
 with some 
very brief references to Taoism and Buddhism. As such, I shall address rationality and 
human nature concepts from the perspective of Confucianism and their outcomes for a 
family pattern of social ordering of peoples in Chinese civilisation. Along this line of 
argument, the relationship between the conception of rationality and models of human 
action and social order in the Chinese civilization will be explored.  
     Xiaoming Huang argues that conceptions of rationality and human nature in 
Chinese civilisation are included in Confucius moral approach to social order. In other 
words, as Hobbes suggested his accounts of rationality and human nature as the base 
of his analysis of his society's social order, Confucius accounts of human nature and 
rationality formed to address the social problem of Chinese society at his time. In 
Huang's words, “the problems that faced Confucius, and Hobbes and Machiavelli 
were essentially the same. In a social setting where the feudal system built on simple 
lord-vassal relationships collapsed and more sophisticated form of production, 
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distribution and social organization emerged and where authority relations within the 
system became more complicated and ambiguous, individual compliance become the 
key to the effective exclusion of any meaningful social agenda which would require 
the cooperation of the population.”669 Like Hobbes, Confucius developed his 
approach to the conceptions of rationality and human nature in order to find a solution 
for the problem of social order. 
      I use the term the wisdom of the past for the Confucian system of rationale and the 
term the family pattern of social order as the corresponding logic for social ordering 
of people in Chinese civilisation. If we look at Chinese civilisation-- as an approach to 
the problem of social order-- we must sketch Chinese civilisation's rationale system in 
those conceptions of rationality and human nature that are defined in the context of an 
ideal-type (wo)man of Confucianism. Hence the cultural logic or social philosophy of 
Chinese civilisation is linked with Confucian accounts of the Chinese ideal (wo)man. 
Benjamin Schwartz argues that the Chinese cultural orientation should be sought in 
the history of ancient thought in China and its account of ideal (wo)man and ideal 
social order.
670
 From a Confucian view, it is only the human heart or mind which 
possesses the capacity to ‘make itself sincere’ and having made itself sincere to the 




     For Confucius, human nature (jen) refers to a moral power that can make itself 
sincere, if it follows the proper code of social practice, delivered from the past to us in 
the terms of good customs and ceremonial action (li).
672
 In other words, human nature 
is defined on the basis of its capacity to become one with tao (the way) as a given 
direction, identified by the wisdom of the past (li). The tao is a roadmap (the way) on 
the basis of which one finds his true direction toward a moral personal and social life. 
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     In the Analects, Confucius links his account of human rationality with his reading 
of human nature-- as the foundations of his approach to the moral order of society. 
The concept of li refers to what Confucius means by rationality or the wisdom of the 
past. This concept is linked with the Confucian reading of human agency (jen) and the 
Confucian ideal-type of a moral social order (tao). Without recognising the Confucian 
account of rationality and vision of human agency, his moral solution for overcoming 
social disorder cannot be understood.      
    While the pre-Confucian approach to jen is defined it as an inner moral power for 
linking the social order with the inner virtue of Kings, Confucius expands this concept 
to show that “the moral power is not the prerogative of those [kings] in authority--that 
commoners like himself may possess virtue.”674 Rationality is embodied in a body of 
objective prescription of moral behaviours that have been transmitted by a long sacred 
tradition, resulting from the wisdom of the past. In this line of thought, human nature 
(jen) is an inner intellectual capacity of the submission to such objective account of 
rationality.
675
 The term li literally means 'rite'; that is, the rules or customs. It refers to 
the rules of correct or rational behaviour in every social situation. Confucius views the 
main source of this rational behavior in the wisdom of the past-- accumulated as a set 
of objective body of moral standard of action. The li therefore can be compared with 
the Shariah law in Islamic thought. Human reason and rationality is viewed in a social 
context that was formed by wisdom of the past. 
     Schwartz argues for an important difference between Confucius and Socrates on 
the source and the method of identifying rational action and a moral society. Socrates 
introduces his method of exploring 'goodness' on the basis of a dialectical inquiry, 
going beyond all tradition and customs. Confucius introduces customs and tradition as 
the main source of rational action. Arthur Waley observes the Confucian approach in 
this way: “there has emerged within the history of the civilized world a universal and 
tested body of what might be called in Hegelian term an 'objective ethical order' 
embodied in the rites, practices and basis institutions of the tao of the three 
dynasties.”676 This Chinese account of rationality is the wisdom of the past. As Arthur 
Wright argues, when the wisdom of the past (li) was institutionalised in social order, 
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peoples find their moral solution (tao) towards a good society.
677
 From a Confucian 
view, the word tao means “an all-encompassing state of affairs embracing the 'outer' 
sociopolitical order and 'inner' moral life of the individual.” 678 In sum, the concept of 
tao refers to a unique way for all things, which links the inner life of individuals 
(human nature) with the proper code of social practice.
679
  
     However, as Joseph Needham points out, for Taoism, “the Tao or Way was not the 
right order of life within human society, but the way in which the universe worked; in 
order words, the Order of Nature.” It was necessary, “to imitate the Tao, which works 
unseen and does not dominate.”680 Needham writes: “Taoist patterns of thought and 
behavior included all kinds of rebellion against conventions, the withdrawal of the 
individual from society, the love and study of nature, the refusal to take office, and the 
living embodiment of the paradoxical non-possessiveness of the Tao Te Ching, 
production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without 
domination.” 681 Taoism was an anti-feudal philosophy and thus against the 
government. But Confucianism was used as a governmental ideology to preserve the 
Chinese authoritarian political and social system. One of important roles of Taoism in 
the historical formation of Chinese civilisation refers to its implementation in the 
work of secret societies, sects, and peasant movements that have been linked to 
revolutionary activity throughout Chinese history.
682
      
     Confucius argues that the family is the basic unit of a good society. The wisdom of 
the past is embodied in the family pattern of social life. Hence, the challenge of 
establishing a good society is reduced to the challenge of the creation of a ruling class 
who have cultivated their inner moral power in order to organise their society based 
on the proper code of social practice. As Huang argues, Confucius strategy for solving 
social problems in the Chinese society of his time was to take a moral approach to 
social ordering of peoples. It referred to a moral cultivation of individuals, in 
particular the ruling class by making them social agents for the creation of a good 
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society. A society follows the wisdom of the past by taking its paradigm as the family 
pattern of social organisation.
683
 
      Confucianism believes that the family pattern in the early Chou dynasty leads us 
to a well-tested model of human relationships based on inner virtue, love and 
authoritative cooperation. Wright points out "the basic social unit of the Confucian 
system was the well-ordered family. The family pattern was seen as a microcosm of 
the sociopolitical order; the wise father was a model for the wise ruler. Both the 
family and the state governed by the li as the norm of proper social behavior."
684
 In 
this way, rationality as the wisdom of the past was institutionalised in Chinese family 
pattern of social order. The family pattern is a well-ordered mode of social life in the 
past and should be applied on a societal scale. It leads us to recognise reasons why, 
"the father to be a living source of authority and power… Without the universal 
kingship through which virtuous kings may influence an entire society, the separate li 
cannot be ultimately realised. Thus, the li must in every way support the institutions 
of Kingship".
685
 This Confucian account of an ideal human society allows us to realise 
an authoritative nature of the Chinese civilisation's social order.  
     Chinese Taoism existed in a peculiar balance within the structures of 
consciousness of Chinese civilization, and it has integrated into Chinese life more 
deeply than its revolutionary character would imply.
686
 Concerning this fact, Joseph 
Levenson writes, “together Confucianism and Taoism made the whole [Chinese] man, 
one implying a testimonial to civilisation and the values and goals of social life 
released from society and social concerns”.687  With the widespread introduction of 
Buddhism into China in the third century, despite its initial tension with Taoism, they 
became inextricably mixed within popular Chinese religion.
688
 Confucianism rose on 
the premise of solving the Chinese's social disorder. But the 'Confucianisation' of the 
uncultivated Chinese's citizens was not able to overcome such a disorder. 
Confucianism was adopted and transformed into a state ideology for the purpose of 
helping maintain the political and economic order.
689
 Inefficiencies of Confucianism 
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led to the rise of a new social philosophy, shaped as the result of the prevalence of 
Mao's Communist Revolution in the mid-twentieth century. Modern China is no 
longer committed to Confucianism as it was before. It has learned to improve its 
account of rationality and its model of social ordering of peoples. 
690
 
8.3 Inter-Civilisational Dialogue and the Open Global Society Formation: 
      Towards a Macrosociology of Dialogic Globalisation   
     In chapter 5, a critical rationalist model of social learning was proposed, which 
used an inter-subjective learning from mutual criticism as the mechanism of a 
conscious social transformation from a closed society into an open society. In this 
model, due to their access to critical rationality, individuals can enter into a social 
learning process that employs the method of learning from errors (P1TTEEP2) 
to shape a normative consensus regarding the moral foundation of social 
organisation—what was called the ethics of openness to criticism. In this section, I 
argue for an application of such a critical rationalist model of social learning on an 
inter-civilisational scale. In addition, I will argue for the transformative role of such a 
global social learning in the formation of an open global society. This global social 
learning as a rational dialogue amongst civilisations, targets the cultural logic of 
global social organisation. The key argument here is how a critical rationalist 
approach to dialogue amongst civilisations can transform the Lockean logic of 
economic competition into the Kantian logic of social cooperation on the basis of 
rational dialogue. This leads us to exploe possibility of a profound institutional change 
on a global scale from liberal globalisation toward a dialogic globalisation via inviting 
civilisations to opening their fumdamental belifes to mutual criticism.  
      From an epistemological perspective, the critical rationalist approach to dialogue 
of civilizations enables us explore reasons why a dialogue amongst competing 
rationale systems, as the cultural logic of civilisational formation, is possible and it 
can converge those systems of rationale toward a meta-civilisational standard of 
rationality. To these ends, the section starts with a brief review of the dynamic of the 
Axial Age civilisations to recall the key role of dialogue in the inter-civilisational 
intercourse. It then argues that the conflicting systems of rationale act as obstacles for 
a rational dialogue of civilisations. However, competing conceptions of rationality can 
be transformed into a higher meta-civilisational rationality, if they open the key 
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premises of their systems of rationality to mutual criticism. A macrosociology of 
dialogic globalisation uses Critical Rationalism to address the emergence of such a 
global conception of human rationality, as an inter-civilisational learning from mutual 
criticism. This section employs the notion of a global critical rationality to address 
the five layers of an ideal type global social learning for the formation of a multi-
civilisational open global society.       
8.3.1 Axial Age Civilisations and Inter-Civilisational World Order 
     Sociologists of civilisations, like Eisenstadt, Wittrock, Nelson and Nielsen, view 
the Axial Age's civilisations as an important turning point in the function of inter-
civilisational dialogue in the formation of world order. I refer to this historical 
background because it leads us to see how competing systems of rationale are 
connected with the dialogue of civilisations as a mechanism of world order formation. 
Wittrock argues that the Axial Age shaped an initial stage of cultural crystallisation 
and macro-institutional change on a global scale.
691
 He refers to Karl Jaspers' work 
entitled The Origin and Goal of History to address the emergence of Axial Age 
civilisations in the context of such cultural crystallization and macro-institutional 
change. For Jaspers, our understanding of history is related to the emergence and 
institutionalisation of some forms of critical reflexivity, which originate from the 
capacity of human beings to reflect upon and to give expression to an image of the 
world. Jaspers marked this capacity with the transition from Mythos to Logos as a 
breakthrough in critical reflexivity and the emergence of global history as a historical 
consciousness.
692
 He termed the historical turning point in such a transition' as the 
Axial Age, covering the centuries around the middle of the first millennium BCE.
693
  
     Eisenstadt and other historians have expanded Jaspers' idea and have given it an 
empirical basis. Wittrock argues that with all its openness to criticism the idea of the 
Axial Age civilisations is to-date the most ambitious and encompassing one that 
outlines key features of a first global cultural crystallisation and its outcomes for the 
world order. In his words, “the concept of the Axial Age encompasses deep-seated 
intellectual and cosmological shifts that occurred in different forms … across the 
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Eurasian hemisphere. These shifts were manifested in such different forms as the 
thought of Confucius and Mencius in China, Buddha in India, the Hebrew prophetical 
movement and the classical age in Greek philosophy.”694 The Axial Age's ontological 
and societal changes are analogous to the formation of the modern age in terms of 
such kinds of transformations in world vision and social order. A macrosociology of 
dialogic globalization, that aims to address interactions of the ideational force and 
macro-institutional transformation, needs to refer to Axial Age civilisations. My 
intention here is to show that competing systems of rationale-- originated in the first 
global cultural crystallisation-- have remained as the core ideational source of 
civilisational conflicts and dialogue since. However, despite Eisenstadt's argument, 
the transition of the Axial Age civilisations to the modern age has not been a 
transition to the formation of a global civilisation of modernity. World civilisations 
are still radically different building blocks of a multi-polar world order, due to their 
conflicting accounts of rationality, of human nature and social order.  
     For Eisenstadt, it was through the emergence of the Axial Age that civilisations 
formed as distinct entities and an explicit consciousness thereof developed.
695
 The 
central aspect of these revolutionary breakthroughs was the emergence and realisation 
of the basic ontological conceptions that a gulf exists between transcendental and 
mundane social orders. The institutionalisation of new ontological conceptions 
entailed that the mundane order is incomplete and in need of reconstruction. It was 
perhaps the first global attempt for reconstructing social order based on a conscious 
human agency that led to an increasing historical consciousness within and amongst 
the Axial Age civilisations.
696
 However, the most important transformation of this sort 
was the construction of culture or religious forms of ethical and political identities, 
which reflected in their civilisational shapes. These cultural identities provided 
epistemic dynamics of world order formation or what Nelson calls civilisations' 
systems of rationale.  
    All of these developments opened up the possibility for the conscious ordering of 
society, but they also exposed society to potential class and ideological conflicts. The 
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distinctive vision in each Axial Age civilisation led to next phase of civilisational 
conflicts and dialogue. 
697
 It supports the idea that later conflict and dialogue of 
civilisations originated in their competing systems of rationale and different patterns 
of social organisation, which were reflected in their competing ontological visions 
about human nature and social order. Sociology of Axial Age civilisations implies that 
with the process of institutionalising these civilizations, a new type of 
intercivilisational world history emerged. Eisenstadt claims that the expansion of 
Western modernity to most other parts of the world led to a global civilisation of 
modernity.
698
 However, it does not seem that non-western civilisations signal such an 
integration into a global civilization, although non-Western civilisations have been 
affected by a global condition that has been created by Western modernity.
699
 Perhaps 
a key reason is that they still follow their own systems of rationale rather than the 
Western liberal wisdom and liberal-democratic model of social organisation. The 
emerging liberal globality follows the logic of competition rather than rational 
dialogue and social cooperation.   
8.3.2 A Critical Rationalist Model of Inter-Civilisational Dialogue 
     Competing rationale systems and models of social organisation are major sources 
of contemporary multi-civilisational global order. The emerging liberal global order 
recognises this competition, but it implies that radically different civilisations, due to 
their incommensurable rationale systems, cannot overcome their conflicts of opinion 
over the good (the ultimate goals of human action) through a rational dialogue. Hence, 
liberal globalisation is not concerned with the key issue of how emerging global order 
can be rationalised through a dialogue among civilisations. It is mainly focused on a 
global economic competition amongst radically different cultural standing points and 
political interests. In chapter 7, the unsocial sociability of emerging liberal globality 
was discussed. The liberal logic of social organisation does not enable us to overcome 
globalisation's unsocial sociability because it regards civilisations of peoples as 
incommensurable systems of rationale with incommensurable conceptions of human 
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nature and incommensurable patterns of social organisation. However, if globalisation 
can be viewed as a global institutional mechanism for the creation of a global society 
of free and equal persons, a kind of convergence is required amongst these competing 
systems of rationale towards a meta-civilisational account of rationality, a meta-
civilisational conception of human nature and a meta-civilisational model of social 
ordering of free and equal persons. As Nielsen rightly argues, controversies in the 20
th
 






…comparative historical research [on sociology of civilisations] needs to 
focus on actual variations in the operation of reason, rationale, 
rationalization, etc. across civilisations. Indeed, despite Weber' early 
warnings on this matter, we still lack a full historical and sociological 
analysis of the ideas and institutions connected with the various notions 
themselves of reason, rational, rationalization, etc. …Controversies in the 20th 
century have much the same 'fundamental' quality, so that shared rationales 
usually elude the opposed parties. Like the twelfth and the seventeenth 
centuries, this century is one of debate as the level of the highest civilisational 
[rationale] structures. 
700
   
     As argued in chapter 5, from a Kantian perspective, the ideal-type of a rational 
dialogue amongst civilisations of peoples is achievable. The possibility of this rational 
dialogue leads us to explore the possibility of the emergence of a meta-civilisational 
system of rationality and value system with important consequences for the possibility 
of the formation of people-centric global institutions. This section argues that critical 
rationalism provides an epistemological logic to address the mechanism of such 
convergence of rationale and value systems and its outcomes for a global institutional 
change from exiting liberal globality to an open global order. From a critical 
rationalist perspective, all civilisational-based rationale systems are imperfect: hence 
epistemologically speaking they should open their fundamental premises to mutual 
criticism. As Bartley rightly argues, Critical Rationalism implies that all of our 
fundamental beliefs must be open to mutual criticism. An emergence of a meta-
civilisational account of rationality refers to a process of opening world civilisations' 
fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism, an openness that leads to an inter-societal 
learning from such mutual criticism on a civilisational scale. If a rational dialogue of 
civilisations limits its own account of rationality to the system of rationale or 
fundamental beliefs of one civilisation, it is hard to realise how other civilisations' 
rationale systems can be converged with that particular rationality. On the contrary, if 
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we take a meta-civilisational account of rationality that demands openness of all of 
our fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism, the way will be paved for exploring the 
possibility of a higher level of global rationality that goes beyond one civilisation's 
fundamental beliefs and values.  
     By saying a critical rationalist approach to dialogue amongst civilisations, I mean 
that civilisations of peoples have ability to criticise their own historically constructed 
fundamental beliefs regarding human rationality, human nature and the patterns of 
social order through activating their access to critical reason. Recalling chapter 4, by 
critical reason, I referred to the three principles of Critical Rationalism: (a) peoples’ 
ability to formulate a valid deductive argument; (b) peoples’ ability to criticise the 
premise of such a valid deductive argument; and (c) peoples’ ability to respect the 
regulative idea of the approximation to the truth. Given these main principles of 
critical rationality, if civilisations of peoples want to enter into a critical rationalist 
dialogue, they must respect such abilities for each other. Despite Habermas’ theory of 
communication action, this thesis does not argue that since civilisations of peoples can 
enter into a linguistic dialogue, they can arrive at a meta-civilisational consensus over 
one set of global shared values. It argues that if world civilisations want to shape a set 
of globally shared values as the moral foundation of their global social order, they 
must accept a common criterion of rationality on which basis they can achieve an 
inter-subjective consensus over such shared values.  
     A critical rationalist ideal-type of an inter-civilisational dialogue implies that, due 
to peoples' access to critical reason, civilisations of peoples have the required 
epistemic capability of going beyond their own systems of rationale and criticise their 
fundamental beliefs concerning rationality, human nature, and the patterns of social 
organisation. In this way, Critical Rationalism provides us with a new epistemological 
theory of dialogue among civilisations based on the logic of openness of fundamental 
beliefs to mutual criticism (i.e., P1TTEEP2). 701  
     As argued before, mutual understanding and exchange of views has already 
operated as the mechanism for inter-civilisational intercourse. In one sense, through 
such inter-civilisational dialogue some common standards of rationality already exist 
globally in such sciences as mathematics, physics, medicine, engineering, chemistry, 
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biology and some aspects of international relations like diplomatic negotiation, and 
international law. However, our multi-civilisational world order suffers from the lack 
of a global standard of human rationality, a globally shared account of human nature 
and a globally validated pattern of social organisation. Linklater rightly questions 
“…how far progress towards solidarism is possible in a universal international society 
which lacks a common [global] culture…”702 The main function of a rational dialogue 
amongst civilisations is the creation of such a global culture-- as a set of shared values 
about human nature and social organisation-- through an inter-civilisational dialogue. 
The modern conception of rational dialogue of civilisations must fundamentally go 
beyond that of the common scientific or diplomatic standards of rationality. It requires 
a global common culture as one set of globally shared values regarding human beings, 
their rights of self-determination and a people-centric model of global social order.  
     The main aim of this modern account of rational dialogue amongst civilisations 
can be creating a common understanding regarding how emerging world order should 
be reorganised in order to recognise all human beings as an end in themselves. It 
seems that contemporary world civilisations, due to their different accounts of human 
nature and social organisation, are not yet ready to give up their own readings of 
human nature and social order in favour of other civilisations. However, such a 
resistance does not imply an impossibility of a convergence of their points of view 
towards a meta-civilisational perspective. As Linklater argues, whilst some reject “the 
Kantian tradition with its progressivist faith in the human capacity to agree on 
universal norms which would secure a passage from a system of states dominated by 
power and force to a world community governed by dialogue and consent”703, the 
thesis argues that a rational dialogue among civilisations can lead peoples to such a 
global agreement on universal norms. The main function of these universal norms is 
shaping a set of global shared values as the moral foundation of global order.  
     Habermas argues, “the normative model for a community that exist without any 
possible exclusion is the universe of moral persons—Kant's ‘kingdom of ends’. It is 
thus no coincidence that ‘human rights,’ i.e. legal norms with an exclusively moral 
content, make up the entire normative framework for a cosmopolitan community.”704 
However, he recognises that the political culture of emerging world society lacks the 
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common ethical-political dimension that would be necessary for a cosmopolitan 
society.
705
 How can a critical rationalist model of dialogue among civilisations lead us 
to explore the possibility of the formation of such a global common culture through 
the critical rationalist ideal-type global social learning? To address this question, the 
insights of the previous section regarding competing systems of rationale and social 
organisation amongst the three world civilisations of the Chinese, Islam and the West 
should be used. If a global culture is required for the formation of a global society of 
free and equal citizens, how could the cultural logics of civilisations be converged 
towards a global culture that rest upon a globally shared accounts of human nature 
and social organisation?  
     The Kantian moral conception of the person should not be taken as an already 
existing fact. On the contrary, such a moral conception must be created through an 
inter-civilisational dialogue and social learning. As the ideal type of open global 
society implies, equal access of peoples to critical reason can operate as an 
explanatory mechanism for addressing the emergence of a Kantian moral person 
among civilisations. While people have been influenced by their own civilisational-
based understandings of rationality, their potential access to critical reason enables 
them to question and to revise their own socially constructed fundamental accounts of 
rationality and their value systems. If we do not recognise such a capacity, we assume 
that peoples would forever remain as the prisoners of their own socially constructed 
rationalities. These abilities of self- awareness and self-learning from criticism (i.e., 
P1TTEEP2) can lead peoples towards a meta-civilisational account of 
rationality; that is, a global critical rationality on which basis they must open their 
fundamental beliefs to mutual criticism. The idea of rationality, as openness to 
rational criticism on an inter-civilisational level, reflects what Karl Popper terms as 
rational unity of humankind. It also can lead us to a meta-civilisational account of 
human nature, as a critical rationalist decider, who can distinguish between the right 
and the wrong actions, beyond his or her civilisational defined account of rationality 
and a moral action.  In other words, when we recognise peoples as rational agents who 
can use their critical reason to form valid deductive arguments and to criticise the 
premise of such arguments, we have assumed the existence of a meta-civilisational 
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capacity for peoples to rationally evaluate and critisise their own civilisational-based 
fundamental beliefs about human beings and social order.  
8.3.3 Transformative Capacities of the Five Layers of  
           Inter-Civilisational Dialogue  
     Against this background, the main role of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations 
is the creation of a global consensus upon such a moral person due to his or her access 
to critical rationality. Individuals are armed with the ability to engage in critical 
argument. They are not prisoners of their civilisations' accounts of human nature and 
social order. Hence, they can enter into a critical discussion on fundamental premises 
of their own civilisational beliefs and value system. Recalling the five layers of a 
critical rationalist model of social learning from chapter 5, the first layer refers to a 
philosophical learning process. The transformative role of a rational dialogue amongst 
civilisations in this layer can be seen in it enables peoples to liberate themselves from 
their limited civilisational accounts of human rationality and people's world-views. If 
they use their access to critical reasoning to question fundamental premises of their 
metaphysical views about human beings and whole world, they recognise the 
imperfection of their civilisational accounts of human rationality and human nature. In 
addition, they recognise they if they open their fundamental beliefs to criticism, they 
can learn from other civilizations' beliefs and values systems.  
     For instance, if a Muslim accepts that his or her system of rationale is imperfect 
due to the fact that it is his or her own reading of the wisdom of God, his or her mind 
would open to other civilisations' rationale systems. By the same reasoning, once a 
liberal (wo)man recognises that her or his account of rationality is an imperfect 
human-made account, she or he would readily to learn from non-Western systems of 
rationale. This process of inter-subjective learning from opening fundamental beliefs 
to mutual criticism addresses an inter-civilisational process of self-adjustment and 
convergence towards a meta-civilisational standard of rationality on which basis a 
metaphysic of openness to criticism can take shape. This philosophical layer of global 
social learning can lead to peoples of different civilisations towards a new 
metaphysical foundation according to which human beings because, despite their 
civilisational or national affiliations, they are recognised as equal moral beings due to 
their equal access to critical reasoning that make them the end in themselves.  
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     From an epistemological perspective, this process of social learning from opening 
people's fundamental metaphysical belifes to mutual criticism (P1TTEEP2) 
can lead them to a normative societal agreement. For instance, if a Western, a Chinese 
or an Islamic (wo) man recognise the imperfection of her or his own civilisational 
account of rationality and human nature, she or he has actually engaged in a global 
social learning that can lead her or him to a normative global conception of the 
person. This normative concpetion of person, in Kantian term, refers to the concpetion 
of the prospective global citizens as equal moral beings. The main identity of this 
global normative account of the person refers to his or her ability to use his or her 
critical reason to engage in a rational dialogue despite his or her civilisational or 
national affiliation. If we take seriously the possibility of this philosophical layer of a 
normative global social learning amongst civilisations, we might be persuaded that the 
emergence of new meta-civilisational conceptions of rationality and rational action 
through is a reasonable global project.  
     As argued in chapters 2 and 5, there are some epistemological necessities to 
enforce the potential participants in such a rational dialogue to accept the results of 
such a dialouge, if they do not want to contradict themselves. If those who belong to 
different civilisational zones respect the principles of critical rationality, they must 
accept logical outcomes of such critical discussion amongst themselves. The logical 
outcome would be a critical rationalist conception of the person, as defined in detail 
in chapter 4. Despite their civilisational accounts of human being, peoples can arrive 
at a global account of human nature. Kant's moral person is a universal person who 
potentially has access to critical reason that enables him or her to judge about the 
rightness or wrongness of his or her action. This epistemological-cum-normative 
learning process can create a globally shared moral conception of the person. 
     This moral person is a rational decision-maker who must be respected as an end 
per se due to his or her capacity to employ critical reason for taking a right moral 
decision, and for creating a moral social order. Once civilisations of peoples enter into 
a rational dialogue about the imperfection of fundamental premises of their systems of 
rationale, they have already started to build such a new conception of a moral person. 
In the Popperian-informed critical rationalist account of human nature, the main 
feature of the person is his or her ability to use critical reason for taking a right moral 
decision. This philosophical layer of the ideal type of global social learning paves the 
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way for a subsequent moral layer of social learning. Without an inter-civilisational 
metaphysical consensus on such a normative account of human nature, the Kantian 
concept of moral person will not actually emerge. In other sense, the Kantian moral 
person must be created through the philosophical layer of global social learning.  
      If world civilisations arrive at a common metaphysical account of human nature, 
they can establish a meta-civilisational moral vision of the person that goes beyond 
their civilisational-based moral accounts of the person. In this way, the philosophical 
layer of our ideal-type global social learning paves the way for an inter-civilisational 
moral learning. In the previous section, it was argued that the civilisations of the 
Chinese, the West and Islam have introduced their patterns of social organisations 
based upon their moral philosophies, which originate in their systems of rationale. 
Hence, conflicting moral philosophies have been one of the major sources of the clash 
of world civilisations. The Islamic civilisation defines its own moral philosophy based 
on the wisdom of God, implying that a moral person is a person whose actions are 
cognitively fueled by the God's commands. The Western civilisation defines its moral 
philosophy according to the liberal wisdom: a moral action is an action that originates 
in the person's self-reading of the proper code of practice in terms of how such an 
action satisfies his or her subjective utilities. The Chinese civilisation defines its moral 
philosophy based on the wisdom of past in which a moral action is an action that 
follows such a wisdom.  
     However, if civilisations of peoples arrive at an inter-subjective consensus over a 
new global conception of rationality (openness to criticism) and accordingly a new 
account of moral person, they must also modify their civilisational moral philosophies 
in favour of a global moral philosophy or what I called a global ethics of openness to 
criticism. In this way, they require to achieve an overlapping consensus regarding the 
ethics of openness to criticism, implying that their fundamental beliefs are open to 
mutual criticism and revision. Such a deep-seated moral transformation of the existing 
civilisational-based moral systems into the global ethics of openness to criticism can 
take shape through the moral layer of such a global learning. Through such a moral 
learning process radically different civilisational moral schemes can learn to subject 
their own attitudes of a moral person to the judgment of other moral philosophies and 
learn to respect each other's people as equal moral beings due to the need for such an 
inter-subjective criticism. The organising principle of this global ethics of openness to 
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criticism is that since individuals are equal possessors of critical rationality-- capable 
of taking a right moral decision-- they should be regarded as ends per se despite their 
affiliations to different civilisations, religions, races, and classes, and nationality. The 
global ethics of openness to criticism realises the Kantian universal moral person, 
which is rooted in Kant's critical philosophy.
706
 In this sense, the philosophical layer 
of the ideal type global social learning paves the way to understand the possibility of 
such a global moral learning.   
    In Towards a Sociology of Global Morals, Linklater argues that humans’ access to 
communicative rationality “raised the possibility of a worldwide communication 
community in which all persons enjoined an equal right to advance claims about any 
decisions that may affect them. …Collective learning process over many centuries 
have brought these possibilities to light. …Collective learning process replaced 
mythical narratives with ‘rationalized world views’ which valued 'argumentative 
foundation' and which broke through morally parochial ways of life.”707 Along the 
same line of reasoning, the emergence of global ethics of openness to criticism 
originates in an inter-civilisational moral learning through which world civilisations 
recognises each other's peoples as equal moral beings. In this way, the emergence of 
such a global conception of a moral person becomes the main product of such a global 
moral learning.  
      By employing the logic of social learning from errors, people can question their 
own civilisational accounts of a moral person. For instance, the Chinese peoples can 
use their critical reason to question the wisdom of the past as the basis of their moral 
action, Muslims can question their own religious account of a moral behaviour and 
the Western peoples can criticise their utilitarian account of a moral code of conduct. 
Such mutual criticisms, in this moral sense, can operate as the mechanism of global 
moral learning through subjecting moral beliefs to an inter-civilisational judgment. 
    The emergence of a global ethics of openness to criticism is closely dependent upon 
the realisation of a critical rationalist ideal type of dialogue among world civilisations. 
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Without a deep-seated epistemological transition from existing civilisational systems 
of rationale to a global standard of human rationality, the global ethics of openness to 
criticism will not be actually realised. As noted before, in current debates regarding 
dialogue of civilisations, we can trace similar ideas of the need for a global discursive 
ethics in Habermas's and Gadamer's debates, followed by Linklater and others.
708
 
They argue that the normative goal of a dialogue amongst civilisations is to achieve a 
global consensus about one set of universal norms. Inspired by Habermas, Linklater 
points out, “norms cannot be regarded as valid unless they have, could command, the 
consent of all those who stand to be affected by them.”709 While the centrality of a 
dialogic normative order for remaking world order is recognised,
710
 there are some 
differences among dialogic cosmopolitanism over its purpose.
711
 From a critical 
rationalist viewpoint, the moral goal of a rational dialogue amongst civilisations is to 
produce a global moral account of human beings due to their equal access to critical 
rationality. 
     This global moral philosophy goes beyond a civilisational moral philosophy since 
it invites all world civilisations to open the fundamental premises of their moral 
schemes to an inter-subjective criticism. Once the morality schemes become open to 
inter-subjective criticisms, this mutual openness (P1TTEEP2) operate as the 
mechanism of moral learning, leading to the global ethics of openness to criticism. In 
Talcott Parsons’ terms, if each human society requires a normative consensus 
regarding the ultimate ends of its own citizens, the aforementioned moral learning can 
be viewed as a global mechanism for producing such a normative agreement for the 
formation of a global society of free and equal persons. This normative consensus can 
be shaped through constructing a global account of equal moral persons who are ends 
per se rather than means for others. Once civilisations of peoples recognise each other 
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as ends in themselves, as opposed to means for others, the moral dimension of an 
emancipatory global social learning has been actualised. This moral layer of global 
social learning turns the epistemic capacity of global critical rationality into a global 
moral capital for the formation of an open global society. 
     Logically speaking, the global ethics of openness to criticism requires a new global 
legal system to turn such a global moral capital into a global human right system. 
Hence, the third layer of our ideal type rational dialogue amongst civilisations refers 
to a legal dialogue regarding how the existing nation state-centric international law 
can be dialogically transformed into an institution of global law-- what Richard Falk 
calls the law of humanity.
712
 From a critical rationalist view, the main aim of the 
global law of humanity should be the legalisation of the epistemic and moral 
equalities of human beings as the end in themselves in the context of a global 
constitutional right. Whilst the existing international law gives legal priority to nation 
states, the law of humanity prioritises individuals’ rights over all other forms of legal 
rights. As Falk argues, the character of the law of humanity is not self-evident. It 
could be mean law that is enacted by and for the peoples of the world.
713
  
    The key function of a legal dialogue amongst civilisations regarding the law of 
humanity is to justify the need for establishing such a global legal system. When 
civilisations of peoples arrive at a moral consensus on the global ethics of openness to 
criticism—in which all persons are respected as equal moral beings or ends in 
themselves—a global legal dialogue over the law of humanity finds a meaningful 
moral reasoning. If peoples are equal moral persons, due to their ability to use critical 
reason for taking a right moral decision, they must formally entitled for an equal legal 
right to realise such a moral autonomy. In other words, if they do not have such an 
equal legal right, they cannot employ their critical rationality in practice to appeal 
their moral equality and to establish a legitimate global order. This indicates a radical 
legal change from the inter-state law to the law of humanity. If we look at our three 
cases of the Chinese, Islamic and the Western civilisations, we can recognise that one 
of the major sources of existing inter-civilisational conflicts over the very conception 
of human rights originates in different civilisational-based legal systems. From an 
Islamic view, the Shariah Law identifies what are Islamic human rights, while from a 
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Chinese view it may be the proper code of social practice that is originated in the 
Chinese wisdom. In the Western law, the equality before the law is defined on the 
basis of a liberal conception of human rights. An ideal type legal dialogue amongst 
world civilisations can lead them to a meta-civilisational account of the human right: 
the law of humanity. The global ethics of openness to criticism logically justifies the 
need for establishing the law of humanity.  
     If people have equal capacity to learn from criticism, they must actualise this moral 
capacity through having an equal right of legal criticism. The term legal criticism here 
refers to a right of making the society's legal system accountable to the interests and 
views of all persons as they express within an inter-subjective dialogue. The 
emergence of this global legal right—what can be termed as an equal legal right of 
social criticism— would be the outcome of the legal layer of dialogue amongst world 
civilisations. From a critical rationalist perspective, a new metal-civilisational account 
of human right refers to persons' equal right of social criticism that enables all of them 
to question the society's legal system and re-shape it via an inter-subjective consensus. 
In this sense, the fundamental premises of world civilisations' legal system must be 
opened to mutual criticism by the world population.  
     Whilst the aforementioned normative global learning processes are essential for the 
formation of an open global society of free and equal citizens, a dialogic globalisation 
also involves in global political and economic learning. Logically speaking, the global 
ethics of openness to criticism and the law of humanity must be enforced by some 
kind of global executive power. The emergence of these global executive power can 
be regarded as the outcome of an ideal type political layer of dialogue amongst 
civilisations. Political globalisation has to some extent transformed the nation-state 
system into a multi-centric global governance in which a global competition for 
economic interests is preferred to the struggle for political power. But, this emerging 
global governance is substantially unaccountable to the world's population. Jan Aart 
Scholte diagnoses this global unacceptability here: “governance of global space… 
lacks democratic legitimacy. Current arrangements…rest--at best--on very limited 
explicit consent from the affected populations.”714 Jedeiah Purdy and Martin Shaw 
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     From a critical rationalist perspective, a rational dialogue of civilisations includes 
an ideal type global political learning that aims to turn peoples' legal right of criticism 
to an equal political right of self-determination that aims to make global governance 
an accountable global pody politic to the interests of all persons. Logically speaking, 
when civilisations of peoples and their affiliated national societies are persuaded to 
recognise the moral and legal equality of their fellow-members, there is a strong 
political justification to make the existing liberal global governance accountable to the 
world population. This global normative political learning can produce the very 
conception of global democracy itself. Hence, global democracy cannot refer to the 
Western model of liberal-democracy. It covers other possible readings of an 
accountability of a political system to its fellow-citizens such as an Islamic or a 
Chinese democracy. The political aspect of a rational dialogue of civilisations refers 
to a global political discourse in which civilisations of peoples recognise each other, 
as equal holders of the political right of self-governance, since they have already 
recognised each other as equal moral beings due to their potentially equal access to 
critical rationality.   
     A critical rationalist ideal type of global democracy would emerge through a global 
political learning that turns the equal legal right of social criticism into an equal 
political power of self-governance. Hence, we can avoid those criticisms of David 
Held's model of global democracy-- such as Heikki Patomaki-- that views it as a 
Eurocentric model of global democracy.
716
 However, for the critical rationalist model 
of global democracy, a democratic global governance only can be created through a 
rational dialogue among world civilisations. As Barry Gills rightly argues, the very 
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     Keeping in mind these four layers of global social learning, the formation of an 
open global society also requires the formation of an open global economy that can be 
created through a global economic learning. By this economic learning, I mean the 
creation of a global economic sphere in which potential economic actors can learn to 
turn their own moral, legal, and political right of criticisms into an equal economic 
right for using global economic opportunities to realise a decent life. The emergence 
of a global competitive and fair global market would be natural outcome of such free 
and equal entrance of potential economic actors to a global economic competition. In 
the context of this fifth layer of global social learning, the existing unequal post-
national world economy can be transformed into a competitive and fair global 
economy within which economic opportunities and resources are distributed to 
activate potential economic agents for a free entrance into global markets.  
     From a critical rationalist viewpoint, the economic layer of global social learning 
refers to the creation of a global competitive economy in which people can use their  
rights of self-governance to create certain global economic institutions that protect 
their free entrance to global competition. If people's equal legal and political right of 
self-determination were globally recognised, the ground is logically paved for making 
the emerging post-national economy accountable to peoples' decent life. A global 
welfare state can play a key role in providing those global public goods that are 
essential for the realisation of a world-wide decent life. In addition, it can take some 
distributional policies to face global problems such as world poverty and global 
income inequality.     
8.4 The Core Values and Social Institutions of an Open Global Society  
     I argued about five layers of an ideal type rational dialogue amongst civilisations, 
in terms of an emancipatory global social learning. This section addresses the key 
institutional features of an open global society that can be emerged through such a 
social learning-cum-global institutional change. The five layers of social learning find 
their own corresponding institutional expressions in the processes of an open global 
society formation.  
    The ideal type of open global society implies that a global society of free and equal 
citizens cannot be emerged without a rational dialogue amongst civilisations and their 
consensus over one set of global core values. It implies that peoples' access to critical 
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rationality via such a social learning can produce the global core values as normative 
foundation of an open global society, as the global ethics of openness to criticism. 
Now, we require to argue how this global core value provides moral justification for 
social institutions of the open global society. The idea of open global society leads us 
to see the links amongst three major institutional aspects of a global society of free 
and equal persons: a 'global dialogue', a 'global democracy' and a 'global justice'.  
     An open society is a dialogic society because it respects public use of reason as the 
main social organising principal of a rational society. An open society is a democratic 
society because it sets free critical power of human reason in order to shape a 
legitimate social governance. As Scholte notes, “a common thread runs through all 
conceptions of democracy: it is a condition where a community of people exercises 
collective self-determination.”718 The idea of an open society links this political self-
determination to the dialogic nature of an open society. The open society is a just 
society because it views all members of the society as equal sources of criticism in the 
course of shaping such a self-determined social order. In other words, all persons have 
equal opportunities for self-determination because they are equal possessors of critical 
rationality. In short, the open society is a dialogic, free and just society of open-
minded persons, who hold all of their fundamental beliefs open to criticism. Hence, 
critical rationalism provides a new epistemic logic for justifying the consistency of 
cultural dialogue, political democracy and social justice as three main institutional 
features of the open society.  
 
8.4.1 An Institutional Moral Reasoning for Open Global Society      
      If I am correct in arguing that a rational dialogue amongst civilisations of peoples 
can lead them to core values of 'human equality' and 'human freedom' due to their 
access to critical rationality, what the outcomes would be for social institutions of an 
open global society? The global core values in the first place reflect their implications 
for global social institutions through their legal outcomes: a legal equality of all 
persons before the law of humanity due to an equal access to critical rationality. This 
legal outcome of the core values leads us to explore social institutions of global 
democracy and justice. Allen Buchanan puts forward a forceful argument about the 
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moral foundations of international law.
719
 He argues why our justice-based moral 
conception of human equality must be integrated into institutions of the international 
legal system: 
A moral theory of international law must build upon or at least be consistent 
with the best available positive theories of international institutions, but must 
go beyond them, providing a coherent, defensible, organized set of 
prescriptive principles that apply not just to the conduct of individuals who 
occupy positions of authority in institutions, but also to the institutions 
themselves. Thus the moral philosophy of international law must include 
institutional moral reasoning: some of its most important principles must be 
formulated and justified in light of the assumption that they will be embodied 
in institutions [emphasis added].
720
  
     Buchanan employs this institutional moral reasoning to explore legal problems in 
existing international law and to address how it should be reformed towards a justice-
based morality as the foundation of a fair international law. He links his accounts of 
international democracy and social justice to his moral reasoning of international legal 
institutions. Buchanan focuses on moral reasoning of the institutions of international 
law, however I utilise his insightful arguments for linking such an institutional moral 
reasoning with the global law of humanity that can be justified based on the global 
ethics of openness to criticism. I will then argue regarding the implications for the 
legal foundations of social institutions of an open global society.  
     Buchanan’s moral reasoning of the legal system implies that the legitimacy of 
international institutions rest on the moral equality of human beings. In other words, 
international law is a just law if its main goal would be realising the moral equality of 
individuals. I apply this moral institutional reasoning to argue for a critical rationalist 
reading of global social democracy that rests upon the person's equal legal right of 
criticism, originating in his access to critical rationality. I aim to show that there are 
systematic links between the global ethics of openness to criticism on the one hand, 
and the legal foundations of global democracy and global justice on the other hand. 
This leads us to new institutional conceptions of global democracy and global justice 
that can be only understood in the context of epistemological theory of Critical 
Rationalism.   
     As Richard Falk points out, “interstate law presupposed the autonomy of the 
territorial state, although such a presupposing was always a legal fiction given the 
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hierarchical reality of geopolitics. …it is only in recent decades, with the collapse of 
colonialism, that interstate law was an encompassing global reality.”721 Buchanan 
argues whilst the main moral reasoning for international law has been the prevention 
of war amongst states, we need to set new moral goal for such an institutional moral 
reasoning i.e., the justice. For him, the main moral goal of an international law is 
realising people's equal access to the international institutions that protect their equal 
right.
722
 While Buchanan does not focus on the need for the law of humanity in the 
post-national world order, Falk argues about it: 
…the erosion of territoriality has undermined the major premise of inter-state 
law and its derivative claim to operate as the guardian of human well-being. 
This erosion can be understood from different angles: matters of 
vulnerability--the state has lost the capacity to uphold security in light of 
nuclear weaponry and long-range delivery systems; matters of environmental 
protection--the state cannot safeguard its territory from the adverse effects of 
extra-territorial behavior…; matters of economic viability--the state, even 
those that are well-endowed and large, can no longer provide an adequate 
framework for economic activity. …In these three types of erosion, the well-
being of humanity requires law to be operative on a regional, or global, scale 
that corresponds to the scope of operations. 
723
  
     Falk concludes that in the emerging post-national world order, while the capacities 
of inter-state law erode, the failure of a more responsive law of humanity has created 
a normative vacuum in a legal sense.
724
 However, the law of humanity can be defined 
through a new moral institutional reasoning based on the global ethics of openness to 
criticism. The law of humanity goes fundamentally beyond the interstate law, because 
its central goal is no longer the preventing war amongst the nation states. In contrast, 
the moral objective of the law of humanity is realising moral equality of persons that 
is reflected in their equal legal right of criticism.  
     The existing international legal system recognises the equality of human rights in 
terms of their equal right to have an adequate standard of living and freedom. 
However, the international law's central moral reasoning is to prevent an inter-
national war. If national societies, in the context of their inter-civilisational dialogue, 
agree on a new moral institutional reasoning that recognises the equal legal right of 
criticism, they have also agreed upon an entirely new moral reasoning for the legal 
structure of the emerging global order.   
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     In Law, Justice and the Idea of a World Society, David Armstrong argues that, “a 
sovereign state cannot formally be subject to any external jurisdiction except by its 
own consent. …profound the changes in international relations in the past 50 years 
have been, [but] they have not altered this central fact. …International law, therefore, 
remains the law of states associated in a society of states, not of people who are 
members of some larger community. As such it inevitably reflects the interests of the 
more powerful members of international society…”725 Validating Armstrong's 
argument, the legal task of a rational dialogue among civilisations refers to producing 
a justification for a post-national (global) legal system in which sovereign states can 
formally be subject to a global law of humanity. This global right recognises the 
primacy of individuals' right of social criticism in order to make global governance 
accountable to their views and needs. 
8.4.2 A Critical Rationalist Approach to Global Democracy  
     Perhaps one of the most advanced institutional models of global democracy is 
provided by David Held.
726
 He applies his concept of democracy, as a collective self-
determination by equal and free citizens, to a global scale. Like Falk, Held argues 
that, due to the erosion of nation-state capacities, people's self-determination cannot 
be realised without global democracy. Held argues that global governance can be 
democratised through making the different sites of global power accountable to 
peoples. Held's model of global democracy implies that if political power should be 
accountable to peoples wherever is located and however far removed its sources are 
from those whole it significantly affects, democratising global governance requires a 
radical global political reform.  
     Inspired by Kant, Held argues that such reform should be based on a cosmopolitan 
democratic law. In his words: “a democratic public law –establishing the 
accountability of power system—entrenched within and across borders. …For Kant, 
the foremost interpreter of the idea of a cosmopolitan law, [it] is a 'necessary 
complement' to the unwritten code of existing national and international law, and a 
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means to transform the latter into a public law of humanity.”727 However, Held does 
not argue how this public law of humanity can be emerged itself. The key issue of the 
mechanism of the emergence of the law of humanity remains unclear in Held's global 
democracy model.   
     For a critical rationalist, the mechanism of the formation of the law of humanity is 
a rational dialogue amongst world civilisations through which the equal right of 
criticism would be recognised. This moral reasoning rests upon the ethics of openness 
to criticism. This mechanism justifies the legitimacy of the law of humanity because it 
emerges through an inter-civilisational consensus. Held's model of global democracy 
does not lead us to explore the origin and the mechanism of the emergence of global 
public law,
728
 as Patomaki argues. On the content of the law of humanity, Held's 
model emphasises the role of cosmopolitan public law in making the sites of power 
accountable to peoples. A critical rationalist approach argues that the global sites of 
power will become accountable to peoples, if peoples' legal rights of questioning 
those sites of power are formally recognised in the context of a global constitution. It 
thus calls for a radical institutional reform in the existing inter-state law towards the 
global law of humanity.   
    The main institutional reform problem with Held’s model of global democracy is 
that it does not address the question of how a global consensus can be created on such 
institutional reforms, required for building global democracy, in particular where Held 
defines global democracy based on Western ideal-type of democracy. But in order to 
avoid a Eurocentric reform, world civilisations must be involved in a rational dialogue 
on the very conceptions of the law of humanity, of global democracy and global 
justice. Heikki Patomaki describes one important aspects of the Eurocentric nature of 
Held's global democracy in this way: “as a special instance of this Eurocentrism, 
cosmopolitan democracy comes to be modeled on--and is also idealized and 
abstracted from—the process of European integration. Indeed, Held's model has been 
explicitly inspired by the European integration process…”729 A critical rationalist 
model of global democracy rests on the person's equal legal right of criticism. If 
civilisations of peoples recognise such an equal legal right, they lead to a multi-
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civilisational account of global democracy in which the main criterion of global 
democracy is its accountability to all prospective global citizens and this requirement 
will be met, if all of them have an equal legal power to question the performance of 
the existing global governance. 
8.4.3 A Critical Rationalist Account of Global Justice 
     According to the ideal type of open global society, global justice co-exists with 
global democracy. A global society is a just society, if its fellow citizens have ‘equal’ 
right of a collective self-determination. A global society is a free society, if its fellow 
citizens voluntarily select their social governance. If our conscious human agency 
makes this equal and free self-determination possible, political democracy and social 
justice are closely dependent on the freedom of thought or a culture of the openness to 
criticism. The culture of the freedom of thought provides the moral foundation of 
social justice as it provides normative base of political democracy. On a global 
domain, the global ethics of openness to criticism can play such a role through 
justifying the equal legal right of criticism. A global society is a just society, if its 
fellow citizens have ‘equal’ legal right of self-determination. As such, democratic 
global governance is itself the main agent of global justice. This procedural 
conception of global justice can be completed with a distributional account of global 
justice. 
     As Chandran Kukathas points out: “Just institutions would ensure not only that the 
distribution of benefits and burdens was morally justifiable but also that people were 
secure against the predations of despots and warlords. The security of people’s 
individual liberties and political rights is also a matter of justice. To establish global 
justice requires institutions that secure human rights broadly understood.”730 In this 
sense, without the formation of global democratic governance, global justice in its 
procedural sense will not be realised. As it was argued, if peoples do not have ‘equal’ 
right of self-determination-- particularly through their equal voice in the formation of 
their their society's legal order-- how can they be convinced that the distribution of 
benefices and burdens across the society is just? While many theories of global justice 
are focused on the distributive justice, we can trace the procedural conception of 
justice in their institutional analyses against or for the possibility of a global justice. A 
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critical rationalist account of global justice supports the need for both procedural and 
distributional global justice.  
      I propose a critical rationalist account of global justice through making clear its 
defining feature, in comparison with some of the major institutional approaches to 
global justice. We can distinguish two major accounts of global justice due to two 
positions about a possibility or an impossibility of social justice on a global scale. The 
first approach implies that justice, in particular social justice, is something that cannot 
be attained globally but can be pursued nationality. The most influential expression of 
this approach is offered by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples. Another notable 
defense of this approach is suggested by David Miller who argues regarding a case for 
limiting the scope of distributive justice and Michael Walzer that claims justice 
cannot be a global ideal but only a local one.
731
 The second approach argues that there 
are standards of justice that should be regarded as globally valid and significant. For 
the second approach, “individuals have basic rights in virtue of their humanity, then 
these are rights they hold as against the whole world; and responsibility for upholding 
them falls upon the world as a whole rather than upon the nations in which they 
happen to reside.”732 Allen Buchanan, Darrel Moellendorf, Thomas Pogge and Simon 
Caney, among others, have argued for the second approach to global justice.
733
 A 
critical rationalist model of global justice defends the second approach to global 
justice, but it provides a new moral institutional reasoning for global justice in its 
procedural and distributional senses.  
    A third approach to global justice is also recognisable that is taken by Kukathas, 
implying that if according to the first approach distributional justice should not be 
followed on a global scale, there is no reason to follow it at the national level as well. 
In Kukathas' words, “advocates of global or cosmopolitan justice have a point in 
demanding consistency from those who argue for justice at home but are prepared to 
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tolerate injustice abroad.”734 Like Kukathas, a critical rationalist account of global 
justice argues that if there are good reasons to pursue justice within the nation-state, 
those reasons also support to pursue justice across the globe. But, unlike Kakathas, it 
argues that justice is possible at both national and global levels.  
      If justice is not only a matter of equal application of the law, but also a matter of 
the fairness of the law itself, we need a moral theory of global justice on which basis 
the fairness of global law-making is integrated with the equality of the people before 
the fair global law. As Linklater points out, "it is the consent of all who stand to be 
affected by these [global] arrangements, irrespective of their citizenship or residence, 
which is the preferred ethical objective."
735
 Such reasoning calls for an institutional 
conception of global justice that integrates the moral equality of peoples with the very 
definition of justice itself. The global ethics of openness to criticism implies that all 
peoples have equal right to determine what a fair global law is and how such a fair 
global law can be equally applied to all persons. 
     If there is an obstacle for realising such legal equality, a global welfare state should 
take one set of global measures to redistribute global resources for realising such 
rights. Hence, a critical rationalist model of global justice integrates the procedural 
and the distributional accounts of global justice in order to secure the core conceptions 
of social justice; that is, the equal access of peoples to global institutions, which 
protect their fundamental rights. If all persons are equally entitled to the rights of self-
determination of a fair global law, they must also have equal power to monitor an 
equal application of such a fair global law. Hence, they can also agree on a 
redistribution of global resources and opportunities to improve global society's well-
being as a whole.  
    The literature advancing the case for global justice is substantial. Rather than to 
address it as whole, I will focus on arguments developed by Rawls against applying 
national conception of justice at a global level, and the arguments of Buchanan, Pogge 
and Caney to defend global justice. Rawls's approach to global justice entail that we 
cannot apply national content of justice in liberal societies at an international scale: 
Because while the members of liberal societies do not share substantive ends, they do 
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share what might be called a core conception of social justice, the idea of a society as 
a cooperative venture among free and equal persons.  
     The existing international order contains societies that do not share this liberal 
conception of social justice. Rawls argues the core conception of justice supplies a 
foundation for a morally robust system of law in a liberal domestic society; its 
absence implies the moral content of international law must be minimal when 
compared with former. Hence, Rawls' argument implies that cultural shared values on 
the core conception of justice provide moral foundation for legal fairness of social 
order. But Rawls takes the lack of such normative consensus among national societies 
as a given fact. Hence, he claims that national content of social justice cannot be 
applied at an international level.
736
 If Rawls's premise regarding the impossibility of 
achieving a rational consensus upon the core conception of justice is correct, his 
conclusion of the impossibility of global justice would be also correct. But a rational 
dialogue among civilisations of peoples is possible. If the result of such inter-
civilisational dialogue can be a global ethics of openness to criticism, it provides the 
emerging world society a global consensus about two major components of global 
justice. First, all of persons have equal right to determine what a just global law is, 
and second all of them have equal right of monitor an equal application of the just law 
itself. If achieving a global (inter-societal) consensus on the moral foundation of an 
open global society is possible, global justice is not an unachievable end because a 
rational dialogue of civilisations can provide such a globally shared account of justice.   
      Since Rawls rules out the possibility of a rational consensus among societies over 
the core conception of justice, he concludes that at the international level we should 
tolerate injustice. Hence, he follows a moral minimalism on this level because of the 
fact that peoples in non-liberal societies do not share with those in liberal societies in  
very concpetion of a just society, as a cooperative venture amongst free and equal 
persons. In one sense, Rawls accepts a relativist morality according to which non-
liberal and liberal societies cannot agree upon the core conception of a just society. He 
claims that their different accounts of justice as reasonable for themselves. If an 
authoritarian society denies the equality of peoples, it is reasonable account of justice 
because the cultural model of the society justifies such an inequality. However, if in a 
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democratic society people respect such an equality, it is also reasonable because the 
cultural model of such a democratic society recognises the equality.  
     In other words, there is not a meta-civilisational conception of social justice or 
human equality on which basis we can argue that peoples should be treated equally in 
all societies either liberal or non-liberal one. In short, the lack of a globally existing 
shared conception of social justice leads Rawls to an impossibility of global justice 
and the need for tolerating a massive global injustice. David Miller follows the same 
line of reasoning by arguing that the conceptions of social justice are non-comparative 
or incommensurable conception on a global level.
737
  
     Liberal and non-liberal societies have different understandings of justice, but they 
can agree on a common definition of justice, if they open the fundamental promises of 
their different accounts of justice to mutual criticism. For a critical rationalist, a 
globally shared concept of social justice can be emerged through a rational dialogue 
amongst civilisations. If we take an epistemological relativist position, we would lead 
to a moral relativism position on a global level and subsequently an impossibility of a 
globally shared account of global justice. However, global justice is possible because 
the emergence of a globally-shared account of justice is possible. 
     Contrary to Rawls, Buchanan, Pogge and Caney argue that a globally shared 
account of justice is possible and even it has been to some extent realised. A critical 
rationalist model of global justice may advance their approaches to global justice by 
arguing that such a globally shared conception of social justice can be built through a 
rational dialogue amongst civilisations. In addition, the global ethics of openness to 
criticism can shape the core content of this concept-model of global justice. Like 
Rawls, Buchanan takes a procedural approach to social justice. However, he argues 
that a globally shared account of justice is possible. If justice, as Rawls asserts, is the 
first virtue of social institutions then “justice is a morally imperative institutional 
goal,” in the global and in the domestic sphere.738 Buchanan here endorses Pogge's 
contention that the global basic structure is a human creation, and that to accept it 
uncritically would be to support massive injustices.
739
 However, Rawls regards 
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various accounts of a just society as a given fact that leads him to an impossibility of a 
global account of a just society. Buchanan and Pogge base their views of global 
justice on a moral equality principle. They argue how global institutions of justice 
should be defined as to ensure us that all peoples have access to those institutions that 
can protect their basic rights.
740
  
     According to Buchanan, there is “an expanding global culture of human rights that 
exhibits a broad consensus on the idea that justice requires respect for the inherent 
dignity of all persons.”741 He rejects the controversy that there is widespread moral 
disagreement on social justice, and the idea that no global moral consensus can 
emerge.
742
 Buchanan’s concern is to present a case for the creation of reform of basic 
international institutions in order to bring about a more just world. Kukathas points 
out that “despite some significant philosophical difference between their approaches, 
Buchanan's concerns are shared by Thomas Pogge, who also calls for reform of the 
basic structure of international society, but whose writing on global justice have 
focused on the problem of world poverty and human rights rather than on 
international law.”743 Despite Buchanan, Pogge takes globalisation as a serious matter 
in which to argue for global justice.  
     Pogge argues that social justice cannot be realised in the local level. Institutional 
interconnections across the planet, he argues, “render obsolete the idea that countries 
can peacefully agree or disagree about justice, each committing itself to a conception 
of justice appropriate to its history, culture, population size and density, natural 
environment, geopolitical context, and stage of development.”744 On the contrary, in a 
globalising world order, peoples' lives are profoundly affected by global rules of 
governance, trade, and diplomacy; and about such institutions, we cannot agree or 
disagree, since they can only be structured one way—not differently in each country. 
If they are to be justified to all persons in all parts of the world, “then we must aspire 
to a single, universal criterion of moral judgment which all persons and peoples can 
accept, as the basis for moral judgments about global order.”745 Pogge argues that this 
moral acceptance is vitally important, for it matters that a society's international order 
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be endorsed by those to whom the order applies. For him, “we should try to formulate 
the universal criterion of justice so that it can gain universal acceptance.”746 If we 
define global justice as the equal legal right of peoples to determine what a global just 
law is and how can it be equally applied, we can find a universal criterion of a moral 
conception of global justice. The global ethics of openness to criticism provides us 
with such a moral institutional reasoning for global justice. 
     Simon Caney defends a global principle of the equality of opportunity, implying 
that it is unfair if someone has worse opportunities because of their national or civic 
identity. Caney disagrees with those objections of global equality of opportunities 
because of the existence of great cultural diversity on a global scale, and the need for 
close interconnection amongst those who must be entitled as equal opportunities 
possessors, and finally the impossibility of thrust liberal ideals like global equal 
opportunities on non-liberal peoples. Caney rejects that cultural relativism prevents 
the impossibility of the formation of global justice or a justice beyond borders.
747
         
    Like global democracy, global justice should not be imposed by one civilisation on 
others. It must be shaped through an inter-civilisational dialogue about the very 
meaning of social justice. We can add a global distributional justice to our procedural 
concept-model of global justice. If the majority of the world population finds the 
existing massive global injustices unacceptable, they can agree about some global re-
distributional measure for rescuing about half of the world population, suffering from 
poverty. In this sense, Rawls' national scale distributive justice should be applied to a 
global scale. As Rawls' Difference Principle requires, the basic structure of society 
should be arranged so that inequalities in prospects of obtaining the primary goods of 
wealth, income, power, and authority must work to the greatest benefits of those 
persons who are the least advantaged with respect to these primary goods.
748
  
    To the extent that Rawls argues that his theory of justice and the difference 
principle in particular, can only apply to a closed society or a self-contained system, 
Pogge rightly argues that it is hard to see why it should not apply to the world if it can 
apply to the United States, which is neither closed nor self-contained. If Rawls would 
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argue that his theory of justice should be applied merely to a liberal society because of 
the lack of a globally shared conception of justice, a critical rationalist's response is 
that a rational dialogue amongst civilisations leads us to such a global conception of 
social justice. As Kukathas concludes, “the development of [a just and democratic] 
cosmopolitanism should not be the product of a [global] political reform. It may well 
be that there will be a convergence across the globe on common moral standards in 
the years to come. Unless that happens, however, we cannot even begin to think in 
terms of global justice.”749 The critical rationalist account of global justice and global 
democracy lead us to realise that a rational dialogue amongst civilisations is the main 
mechanism of the emergence of such a global moral convergence as the normative 
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Global Civil Society and Dialogic Globalisation 
 
     The ideal type of dialogic global social learning, introduced in chapter 8 provided 
an analytical framework regarding the epistemological possibility of an institutional 
transformation from a liberal form of globality into an open global society of free and 
equal persons. However, the question of who are global agents of such a dialogic form 
of global social change has not yet been addressed. This chapter attempts to address 
the question of how emerging global civil society can operate as global agent of such 
an ideal type global learning and social change. It argues that the ideal type of open 
global society can be integrated in the functions of global social movements against 
liberal globality through a global collective action frame.    
     The chapter proceeds in four sections. Section 9.1 briefly reviews the historical 
formation of civil society’s concepts and functions. This section emphasises a cultural 
approach to civil society's conception, mainly inspired by Jeffery Alexander’s 
approach to civil society. Section 9.2 distinguishes the two major approaches to the 
emergence of global civil society, one of which argues that global civil society cannot 
be simply regarded as an expansion of domestic civil society to a global scale and 
another argues that global civil society originates in its cultural roots in the 
Enlightenment era. Section 9.3 argues for a critical rationalist normative concept-
model of global civil society and a global collective action frame against neo-liberal 
globalisation. Section 9.4 proposes the major steps and the essential conditions of 
remaking global civil society for a dialogic form of globalisation.  
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9.1 Civil Society’s Concepts and Functions: A Brief Review  
     The concept of ‘civil society’ entered into social understanding in the late 17th 
century.
750
 Contemporary social theorists conceptualise civil society in different ways.  
Krishan Kumar describes the meaning of civil society for the 18
th
 century's social 
thinkers as follows: 
Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the term ‘civil society’ was 
synonymous with the state or ‘political society’. Here it reflected precisely its 
classical origins. ‘Civil society’ was a more or less direct translation of 
Cicero's societas civilis and Aristotle’s koinonio politike. Locke could speak 
of ‘civil government’… Kant sees burgerliche Gesellschaft, as that 
constitutional state towards which political evolution tends. For Rousseau the 
etat civil is the state. In all of these uses the contrast is with the 'uncivilized' 
condition of humanity…But there was a decisive innovation in the latter half 




     In the later half of the eighteenth century, civil society was referring to a sphere of 
society distinct from the state with own forms and dynamics. If in the early eighteenth 
century, civil society referred to a civilised society, in the second half of that century, 
it implied a sphere between the state and peoples. For John Keane, this was an 
achievement of British and American thought. In the writings of Locke and Paine, and 
in those of Ferguson and Smith, they discern the basic elaborations of a sphere of 
society that is distinct from the state. 
752
 They proposed a political conception of civil 
society, i.e., a sphere between peoples and the state. As Jeffery Alexander argues, “the 
possibility for civil control, as opposed to military violence or political domination, 
can be traced back to the idea of the social contract, to the Lockean vision of 
consensual agreement and persuasion in contrast with the Hobbesian resort to force 
and fraud.”753 The political concept of civil society emphasises the possibility of such 
a civic control of the state by the people through the institutions of civil society. 
     If the concept of civil society for these writers was largely political, Marx offered 
an economic approach to civil society. He associated the emergence of a societal 
space between peoples and the state with the growth of capitalism. For Marx, civil 
society evolved directly out of production and commerce, which has always been 
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everywhere the ‘motor’ of history. Civil society shapes the basis of the state and the 
ideational superstructure of the society. It could only come about at a particular stage 
in a capitalist mode of production: “the stage at which the bourgeoisie could establish 
an economy in principle and to a good extent in practice distinct from the state and all 
other regulatory bodies.”754 Marx situates the civil society's political function within 
capitalist society’s economic dynamics. For him, the term ‘civil society’ emerged in 
the eighteenth century, when the property relationship had already removed itself 
from the medieval communal society. 
755
  
9.1.1 ‘Political’ Versus ‘Economic’ Concept-Models of Civil Society 
     Alexander distinguishes three analytical models of civil society.
756
 We can regard 
these three models as political, economic and cultural approaches to civil society. This 
sub-section discusses political versus economic concept-models, while the next sub-
section argues for the cultural core of civil society.   
     According to Alexander, the first analytical-model (i.e. the political approach) 
defines civil society as “an umbrella-like concept referring to a plethora of institutions 
outside the state. It concluded the capitalist market and its institutions, but it also 
denoted what Tocqueville called voluntary religion …private and public associations 
and organizations, and virtually every form of cooperative social relationship that 
created of trust—for example, currents of public opinion, legal norms and institutions, 
and political parties.”757 This approach to civil society originated in the writings of 
figures like Locke and developed subsequently by such Scottish moralists like 
Ferguson and Smith and used by Rousseau, Hegel and Tocqueville.
758
 The political 
core of the first model can be viewed in its emphasis on the definition of civil society 
as a social sphere outside of the state. But, this social sphere was endowed with a 
distinctively moral and ethical force. The capitalist market was understood as 
producing self-discipline and individual responsibility. Despite this individualistic 
ethic that emphasised individual power, which could be realised by an independent 
political-economic sphere outside the state, a pejorative association of capitalism with 
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inhumane instrumentality, domination, and exploration emerged that led to an 
economic approach to the very meaning and functions of civil society. As Karl 
Polanyi argues in The Great Transformation, a civil movement shaped from the civil 
side of the society against the market unsocial sociability.
759
 In this historical context, 
the second analytical model of civil society was shaped that emphasised economic 
functions of civil society. 
      In the economic account, civil society came to be mainly associated with market 
capitalism alone. In Alexander's words: “not only does civil society come to be treated 
simply as a field for the play of egoistical, purely private interests, but it is now 
viewed as a superstructure, a legal and political arena that camouflages the 
domination of commodities and the capitalist class.”760 Marx believes that “the 
material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the 
Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of 
‘civil society’.”761  As Jean Cohen observed in her critique of the economic account, 
in Marx's theory of civil society “social, political, private, and legal institutions were 
treated as the environment of one capitalist system, to be transformed by its logic but 
without a dynamism of their own.”762 Alexander rightly reminds us that nothing more 
evidently illustrates a paradigm shift--from civil society as a socio-political sphere 
outside the state, creating a civil control over the state itself, to civil society as an 
instrument for the capitalist social system to maintain its exploitative function--than 
the accusations Marx made against Hegel. For Marx, Hegel justified such a privatized, 
selfish vision of civil society, that he has identified the civil sphere only with the 
system of needs.
763
   
     However, Hegel recognises an emancipatory intention in the history and meaning 
of civil society. Civil society for the first time gave all determinations of the Idea 
their due. For him, civil society becomes a part of an ethical life--opposed to an 
egoistic life of economic interests. It thus provides a unity of 'abstract right' and 
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'subjective morality' that is the formal principle of ethical life.
764
 Hegel argues that the 
concrete person of civil society differs from an isolated moral person of the ethical 
life. Civil society, as a process of mediation between the family and the state, referes 
to a social learning process through which the isolated moral person gradually comes 
to recognise him or her self as a member of society and realise that for achieving his 
ends he must work with others. For Hegel, “through working with others, his 
particularity is mediated; he ceases to be a mere unit and eventually becomes so 
socially conscious, as a result of the educative forces of the institutions of civil 
society, that he wills his own ends only in willing universal ends and so has passed 
beyond civil society into the state.”765 Hegel recognises a self-liberating social 
learning role for civil society in educating people to reduce their particularity in 
favour of the creation of a cooperative social order.  
     In Civil Society and Political Theory, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato rehabilitate 
the Hegelian conception of civil society. They conceptualise civil society “as a sphere 
of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate 
sphere (especially the family), the sphere of association (especially voluntary 
organizations), social movements and forms of public communication”.766 They lead 
us to an analytical model of civil society in which intellectuals and social movements 
are two major civil society groups, where non-governmental organisations interplay 
with them. In one sense, intellectuals, social movements and non-governmental 
organisations can be called ‘Civil Society Organisations’ (CSOs).767  
     Marx’s economic concept-model of civil society led Marxism away from an active 
engagement with the central subject matter of Sociology i.e. societal structures of 
civil society. But, sociologists, like Saint Simon, Auguste Comte, Max Weber, Alexis 
de Tocqueville, Emil Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies, and Talcott Parsons attempted to 
situate civil society in the central problem of modern society. They tried to address the 
question of “how to find a ‘third way’ between the atomization of competitive market 
society, on the one side, and a ‘state-dominated existence,’ on the other. The solution 
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has gradually been seen to lie in a structure of ‘natural’ or voluntary groups and 
organizations through which the individual develops the sense of social solidarity and 
civic participation.”768 This essentially Hegelian-inspired concept of civil society was 
reshaped in the context of de Tocqueville notion of political society. In a civilised 
society, for de Tocqueville, there are political associations, such as local self-
governments, juries, parties, and public opinion, and there are civil associations, such 
as churches, moral crusades, schools, and scientific communities.
769
  
9.1.2 The Cultural Core of Civil Society's Function: Human Solidarity 
     Alexander leads us to realise a culturally informed analysis of civil society's 
concept and functions. Recognising insufficiencies of the political and the economic 
analytical models of civil society, Alexander defines civil society in this way: 
… civil society should be conceived as a solidary sphere, in which a certain 
kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally defined and to some 
degree institutionally enforced. To the degree that this solidary community 
exists, it is exhibited and sustained by public opinion, deep cultural codes, 
distinctive organizations—legal, journalistic and associational—and such 
historically specific interactional practices as civility, criticism, and mutual 
respect. …Civil society is a sphere of solidarity in which individual rights 




       Alexander discusses that the economic approach to civil society is quite mistaken 
to link the emergence of individualism and the collective sense of social obligation 
with market sociability. For him, “the individuality that sustains civil society has a 
long history in Western societies, as a moral force, and institutional fact, and a set of 
interactional practice. It has a non-economic background in the cultural legacy of 
Christianity, with its emphasis on the immortal soul, conscience, and confession; in 
aristocratic liberty, and Renaissance self-fashioning; in the Reformation's insistence 
on the individual relation to God; in the Enlightenment's deification of individual 
reason; in Romanticism’s restoration of expressive individuality. Institutions that 
reward and model individuality can be traced back to English legal guarantees for 
private property in the eleventh century…”771 However, the rise of modern liberalism 
in the past three centuries should be regarded as a new phase of cultural justification 
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 centuries, as Wittrock among other reminds us.
772
  
     Alexander argues that it was from such an already existent individualistic culture 
that emerged protests against capitalism on behalf of the 'the people.' “To identify 
civil society with capitalism is to degrade its universalizing moral implications and 
the capacity for criticism and repair that the existence of a relatively independent 
solidary community implies. The civil society sphere and the market must be 
conceptualised in fundamentally different terms. We are no more a capitalist society 
than we are a bureaucratic, secular, rational one, or indeed a civil one. ”773 Viewed 
from this culturally inspired reading of civil society, we can also uncover shortfalls of 
a purely political concept-model of civil society. In the political approach the core 
cultural function of civil society, in which a certain kind of universalising community 
comes to be culturally defined, has been ignored. In this sense, the political 
conception of civil society is also quite mistaken due to such an ignorance of the 
cultural core of civil society's function. Alexander rightly argues that, “this is the 
criterion of justice that follows from ideals that regulate the civil sphere. The codes 
and narratives, the institutions, and the interactions that underlay civil solidarity 
clearly depart from those that regulate the world of economic cooperation and 
competition…”774 It has been the subjective demands for the civil sphere that have 
provided the possibilities of justice and freedom.  
     A link between the cultural and the political functions of civil society can be found 
also in Antonio Gramsci’s revised version of the Marxist approach to the meaning of 
civil society. Gramsci sets himself against the purely economic conception of civil 
society. For him, the State equals ‘political society’ plus ‘civil society’. Political 
society is the arena of coercion and domination; civil society is the sphere of cultural 
consent and intellectual leadership.
775
 He is mainly concerned with the central role of 
civil society in the production and maintenance of hegemony. Civil society is the area 
where hegemony is exercised: the State exists as a point of equilibrium between 
political society and civil society. Civil society refers to an hegemony of a social 
group over the entire society, exercised by the so-called private organisations such as 
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the Church, the trade unions, and schools, etc. But, it is precisely in civil society that 
intellectuals operate specially. It is here that the elite perform their key function of 
supplying legitimacy and creating consensus on behalf of the ruling groups.
776
  
     For Gramsci, “civil society is the sphere of culture in the broadest sense. It is 
concerned with the manners and mores of society, with the way people live. It is 
where values and meanings are established… It is the necessary complement to the 
rule of a class through its ownership of the means of production and its capture of the 
apparatus of the state.”777 While Gramsci focuses on the hegemonic function of civil 
society, as Robert Cox points out, Gramsci’s thought “embraced both meanings: civil 
society was the ground that sustained the hegemony of the bourgeoisie but also the 
basis on which an emancipatory counterhegemony could be constructed. ”778  In this 
sense, emancipatory potential of civil society was also the object of Gramsci’s 
thinking. Nevertheless, as Alexander argues, “while Gramsci challenged the 
instrumentalism of Marx’s thinking about the civil sphere, he reinforced CSII [i.e., the 
economic concept of civil society] by insisting that, within the confines of capitalist 
market society, there would never be the scope for institutionalizing solidarity of a 
more universalistic and inclusive kind. Gramsci did not associate civil society with 
democracy. It was a product of class-divided capitalism understood in the broad 
socio-cultural and economic sense. The values, norms, and institutions of civil society 
were opposed to the interests of the mass of humanity, even if they did provide a 
space for contesting their own legitimacy in a public, counterhegemonic way.”779 In 
this sense, it is hard to situate Gramsci's approach in a culturally inspired concept-
model of civil society. 
     Habermas’s account of civil society leads us to better explore the cultural core of 
civil society. As he argues, even in the eighteenth century, civil society was a societal 
sphere for rational and critical discussion among elites, who were committed to the 
pursuit of definite social progress.
780
 He writes: 
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Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent 
associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal 
problems resonate in private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in 
amplified form of the public spheres. The core of civil society comprises a 
network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on 
questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public 
spheres. …this public is made of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations 
for their social interests and experiences and who want to have an influence 
on institutionalized opinion- and will-formation
781
 [emphasis added]. 
     Viewed from such an account of civil society, with a critical rationalist approach to 
civil society we can explore a self-liberating function for civil society in setting free 
peoples’ access to critical rationality. While people potentially have access to critical 
rationality, their existing rationale system is shaped in the context of dominant 
cultural environments. In this sense, people who have already activated their critical 
rationality can inform ordinary peoples about their potential access to critical reason. 
If we call them intellectuals, they play a key epistemic function to set free ordinary 
peoples' capacity for a self-liberating social learning, which is needed for an 
institutional transformation from the closed to an open society. In Alexander’s terms, 
the ideal of open society can play the function of a universalising community of the 
ends, which provides the cultural model of the civil sphere. In a word, it advocates a 
cultural solidarity that rests on the universal commitment to view each person as 
possessor of critical rationality, worthy of equal respect and treatment. In this account, 
the emancipatory role of intellectuals, at the core of civil society's cultural function, 
finds different shapes within different layers of such a self-liberation social 
learning.
782
 The social network of intellectuals-- as an epistemic community--is 
connected with social movements and non-governmental organisations who want to 
create a social change.  
      This wider account of a social network of intellectuals goes beyond Peter Haas' 
technocratic expert focused definition of an epistemic community. Haas “offers an 
approach that examines the role that networks of knowledge-based experts --epistemic 
communities-- play in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex 
problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective 
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debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation.”783 
While technocratic experts are in fact a part of the wider account of the social network 
of intellectuals, intellectuals are not limited to the experts. This deeper account of 
epistemic community, as a social network of intellectuals, has not received a formal 
definition in current literature of the epistemic community; however, as Delanty 
reminds us, Habermas’s works refer to it.784         
     In a framing approach to social movements, Hank Johnston and John Noakes 
write, “mobilizing people to action always has a subjective component, and in recent 
years this subjective component—the elements of perception or consciousness—has 
been conceptualized as a social-psychological process called framing.”785 In the 
framing process individuals must be convinced that an injustice has occurred, 
persuaded that collective action is called for, and motivated to act for a social 
movement to occur. In their words, “the process of defining what is going on in a 
situation in order to encourage protest is referred to as the forging of collective action 
frames…”786 Robert Benford also argues that, “frames are modes of interpretation that 
are socially/culturally constructed. …movement actors bring a repertoire of socially 
constructed frames to any particular movement encounter.”787 In a critical review of 
social movement theories, Alexander discusses the need for the formulation of a new 
model of social movements, which incorporates the cultural core of civil society in the 
very functions of civil society.  
     In this line of reasoning, he argues that, “behind social movements there is 
reference to a highly idealized community, one that demands that the universal 
become concrete. Demands for a concrete universal are made against the backdrop of 
a utopian notion of community, according to which rational actors spontaneously 
forge ties that are at once self-regulating, solidaristic, and emanciptory, and are 
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independent of market rewards … It is the existence of this regulative ideal, and its 
promised or partial realization in the communicative and regulative institutions at a 
particular time, that allows protests that emerge in one structural sector to be 
transferred into the domain of civil society.”788 For Alexander, social movements are 
translators of the regulative ideal of a universal community into an analysis of the 
causes of the contradictions of the existing social order. “Insofar as they succeed, 
social movements strike up a conversation with society and draw their members' 
attention to a more generalized understanding of their cause. When this happens, the 
social problem and group managing it enter firmly into the public life of the civil 
sphere. ”789 From this perspective, social movements are viewed as social devices that 
construct translation between the discourse of civil society and the institutional 
reforms that are required to overcome the social crises.  
     In sum, the cultural concept-model of civil society leads us to see systematic like 
between the universalising ideals of solidarity as the cultural driving forces of those 
intellectual movements who want to transform the existing unjust social order into a 
just and free social arrangement. As we will see, in this sense, global civil society can 
be a global agent of dialogic globalization with the ultimate aim of a global society of 
free and equal persons.  
9.2 Global Civil Society: ‘Existing Realities’ and ‘Potential Capacities’   
     Keeping in mind three aforementioned accounts of civil society, the emergence of 
global civil society has been analysed from different perspectives. In comparison with 
‘domestic’ civil society, two approaches to ‘global’ civil society are notable.790 The 
first one argues that ‘global’ civil society differs from the ‘domestic’ equivalent. The 
second one views ‘global’ civil society as a type of global expansion of ‘domestic’ 
civil society. I shall argue that a critical rationalist account of global civil society can 
use the insights of both approaches, which reveal the existing realities and potential 
capacities of emerging global civil society. 
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9.2.1 Differences between ‘Domestic’ and ‘Global’ Civil Sphere   
     The question of whether a ‘global’ civil society is comparable with its 'domestic' 
counterpart has been addressed by two major approaches. This sub-section discusses 
the first approach that does not view global civil society as an equivalent of its 
domestic counterpart. For instance, Robert O’Brien et al. write: 
There are difficulties with the appropriating of notions of civil society and 
social movements from the domestic context. The global civil society concept 
goes against the basic ontology of most international relations literature. The 
traditional international relations approach to ‘international society’ has to 
speak of a society of states… This leaves no room, for discussion of civil 
society because non-state actors are defined out of society. While traditional 
international relations scholarship may reject the notions of global civil 
society and GSMs [Global Social Movements] because of its state centric 
approach, others will raise debates about the existence of a global civil 
society and GSMs in the absence of a global state.
791
  
     The first approach discusses that global civil society differs from its domestic 
version. In addition, the Western conception and experience of civil society cannot be 
the reference point for the definition of a 'global' civil society. The global civil society 
is viewed as an arena for conflict that interacts with both the interstate system and the 
global economy, as opposed to a normative global social structure.
792
 The approach 
focuses on the existing reality of global civil society rather than its normative 
potential that can originate in the ideal of domestic civil society. 
     In adopting such a reading of global civil society, Jan Aart Scholte emphasises an 
active political orientation in defining global civil society: in his word, “an active 
political orientation is key to this conception of civil society. …The conception of 
civil society adopted here also encompasses considerable cultural diversity. In earlier 
Lockean, Hegelian, and Gramscian formulations, civil society related to Western 
politics in a national context. However, talk of ‘civil society’ today circulates all over 
the world…[and] derives largely from non-Western traditions.”793 Similar to 
Alexander, Scholte argues that civil society lies outside the ‘public sector’ of official 
governance and the ‘private sector’ of market economy. In this independent space, 
civil society exists whenever people mobilise by voluntary associations for shaping or 
remaking social order. Global civil society addresses transnational issues, it involves 
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transborder communication and has a global organisation, and finally it acts on a 
premise of supraterritorial solidarity.
794
  
     The first approach views the emergence of global civil society in connection with 
contemporary globalisation. According to Scholte, “the contemporary expansion of 
global civil society can also be ascribed in part to a more general altered position of 
the state in the face of globalisation. …Global civil society has therefore also grown 
in part as citizens have attempted to acquire a greater voice in post-sovereign 
governance…”795 In this approach, as far as nation-states have been confronted with 
global problems-- similar to the climate change, stability of financial markets, and the 
protection of human rights-- they have set up global inter-governmental actors.
796
 In 
an analysis of the emergence of global civil society, Ronnie Lipschutz argues for the 
key role of global liberalism: 
…the emergence of global civil society can be explained by interacting 
phenomena, at the macro, or structural, level, and at the micro, or agency, 
level. At the structural level ...anarchy, as the organizing principle of the 
international system, is withering away. This is the result … of a shift from 
bipolarity to multipolarity or unipolarity—as the long-term acceptance of 
liberalism as a global ‘operating system’… At the level of agency, national 
governments are unable, or loathe, to provide the kind of welfare services 
demanded by citizens. …This micro response is to find new ways of 
providing these services, and citizens are increasingly capable of doing 
this…The results are networks of skilled individuals and groups, operating in 
newly politicized issue areas, who are helping to modify the state system  
797
 
[emphasis added].     
     Given this analysis, the participants in this global political sphere interact with 
states over global policy issues. They try to organise global efforts into a legitimate 
form of global protest against the contradictions of contemporary globalisation.
798
 
Greenpeace, for example, in itself constitutes a global network engaged in both anti-
state and state-reforming tendencies.
799
 Another bold example of global civil society's 
network is the human rights organisation: Amnesty International. As Lipschutz 
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reminds us, “a broad range of organizations has come into existence as a response to 
the global institutionalisation of norms relating to human rights.”800 The problem of 
indigenous peoples is another subject for a growing network in global civil society 
that “composed of groups of indigenous people; that is, tribes, clans, societies and 
cultures that predate the arrival of colonialism or the mass urbanisation of 
population.”801 We can also situate John Keane’s definition of global civil society in 
the first approach: it “refers to a dynamic non-governmental system of interconnected 
socio-economic institutions that straddle the whole earth…”802 Keane believes that 
global civil society is an unfinished project, where it has “the deliberate aim of 
drawing the world together in new ways.”803 As such, Keane pays equal attention to 
both descriptive and normative aspects of emerging global civil society.      
     In sum, the first approach to global civil society has conceptualised it as a global 
socio-political sphere between peoples and global governance. Economic and political 
globalisation have paved the way for the emergence of global civil society because 
they have reduced the anarchical context of the Cold War and facilitated the entrance 
of private sector actors into the global market. At the same time, shortcomings of the 
emerging global political economy to fulfill the needs of the world's population have 
led global civil society organisations to look for new solutions to global problems.  
9.2.2 A ‘Global’ Expansion of ‘Domestic’ Civil Sphere    
     For the second approach to global civil society-- in addition to the political and 
economic dimensions-- the cultural sphere plays an important role in the emergence 
of global civil society. As William Coleman and Sarah Wayland argue, this approach 
views global civil society as an arena of political activity that has grown gradually and 
continuously since the mid-nineteenth century, with perhaps some acceleration in the 
period after 1945.
804
 They note that John Boli and George Thomas have argued that a 
world culture and a world polity have emerged over this period. The contemporary 
world has become “conceptualized as a unitary social system, increasingly integrated 
by networks of exchange, competition and cooperation, such that actors have found it 
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‘natural’ to view the whole world as their arena of action and discourse.”805 For Boli 
and Thomas, this world polity consists of a world culture, “a set of fundamental 
principles and models, mainly ontological and cognitive in character, defining the 
nature and purposes of social actors and actions.”806 This culture is global, in that it is 
cognitively constructed in similar ways and is applicable throughout the world.
807
 
They refer to five aspects of the world culture by exploring the character and 
operations of international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs).  
     The second approach argues that global civil society emerges gradually as INGOs 
come to interact more frequently and in greater numbers with nation-states and inter-
governmental organisations. Global civil society has emerged via “the extension of 
European Enlightenment principles onto a world stage—comprises the Western 
institutional innovations of the nation state, law governing interstate relations, and 
voluntary association. In this respect, it stands as the global equivalent of domestic 
civil society in Western democratic nation-states.”808 However, this equilibrium 
between ‘global’ and ‘domestic’ civil society seems to be an exaggeration, because 
the second approach uses a special reading of domestic civil society when it claims 
that it stands as the global equivalent of domestic civil society. Viewed from the 
cultural-concept-model of civil society we do not yet have a global civil society that 
stands as a global equivalent of domestic civil society because emerging global civil 
society has not created a cultural solidarity among global civil society’s actors. If 
domestic civil spheres in the Western societies were shaped as a societal sphere 
between peoples and national state, they originated from a type of cultural consensus 
over the liberal values and ideas among civil society actors. But we cannot find an 
equivalent global consensus among civil society’s actors on a global scale.  
    Alexander leads us to deeper analysis of the emergence of global civil society and 
its origins in liberal discourse of the Enlightenment era. He writes: 
‘Globalization’ appeared as a response to the trauma of the 20th century, in a 
moment of hope when it seemed, not for the first time, that the possibility for 
a world-wide civil society was finally at hand. Since before the 
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Enlightenment, the idea of world peace has accompanied the expansion of 
organizational and cultural power. From the 17
th
 century on, the political 
theory of high and organic intellectuals alike has articulated the idea of 
peaceful conflict resolution through the concept of civil power. The 
possibility for civil control, as opposed to military violence or political 
domination, can be traced back to the idea of the social contract, to the 
Lockean vision of consensual agreement and persuasion in contrast with the 











 century movements for creating world peace and justice. For his 
cultural approach, the ideal of civil society refers to the ideal of a liberal discourse 
that is at once critical and tolerant, and to the institutions of mass media, to voting and 
law that allows collectivities to be directed by symbolic communication among 
independent and rational citizens who feel connected by ties of an ideational 
solidarity.
810
 But he recognises that, “there is not a world government to curb a 
hegemonic state bent on defending its interests as nationally conceived. The nascent 
global civil sphere has none of the institutions that in a fully functioning democracy, 
allows public opinion to produce civil power and thus regulate the state, such as 
independent courts, party competition, and elections. ”811 Yet, he believes that, despite 
its unsuccessful efforts, “the dream of cosmopolitan peace has not died. The forceful 
hope for creating a global civil sphere remains. It is embodied in the collective 
representation of globalization. …There is a global stage in which local events are 
evaluated, not only nationally or ethnically, but according to the standards of the civil 
sphere.”812 In the same line of thought, Kaldor connects the emergence of global civil 
society with the collapse of the Cold War and the emergence of liberal globality:  
…there were indeed new ideas in the revolutions of 1989 and they can be 
summed up in the concept of global civil society. What was new about the 
concept, in comparison with earlier concepts of civil society, was both the 
demand for a radical extension of both political and personal rights—the 
demand for autonomy, self-organization or control over life—and the global 
content of the concept. …To achieve these demands, the new civil society 
actors found it necessary and possible to make alliances across borders and to 
address not just the state but international institutions as well. …The 1989 
revolutions…permitted the emergence of global politics—the engagements of 
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     Kaldor’s analysis reveals a link between intellectual ideas and social movements 
that took place in the course of the Cold War's collapse. She leads us to a normative 
ideal type of global civil society that refers to those “global process through which 
individuals debate, influence and negotiate an ongoing social contract or set of 
contracts with the centers of political and economic authority…[and] it includes all 
those organizations, formal and informal, which individuals can join and through 
which their voices can be heard by decision-makers.”814 This line of analysis can be 
seen in some Habermasian-inspired approaches to the global public sphere. For 
instance, Marc Lynch views dialogue of civilisations as a global public sphere in 
which the act of dialogue would build mutual understanding amongst people for 
making a new contract with the global centers of political and economic power.
815
 
James Bohman discusses the emergence of a global public sphere through a global 
cultural interaction. For him, such a global public sphere requires the development 
and expansion of a transnational civil society.
816
         
     The first and the second approaches to global civil society lead us to insightful 
lessons regarding the potential roles of emerging global civil society in realising a 
dialogic globalisation. Both approaches share an analysis that implies global civil 
society has been developed as a result of the end of the Cold War.
817
 Referring to the 
existing reality of global civil society, the first approach rightly argues about diversity 
of aims and functions of global civil society's organisations due to their origins in 
different national identities. However, for the second approach, the existing global 
society suffers from a lack of democratic global institutions that can give a civil 
power to people for controlling global governance due to the absence of a global 
cultural solidarity among global civil society's actors. The insightful implications of 
the two approaches for a critical rationalist concept-model of global civil society are 
that global civil society's existing realities and potential capacities should be both 
taken into account, if it should play the role of a global agent of dialogic globalisation. 
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In order to shape a global civil sphere, in Alexander's terms, we need to cultivate a 
global cultural solidarity among nationally rooted global civil society's actors. 
9.3 A Critical Rationalist Approach to Global Civil Society: 
       Toward a Global Collective Action against Liberal Globalisation 
    Popper did not discuss ‘civil society’ as the agent of a radical institutional change 
from the closed to the open society. However, a critical rationalist concept-model of 
civil society can be introduced for an exploration of the question of how the 
emancipatory function of global civil society can be conceptualised based on Critical 
Rationalism. If we replace Habermas’s communicative rationality with Popper's 
critical rationality, and if we situate our critical rationalist model of social learning in 
Alexander's cultural conception of civil society, we would arrive at a new normative 
concept-model of global civil society. This concept-model in turn enables us to 
address the question of how the ideal of open global society can be translated into 
emancipatory driving force for global social movements through a global collective 
action frame against neo-liberal globalisation. 
9.3.1 Critical Rationalism and Normative Conception of Global Civil Society 
     The aforementioned two approaches to global civil society recognise a normative 
content in the emerging global civil society. However, the second approach pays more 
attention to this normative aspect. Kaldor describes this normative aspect in this way: 
The normative content of the concept of civil society was to be reconstructed 
by Kant in the late eighteenth century…For Kant, morality could be derived 
from reason in a way that was independent of actual experience and it was 
this moral autonomy that provided the basis for freedom… The term 
‘community of ends’ referred to the idea that the individual human being is 
an end in her or himself, and that this provides the organizing principle of 
civil society. …Universal civil society is indeed the telos of human 
development but it is attained not through some prearranged rational plan nor 
through instinct but rather an antagonistic process of learning through 
experience, through the conflict between man as a private being guided by 
selfish interests and man as a rational moral being, which is expressed in 
public discord [emphasis added]. 
818
  
      If Kant’s normative account of civil society rests on human rationality, Critical 
Rationalism as a theory of rational action can lead us to a normative concept of global 
civil society. Like Kant, from a critical rationalist perspective, individuals are rational 
moral beings who have access to critical reason, hence they can form a universal civil 
society through the creation of a cultural solidarity based on their mutual recognition 
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of an ideal type globality. Open-minded intellectuals and social movements, who 
respect the principles of openness to critical criticism, can establish this global civil 
sphere. Such an intellectual movement can translate their analyses of the causes of 
liberal globality's unsocial sociability into a practical frame of action for the 
transformation of existing unjust global order into a global governance accountable to 
the world's population.  
9.3.2 A Critical Rationalist’s Global Collective Action Frame 
           Against ‘Liberal Globalisation’  
     To address the question of how civil society's organisations can perform as global 
agents of a dialogic globalisation, I propose a critical rationalist collective action 
frame that develops a counterhegemony framework against neo-liberal globalisation 
with the aim of creating an open global society. In the context of this collective action 
frame, we can better realise how open-minded intellectuals work with global social 
movements to transform liberal globality into a global society of free and equal 
citizens. Jackie Smith leads us to view such an action frame as a struggle between 
capitalist and democratic visions of globalisation: 
This struggle [of visions] might be seen in terms of a global society versus a 
world economic system. A global society is a community of citizens and 
states organized around a shared human identity and common norms that 
promote cooperation and social cohesion. Advocates of a world economy are 
not necessarily opposed to such a vision of global society, but in their view 
the most efficient way to allocate the world’s resources is through markets. 
Global markets are seen as the key to the prosperity that will bring peace to 
the human community. Thus, while advocates of global society seek to 
socialize states and other actors in ways that place human rights norms at the 
center of policy. Those advocating a world economy want to subordinate 
societies and state to market forces. 
819
  
     Smith, among others, has conceptualised such competing visions or ideal types of 
global order in the context of the global action frames to realise the ideal types. She 
reminds us that, “scholars have therefore focused considerable attention on ‘framing 
conflict,’ since social change efforts typically begin when social movements mobilize 
people around ideas of the necessary and possibility for change. Movement organizers 
must convince large numbers of people that things they take for granted as normal, 
natural, or the result of their own personal failings are in fact the result of systematic 
and changeable conditions.”820 Smith also addresses the role of the ideal types in the 
development of the collective action frame: “the ideal type also helps analysts assess 
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the potentials of and limitations on social movements. Its key advantage, however, is 
its emphasis on the ways interactions among diverse actors—including those within 
elite groups—shape trajectories of social conflict.”821 Like Smith, Benford and Snow 
argue that the concept of framing processes is analytically useful for addressing the 
question of how the development and spread of mobilising ideas are integral to social 
movement dynamics.
822
   
     Benford and Snow indicate that for movement activists framing is ‘meaning work'. 
This meaning construction is an active and contentious process where actors are 
engaged in producing and disseminating meanings that differs from and may in fact 
challenge existing socio-political conditions.
823
 As such, when social movement’s 
participants ‘frame’ a particular social condition, they frame, or assign meaning to and 
interpret events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential 
believers and voters. In Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism, Jeffrey 
Ayres rightly argues that the framing process “provides a useful conceptual guide for 
understanding the ongoing struggle to produce and disseminate mobilizing ideas 
critical of neoliberal globalisation. So-called collective action frames result from this 
meaning production and serve several crucial functions for [social] movements.”824  
Open-minded intellectuals, as potential members of a global epistemic community, 
are responsible for uncovering the unsocial sociability of liberal globality and to 
introduce the potentials of the ideal type of open global society to overcome such an 
unsocial sociability. As argued in chapter 7, the term ‘unsocial sociability’ of liberal 
globality refers to the utilitarian principle of the liberal model of globality on which 
basis individuals’ social relations shape just because of their usefulness to each other 
as ‘means’ rather than as ‘the end’ in themselves. In this way, the cultural discourse of 
open global society can spread mobilising ideas, which are integral to those global 
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social movement dynamics against liberal globality that aim to dialogically transform 
the unsocial sociability of liberal globality into a humane global order. 
     Referring to Benford and Snow, Ayres points out, collective action frames are 
“constructed as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some 
problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions 
regarding who or what to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements and urge 
others to act in concert to affect change.”825 As Ayres argues, collective action frames 
provide diagnostic attribution, which is concerned with problem identification, and 
prognostic attribution, which is concerned with problem resolution.  
     A critical rationalist collective action frame against neo-liberal globality produces 
meanings and critical analyses of liberal globality’s problematic situation in terms of 
its unsocial sociability, i.e., the lack of a ‘bottom-up’ global consensus on the very 
liberal model of globality; unaccountability of global governance to the world’s 
population; and uneven distribution of globalisation’s costs and benefits. It also 
provides a diagnostic attribution, implying that the contradictions of liberal globality 
should be ultimately traced to the unsocial sociability of liberal model of social 
organisation, as argued in chapter 5. More importantly, such a critical rationalist 
action frame provides global social movements with a problem resolution in terms of 
the ideal type of an open global society of free and equal citizens-- as an alternative 
form of a humane globality. In this sense, the formation of the critical rationalist 
global collective action frame can integrate the ideal type of open global society into 
the very functions of global civil society.   
     As Benford and Snow argue, when faced with what are interpreted as unjust social 
conditions, activists then develop social movement specific and related collective 
action frames to highlight the unjust character of the conditions, which are no longer 
tolerable.
826
 In the current literature of global protest against neo-liberal globalisation 
we can see the emergence of such a collective action frame. For instance, Barry Gills 
argues about the tension between neoliberal economic globalisation—that seeks to 
expand global capital and market—and movements of social resistance –that seek to 
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protect and redefine community and solidarity.
827
 In Global Activism, Ruth Reitan 
discusses regarding the emergence of cross-border networks of global actors in forms 
of social movements and non-governmental organisations, which aim to fight against 
unjust conditions that have been created by neo-liberal globalisation.
828
  
     Jackie Smith argues that, “social movement actors are seeking to generate new 
ideas for confronting growing array of [global] problems that require transnational 
attention. Their focused attention to problems such as human rights violations, 
poverty and social exclusion, or environmental degradation generates intensive efforts 
by social movement activists to come up with new ideas about how to improve these 
conditions.”829 The idea of open global society provides global social movements with 
both diagnostic and prognostic analyses of the contemporary libera globality that its 
outcomes are manifested in global problems such as human rights violations, world 
poverty and income inequality, and environmental degradation.   
     Ayres provides us with a detailed analysis of how the collective action frame can 
be used to develop a diagnostic framing that identifies neo-liberal globalisation as a 
global social organisational problem, and its consequences for contemporary global 
crises. Ayres’s analysis can be used to develop a critical rationalist collective action 
frame against neo-liberal globalisation on the basis of the ideal type of open global 
society. In the context of this global collective action frame, we can explore how 
open-minded intellectuals provide ideational inputs for a critical rationalist vision of 
global social movements who aim to transform the existing global order into an open 
global society of free and equal citizens through a dialogic globalisation. 
     While a transnational alliances of civil society actors “have long been at work 
trying to shape a vision of world order that is not defined by the needs of capital, but 
rather that responds to broader concerns for human well-being”830, global activists by 
the late 1990s developed an increasingly transnationally accepted master collective 
action frame to challenge the prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy as it existed in such 
global institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMP) and regional trade agreements like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The construction of such an anti-neoliberal globalisation 
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collective action frame involved a long-term process of diagnosing global problems, 
originated in neo-liberal globalisation. In addition, such a collective action frame has 
been faced with the challenges of a set of powerful and wealthy interests in those 
states, corporations and other social actors supportive of the neoliberal model of 
globality and the diversity of different regions, states, languages, cultures, and popular 
experiences affected by neo-liberal globalisation.  
     Ayres recognises that while various movements and region-specific collective 
action frames were emerging throughout the 1980s and 1990s in different regions and 
parts of the world, it would require the development of a more inclusive master frame 
to bind disparate actors into a global protest movement against neoliberal globality.
831
 
The ideal type of open global society leads us to a possibility of shaping such global 
action frame through a rational dialogue among intellectual movements who have 
different cultural identities and political interests. In a sense, the first step towards a 
rational dialogue among civilisations is a dialogue among intellectuals over a global 
collective action frame for overcoming global crises. From an epistemological view, 
respecting the principles of critical rationality makes a global consensus over certain 
aspects of such a global action frame possible.   
     During past decades, a global process of diagnostic framing has been shaped that 
recognises neo-liberal form of globalisation as problematic.  As Ayres writes:  
…by the mid-1990s, a number of regional protest campaigns were being 
shaped by collective actions frames that implicated neoliberal policies and 
institutions for the mounting inequalities and dislocations of the post-Bretton 
Woods era. In fact, the record of neoliberalism around the world was less 
than auspicious and made it easier for activists to assign blame: the total 
external debt of developing countries had skyrocketed, the gap between the 
richest, and poorest states had grown demonstrably, poverty had increased in 
many developing states, and the average per capita income growth rate was 
significantly lower across the developing south than has been the case in the 
roughly twenty years before the onset of debt crisis and the policy 
generalization of the neoliberal model. 
832
 
     Due to the emergence of such global crises, neoliberal globalisation's performance 
has received more widespread criticism. In this way, more space opened up for civil 
society networking, collective bargaining and political lobbying across the world, in 
particular across a number of developing states had made transition to electoral 
democracies during the previous decades. Ayres argues that neo-liberal globalisation's 
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records have paved the way for the emergence of an inclusive global master collective 
action frame for a variety of perceived injustices: “from environmental degradation, 
the shifting of jobs to low wages productions sites, human rights abuses in 
sweatshops, and still growing poverty and persistent indebtedness across the 
developed world.”833 Global protests are not against the globalisation of economics 
itself, but against those global liberal policies, focused on promoting economic 
liberalisation, without a concern with the social and environmental consequences. 
Ayres leads us to the action frame’s shortcomings: 
while the anti-neoliberal ‘injustice frame’ performed reasonably well in 
crafting a transnationally shared diagnosis of neoliberalism's faults, 
movement activists were having more difficulty undertaking prognostic 
framing. That is, proposing and agreeing upon plans for attacking neoliberal 
policies and institutions, as well as in encouraging new movement recruits to 
literally take to the streets to oppose neoliberal policies, was proving to be a 
far more difficult task. … Civil society groups and activists shared a strong 
sense of what they felt was “wrong” with neoliberalism; what remained 
unresolved was the development of collectively shared and agreed upon 
solutions and strategic responses to those problems (emphasis added).
834
 
     The ideal type of open global society proposes an alternative humane globality --  
as introduced in detail in chapter 4—implying that any global consensus over a 
collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation should recognise deep-seated 
epistemic roots of neo-liberal globality's faults in liberal social philosophy, which has 
reflected in contemporary globalisation’s unsocial sociability. But such a recognition 
needs a global dialogue.  
     A major step towards a critical rationalist action frame against liberal globalisation 
is the achievement of a global consensus on the origins of globalisation’s social crises. 
It requires to rethink about the insufficiencies of liberal model of globality. As Robert 
Cox notes, “in today's context, the challenge is to bridge the differences among the 
variety of groups disadvantaged by globalization so as to bring about a common 
understanding of the nature and the consequences of globalization, and to devise a 
common strategy towards subordinating the world economy to a regime of social 
equity.”835 Cox’s recognises the difficulties of arriving at such a common 
understanding and strategy, for now this study’s core ambition is to present an ideal 
type of overcoming such a challenge through a rational dialogue.  
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9.4 Major Steps and Essential Conditions for Remaking Global Civil Society   
     This section proposes a possible scenario regarding major steps for making the 
existing global civil society work for a dialogic globalisation through the development 
of a global collective action frame against neo-liberal globalisation based on the ideal 
type of open global society. Sub-section 9.4.1 argues about the scenario’s three major 
steps for shaping the collective action frame and sub-section 9.4.2 discusses essential 
conditions for realising the steps due to the existing possibilities and limitations of 
global civil society. In this line of reasoning, in section 9.4.3, I refer to an example of 
a global dialogue among intellectuals and activists regarding global democracy in the 
context of the Building Global Democracy (BGD) project.   
9.4.1 Three Major Steps for Remaking Global Civil Society     
     As argued, a critical rationalist approach to global civil society implies that a 
global network of intellectuals-- who respect the principles of critical rationality-- can 
shape a global epistemic community for advocating an alternative global social order 
that aims to mitigate injustice of the existing liberal globality. Recalling chapter 5, the 
ideal type of open global society introduces the openness to rational criticism as the 
ethics of such an alternative global order. The mechanism of dialogue of civilisations 
can work for the emergence of such a global network of intellectuals. Such a network 
of open-minded intellectuals, who are interested in a humane global order, can shape a 
global epistemic space for a mutual understanding of the world’s problems and their 
potential solutions.  
     The above overall picture leads us to explore the three major steps for making 
global civil society work for realising a new global collective action frame against 
neo-liberal globalisation. Jackie Smith reminds us the importance of having an  
alternative vision of globality, when we talk about a global action frame against neo-
liberal globality in this way: “any attempt to fundamentally challenge the neoliberal 
global vision must create different possibilities for people to make a living while 
supporting a different worldview. …Neoliberal advocates seek to organize the world 
around economic competition, and most people everywhere find few alternatives to 
engaging somehow in this competition. But those challenging neoliberalism are 
asking whether efforts to promote global economic competition are ultimately self-
defeating, since many of the problems the world faces require cooperation and 
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compromise.”836 Having a clear alternative of globality leads global activists to realise 
the reason why they must change the existing global disorder, and what would be the 
outcomes of such a global social change.  
     The First Step: As argued earlier, one of the main functions of a collective action 
frame is to show how the development and spread of mobilising ideas are integral to 
social movement dynamics. Keeping this in mind, the formation of a global epistemic 
community, or a global network of intellectuals, who validate the ideal type of open 
global society as an alternative model of globality, is the first step for remaking global 
civil society. In this fundamental step, open-minded intellectuals of world civilisations 
can join to discuss the nature of contemporary globalisation and its problems. This 
global epistemic community produces cognitive inputs for shaping a new global social 
movement. If the key challenge of existing global collective action frame is to achieve 
a common understanding of globalisation’s contradictions and potential solutions, a 
rational dialogue among open-minded intellectual movements could be a reasonable 
solution.  
     The Second Step:  the second step to form a global collective action frame against 
neo-liberal globalisation is the creation of a systematic link between such a global 
epistemic community and global social movements. As Smith argues, “social change 
efforts typically begin when social movements mobilize people around ideas of the 
necessity and possibility for change.”837 If the global epistemic community can arrive 
at a more or less common reading of globalisation’s problems and its prognostic 
solution, global social movements who seek diagnostic and prognostic ideas, can base 
their emancipatory efforts on such shared understanding. Against this perspective, the 
second step for remaking global civil society for a dialogic globalisation refers to a 
global cognitive process through which the global epistemic community persuades 
global social movements on the origins of liberal globality’s unsocial sociability and 
its dialogic solutions. If global social movements recognise the validity of such 
diagnostic and prognostic analyses, they have entered to a systematic epistemic-
institutional connection with the social networks of intellectuals. Creating such a 
systematic link between a global network of open-minded intellectuals and global 
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social movements turns the ideational capacity of global epistemic community into a 
global political force to overcome the existing global disorder.  
     The Third Step: Global social movements who employ an alternative ideal type of 
world order to justify their protests against injustice of contemporary globalisation 
need to mobilise ordinary peoples for a global collective action. The third step of 
remaking global civil society for a dialogic globalisation refers to the creation of a 
systematic link between global social movements and prospective global citizens. As 
Smith points out, “the global political arena is far removed from the experiences of 
most of the world’s people, and the challenge for those seeking to advance a local 
vision to rival the neoliberal network is to connect their vision to people’s everyday 
practice.”838 Having said that, an active involvement of people in global collective 
action against neo-liberal globality should be one of the core objectives of remaking 
global civil society. Ayres points out “civil society groups during the late 1990s had 
found it increasingly easier to develop shared and ultimately transnational 
understandings of the experiences and problems fostered on different regions by 
neoliberal economic policies.”839 However, the creation of a global cognitive process 
through which global social movements can translate such a shared understanding to 
people around the globe needs many more innovations and efforts.  
9.4.2 The Major Essential Conditions for Remaking Global Civil Society   
     Viewed from the critical rationalist normative concept of global civil society and 
the aforementioned major steps, this sub-section argues regarding the essential 
conditions for an ideal type function of global civil society. To this end, we need to 
address the existing major potentials and limitations of global civil society to work for 
a dialogic globalisation.   
     If we look at the three major steps for remaking global civil society, we realise that 
the formation of a global epistemic community of open-minded intellectuals requires 
some essential conditions. While there are different social networks of intellectuals, 
and globalisation research centers-- which are interested in an alternative humane 
globalisation-- it does not seem that one of them has yet constructed a global network 
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of intellectuals who are specifically committed to the principles of critical rationalism. 
The Open Society Foundation is perhaps the most important international network, 
which is specifically committed to the motto of critical rationality,
840
 as Karl Popper 
defines it. However, it basically focused upon nationally oriented initiatives for the 
transition from the closed to the open societies around the globe without a special 
mission for the transformation of a closed world society into an open global society.  
     One of the most important networks of globalisation scholars has emerged in the 
last decade as the Globalisation Studies Network (GSN), which includes global 
thinkers from four corners of the globe.
841
 The first ideas for the creation of a network 
of globalisation research centers and scholars were spawned in 2002. The proposition 
was made that researching the topic of globalisation and its various dimensions is 
beyond the capacity of any one university or research center to take on and address 
comprehensively. It was agreed that a coalition of university research centres from all 
over the world would be able to pool their expertise in globalisation. The GSN as a 
network of global research centres, rather than researchers, has some potentials for the 
formation of a global epistemic community that respects a rational dialogue amongst 
intellectuals over the nature of globalisation and alternative world order. However, it 
does not specify any emancipatory task for an intellectual leadership of global social 
movements towards a humane globalisation. 
     In 2001, United Nations’ Initiative for Inter-Civilisational Dialogue was an 
important opportunity for the creation of a global epistemic community of open-
minded thinkers who argue for an alternative global order through rational dialogue 
amongst world civilisations. In the year 2000, former Iranian President Mohammad 
Khatami called for a global dialogue of civilisations as an effective solution for 
overcoming global problems. That call was taken up by Kofi Annan, the Secretary 
General of the United Nations and the year 2001 was proclaimed the International 
Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations. But the idea of dialogue among civilisations 
has not led to a global epistemic community, involving in a sustained discourse 
regarding a rational dialogue amongst civilisations. 
     It seems that existing global networks of intellectuals do not meet the requirements 
of a global epistemic community that respects the principles of critical rationality (like 
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Open Society Fundation), and it has a global emancipatory mission (like Initiative for 
Inter-Civilisational Dialogue), and finaly it mobilises scholars and intellectuals who 
are interested in globalisation (like the Globalisation Studies Network). As such, one 
essential condition for the emergence of such a global epistemic community is the 
formation of a global network of intellectuals who respect the principles of critical 
rationality; who validate the formation of a multi-civilisational open global society, 
and who believe that rational dialogue of civilisations is a sophisticated way to create 
a global society of free and equal persons.  
     The second major essential condition for the emergence of the global collective 
action frame is the formation of a new global social movement, which turns the 
ideational capacity of global epistemic community into a global political force. Smith 
rightly points out:  
The WSF is a self-consciously global project, attempting to bring people 
from diverse countries and cultural traditions together to consider alternative 
visions of how the world might be organized and to take action to realize 
these visions. It is essentially a global public meeting, which serves three 
crucial functions to help construct a foundation for a more democratic global 
order. Specifically, it contributes to the development of global identities, the 
cultivation of shared understandings of the world’s problems and their 
appropriate solutions, and the building of capacities for citizens’ groups to 
challenge existing global power relations (emphasis added).
842
 
     However, while the World Social Forum (WSF) is the most important global space 
for intellectuals and social movements to cooperate against neo-liberal globality, it 
has not yet realised promised functions to develop a global shared understanding of 
globalisation’s problems and an alternative vision of global order. As Ayres argues, 
“differences of opinion, illustrative of the limits of anti-neoliberal prognostic framing, 
starkly emerged in setting such as the World Social Forum…Questions that 
confronted activists included: what are to most effective tactics for challenging 
neoliberal policies; more consultative and collaborative engagement in neoliberal 
summitry by NGOs, or grassroots mobilization and contentious protest.”843 The 
absence of a globally shared anti-neoliberal prognostic action frame is one of the most 
important weaknesses of the existing global social movements who are interested in a 
radical institutional reform in the global power relations.  
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      Nevertheless, the World Social Forum is still the most important global space for 
linking intellectuals with social movements. The WSF, held first in Brazil, and in 
2004 in Mumbai, India, continues to draw large numbers of people and represents a 
crucial forum for developing a more widely accepted global prognostic frame against 
neo-liberal globality.
844
 In this sense, the WSF remains the most important global 
space for linking open-minded thinkers with global social movements. However, an 
essential condition for making the WSF work for the development of a critical 
rationalist global collective action frame is an integration of cultural dialogue among 
world civilisations in the WSF’s self-consciously global project, serveing to construct 
the foundation for a democratic global society. In a word, the WSF could be improved 
as a space between global governance and peoples in which global social movements 
use mobilising ideas of alternative global order for organising peoples against the 
unsocial sociability of contemporary globalisation.
845
 
       The third major essential condition is the emergence of a certain level of a sense 
of global citizenship. In a word, we should not view ordinary people as merely 
passive  actors who must be activated by global social movements and intellectuals. 
Due to their access to critical rationality, prospective global citizens can also play 
their own contributions in a dialogic globalisation in terms of showing a more active 
sense of global citizenship. As Scholte argues, “given that most citizens across the 
world feel some degree of concern about negative implications of existing forms of 
globalization, the potential constituency for the movement is huge. On the other hand, 
a prevailing climate of political passivity and cynicism inhibits their limited political 
energy to local and national politics.”846 But, without the emergence of a certain level 
of an active participation of people in global politics, global social movements cannot 
mobilise them to create the global collective action frame against neo-liberal 
globalisation. In Scholte's words, “to yield its fruits transborder civic activity needs to 
have adequate capacities in terms of human, material and ideational resources. In 
many cases to date these means have been lacking. Next to governance institutions 
and the market, civil society has run a very poor third in terms of supporting staff, 
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funds, equipment and symbolic capital.”847 As such, a critical rationalist remaking of 
global civil society requires its own human and material resources.  
      In sum, the essential conditions for remaking global civil society include:
848
  
firstly, the creation of a global epistemic community of open-minded intellectuals 
who are committed to the principles of critical rationalism as their discursive ethics to 
achieve shared understandings of globalisation’s problems and solutions. Secondly, 
the formation of a global social movement that aims to translate the ideal of open 
global society into a global place of action for protesting against neo-liberal globality. 
Thirdly, a certain level of the awareness and feeling of global citizenship amongst 
ordinary peoples across the globe to make them ready for taking alternative vision of 
globality as a serious solution for their own global problems.  
 
9.4.3 Building Global Democracy Programme: A Global Dialogic Network   
     In this final part of chapter 9, I briefly refer to an actual case of a world-wide 
dialogue among intellectuals, researchers, activists and practitioners regarding global 
democracy. In 2008, a global project entitled ‘Building Global Democracy’ (BGD) 
was initiated with the aim of advancing “knowledge and action for greater public 
participation and control in the governance of global affairs. The initiative explores 
how ‘rule by and for the people’—a core attribute of human livelihood and a good 
society—can operate when addressing global challenges of the present age.”849 The 
BGD program can be viewed as a major international action-oriented research project. 
More specific objectives of the project are: (a) to increase the attention to problems of 
global democracy; (b) to elaborate the very notion of global democracy; (c) to record 
and assess past efforts to advance global democracy; (d) to contribute viable visions 
and proposals for global democracy; (e) to advance the capacities to promote global 
democracy; (f) to foster participant-researcher exchange on global democracy; and (g) 
to further advocacy networks for democratisations of global governance.
850
 
      The BGD programme rests on a fivefold diagnosis of the principal shortfalls of 
democracy in current global governance. Firstly, ideas of democracy have not been 
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adequately reformulated to address the altered global circumstances, as a conceptual 
problem. Secondly, the learning processes for empowering citizenship in global 
politics have not been sufficiently developed, as a pedagogical challenge. Thirdly, the 
agencies of global governance suffer from acute accountability deficits, as an 
institutional problem. Fourthly, highly unequal distributions of world resource create 
large discrepancies in people’s possibilities for engagement in global politics, as an 
economic obstacle. Finally, numerous collective identities lack due recognition and 
voice in contemporary global governance, as a cultural problem. In order to address 
these respective challenges the BGD programme comprises five projects:  
The first project, entitled ‘Conceptualizing Global Democracy’, explores how 
democracy can be (re) envisioned to be meaningful for a more global world, 
…The second project, ‘Citizen Learning for Global Democracy’, examines 
how affected people … can become more empowered through greater 
knowledge of global relations and their governance. The third project, 
‘Including the Excluded in Global Policymaking’, considers how governance 
institutions in global affairs can be made more accessible and responsive to 
heretofore sidelined constituencies. The fourth project, ‘Structural 
Redistribution for Global Democracy’, assesses how alternative allocations of 
world resources can help currently subordinated stakeholders to obtain due 
participation and control in the governance of global affairs. The Fifth 
project, ‘Intercultural Constructions of Global Democracy’, investigates how 
increased legitimacy in the governance of global affairs can be achieved with 
greater recognition of, and more effective communication and negotiation 




    The BGD programme aims to make the five action-oriented research projects a 
global dialogic context within which intellectuals, researcher, activists and policy-
makers exchange their views on global democracy and use the shared findings in their 
efforts for building global democracy. The five projects can mutually reinforce each 
other to realise the above objectives. For instance, increasing conceptual clarity on 
global democracy can pave the way for an improvement in the attention, among 
academic and practitioners, to the challenges of democratising global governance. In 
addition, such a conceptual clarity may facilitate an intercultural construction of 
global democracy through paving the ways for the emergence of a globally shared 
account of democracy itself. Similarly, a structural redistribution of the world’s 
resources can provide some pre-conditions for increasing people’s awareness of the 
importance of global democracy for their own well-being.  
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     From the perspective of the thesis’ central argument, the BGD program can be 
regarded as an example of a world-wide dialogue among researchers and practitioners 
in relation to different aspects of global democracy. Although, it is hard to view such 
type of global dialogue as an inter-civilisation dialogue on global democracy, it 
provides an inter-regional scale of such a global dialogue due to the fact that the main 
sub-units of the project’s researchers-practitioners are defined based on the world’s 
major geographical regions, namely North America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, 
Eastern Europe, the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East 
Asia, and Western Europe. Nevertheless, it is a sample of the possibility of dialogue 
among a wide range of researchers, intellectuals, policy-makers and activists across 
the world. However, a key point is that the BGD project’s methodology aims to 
interlink “theory and practice, researchers and practitioners, intellectual labours and 
political struggles. Past explorations of global democracy have tended to be either 
highly abstract academic treatises or loosely formulated activist pamphlets. … A more 
meaningful and effective exercise in building global democracy would overcome this 
researcher-practitioner divide. A mutual learning exercise [through dialogue] between 
academic and policy circles has advantages including: (a) ‘reality checks’ for 
researchers; (b) practitioners stake in the research … and (c) capacity building for 
practitioners…”852 Against these premises, the BGD’s projects use the various 
international workshops and case studies in order to involve researchers and 
practitioners in a global dialogue regarding different challenges of building global 
democracy.   
     While the final results of the BDG’s projects will be published over the next few 
years as book series, available information from the sub-projects’ workshops and case 
studies shows that the dialogue among researchers, intellectuals, practitioners, and 
policy-makers has led to some shared understandings and policy advice among them. 
For instance, on 6-8 December 2009, the project convened a dialogue of diversities on 
the question of what does it mean to speak of global democracy in Cairo, Egypt. Core 
to the discussions were 40 researchers and practitioners from 29 countries spread 
across all world regions. The workshop’s major results were as follows: (1) in today’s 
more global world some political decisions must be global. For those actions to be 
legitimate and effective, it is important that all concerned participate in and hold 
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control over the process; (2) currently predominant forms of globalisation are severely 
undemocratic; (3) the ideas of democracy inherited from nation-state contexts do not 
seem to provide a sufficient basis for conceptions of global democracy; (4) the 
problem of conceptualising global democracy needs to remain directly linked to 
processes of achieving it; (5) democracy as a key value for a good society is deeply 
interconnected with other core values such as justice, peace, diversity, human 
development, and ecological sustainability; (6) a universal consensus on conceptions 
of global democracy is neither available nor desirable. However, the principles, 
institutions and practices of global democracy cannot be contested, sometimes very 
deeply, and (7) listening is key to the communication and negotiation of diversities 
around global democracy.
853
 The above results imply some significant progresses 
among participants regarding certain features of global democracy, which can be 
viewed as the outcomes of such a dialogue-- as indicated by the term ‘shared findings 
on the concept of global democracy’.    
     Viewed from the perspective of the thesis’ critical rationalist account of global 
democracy as a global learning process, it seems that the case studies of the project of 
Conceptualising Global Democracy support the key role of dialogue in clarifying 
meaning of global democracy. For instance, in her case study, Nadia Mostafa writes: 
“Reconceptuaisation of global democracy beyond Western notions is needed. If global 
democracy is to be truly global, then theoretical mapping of the idea cannot be limited 
to Western literature and Western experiences. Otherwise, there is a unilateral 
hegemony, which is itself highly undemocratic. Conceptualisation of global 
democracy must therefore include non-Western others, including Muslim thought.”854 
In the same line of analysis, Edgardo Lander argues that, “veritable global democracy 
is not possible when, as at present, one societal order is prescribed for and imposed 
upon the whole of the planet’s population. …Yet there is also worldwide resistance 
against so-called free trade; against agribusiness and the model of accumulation of 
dispossession that has characterised neoliberal globalisation …these movements 
constitute some of the most dynamic expressions of struggles for another possible 
world, bringing together local, national, regional and global struggles for a new plural 
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democratic society.”855 By the same reasoning, Melissa Williams points out, “the rise 
of a more global world has stimulated new democratic imaginaries: different ideas of 
what democracy could be. …disagreement reigns about the location of the 
governance that should be rendered more democratic as well as the modality of 
political action that should be adopted to enhance global democracy.”856  
      Viewed from a Chinese’s perspective, Xu Jiajun, Ma Ben and Peng Zongchao 
define their account of global democracy in this way: “on the normative side, it 
emphasizes the significance of cross-cultural exchange, rather than taking for granted 
the validity of any preordinated democratic principle, Western or otherwise. Such 
dialogue might reveal, for instance, that neither ‘liberal democracy’ nor ‘authoritative 
democracy’ deserves priority over the other…On the institutional side, the concept of 
global democracy developed here highlights the necessity of institutional innovations 
and refuses to accept the legitimacy of any fixed arrangement, …On the substantive 
side, the touchstone of global democracy should be how globalization can yield 
equitable and sustainable development.”857 These case studies reinforce each other in 
shaping a globally shared account of a multi-civilisational conception of global 
democracy. Viewed from a critical rationalist approach to global democracy, a further 
progress can be emerged in such a global dialogue among researchers and 
practitioners, if they discuses regarding the need for a micro-foundation for such a 
plural account of global democracy. It implies that without a globally shared account 
of the equality of human beings, the institutional features of global democracy cannot 
be systematically conceptualised. Global democracy as rule by, and for the people 
requires a common understanding of the very idea of the people itself. The critical 
rationalist account of global democracy introduces a foundation for this common 
understanding as rational unity of humankind in Popper’s term or what this thesis 
termed as people’s potential access to critical rationality.  
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Contributions of Critical Rationalism to 
 Macrosociology of Globalisation 
 
 
     This concluding chapter pursues three aims: Section 10.1 concludes the thesis’ 
methodological and analytical contributions to the macrosociology of globalisation. 
Section 10.2 sums up major research findings. Section 10.3 introduces general themes 
of a research programme for building open global society. 
10.1 Methodological and Analytical Contributions 
      Chapter 2 argued that Critical Rationalism—as a conjectural theory of human 
knowledge and rationality—contributes to the thesis’ research methodology. Chapter 
5 used Critical Rationalism to offer an analytical framework for the macrosociology 
of dialogic globalisation. This section highlights the thesis’ key methodological and 
analytical contributions to macrosociology of globalisation.  
     The thesis discussed an integration of Critical Rationalism in the methodology of 
macrosociology of dialogic globalisation. To this end, it proposed a cultural turn in 
exploring globalisation as a macro-societal institutional change. In this cultural turn, 
the role of epistemic impetus or ideational factors in the formation of more global 
world was emphasised. While contemporary approaches to globalisation are mainly 
focused upon the economic, political, and technological causes of globalisation, the 
function of ideational factors in the context of globalisation’s cultural mechanisms has 
received less systematic interest. A contribution of the thesis to the methodology of 
macrosociology of globalisation is to show how critical rationalism can be employed, 
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in the context of a hermeneutic method, in order to enable us to explore the ideational 
forces of global social changes. In a sense, the thesis leads us to see the interplay 
between global liberalism, as a globalising social philosophy, and the formation of a 
post-national political economy-- as a type of global macro-institutional change. 
     A key innovative contribution of the thesis to the methodology of macrosociology 
of globalisation is using Critical Rationalism as a theory of rational action in order to 
propose a new micro-foundation for such a macrosociological analysis. Habermas’ 
normative analysis of globalisation has used Communicative Rationality to provide a 
normative critique of existing liberal globalisation. However, it does not introduce a 
systematic application of Communicative Rationality as the micro-foundation of his 
sociological analyses of contemporary globalisation. The thesis attempts to employ 
Critical Rationalism--as a theory of rational action-- to explore ideational motor forces 
of liberal globalisation. It also applies Critical Rationalism as an epistemological 
theory of a rational dialogue of civilisations with the aim of introducing a dialogic 
form of globalisation. 
     In a purely methodological sense, the thesis contributes to an application of 
Critical Rationalism for the construction of a new logic for critical social sciences. 
Inspired by Popper and Adorno’s methodologies, the thesis argues for a critical 
rationalist methodology of a critical social theory. It discusses that if Critical 
Rationalism is to be used as a theory of rational action,  the contradictions of the 
existing social order can be attributed to a ‘closedness’ of the members of society to 
rational criticism. In addition, Critical Rationalism can be utilised as a methodological 
base for exploring how openness to rational criticism acts as self-liberation through 
social learning for a transition from the closed to the open society. In this way, the 
thesis introduces systematic linkages amongst (a) Popper’s conjectural theory of 
knowledge, (b) a critical rationalist theory of action, and (c) a critical macrosociology 
of dialogic globalisation. Such links help the thesis to identify three major tasks for 
macrosociology of globalisation: (a) analysing the existing forms of globalisation, (b) 
criticising unsocial sociability of contemporary globalisation, and (c) advocating a 
dialogic form of globalisation. 
     From an analytical perspective, the thesis contributes to the development of a new 
theoretical framework for macrosociology of globalisation. It does so by introducing 
the ideal type of an open global society, and by offering the critical rationalist models 
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of human action and social organisation. The ideal type of open global society plays 
the key role in realising the three major tasks of macrosociology of globalisation. It 
provides the thesis with a normative standard from which the deviations of the 
existing forms of globality can be explored. The thesis discusses if contemporary 
liberal globalisation suffers from global societal deficits, the ultimate ideational 
source of such deficits can be traced to the flawed foundation of the existing liberal 
model of social organisation. The thesis’ three-fold pattern of social organisation-- 
namely the Hobbesian, the Lockean and the Kantian patterns-- can be regarded as a 
contribution to the development of the ideal type of open global society.  
      The thesis situates Critical Rationalism between two major epistemologies; that is, 
Uncritical Rationalism (Absolutism) and Critical Irrationalism (Relativism). Upon this 
categorisation, the thesis finds an epistemological logic to argue for the possibility of 
a critical rationalist model of inter-civilisational dialogue. In addition, the shift from 
viewing Critical Rationalism, as an irrational faith in reason to a theory of rationality, 
has played a crucial role in the development of the ideal type of open global society. 
Critical Rationalism, as a meta-civilisational theory of rationality, leads the thesis to 
explore the essential principles of a rational dialogue among world civilisations. It 
argues that the first principle of a rational dialogue of civilisations is that they use 
valid deductive arguments in their global dialogue. The second principle of such a 
rational dialogue is looking for ‘falsifier’ evidence, as the mechanism of the growth of 
rationality through learning from mutual criticism. The third principle is respecting 
the possibility of the approximation to the truth through a rational dialogue. As such, 
despite Absolutism and Relativism, Critical Rationalism leads to realise the epistemic 
possibility of a rational dialogue among civilisations of peoples. 
     The thesis recognises an important link between epistemology and social theory, 
and uses this critical link to argue for a new micro-foundation for the development of 
a new macrosociology of globalisation. An important analytical achievement of the 
thesis is introducing a critical rationalist model of human action that may advance 
Habermas’ communicative action model. In this way, the thesis provides a new 
analytical framework for the macrosociology of globalisation based on a new analysis 
of the origins of action’s goals. This leads the thesis to a critical rationalist model of 
social learning as motor forces of global social changes. The model provides the 
analytical model for exploring globalisation as a set of global learning process.  
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10.2 Major Findings of the Macrosociology of Dialogic Globalisation 
     The thesis developed its macrosociology of dialogic globalisation in three major 
steps. The first step was the description of contemporary globalisation as the 
development of a liberal form of globality. The second step was criticising liberal 
globality due to its unsocial sociability. The third step was introducing an alternative 
ideal type of globality (open global society) and a dialogic globalisation. This section 
highlights the key findings of these three major steps toward a critical rationalist 
macrosociology of globalisation. 
      In order to explain the reasons why contemporary globalisation can be analysed as 
the transformation of the Westphalian world order into a liberal globality, the thesis 
took an epistemic-institutional approach to the globalisation concept. It argued that 
increasing global interconnectivity could be explained in the context of a global 
qualitative institutional change from the Westphalian order towards a post-national 
political economy, in which national obstacles for the expansion of transnational 
connectivity have been systematically reduced. In this sense, global interconnectivity 
finds a new institutional meaning. Using the critical rationalist analytical framework, 
the thesis argued that liberal globalisation can be described as a global learning 
process, containing three cultural, political, and economic sub-learning processes. The 
macrosociology of globalisation addresses the interplay amongst these three sub-
learning processes due to the key role of the liberalism-- as a social philosophy: A 
philosophy that rests on a relativist epistemology and a utilitarian ethics, in which 
human action-goals are subjective, and there is not an inter-subjective criterion to 
identify the rationality of action-goals. If action-goals are determined purely 
subjectively and a rational agreement over competing conceptions of the good (the 
ultimate goals of action) is not possible, the best way of social ordering of liberal 
(wo)men is to allow them free to opt and act as they wish.   
     Along with this line of analysis, the thesis introduced the globalisation of liberal 
social philosophy, as a global epistemic shift from the logic of the struggle for 
political power to the logic of competition for economic interests. This top-down 
global epistemic shift refers to an inter-bloc cultural learning regarding the model of 
social ordering of peoples. If contemporary globalisation indicates a big reduction in 
the nation state’s control of national political economy and an opening of borders to 
the transnational exchanges, and if the military-political sector is losing dominance as 
  326 
the defining process of world politics, such a liberalisation of politics and economy 
cannot be analysed without recognising a cultural or epistemic turn in global social 
philosophy, i.e. from the Hobbesian model to the Lockean one. 
     The thesis offers a cultural history of the emergence of Western liberal democracy 
and its expansion to the Western bloc of liberal democracies in order to show that 
such a global epistemic shift, or cultural learning, started in the West, but became 
globalised through inter-bloc learning and institutional reforms, when the Eastern bloc 
realized the relative advantages of the liberal model of social order in comparison 
with its own the former Communist model. One key contribution of the thesis’ 
macrosociology to Globalisation Studies refers to an explanation of how such relative 
advantage of liberal social philosophy—i.e. an ideational motor force—affected the 
collapse of the Cold War political order, and accordingly paved the way for the 
formation of a post national market. In this way, an interplay between a global 
expansion of the liberal ideal type of social organisation and the emergence of post-
national political economy was analytically unmasked by the thesis’ macrosociology 
of globalisation. 
     The thesis discussed when early modern Europeans accepted liberal accounts of 
human nature and social organisation, a deep-seated epistemic shift occurred from the 
individual as the subject of a monarchy’s rule towards the individual as possessor of 
the equal property rights and self-governance. Such a micro-epistemic shift in the 
conception of the person itself led to a resulting macro-institutional change from the 
institution of monarchy to liberal democracy as one set of modern social institutions 
market economy and constitutional state.  In this sense, the ideas of liberal thinkers, 
such as John Locke and David Hume, among others, provided epistemic inputs for 
liberal social movements who were involved in a social transformation from 
monarchies to liberal democracies.  
      Liberal ideas and values also helped the Western liberal democracies to shape a 
liberal bloc of nation-state despite all of their internal differences and diversities, in 
order to faces the challenge of its international competitor, i.e. the Sovit bloc. Liberal 
logic convinced liberal democracies to view each other as useful means to form a new 
Western- bloc of liberal democratic states for dealing with such an emerging 
international threat. The relative advantages of a liberal model of social organisation, 
because of its more ideational consistency compared with the Eastern rival, led to its 
  327 
practical success in an inter-bloc competition. When political leadership of the Soviet 
Union faced its domestic and international crises in the 1980s, it practically realised 
such an ideational advantage. In this sense, an inter-bloc learning about the cultural 
model of social organisation, reflected in corresponding institutional reforms, resulted 
in the collapse of the Cold War political system. 
     The thesis argues that the emergence of liberal global governance was not merely a 
result of the West’s political win. It originated from a global epistemic shift, due to 
inter-bloc cultural learning that justified the need for superseding the Hobbesian logic 
by the Lockean model. In this sense, the thesis introduces liberal globalisation as an 
epistemic-institutional transition from the centrality of the struggle for political power 
to a competition for economic interests. The collapse of the Cold War already 
originated from a type of global epistemic refutation of the Hobbesian model of social 
organization. The Soviet Union’s political leadership in fact learned from  critiques of 
the Soviet’s model of social organisation. 
     The end of the Cold War led to the emergence of multi-centric global governance 
in which nation-state actors no longer play the main role in the political organisation 
of the world. This political transformation from the Westphalian system into a post-
national constellation paved the way for the formation of a transnational market in 
which the main units of economic action are private sectors rather than nation-states. 
Hence, the cultural and political sub-processes of liberal globalisation provided the 
required institutional preconditions for the emergence of a post-national economy in 
which the Lockean philosophy i.e. competition for economic interests finds its 
ultimate manifestation.  
     Using the normative ideal type of open global society, the thesis contributes to a 
new normative critique of contemporary globalisation. The unsocial sociability of 
liberal globality should be traced in the liberal model of social order in which human 
beings are viewed, as useful means for each other rather ends in themselves. The 
modern liberal (wo) man is forced to collaborate with others yet s/he is thinking only 
about subjective ends of her/himself for which there is not an inter-subjective or 
objective yardstick.  As competitors, they are not obliged to do ‘good’ to each other. 
As Rousseau argues, none of the great human passions can emerge in such a society 
because self-love is a unique passion of modern liberal (wo) man. As Habermas 
reminds us, in such an individualistic liberal society, persons can do and permit what 
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they will according to their own preferences and value orientations within the limits of 
legally permissible action. However, they are not required to take into account any 
mutual interest for each other. The legally requisite respect for private liberties, that 
all competitors are entitled to, is something very different from the equal respect for 
the human worth of each individual. In contrast to this liberal social philosophy, 
Critical Rationalism leads to the social philosophy of an open society according to  
which individuals can agree upon a certain common goals because their action-goals 
are not determined entirely subjective and arbitrary that could be regarded as a moral 
anarchy. But the action-goals can be identified through an inter-subjective consensus 
that is always open to rational criticism.   
     To an extent liberal globalisation advocates such a utilitarian mentality as the 
essence of a global competition for economic interests, where there is not a bottom-up 
global consensus on this ideal type of social organisation. An important cultural 
shortfall of liberal globality is the lack of a global consensus on its model of social 
philosophy; hence it imposes such a model of global organisation unilaterally. Liberal 
globality has not created a global governance accountable to the world's population. 
Hence, it suffers from a shortage of global political legitimacy. Its cultural and 
political deficiencies have made liberal form of globality a highly uneven distribution 
of globalisation’s costs and benefits. In sum, the thesis’ normative critique of liberal 
globality leads us to realise an inter-linkage among the cultural, political, and 
economic causes of ‘unsocial sociability’ of contemporary globalisation.  
     In addition to its normative critique of liberal globality, the macrosociology of 
dialogic globalisation introduces an alternative ‘humane globalisation’ through which 
the unsocial sociability of liberal globality could be dialogically overcome. To this 
end, the thesis introduces the five layers of an ideal type global social learning 
process. It uses a critical rationalist logic of learning from mutual openness to rational 
criticism to address epistemic and institutional possibilities of altering liberal globality 
into a just and democratic global order. 
     The thesis proposes the philosophical layer of such a normative global social 
learning as the most fundamental epistemic driving force of the transformation from 
liberal globality into an open global society. It argues that if civilisations of peoples 
activate their potential access to critical rationality, they can enter to a rational 
dialogue over their competing systems of rationale. Critical Rationalism, as a meta-
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civilisational theory of rationality, implies that if civilisations of peoples respect the 
principles of rational dialogue, they would lead to a global standard of rationality. 
     The thesis shows that such a philosophical layer of global (inter-civilisational) 
learning is necessary for the emergence of a globally shared conception of human 
equality based on humans’ equal access to critical rationality. Without such a globally 
shared account of human being as the end in themselves, in Kant’s terms, the unsocial 
sociability of liberal globality cannot be overcome. In other words, as long as 
civilisations of peoples do not arrive at certain shared understanding of the equality of 
human beings, democratic global institutions, which must protect such equality, will 
not find a cultural justification. The modern shape of an inter-civilisational dialogue 
must go beyond its previous forms in order to create a globally shared account of the 
individual’s nature and rights, on which basis global institutions of democracy and 
justice can be dialogically established.  
     The thesis then introduces other layers of such an ideal type global social learning.   
Recognising the five layers of social learning as prescriptive explanations, it argues 
for a logical consistency of the analytical model of global learning. The thesis 
attempts to advocate one set of potential and normatively justified layers of global 
social learning at the core of its critical rationalist model of dialogic globalisation. The 
thesis recognises the normative nature of its proposed model of dialogic global 
learning, but it argues that such a normative model has been constructed based on the 
rational and objective premise of humans’ access to critical rationality, which is 
rooted in the reality of the limits of human rationality. Hence, the thesis’ normative 
model of global social learning rests upon epistemology of critical rationalism and the 
possibility of the growth of human rationality via an inter-subjective openness to 
rational criticism. As such, the thesis has not constructed its analytical and normative 
model of inter-civilisational dialogue based on a subjective or an arbitrary criterion. 
To the contrary, it has formulated based on an inter-subjective standard of human 
rationality that takes its own paradigm from sciences. Popper’s philosophy of 
sciences, or his theory of knowledge, is employed to construct the thesis’ analytical 
model of rational dialogue among world civilisations—as the mechanism of a global 
social change from contemporary unjust global order towards an open global society. 
In sum, the thesis’ key contribution to Globalisation Studies refers to a systematic 
integration of Popper’s theory of knowledge in the macrosociology of globalisation.  
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10.3 Towards a ‘Scientific Research Programme’ 
          For ‘Building Open Global Society’ 
     Chapter 9 discussed the Building Global Democracy (BGD) Programme as an 
action-oriented international programme, including the five research projects. This 
section aims to use the insights of the thesis’ macrosociology of dialogic globalisation 
in order to introduce general themes of a ‘scientific research programme’ for building 
open global society.  
     The BGD programme justifies the need for a global research on global democracy 
in this way: “in contrast to the many major research programmes that have developed 
across the world concerning global economic welfare, global security threats and 
global ecological changes—similar large systematic efforts have not attended to 
issues of global democracy. Amidst worries about competition, violence and 
environmental crisis in contemporary globalization, democracy easily gets lost in the 
research and policy shuffle. The Building Global Democracy programme is meant as 
one initiative to right this imbalance.”858 I shall argue that there is another important 
imbalance in the global research agenda; that is, the lack of a systematic programme 
for a large-scale effort to scientifically investigate the question of how a global society 
of free and equal citizens can be built. In a word, we require a research programme to 
explore interrelated cultural, political, and economic dynamics of globalisation in the 
context of a global macrosociological research programme. It is worthy of note that 
building global democracy or justice cannot be realised without the construction of an 
inter-cultural infrastructure for a democratic and just global order. The ideal type of 
open global society introduced the systematic links between global democracy and 
cultural dialogue of civilisations on the one side, and global democracy and a just 
world economy on the other side. Without such a macrosociological research, how 
can we explore interface among global democracy, global dialogue and global justice?  
     In order to introduce the general themes of such a scientific macrosociological 
programme, that can be called as Building Open Global Society Programme,  I first 
recall that the thesis has attempted to offer an analytical model for exploring  
systematic links amongst the cultural, political, and economic sub-processes of a  
macrosociological process of dialogic globalisation. However, this section discusses 
such an analytical model should be advanced to a well-developed macrosociolgical 
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theory of globalisation. The thesis introduced a micro-macro link between a critical 
rationalist model of human action and a critical rationalist model of social learning to 
address the interactions amongst aforementioned sub-processes. In order to formulate 
a critical rationalist-based macrosociological theory of globalisation, those models of 
human action and social learning must be developed to a theory of action and a theory 
social learning.  
     To advance the thesis’ critical rationalist model of human action to a theory of 
rational action, a more comprehensive inquiry into competing theories of human 
action is required. The thesis used the three-fold model of human action, namely the 
Hobbesian, the Lockean, and the Kantian models. These models can be expanded, for 
instance, by including Anthony Giddens’ Structuration-Action theory859 and Hans 
Joas’ Creative Action theory, among others.860 By analogy, the critical rationalist 
model of social learning can be developed to a theory of social learning by further 
inquiries into the sociological theories of learning and social changes.
861
  
     Given the necessity of these general theoretical researches, we need to explore how 
one set of theoretical, empirical and comparative investigations in epistemology, 
action theory, cultural theory, civilisational studies, political philosophy, social justice 
and sociological theory must be systematically interlinked in order to develop a 
scientific research programme for building an open global society. Such a 
macrosociological research programme would be a truly inter-disciplinary research 
programme. 
      In order to outline some potential themes of such a research programme, I begin 
with what Jeffery Alexander has called Strong Programme in Cultural Sociology.
862
 
As I shall discuss, this programme that can be linked with what S.N. Eisenstadt terms 
a scientific project of a civilisational turn in sociological theory, which has a close tie 
with Donald Nielsen’s call for an integration of the competing systems of rationale 
into the very fabric of a comparative macrosociology of world civilisations. 
Recognising these relationships, I will then situate these interlinked areas of research 
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in Bjorn Wittrock’s argument for the existence of the full potential of a research on 
the interplay between the cultural crystallisations and macro- institutions trajectories. 
Finally, I shall discuss that all of these intrwoven research areas can be systematically 
connected with our Popperian-informed epistemology of Critical Rationalism. In 
addition, as an applied research, the programme of building an open global society 
should response to the question of  how such theoretical explorations can be applied 
for shaping a global collective action frame against existing unjust global order. 
     In his Strong Programme in Cultural Sociology, Alexander leads us to see the 
importance of a radical cultural turn in sociological theory:  
Cultural sociology can be as hardheaded and critical as materialistic 
sociology. Cultural sociology makes collective emotions and ideas central to 
its methods and theories precisely because it is such subjective and internal 
feelings that so often seem to rule the world. Socially constructed subjectivity 
forms the will of collectivities; shapes the rules of organizations; defines the 
moral substance of law, and provides the meaning and motivation for 
technologies, economies, and military machines. …We would like to suggest 
that a strong program also might be emerging in the sociological study of 
culture. Such an initiative argues for a sharp analytical uncoupling of culture 
from social structure, which is what we mean by cultural autonomy… As 
compared to the sociology of culture, cultural sociology depends on 
establishing this autonomy, and it is only via such a strong program that 
sociologists can illuminate the powerful role that culture plays in shaping 
social life (emphasis added).
 863
 
    As Baert and da Silva remark, Alexander argues for a radical cultural refounding of 
sociological theory.
864
 The importance of this radical cultural refounding of our 
research programme for building an open global society is that it provides us with a 
new sociological theory, according to which we can investigate an independent 
explanatory role of the cultural dialogue among civilisations in the rise of one set of 
globally constructed subjectivities about the equality of human beings and a people-
centric model of social ordering of such equal persons. These subjectivities can in turn 
shape the rules of global organisations, the moral substance of global law and the 
meaning and motivation for global democracy and global justice. Having said that, a 
major theme of the research programme for building an open global society could be 
addressing the question of how such subjectivities can be constructed globally--as an 
independent force for the creation of a global cultural solidarity.  
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     For Alexander, the strong programme in cultural sociology defines culture as webs 
of significance that guide action. However, he argues that we need a new cultural 
theory to explain the precise mechanisms through which webs of meaning influence 
human action. In a word, the cultural sociology must employ a theory of culture that 
has built the cultural autonomy into the fabric of the webs of meaning. This paves the 
way for a macrosociological theory that explains how an institutional manifestation of 
the webs of meaning shapes the rules of social organisations that guide action.
865
 
Alexander calls for a Structural Hermeneutics approach to the cultural sociology. The 
approach employs a hermeneutically reconstruction of the webs of meaning and 
analyses the culture as the webs of meaning that is underpinned by signs and symbols 
that are in patterned relationships, i.e., the structural patterns that can be translated 
into formal models applicable across cultural boundaries.  
     Against this background, the programme of building an open global society 
requires an investigation of how a cultural exchange of the webs of meaning among 
world civilizations, in particular regarding their radically different conceptions of 
human nature and models of social order can take shape. More importantly, how such 
an inter-civilisational dialogue can construct a global collective subjectivity, which is 
principally capable of shaping the rules of global organisation.  
     The development of a strong cultural sociology of open global society needs to 
explore how the civilisational units of contemporary world order can be investigated 
due to their potential for a rational exchange of their webs of meaning in order to 
build a globally shared web of meaning on the human nature and social organisation.  
Hence, the programme needs to investigate how world civilisations have historically 
produced and interchanged their webs of meaning and what are possibilities for 
improving this exchange for the creation of a global cultural solidarity.  
     This leads us to the second important theme of our programme: the question of 
how civilisational studies can be integrated in the cultural sociology of globalisation. 
As Johann Arnason argues, Eisenstadt’s civilisational theory has paved the way for an 
application of Alexander’s programme of cultural sociology at an inter-civilisational 
scale.
866
 According to him, “S.N. Eisenstadt’s work represents the most systematic 
attempt to theorize the civilizational dimension of the social-historical world. In this 
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case, civilizational perspectives are crucial to a comprehensive restructuring of 
sociological theory…”867 As argued in chapter 8, Eisenstadt’s theoretical project of a 
civilisational turn in macrosociological theory emphasises that, “central analytical 
core of the concept of civilization …is the combination of ontological or cosmological 
visions of transmundane and mundane reality, with the definition, construction and 
regulation of the major arenas of social life and interaction.”868 This account of 
civilisation leads us to explore how a rational exchange of the webs of meaning 
regarding civilisations’ world-views of the human nature and social organisation may 
lead to a new socially constructed global subjectivity, which provides the required 
moral substance for realising global democracy and justice at the core of global social 
organisation.  
     Our scientific research programme calls for a comparative historical research on 
actual variations in the operation of reason and rationale systems across civilisations 
in order to explore how competing accounts of rationality themselves have played a 
key epistemic function in the formation of civilisational world-views and webs of 
meaning. As Donald Nielsen remarks, “we still lack a full historical and sociological 
analysis of the ideas and institutions connected with the various notions themselves of 
reason, rationale, rationalization... .” 869 Viewed from this perspective, the third major 
theme of the programme can be an exploration of the question of how competing 
systems of rationale have affected the nature of the existing cultural dialogue among 
world civilisations and what are reasonable potentials for the emergence of a globally 
shared standard of rationality and rational dialogue. Similar to the Building Global 
Democracy programme, conducting regional and civilisational case studies regarding 
this theme would be an effective way for addressing the above question.   
     The fourth theme of our research programme can be defined based on the need for 
an investigation of how cultural crystallisations across civilisations have shaped their 
macro-societal institutional trajectories. A global application of this investigation may 
lead the research programme to new causal explanation of the interplay between the 
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cultural dialogue among civilisations and building global democracy and social 
justice. Wittrock discusses the full potential of research on an interplay between 
cultural crystallisations and the emergence of macro-institutional trajectories across 
world civilisations. He suggests “the term cultural crystallization to denote periods of 
fundamental reconceptualisations of positions on these phenomenological dimensions, 
leading to basic reconfigurations or reassertions of macro-institutional practices.”870 
On a global scale, our research programme should explore how a new fundamental 
reconceptualisation of positions about the equality of human beings-- which should be 
constructed through a rational dialogue of civilisations-- can affect the emergence of 
the global institutions of democracy and justice. If world civilisations do not change 
their different accounts of rationality, human nature and social organisation, can they 
arrive at a socially constructed subjectivity concerning a set of people-centric global 
institutions?  
      The Building Open Global Society programme should explore the potentials of the 
interplay between an inter-civilisational reconceptualisation of positions regarding 
human rationality, the equality of persons and a people-centric social organisation on 
the one hand and a fundamental institutional transition from the existing liberal global 
governance towards the social institutions of open global society on the other hand. 
The mechanisms of the interplay between cultural reconfiguration and institutional 
change can be investigated in the context of the five layers of a critical rationalist 
ideal type of global social learning. The functions of each layer and their interactions 
must be subjected to deeper investigations by the research programme.  
     Critical Rationalism, as a meta-civilisational theory of rationality provides our 
research programme with a new micro-foundation for the formulation of a cultural 
sociology of open global society. However, the programme requires exploring how a 
critical rationalist theory of human action can be systematically integrated into the 
very fabric of a theory of global culture, which aims to build the autonomy of global 
culture as motors of global social change towards an open global society. This also 
leads the research programme to rethinking the key role of human agency in micro 
(global citizenship level) and macro (global social movement level) in the context of 
the notions of human’s access to critical rationality and self-liberation through inter-
subjective learning from rational criticism.  
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     As James Farr persuasively argues, “for Popper, understanding—that is, objective 
understanding—is essentially a matter of problem-solving by conjecture and 
refutation. The rational reconstruction of problem-solving takes on this dialectical and 
admittedly oversimplified schema: P1—TT—EE—p2. …Popper claims that problem-
solving by conjecture and refutation is ‘an explanatory theory of human action [or 
human agency]… In this way, Popper forges a systematic and highly suggestive link 
between the theories of science, human action, and interpretive understanding” 
(emphasis added).
871
 As such, the fifth major theme of the research programme could 
be an investigation of how Critical Rationalism, as a conjectural theory of rationality, 
can operate as an explanatory theory of human agency on the micro and the macro 
levels. As noted in chapter 5, David Harper has systematically employed Popper’s 
conjectural theory of knowledge in order to show economic actors, in particular 
economic entrepreneurs, operate as the key agency of the market process.
872
 However, 
we need also a critical rationalist theory of entrepreneurship, as David Harper argues, 
in order to explore how global elites and global social movements can play the key 
agency roles in shaping the processes of an open global society formation. This thesis 
has attempted to internalise Popper’s theory of knowledge in an analytical model of 
human agency through a self-liberation social learning. However, it can be advanced 
to a knowledge-based theory of human agency for addressing the potential agency 
roles of global social movements and the prospective global citizens in the formation 
of a just and free global society.      
     As argued in chapter 9, one of the greatest challenges of the existing collective 
action frames against neo-liberal form of globalisation originates from the lack of a 
globally constructed subjective consensus upon such collective action frames. Hence, 
another major theme of our research programme can be defined as a response to the 
following questions: ‘how can intellectuals use the normative capacity of the ideal 
type of a just and free global society to pave the way for the emergence of a global  
solidarity among people?’ and ‘how can global social movements translate such a 
global cultural solidarity into practical meanings and motivations for the prospective 
global citizens to effectively mobilise their critical rationalist agencies for building an 
open global society of free and equal persons?'   
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      As Robert Fine remarks, “Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right is widely viewed as 
the philosophical origin of modern cosmopolitan thought.”873 Kant referred to his own 
time as an ‘age of enlightenment,’ he did not claim that his time was an enlightened 
age, but rather that enlightenment was the intellectual project of his age— its social 
imaginary.
874
 Fine writes: 
The age of cosmopolitanism may be understood analogously: more a 
philosophical perspective for viewing the potentialities of our age and acting 
ethically within it, than an objective characterisation of the age itself. It might 
be helpful to say … that the cosmopolitan outlook expresses a new 
‘imaginary community’ in the minds of men and women that does have 
actually existing references but whose virtual existence transcends anything 
yet established in fact (emphasis added).
875
  
     The ideal type of open global society presents a Kantian-inspired cosmopolitan 
outlook, as a ‘global imaginary community’, for viewing the potentialities of our 
access to critical rationality and their capabilities for realising a cosmopolitan society 
of free and equal citizens. This thesis introduced an important interplay between 
‘ideas’ like the idea of an imaginary community of free and equal peoples who have 
access to critical rationality and the potentialities of a global fundamental 
organisational change from the competition for power and interests towards a rational 
dialogue, human solidarity, and social cooperation as individuals who regards each 
other as ‘ends’ in themselves. The thesis argued that without a substantive 
epistemological and moral shift from the existing utilitarian and subjective accounts 
of rationality towards an inter-subjective global rationality, we cannot transform legal, 
political, and economic institutions of liberal globality. However, we need much more 
theoretical and applied research to clearly spell out such epistemological and moral 
shifts and their implications for building an open global society.  
      The thesis’s macrosociology of globalisation is an effort to explain how Critical 
Rationalism, as a meta-civilisational theory of human rationality, can contribute to the 
emergence of a multi-civilisational global society of free and equal citizens through a 
rational (open to criticism) dialogue among civilisations. The proposed scientific 
research programme shows how Critical Rationalism’s contributions to Globalisation 
Studies can be advanced through new set of systematic scientific efforts. 
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